

CESRAN - Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis

“Advancing Diversity”

JOURNAL OF GLOBAL ANALYSIS



ISSN 2041-1944

Vol. 1 | No. 2 | 2010

Biannual, Interdisciplinary, Refereed Academic E-Journal

Journal of Global Analysis



Journal of Global Analysis

Editor-in-Chief:

Ozgur TUFEKCI | University of Birmingham, UK

Managing Editor:

Husrev TABAK | UCL, UK

Book Review Editor:

Kadri Kaan RENDA | King's College London, UK

Associate Editors*:

Emel AKCALI, Dr. | University of Birmingham, UK

Mitat CELIKPALA, Assoc. Prof. | Kadir Has University, Turkey

Bayram GUNGOR, Assoc. Prof. | Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey

Editorial Board*:

Sener AKTURK, Dr. | Harvard University, USA

William BAIN, Dr. | Aberystwyth University, UK

Alexander BELLAMY, Prof. | Uni. of Queensland, Aust.

Richard BELLAMY, Prof. | Uni. College London, UK

Andreas BIELER, Prof. | University of Nottingham, UK

Pinar BILGIN, Assoc. Prof. | Bilkent University, Turkey

Ken BOOTH, Prof. | Aberystwyth University, UK

Stephen CHAN, Prof. | SOAS, University of London, UK

Nazli CHOUCRI, Prof. | MIT, USA

John M. DUNN, Prof. | University of Cambridge, UK

Kevin DUNN, Prof. | Hobart and William Smith Col., USA

Mine EDER, Prof. | Bogazici University, Turkey

Ertan EFEGIL, Assoc. Prof. | Sakarya University, Turkey

Ayla GOL, Dr. | Aberystwyth University, UK

Stefano GUZZINI, Prof. | Uppsala Universitet, Sweden

Elif Ince HAFALIR, Assist. Prof. | Carnegie Mellon Un., USA

David HELD, Prof. | London School of Economics, LSE, UK

Raymond HINNEBUSCH, Prof. | Uni. of St Andrews, UK

Naim KAPUCU, Assoc. Prof. | Uni. of Central Florida, USA

Fahri KARAKAYA, Prof. | Uni. of Massach. Dartmouth, USA

Abdulhamit KIRMIZI, Dr. | Istanbul Sehir Uni., Turkey

Cécile LABORDE, Prof. | University College London, UK

Ziya ONIS, Prof. | Koc University, Turkey

Alp OZERDEM, Prof. | Coventry University, UK

Oliver RICHMOND, Prof. | University of St Andrews, UK

Ian TAYLOR, Prof. | University of St Andrews, UK

Murat TUMAY, Dr. | Selcuk University, Turkey

Talat ULUSSEVER, Assist. Prof. | King Fahd Un., S. Arabia

Ali WATSON, Prof. | University of St Andrews, UK

Stefan WOLFF, Prof. | University of Birmingham, UK

Hakan YILMAZKUDAY, Assist. Prof. | Temple Uni., USA

Legal Adviser

Hilal BULUT

Technology Adviser

G. Serdar TOMBUL

University of Sheffield, UK

Graphic Illustration

Zeynep ASLAN

International Advisory Board*:

Yasemin AKBABA, Assist. Prof. | Gettysburg Col., USA

Mustafa AYDIN, Prof. | Kadir Has University, Turkey

Ian BACHE, Prof. | University of Sheffield, UK

Mark BASSIN, Prof. | University of Birmingham, UK

Mehmet DEMIRBAG, Prof. | Uni. of Sheffield, UK

Can ERBIL, Assist. Prof. | Brandeis University, USA

Stephen Van EVERA, Prof. | MIT, USA

John GLASSFORD, Assoc. Prof. | Angelo State Uni., USA

Bulent GOKAY, Prof. | Keele University, UK

Burak GURBUZ, Assoc. Prof. | Galatasaray Uni., Turkey

Tony HERON, Dr. | University of Sheffield, UK

John M. HOBSON, Prof. | University of Sheffield, UK

Jamal HUSEIN, Assist. Prof. | Angelo State Uni., USA

Murat S. KARA, Assoc. Prof. | Angelo State Uni., USA

Michael KENNY, Prof. | University of Sheffield, UK

Gamze G. KONA, Dr. | Foreign Policy Analyst, Turkey

Scott LUCAS, Prof. | University of Birmingham, UK

Christoph MEYER, Dr. | King's College London, UK

Kalypto NICOLAIDIS, Prof. | University of Oxford, UK

Bill PARK, Mr. | King's College London, UK

Jenik RADON, Prof. | Columbia University, USA

Ibrahim SIRKECI, Reader | Regent's College London, UK

Claire THOMAS, Dr. | University of Sheffield, UK

Brian WHITE, Prof. | University of Sheffield, UK

M. Hakan YAVUZ, Assoc. Prof. | University of Utah, USA

Birrol YESILADA, Prof. | Portland State University, USA

Editorial Advisory Board*:

Alper Tolga BULUT | University of Houston, USA

Sen DU | University of Birmingham, UK

Aksel ERSOY | University of Birmingham, UK

David JAROSZWESKI | University of Birmingham, UK

Ali Onur OZCELIK | University of Sheffield, UK

Paul RICHARDSON | University of Birmingham, UK

Duygu UCKUN | Columbia University, USA

Abdullah UZUN | Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey

Cover Illustration

MAJOR Design Workshop



The Journal of Global Analysis is published on behalf of the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN) as bi-annual academic e-journal. The articles are brought into use via the website of CESRAN (www.cesran.org). CESRAN and the Editors of the Journal of Global Analysis do not expect that readers of the review will sympathise with all the sentiments they find, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, which appears in the Journal of Global Analysis.

* The surnames are listed in alphabetical order.

Indexing & Abstracting

- Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO)
- EBSCO Publishing Inc.
- EconPapers
- IDEAS
- Index Islamicus
- International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR)
- International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBZ)
- International Relations and Security Network (ISN)
- Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature
- Research Papers in Economics (RePEc)
- Social Sciences Information Space (SOCIONET)
- Ulrich's Periodicals Directory



TABLE OF CONTENTS

Articles

111

The Sociolinguistics of a Nollywood Movie

Dr. Emmanuel Adedayo Adedun

139

Turkey's Increasing Role in Afghanistan

Muharrem EKSI

153

Risk Politicization Strategies in EU Migration and Asylum Policies

Maria Ferreira

Book Reviews

185

Janne Haaland Matlary

European Union Security Dynamics: In the New National Interest

188

John N. Paden

Faith and Politics in Nigeria: Nigeria as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World

193

Mark Bevir

Democratic Governance



CESRAN SARAM

STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR VE ANALİZ MERKEZİ - SARAM
CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS - CESRAN

www.cesran.org

Journal of Global Analysis

The Sociolinguistics of a Nollywood Movie

Dr. Emmanuel Adedayo Adedun*

Recent trends in sociolinguistic study (Bleichenbacher 2008, Heller 2008, Coupland 2007, Lippi-Green 1997) have focused on the understanding of the ideologies that underpin linguistic variation and how linguistic behaviour in a multilingual setting makes people reveal both their personal identity and their search for social role (Le Page and Tabourett-Keller 1985). Language scholars have interrogated these issues more in face- to-face interaction than in fictional contexts. The movie as a genre of fictional study has been found to be the 'most apt medium to represent the richness and complexity of real-life multilingual realities' (Bleichenbacher, 21).

This article examines the dominance of English in Nollywood movies and the language ideology that is responsible. The semiotic processes of linguistic differentiation developed by Irvine and Gal (2000) and Mares' (2003) classificatory strategies for the analysis of multilingual texts provide the framework for the case study of a Yoruba movie in which there is a preponderance of English switching. Also, the distribution of languages in which filmmakers produce their movies in Nigeria indicates that English is dominant. Even when a movie is produced in the local Nigerian language, English words and expressions still feature prominently. The article consequently argues that the dominance of English in Nollywood movies is linguistic as the power relation between English and Nigerian languages is disproportionate. The local and global implications of this are then examined.

Keywords: Sociolinguistics, Nollywood, Movies, Multilingualism, Language Ideology, Linguist.

Dr. Emmanuel Adedayo Adedun
Department of English
University of Lagos
Akoka – Yaba
Lagos, Nigeria

e-mail: eaadedun@yahoo.co.uk; adedun.emmanuel@kcl.ac.uk

* Dr. Emmanuel Adedayo Adedun is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of English, University of Lagos and Visiting Scholar in Centre for Language, Discourse and Communication at King's College London. His research interests are Sociolinguistics and application of sociolinguistic insights to advertising and film. His teaching and research experience spans one and a half decades.





CESRAN SARAM

STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR VE ANALİZ MERKEZİ - SARAM
CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS - CESRAN

www.cesran.org

The Sociolinguistics of a Nollywood Movie¹

Introduction

This article demonstrates that the use of English in Nigerian (Nollywood) movies is linguicist. *Linguicism* is a terminology coined by Phillipson to depict “ideologies, structures, and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate, and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of language”.² In recent time, language scholars have focused on the functional and insightful benefits that sociolinguistic study can offer to the understanding of multilingual communities and the assumptions that govern the language choice of individuals. This has prompted the assertion that ‘when individual people shift their ways of speaking... they do it... in predictable ways that are amenable to social explanation’³. Language scholars have analysed language ideology in different ways but none seems to have disagreed with the view that it is the study of how languages and linguistic styles or features come to have given social and political meanings⁴. Lukas Bleichenbacher studied multilingualism in Hollywood movies and found that multilingualism is not considered to be a universal and mainstream phenomenon as his study indicated that movie dialogues were conducted mainly in English with minor and skeletal occurrence of other languages.⁵ He outlined a framework for the description and interpretation of how multilingual practices are represented in contemporary mainstream Hollywood movies while noting that his findings and conclusions strictly applied to multilingualism in Europe and America but that “the insights gained from the work can be tested against the evidence from different sociolinguistic settings”. This study therefore attempts to validate these findings in Nigerian context where English is used as a second language. Bleichenbacher’s study focused on the use of other languages in a context that is almost entirely English i.e. L1 English context where movie actors are native speakers. This is in contradistinction with the Nigerian situation. In spite of so many local languages in Nigeria and in spite of the fact that English is a second language, the language dominates movie production

1 This article has been made possible by the fund made available by the Central Research Unit of the University of Lagos and the kind permission granted to me by Prof. Ben Rampton and Dr. Jannis Androsopolous to benefit from the scholarly inspiration of the Centre for Language, Discourse and Communication, King’s College, University of London.

2 Robert Phillipson, *Linguistic Imperialism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 47.

3 Nikolas Coupland, *Style: Language Variation and Identity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. ix.

4 J. Irvine, and S. Gal, “Language Ideology and Linguistic Differentiation”, P. V. Kroskrity, (ed.), *Regimes of Language: Ideologies, Politics, and Identities*, Santa Fe, School of American Research Press, 2000, pp. 35-83.

5 Lukas Bleichenbacher, *Multilingualism in the Movies. Hollywood Characters and Their Language Choices*, Tübingen, Narr Francke Attempto, Verlag, 2008.



in the country. Thus, this study examines the use of English and indigenous languages in the production of Nollywood movies and how the languages are made to index social practices.

Nollywood refers to the Nigerian film industry; the name being an adaptation of its American counterpart, Hollywood. But unlike Hollywood, Nollywood is a recent phenomenon, barely one and a half decades old. In spite of its age, the industry has made an astronomical stride and has secured global attention for itself having been declared as the world's second largest producer of film by the United Nations⁶.

The popularity of Nollywood films can be traced not just to the people of African descent but also to Europe, America and the Caribbean where the films are "hawked"⁷. This popularity has resulted into insightful comments from scholars. John McCall underscores this when he says "... it's hard not to get excited about the Nigerian video industry, ...the video industry has laid the groundwork for what might be called the Nigerian Dream – a genuine opportunity for legitimate financial success and even celebrity, open to just about anyone with talent and imagination"⁸. Nollywood filmmakers have applied their talent and imagination to both historical and contemporary issues as reflected in diverse themes of their movies. The themes range from religion to governance, from crime to adventure and from rural/urban living to campaigns against social vices like AIDS, corruption, prostitution, etc. These are produced as common video genres like horror, comedy, urban legend, mythic parable, romance, witchcraft, melodrama, Christian morality tale and historical epic.

The aim of this article is to analyse the language choice of film makers in Nigeria in the context of English and indigenous languages and to interpret the language ideology that governs the choice. The multilingual character of Nigeria is reflected in all aspects of the national life, including film making. It is thus interest-provoking to discover how the languages that are available in Nigeria, including English, are deployed in film making. Of equal interest is the power relationship between the languages used in movie production with particular focus on the overt and covert power equation between English and Nigerian languages. When characters are made to speak English in a context of Yoruba (or any other indigenous language) interaction, it is assumed that the film maker has chosen that medium consciously or unconsciously to achieve certain ideological objectives. Also, the use of code-switching by characters is also ideologically significant. It is desirable to know the ideological underpinning of codeswitching in Nollywood movies especially as English is observed to be at the centre of this phenomenon.

Language in Fictional Studies

The scope of language studies in fictional texts has been expanded beyond form and style in monolingual texts. Considerations of language use in fiction now entail

6 United Nations, "Nigeria Surpasses Hollywood", Scoop Independent News, www.scoop.co.nz. (Accessed 05 June 2009), p. 1.

7 Ekwenchi, Ogochukwu, Popular Fiction Television Production in Nigeria: Global Models, Local Responses. Unpublished Ph.d Thesis, London, University of Westminster, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2008. p. 7.

8 John C. McCall, "Nollywood Confidential: The Unlikely Rise of Nigerian video Film", *Transition*, 95, 13, 1, pp. 98 – 109.



a critical examination of the languages that are present, signalled or even absent in a work of art as these have a set of assumptions guiding them. In other words, the study of fictional language now goes beyond language-internal variation and now includes textual multilingualism. When a text is produced in only one language, it is believed that monolingual ideologies – linguistic attachment, cultural patriotism, etc. - underly it⁹. In the same vein, a multilingual text is also believed to have its own set of assumptions governing it – identity, linguistic heterogeneity, etc.¹⁰ Mares identified four classificatory strategies for the analysis of multilingual discourse in fictional texts.¹¹ These are elimination, evocation, signalization, and presence. The strategy of *elimination* permits the writer to replace the speech of a character that would have been in another language with an unmarked standard variety of the base language or the language of communication. For instance in fiction, a writer may enact the dialogue between an English character and a Yoruba character in English. Automatically, Yoruba is eliminated. This strategy does not allow the audience to know that the other language is replaced unless other issues of plausibility crop up.

Evocation is a strategy used by writers to make characters speak a variety of base language that is characterized by interference or transfer phenomenon. For instance, the author of an English text can make a Yoruba character speak English that is marked with Yoruba accent or filled with Yoruba mixing. The use of L2 accent for evocation has an advantage in movies over written texts as there is no risk of violations of orthography¹². *Signalization* is a strategy that permits the viewer to make an intelligent guess of replaced languages. Well-known landmarks and sociolinguistic inferences of geographical settings are the major tools of signalization. Viewers may link the flag of Japan with Japanese language or the name “Hitler” with German language and use this as an evidence of language exclusion in a movie. The last strategy for the analysis of multilingual discourse in fictional texts is *presence* which allows the multilingual reality to be enacted in fiction. The characters are made to display their multilingualism individually and the multilingual character of the society is also depicted. The contact situations that are responsible for multilingualism are plausibly captured in fiction as characters are carefully represented in their languages. When the strategy of presence is used, it is expected that the audience too will be multilingual in the languages that feature in the fiction. Otherwise, the problem of comprehension will arise. However, one of the ways of tackling the comprehension problem is translation. In movies, comprehension is enhanced by the multiple, overlapping signifiers of the images that underlie the dialogue and by the option of a written translation in subtitles¹³.

9 Krennitz, Georg, *Mehrsprachigkeit in der Literatur: Wie Autoren ihre Sprachen Wahlen*, Wien, Edition Prasens, 2004.

10 Ludi, Georges, “Le ‘melange de langues’ comme moyen stylistique et/ou comme Marqueur d appartenance dans le discours litteraire”, in J. Bem and A. Hudlett, *Ecrire aux Confins des Langues*, Mulhouse, Centre de Recherche sur l’Europe litteraire, 2001.

11 Mares, P. , “Mnogojazycznaja komunikacija I kinofil’ m, in Rossijskaja Akade-mija Nauk (ed.) *Jazyk kak Stredstvo Transljacii Kul’tury*. Moskva, Nauka, 2000.

12 Bleichenbacher, p. 25.

13 Sarah Kozloff, *Overhearing Film Dialogue*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002, p. 25; Brigitta Busch. *Sprachen im Disput: Medien und Offentlichkeit in multilingualen Gesellschaften*, Klagenfurt/Ce-lovec, Drava, 2004.



The extent to which the study of filmic language approximates reality or language studies in face-to-face interaction is a major issue in fictional discourse. Kozloff anticipates this when he points out that fictional (filmic) representations may be regarded as being “too carefully polished, too rhythmically balanced (and), too self-consciously artful”. However, researchers have argued that the benefits derived from fictional and media studies are indeed crucial to lived reality and existence as they contend that studying the language of fiction (film) approximates reality and interrogates it. Linguistic study of fiction can reveal “unconsciously-adhered-to-assumptions” which constitute the strategy speakers use to generally formulate verbal interaction.¹⁴ Coupland is of the opinion that fictional conversation “can sometimes reveal social processes more clearly than lived reality”¹⁵. Pable considers the study of fictional conversation to be a major source for the study of language ideology and stereotyping.¹⁶ Researchers have used different approaches to understand the language ideology that underlies stereotypes. Angela Reyes focuses on how widely circulating stereotypes can serve as resources for interactional identity construction and diverse social actions¹⁷. Jane Hill explores the hidden racism in “Mock Spanish” and shows how it exemplifies a strategy of dominant groups which she calls “incorporation”¹⁸. By “incorporation”, she means the expropriation of desirable resources, both material and symbolic, by members of the dominant group from the minority group. Through this practice, both the cultural and mental facilities are utilized to legitimate the exclusion of the minority from the resources that are reserved for the majority.

The process of incorporation also operates in Nigeria and reflects in Nollywood movies. Characters are depicted in a way that makes them show positive attitude to “whiteness” and permits them to relegate home-grown resources, both material and symbolic, to the background. This kind of practice in which Nigerians indicate preference for white values at the expense of local choices, including language choice, is what Coupland has described as “sociolinguistic styling”, a means by which people have an avenue to understand social identities and social relationships.¹⁹

Irvine and Gal propounded three semiotic processes “by which people construct ideological representations of linguistic differences”.²⁰ These are iconization, fractal recursivity and erasure. Iconization refers to a process where the sign relationship between linguistic features and the social images with which they are linked is transformed and the linguistic features are made to depict social group’s inherent nature or essence in a way that is iconic. Fractal recursivity is a term used to describe

14 E.S. Tan, *Emotion and the Structure of Narrative Film: Film as an Emotion Machine*, Mahwah, Lawrence Erlbaum, 1996.

15 Nikolas Coupland, “Stylised Deception”, in Adam Jaworski et al. (eds.), *Metalanguage: Social and Ideological Perspectives*, Berlin, Mouton de Gruyter, 2004, p. 258.

16 A. Pable, “Archaische Dialekte im Vergleich: Das Fruhamerikanische in filmischen Adaptionen von Nathaniel Hawthorne’s *The Scarlet Letter* und Arthur Miller’s *The Crucible*”, in I. Helin, (ed.) *Dialektubersetzung und Dialekte in Multimedia*, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2004.

17 Luis Reyes and Peter Rubie, *Hispanics in Hollywood: An Encyclopedia of Film Television*, New York, Garland Publishing, 1994.

18 Jane Hill, “Mock Spanish, Covert Racism, and the (Leaky) Boundary Between Public and Private Spheres”, Roxy Harris and Ben Rampton (eds.), *The Language, Ethnicity and Race Reader*, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 11
Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977.

19 Coupland, 2007, p. 30.

20 J. Irvine and S. Gal, pp. 37-52.



the projection of an internal opposition to some other level which may be external. For example, the suspicion among Nigerian languages arising from the competition about which of them should be chosen to perform official functions might lead to the encouragement that English should function without any hindrance in every aspect of the national life. Erasure is a term used to indicate a strategy of rendering some persons or activities, e.g. sociolinguistic phenomena, invisible by ignoring or glossing over facts that are inconsistent with an ideological scheme.

Irvine and Gal applied these processes to different sociolinguistic settings, ethno-linguistic data and multilingual societies. An example is their description of the "complex and multilingual sociolinguistic landscape of Macedonia". They found that the different linguistic groups that lay claim to the Macedonian territory use the strategy of erasure to omit aspects which are not in tandem with their interest. Other scholars have also successfully applied the theory. Blackledge adapted the theory to demonstrate and criticize how "a lack of English, and a failure to encourage others to speak English, are iconically associated with the presupposed oppressive, regressive values and practices of Asian men"²¹. Also, Kelly-Homes applied it to multilingualism in advertising discourse²². She discovered that advertising is replete with instances of "fake multilingualism" and that "ethnocentrism" is the underlying ideology behind the use of many languages in a piece of advertisement. In the same vein, Jaworski, et al studied language choice in British TV holiday programmes to show the way other languages apart from English are used "to enhance the entertainment level for the television viewer rather than to serve any other communicative need"²³. Lippi-Green analyzed a corpus of 371 characters in a quantitative study of Disney films to examine the relationship between negative characterization and the use of non-standard accent or foreign language (a language other than English).²⁴ He found a correlation between negative depiction and characters that either speak foreign languages or non-standard English. On the other hand, there was a correlation between the depiction of good characters and monolingual speakers of English or characters that speak standard English. Bleichenbacher also used the theory to study the language choices of Hollywood characters.²⁵ Although his findings neither supported nor rejected the claim that there is linguisticism in Hollywood movies, it "shows that an unhibited preference for multilingualism is far from being a universal and mainstream phenomenon, at least in the Western world". The present researcher also adopts the theory in an attempt to understand multilingualism in Nollywood movies. The fact that it has been successfully adapted by similar studies encouraged this choice.

Therefore, this study adopts both Mares' classificatory strategies for the analysis of multilingual discourse in fictional texts and Irvine and Gal's ideological representations

21 Adrian Blackledge, "Constructions of Identity in Political Discourse in Multilingual Britain", Aneta Pavlenko and Adrian Blackledge (eds.), *Negotiations of Identities in Multilingual Contexts*, Clevedon, Multilingual Matters, 2004.

22 Kelly-Homes, Helen, *Advertising as Multilingual Communication*, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

23 Adam Jaworski et al. (eds.), *Metalanguage: Social and Ideological Perspectives*, Berlin, Mouton de Gruyter, 2004, p. 21.

24 Rosina Lippi-Green, *English with an Accent: Language, Ideology, and Discrimination in the United States*, USA, Routledge, 1997, pp. 63-76.

25 Bleichenbacher, p. 12.



of linguistic differences because of the similarity of their propositions and relevance to the present study. While fractal recursivity and iconization are equivalent in various ways to evocation, signalization and presence, erasure is similar to elimination.

The Data

The data for this study are of two types. The first is made up of statistics obtained from the Nigerian Film and Video Censorship Board (NFVCB) which provides information about the films and languages in which they were produced between November, 2007 and October, 2008²⁶. The period represents the latest official statistics on movie production released by NFVCB. The second is a case study in which a Yoruba film, *Jenifa* was selected for analysis.²⁷ This choice was motivated by five factors. First, the film is a box office success. Its popularity cuts across geographical location as evidenced by different category of people that have accessed it on the internet. What this means is that the nuances contained in the film have been sufficiently disseminated to the public and the public has been made to share the socio-cultural sentiments and language ideology that are present there. Second, it is a recent film, produced in 2008. Thus, it provides up-to-date information about the current state of multilingualism and language use in Nollywood movies. Third, the film is a recipient of the African Movie Academy Awards for best indigenous film in Nigeria which underscores the positive assessment of the film and further raises awareness about its popularity and acceptance. Fourth, the film typifies the use of local language by educated Nigerians whose language of education is English, and provides evidence of how this multilingual knowledge is displayed in the course of interaction in the local language. Moreover, the film was chosen because of the topicality of its theme, prostitution and AIDS, which has been a subject of international concern and action. Finally, the film was selected for analysis because it depicts the multilingual situation in Nigeria and also represents several other Nollywood movies that feature urban/educated language use.

Nollywood movies are produced in English and Nigerian indigenous languages made up of three major languages – Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba – and more than 500 other minority languages. According to the 2006 national census, the population of Nigeria is about one hundred and forty million five hundred and forty two²⁸. However, the 2009 estimate puts the population at 149,229,090 million. Growth rate is 1.9%; birth rate is 36.6/1000; mortality rate is 94.3/1000 while the life expectancy rate is 46.9.²⁹ Nigeria is one of the most linguistically diverse regions of the world, with over 500 languages. The number of languages currently estimated in Nigeria is 521. This number includes 510 living languages, two second languages without native speakers and 9 extinct languages³⁰. The official language of Nigeria is English while the indigenous languages are classified into three. The first being the three major Nigerian languages classified in terms of number of speakers – Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba. The second group

26 Nigerian Film and Video Censorship Board, Federal Ministry of Information, Abuja, 2008.

27 Funke Akindele, *Jenifa*, dir.: Myyhddeen Ayinde, Olasco Films Nigeria Limited, 2008

28 Official Gazette (FGP 71/52007/2,500 (OL24): Legal Notice on Publication of the Details of the Breakdown of the 2006 Nigerian Census

29 <http://www.nigeriastate.gov.ng>

30 David Crozier and Roger Blench, *An Index of Nigerian Languages*, Dallas. SIL 2nd ed., 1992



is made up of nine relatively less widely spoken, state/regional languages, namely – Edo, Efik, Ibibio, Fulfulde, Ijaw, Kanuri, Nupe, Tiv and Urhobo. They are also known as “network languages” because they are used in announcing national and state news originally broadcast in English. The third group consists of other local languages which are mostly spoken in small districts or local government authorities within some states³¹. The historical processes underlying Nigeria’s linguistic diversity remain poorly understood and a rapidly increasing research base makes continuous updating quite essential.³² The linguistic diversity in Nigeria is a microcosm of Africa as a whole, encompassing three major African language families: the Nilo-Saharan, Afro-Asiatic and the Niger-Congo. The representation of English relative to local Nigerian languages in the production of Nollywood movies and the language ideology that governs it are the focal points of this article.

Analytical Frame-work

Five major procedures were designed for the purpose of analysis. The first accounts for the frequency of movie production in English and each of the Nigerian local languages within the study period i.e. within 2007/2008 calendar year. This enables me to assess the extent of deployment of English and other Nigerian languages in the production of Nollywood movies.

Procedure two to five are designed to socio-linguistically analyse multilingualism in *Jenifa* and determine the extent of deployment of English in the movie. In Procedure two, attention is given to language use in each of the scenes. Through this, I am able to account for the pattern of multilingual behaviour in the film world. In Procedure three, I focus on the characters’ use of language in order to understand how individual characters respond to the multilingual situation created in the film and the possible factors that condition their response. The fourth Procedure is a socio-demographic analysis of multilingualism in the dialogues of the characters according to their gender, age and occupation. This makes it possible for me to interpret the sociolinguistic factors that account for the characters’ linguistic behaviour. In each of the Procedures, effort is made to analyze the languages that are present, evoked, signalled and eliminated.

Languages Of Nollywood Movies

Table 1 below shows the details of the languages in which filmmakers produced Nollywood movies from November 2007 to October 2008. As earlier noted, this period was chosen because it was the latest statistics available with the Nigerian Film and Video Censors’ Board, the official watchdog of movie production in Nigeria, and my desire to base this study on current data made the period in which the statistics apply attractive. The statistics is significant in the sense that it accounts for the deployment of languages in Nollywood within the context of multilingual Nigeria.

31 Emmanuel A. Adedun , “Linguistic Plurality and Language Policy Decision in Nigeria” , C. S. Momoh & Jim Unah (eds.), *Nigerian Integrative Discourse: Vol. V, Intergroup Tensions*. Lagos: Faculty of Arts, University of Lagos, 2006, pp. 68-91

32 Roger Blench, “The Linguistic Geography of Nigeria and its Implications for Prehistory”, Kpppe verlag Koln, 2009, pp. 187-206.



Table 1: Nollywood Movies And Their Languages Of Production

LANGUAGE	NUMBER	PERCENTAGE
ENGLISH	436	37.36
YORUBA	623	53.38
HAUSA	67	5.74
BINI	37	3.17
IBIBIO	1	0.08
EFIK	1	0.08
TOTAL	1167	100

Source: Annual Report of Nigerian Film and Video Censors' Board

The table clearly indicates the level of multilingualism in the Nigerian movie industry within the study period. Six languages were used for film production consisting of English and five indigenous languages. This means that only six languages used in movie production are present while over five hundred indigenous languages are not represented in recent Nollywood productions.

It can be seen from the table that English language accounted for 37.36 percent of the total films produced in Nigeria within the study period. This was second only to the films produced in Yoruba which accounted for 53.38 percent of the total films produced within the same period. Hausa accounted for 5.74 percent, Bini 3.17 percent while Ibibio and Efik each accounted for 0.08 percent. It is significant to note that of the three major languages in Nigeria, Igbo is the only language that did not feature in film production within the study period. This may be due to the fact that Igbo ethnic tradition and world-view find expression in English language motivated by the desire to reach a wider audience. Therefore, the films produced by Igbo producers within this period are in English. According to Haynes and Okome, “the Igbo videos are the expression of an aggressive commercial mentality, whose field of activity is Nigeria’s cities – and not only the Igbo cities”.³³ In comparison, Yoruba language has become a veritable vehicle of producing films reflective of the cosmology, culture and tradition of the Yoruba people. In the words of Jonathan Haynes and Onookome Okome, “ the Yoruba video repertoire has expanded beyond the genres of village idylls, traditional religious dramas, juju contests, and farcical comedy that dominated Yoruba travelling theatre films and early videos....” Before the advent of Nollywood, film production in Yoruba had been very popular and it dated back to the 1960’s . The interest of the people to project their culture and worldview through their language is still evident in this statistics. However, the data shows that film production in Hausa language is very scanty. Haynes and Okome (as cited) explain that the culture of producing film in the language is “emergent”. Again, out of the three major languages – Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba – and over 500 minority languages in Nigeria, there were only five indigenous languages that featured in film production within the study period. The minority share of film production within the study period was 3.34 percent out of which Bini language accounted for 3.17 percent, that is 94.88 percent of the total film

33 Haynes, Jonathan and Okoome, Onookome (eds.), Nigerian Video Film, Jos, Kraft Books Limited, 1997, p. 35.



production in minority languages. Does it mean that speakers of all the remaining languages do not engage in film production? Not exactly. Film production by speakers of these languages may have been done in English so that the *film* can circulate beyond their shores. English thus becomes the language of wider communication in movie production not only for the minority languages but also for the major ethnic groups in Nigeria. I have already mentioned how speakers of Igbo may have made all their movies within the study period in English. The fact that the statistics presented Yoruba as the language of highest film production within the study period is not an indication that it is free from multilingual influences, especially as motivated by the nuances of English. How Nigerian movies are influenced by multilingual practices is the focus of the next section which uses a popular and an award-winning movie produced in Yoruba, *Jenifa*, as a case study.

A Sociolinguistic Analysis Of Jenifa

Jenifa (2008) was written by Funke Akindele and directed by Myyhddeen Ayinde

*It is a story of a village bumpkin, Suliat, whose desire to live an ostentatious city life leads her into campus prostitution which eventually consumes her. The process of becoming a "big girl" is tortuous for her as she finds the aura of importance and self-esteem she brings from the village bruised time over time. She learns from the three "refined" city girls that adopt and give her the necessary campus orientation that her cherished brash ways are uncouth and vulgar and do not fit into their desperate quest for social relevance and financial security. "Through the protagonist, Jenifa, whose name is a corruption of the Anglo-Saxon 'Jennifer', the movie succeeds in meandering through a potent mine-field of well-worn clichés and easily- recognizable situations, ending up as a box-office success, the kind of which has not been seen in Nigeria in recent times"*³⁴.

Analysis Of Languages Used According To Scenes

There are 68 scenes in the movie but I have added the post-production clip because of the significance of its language. Six possibilities of language choice and combination were created to account for linguistic behaviour in the scenes. These are Yoruba, English, Yoruba-English, English-Yoruba, Yoruba/Other-Nigerian-Language, and English/Other-Languages. The option of Yoruba-English is to account for scenes where Yoruba is the major language used and where there is also a preponderance of English words and expressions. On the other hand, the option of English-Yoruba accounts for the scenes where English is the major language of discussion with occasional use of Yoruba words and expressions. Yoruba/Other-Nigerian-Language option accounts for the scenes where Yoruba language co-occurs with other Nigerian language while the option of English/Other-Languages handles the possibility of having a scene dominated by English and interspersed with other language(s). The extent of occurrence of each of these possibilities is assessed on a three dimensional scale of high, medium and low. A

34 Wole Oguntokun, "Movie Review: Nigerian Playwright Deconstructs Nollywood's 'Jenifa', – AfricanLoft – <http://www.africanloft.com> – (Accessed 30 May 2009), p. 1.



scene is rated “high” if all the characters converse in the same possibility of language or language combination. The rating is “medium” if most of the characters converse in the same language or combination of languages in a scene. The “low” rating is applied to the possibility of the use of a language or language combination where there are just flashes of another language other than the main language of communication. Table 2 shows the occurrence of each of these possibilities in the movie. It indicates the languages that are used in each of the scenes, the nature and the extent of their combination where ‘extent’ refers to the three dimensional possibilities of ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’ occurrences of language choice.

Table 2: Language Use Options According To Scenes

SCENE	SETTNG	YOR	ENG	YOR/ENG	ENG/YOR	YOR/ONL	ENG/OL	EXTENT
1	Village	X						High
1	Campus			X				High
3	Campus			X				High
4	Campus			X				High
5	Home			X				Low
6	Market						X	High
7	Hotel			X				High
8	Campus			X				High
9	Campus			X				High
10	Campus			X				High
11	Campus			X				High
12	Campus			X				High
13	Village	X						High
14	Home			X				High
15	Campus			X				Medium
16	Home			X				Medium
17	Hotel			X				High
18	Campus			X				High
19	Bar			X				High
20	Campus			X				High
21	Campus			X				Low
22	Campus			X				High
23	Campus			X				High
24	Campus			X				High
25	Campus			X				High
26	PartyHall			X				High
27	Hotel		X					High
28	PartyHall			X				High
29	Campus			X				Low
30	Campus			X				High



SCENE	SETTNG	YOR	ENG	YOR/ENG	ENG/YOR	YOR/ONL	ENG/OL	EXTENT
31	Campus						X	High
32	Campus			X				High
33	Campus			X				High
34	Home			X				High
35	Party			X				High
36	PoliceStation			X				High
37	Campus			X				High
38	Campus			X				High
39	Campus			X				High
40	Office			X				High
41	Home			X				High
42	Panel			X				High
43	Campus			X				High
44	Campus			X				High
45	Campus			X				High
46	Campus			X				High
47	Garage			X				High
48	Market						X	High
49	Village			X				Low
50	Village			X				Low
51	Office			X				High
52	Home			X				High
53	RoadSide			X				High
54	Home			X				High
55	Home			X				High
56	Restaurant			X				Low
57	Home			X				High
58	Hotel			X				High
59	Home			X				High
60	Home			X				High
61	Hospital			X				High
62	Home			X				High
63	Bar			X				High
64	Home			X				High
65	Hospital			X				High
66	Hospital			X				High
67	Hospital			X				High
68	Village			X				Low
69	PostProductn		X					High

**Table 3:** Options Of Language Use In Scenes According To Percentage Of Occurrence

LANGUAGE POSSIBILITIES	NUMBER OF OCCURRENCE IN SCENES	PERCENTAGE TOTAL
YORUBA	2	2.90
ENGLISH	1	2.90
YORUBA-ENGLISH	62	89.86
ENGLISH-YORUBA	-	0.00
YORUBA/Other Nig. Lang	-	0.00
ENGLISH/Other-Lang	3	4.35
TOTAL	69	100

In the movie, there are only two scenes where Yoruba is wholly used. It is significant to note that the two scenes are set in the village where the characters are depicted to be illiterate farmers. Two scenes are recorded as having used English as a language of communication. One of them is an advertisement that appears in-between acts of the film. This raises the issue of motive and target audience. The fact that *Jenifa* is classified as a Yoruba movie makes one to anticipate that it will target Yoruba audience, both bilingual and monolingual. But when there are instances where English is exclusively used, the monolingual Yoruba audience is automatically cut off. This may be a strategy to signal the motive of the producer. This motive is made clearer by the fact that pre- and post-production information (about producer, director, writer, persons who played various roles in the making of the movie, etc.) is written in English. This suggests that there is a point to be proved about language preference and target audience. There is no doubt at all that the movie is not directed at a monolingual Yoruba audience as 62 scenes representing 89.86 percent of the total scenes in the movie contain heavy mixture of Yoruba and English. The co-occurrence of English and Yoruba cuts across the settings of the movie – campus, home, hotel, bar, party hall, police station, garage, office, road side, restaurant, hospital and even the village as there are two other instances of Yoruba-English usage, though of a low degree. (Pidgin) English/Other Nigerian language (Igbo) is used twice in the market when the protagonist goes to buy used clothes. *Jenifa*, the Yoruba buyer, speaks (Pidgin) English to Bobo Ibo, the Igbo seller and Bobo Ibo also responds in English but with Igbo (Ibo) interjections: “Asa nwa ima na idike” (Pretty girl, you know you are very strong). The movie does not make it clear whether *Jenifa* understands the interjections or not but they are not strong enough to distort the flow of communication, even if she does not. This is very real in the sense that used cloth business is associated with the Igbo in Nigeria and market language or informal buying and selling is done in Pidgin (English).

The Multilingual Behaviour Of Characters

There are 105 characters in all that are featured in the movie. Only thirty two of them engage in the movie dialogue (the focus of this section). The rest appear as extras. There are four major characters, *Jenifa* (the protagonist), and her mentors -Becky, Tracy and Franca – who provide the platform for interaction and it is with them that the remaining 28 characters relate either collectively or individually. The task here is

to analyze the speeches of the 32 characters with a view to identifying the patterns of their multilingual behaviour. The table below provides the summary.

Table 4: Characters' Turns And Their Language Choices

Character	Number of Scenes	Number of Turns	Language Choices of Characters' Turns					
			Yor	Eng	Yor-Eng	Eng-Yor	Yor/ONL	Eng/OL
Jenifa	41	562						
Becky	22	324	256	3	297	6	-	-
Tracy	26	398	102	6	204	12	-	-
Franca	8	193	121	1	270	5	-	-
Bobo Ibo	1	16	78	5	112	3	-	2
Gb.BigGirl	5	53	-	13	-	-	-	-
Jeni's moth	4	68	28	3	42	-	-	-
Jeni's fath	4	63	56	-	2	-	-	-
Iyabo	1	13	63	-	-	-	-	-
Dayo	4	33	8	-	5	-	-	-
Prof.	3	21	17	-	16	-	-	-
Lekan	1	11	7	3	11	-	-	-
Tutu	1	9	6	-	5	-	-	-
James	1	8	6	-	3	-	-	-
Demola	6	19	6	-	2	-	-	-
Shakira	5	17	15	-	4	-	-	-
Funmi	5	13	10	-	7	-	-	-
Waheed	3	9	6	-	7	-	-	-
DPO	1	7	8	-	1	-	-	-
Skid	1	3	4	-	3	-	-	-
Herbalist	1	7	2	-	1	-	-	-
Owonikoko	2	11	7	-	-	-	-	-
Badmus	2	11	9	-	1	-	-	-
Lecturer	1	7	5	-	6	-	-	-
Franç's sis	1	3	3	-	4	-	-	-
Baba T	1	6	-	3	-	-	-	-
Doctor	2	32	4	-	1	-	-	-
Student 1	2	5	12	3	14	3	-	-
Student 2	1	3	1	-	3	-	-	-
Student 3	1	3	1	-	1	-	-	-
Student 4	1	2	1	-	1	-	-	-
Student 5	1	2	1	-	1	-	-	-
TOTAL	164	1,931	754	40	969	29	-	2



As earlier explained (in the section under language use according to scenes), the six possibilities of occurrence of language choice are used to analyse the turn-taking strategies of the characters. The number of scenes in which each character appears and the number of turns each takes in the movie dialogue are weighed against the choice(s) of languages they make. For a more vivid description, the characters' multilingual behaviours are calculated in percentage and presented in the table below.

Table 5: Percentile Analysis Of Characters' Language Choices

CHARACTER	LANGUAGE CHOICES IN %					
	Yor	Eng	Yor-Eng	Eng-Yor	Yor/ONL	Eng/OL
Jenifa	45.55	0.53	52.8	1.07	0.00	0.00
Becky	31.48	1.85	62.96	3.70	0.00	0.00
Tracy	30.40	0.25	67.83	1.26	0.00	0.00
Franca	40.41	2.59	58.03	1.55	0.00	0.00
Bobo Ibo	0.00	86.67	0.00	0.00	0.00	13.33
Gb.BigGirl	44.44	4.76	66.67	0.00	0.00	0.00
Jeni's moth	96.55	0.00	1.72	0.00	0.00	0.00
Jeni's fath	100	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Iyabo	61.53	0.00	38.46	0.00	0.00	0.00
Dayo	51.51	0.00	48.48	0.00	0.00	0.00
Prof.	33.33	14.29	52.38	0.00	0.00	0.00
Lekan	54.55	0.00	45.45	0.00	0.00	0.00
Tutu	66.67	0.00	33.33	0.00	0.00	0.00
James	75.00	0.00	12.5	0.00	0.00	0.00
Demola	78.94	0.00	21.05	0.00	0.00	0.00
Shakira	58.82	0.00	41.18	0.00	0.00	0.00
Funmi	46.15	0.00	53.85	0.00	0.00	0.00
Waheed	88.89	0.00	11.11	0.00	0.00	0.00
DPO	57.14	0.00	42.86	0.00	0.00	0.00
Skid	66.67	0.00	33.33	0.00	0.00	0.00
Herbalist	100	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Owonikoko	81.81	0.00	18.18	0.00	0.00	0.00
Badmus	45.45	0.00	54.55	0.00	0.00	0.00
Lecturer	42.86	0.00	57.14	0.00	0.00	0.00
Franç's sis	0.00	100	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Baba T	66.67	0.00	33.33	0.00	0.00	0.00
Doctor	37.5	9.38	43.75	9.38	0.00	0.00
Student 1	40.00	0.00	60.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Student 2	33.33	0.00	66.67	0.00	0.00	0.00
Student 3	33.33	0.00	66.67	0.00	0.00	0.00
Student 4	50.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Student 5	50.00	0.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
PERCENTAGE TOTAL	39.09	2.07	57.34	1.50	0.00	0.10



The analysis reveals that Yoruba with English switching turns are more prevalent than any of the other language choices. With 57.34 percent, this language choice is ahead of turns recorded in Yoruba (39.0) by almost 20 percent. Turns recorded in English are very minimal, 2.07 percent, just like turns recorded in English with Yoruba switching, 1.50 percent. Turns recorded in English and Other Nigerian Languages are negligible, 0.10 percent, while there are no turns that occur in Yoruba and Other Nigerian Language, 0.00 percent. It is significant to note that there is only one character, Bobo Ibo, whose turn-taking device falls into the category of English with Other Language. In the two scenes where he appears, he combines English and Igbo. His name is indexical of his origin and language. Being a person from another linguistic group, he adopts the Nigerian lingua franca, English, to do his business of used clothes. Of course, he mixes this with his Igbo language. His customers too have no choice than to use the lingua franca to communicate with him as English is the language that binds every ethnic group in Nigeria together. However, pidgin is the type of English that is freely available to trade and informal communication in the urban cities of the country; it does not require formal learning unlike standard English that needs to be learned formally in the educational institutions. The method of acquiring it is by immersion, an individual's effort to mingle with the people that use it. The use of Pidgin English is even more evident in the speeches of Francisca's Sister whose turns are 100 percent (Pidgin) English. A character's choice of language is conditioned by his/her awareness of the language options and abilities of his or her interlocutor(s) and, a recognition of his/her own language strengths and limitations. Francisca's sister arrives at the campus, meets her sister's roommates and makes enquiries about Francisca from them. Right from the beginning of the conversation to the end, Francisca's sister converses in Pidgin English. Why does she choose this option? First, she recognizes that she is from a Nigerian linguistic group that is different from her interlocutors' whom she may not be certain of their linguistic affiliation. Second, she has come to the campus and she knows or reasons that campus language, which is the language of social relevance, is English. She then initiates the discussion in English, the form of it that she can control, Pidgin. All through the film, this principle of interlocutors' language awareness and compatibility operate among the characters. For instance, Jenifa's penchant for English switching in Yoruba utterances is minimized when conversing with her own father and mother whom she knows are uneducated rural dwellers. On the other hand, Jenifa's communicative interaction with her fellow campus students and other educated characters and indeed the communicative interaction of the educated characters with one another are replete with Yoruba-English switching. The extract below illustrates this:

(Key: The utterances by the characters are numbered serially from 1 to 20. The English expressions in the utterances are underlined while the translation of the utterances is provided in brackets immediately after the utterances).

1. **Tracy:** Becky Baby!
2. **Becky:** Tracy Darling!
3. **Tracy:** S'owa okay? (Are you okay?)



4. **Jenifa:** Hi
5. **Tracy:** Oh, intruder wa around, ma ma gist e later. (Oh, an intruder is around, I will gist you later.)
6. **Becky:** Okay, em, mo lero pe o ti meet Sulia, omo ti mo soro e fun yin nijeta? (Okay,em, I hope you have met Sulia, the lady I discussed with you two days ago?)
7. **Jenifa:** Tracy, booni? So wa okay? (Tracy, how are you? Are you okay?)
8. **Tracy:** Mo wa pa. Becky, jo jeki nri e. (I'm alright. Becky, please let me have a word with you.)
9. **Becky:** Okay, Sulia, make yourself comfortable, you hear?
10. **Tracy:** Becky, kinni gbogbo eleyi now? Sebi gbogbo wa ti jo agree, afigba to mu omo yi wa sinu yara yi. Iwo naa ri problem to gbe wo yara yi o. (Becky, what's all this now? Despite our agreement, you still brought this lady into this room. You too can see the problem she has brought into this room.)
11. **Becky:** Ko si wahala. (There is no problem.)
12. **Franca:** Hello girls!
13. **Becky:** Hei Franca!
14. **Jenifa:** Hi, 'Franklin'!
15. **Franca:** Becky!
16. **Becky:** Yes!
17. **Franca:** Becky, kinni gbogbo rubbish yi na? O tun mu kinni yi wa sinu yara wa, ehn? (Becky, what is all this rubbish? You still brought this "thing" into our room, ehn?)
18. **Tracy:** Nnkan temi gan si nba so nisinyi niyen, (It's exactly the matter I'm discussing with her).
19. **Franca:** Lo nba so kelekele. Se nkan ti gbogbo yin nso kelekele niyen? O ya, o ya, o ya, eh, kinni won npe e, local champion, idiot, o ya dide, dide, o ya, o ya, o ya. (You are discussing it quietly. Is that what all of you are discussing quietly? You, what are you called, local champion, idiot, get up quickly.)
20. **Becky:** Franca, mi o like bi o se nse yi, sebi emi ati Tracy ni original occupant inu ile yi. (Franca, I don't like this behaviour of yours, after all, Tracy and I are the original occupants of this room.)

In this extract (the scene on Jenifa's arrival at the campus), there are twenty verbal exchanges by four undergraduate characters - Tracy, Becky, Jenifa and Franca. Apart from four exchanges (8, 11, 15 and 18), all the exchanges or turns have one form of English switching or the other. The first two expressions are statements of endearment which the characters use to demonstrate intimacy and solidarity. The expressions which also include the acquired English names of the characters are rendered in English. The third expression is structurally English. "Are you okay?" is an English greeting form and English phatic communion. This has been juxtaposed with Yoruba to produce the hybridized expression "so wa okay?"(are you okay?). This trend is sustained in the fourth expression where the English greeting form "hi" is used. This is also used in



the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth expressions. Even when the traditional Yoruba greeting form is used, the characters still feel there is need to use an alternative form of the expression in a way that will make it to accommodate an English word. We can see an example in the seventh expression where there is a duplication of the same greeting intention first realized in Yoruba and later given in Yoruba- English mixing: “bawo ni” (how are you?); “s’owa okay?” (are you okay?).

The next section is focused on the impact of socio-demographic factors on the multilingual behaviour of the characters.

Table 6: Socio-Demographic Factors Of Characters

CHARACTERS	SOCIO DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS		
	AGE	GENDER	OCCUPATION
Jenifa	Adult	Female	Student/Self-Employed
Becky	Adult	Female	Student/Self-Employed
Tracy	Adult	Female	Student/Executive
Franca	Adult	Female	Fake Student
Bobo Ibo	Adult	Male	Trading
Gb.BigGirl	Adult	Female	Student
Jeni’s moth	Adult	Female	Farming
Jeni’s fath	Adult	Male	Farming
Iyabo	Adult	Female	Trading
Dayo	Adult	Male	Trading
Prof.	Adult	Male	Lecturing
Lekan	Adult	Male	Not Revealed
Tutu	Adult	Male	Lecturing
James	Adult	Male	Not Revealed
Demola	Adult	Male	Not Revealed
Shakira	Adult	Female	Student
Funmi	Adult	Female	Student
Waheed	Adult	Male	Not Revealed
DPO	Adult	Male	Police
Skid	Adult	Male	Not Revealed
Herbalist	Adult	Male	Herbalist
Owonikoko	Adult	Male	Trading
Badmus	Adult	Male	Not Revealed
Lecturer	Adult	Male	Lecturing
Franc’s sis	Adult	Female	Not Revealed
Baba T	Adult	Male	Comedian
Doctor	Adult	Male	Medicine
Student 1	Adult	Female	Student
Student 1	Adult	Female	Student
Student 3	Adult	Male	Student
Student 4	Adult	Female	Student
Student 5	Adult	Female	Student

Table 7: Percentile Analysis Of Social Demographic Factors Of Language Choices

SOCIAL DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS			LANGUAGE CHOICES					
			Yor	Eng	Yor-Eng	Eng-Yor	Yor/ONL	Eng/OL
AGE	Children	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Adult	100	39.09	2.07	57.34	1.50	0.00	0.10
GENDER	Male	56.25	22.41	47.50	45.68	10.34	0.00	100
	Female	43.75	77.59	52.50	54.32	89.66	0.00	0.00
OCCUPATION	Students	37.50	31.43	0.93	48.99	1.35	0.00	0.00
	Traders	12.50	1.76	0.67	1.14	0.00	0.00	0.10
	Police	3.13	0.21	0.00	0.16	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Doctor	3.13	0.62	0.16	0.73	0.16	0.00	0.00
	Lecturers	9.38	0.83	0.16	0.93	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Herbalist	3.13	0.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Comedian	3.13	0.21	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Farmers	6.25	6.16	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Not Revealed	21.25	2.07	0.16	0.93	0.00	0.00	0.00

The social demographic factors of age, gender and occupation are significant in analyzing social stratification in the movie world. In *Jenifa*, the factor of age is made to align with the theme of the movie. Children are completely excluded from the film due to its central concern which is prostitution. In the first instance, children are not expected to be involved in prostitution. Secondly, children are not expected to be university students. Therefore, the factor of age is totally made to emphasize adults who are naturally the ones qualified to practice prostitution. The language choice of these adults reflects a high display of Yoruba-English switching.

In terms of gender, the male characters are more than the female characters, 56.25 to 43.75. However, the female characters that are made to speak Yoruba are more than the male characters that used the same language option. 77.59 per cent of the females used Yoruba language option while only 22.41 per cent of the male characters are given the same language option. The language choice of the two sexes in terms of the options of English utterances and Yoruba-English utterances falls within the same range. 47.50 per cent of the male characters used English expressions relative to 52.50 per cent of the female characters while 45.68 per cent of the male characters used Yoruba-English expressions relative to 54.32 per cent of the female characters. The option of English-Yoruba expressions yielded astounding results as the ratio is 10.34 per cent for the males as against 89.66 per cent for the females. The reason for this is simply that females start off their talk in English and make English the base while injecting Yoruba into their utterances. A lot of prestige is attached to English and this reflects more in the attitude of the female characters who are out to deliberately flaunt their mastery of not just the language but also the culture. This becomes evident in the tutorial session organized for *Jenifa* by her mentors upon arrival at the campus. Tracy, one of the three mentors, tells *Jenifa*:



Then, awon ede to ma nso yen, emi o like e. O need lati ma so awon oyinbo diedie ninu oro e. For example, hello, you mean, instead of, what, I mean, you know, as in, what's up...

(Then, I don't like your language mannerisms. You need to interlard your speeches with some English words, for example, hello, you mean, instead of, what, I mean, you know, as in, what's up....)

Becky, another mentor, tells Jenifa to change her name from the native Nigerian name, Sulia, given to her by her parents, to a fanciful and more glamorous name, Jenifa:

I have a problem with your name. O ma need lati change oruko e. S'ori Franca to nwo yi, Izodua loruko e nile but ni school, Franca lo nje. S'ori Tracy to nwo yi gan, Peju lo nje nile, school, Tracy lo nje. So, iwo naa, O ma need lati change oruko e because O ranti pe emi gan, mi o kin se Becky nile but ni school, Becky ni mo nje. So you must change your name.

(I have a problem with your name. You will need to change your name. You see this Franca, her name from home is Izodua but in school, she is Franca. You see this Tracy also, her name from home is Peju. So, you too will need to change your name because you will recall that even me, I wasn't Becky from home but in school I'm known as Becky. So you must change your name.)

This extract illustrates the attitude of the leading characters and indeed most educated Nigerians to English, not just as a language but as a culture and ideology. The logic is that for one to attain the height of respectability and honour, it is not enough to be proficient in English; one's name must also be associated with the names of the owners of the language hence names like Becky, Tracy, Franca and Jenifa (an adaptation from Jeniffer).

In terms of occupation, the student characters are the highest, 37.50 per cent. This is understandable as the movie is centred on the students who engage in campus prostitution. Other categories of workers are made to complement the activities of the students. The traders sell to the students, the police investigate allegations brought against them, the lecturers conduct examinations for them, the comedian is a friend to one of them, two of them patronize the herbalist and the farmers are parents to one of them. However, seven characters representing 21.25 per cent of the movie characters have unrevealed identities. These are all male characters most of whom patronize the campus prostitutes. The significant thing about this is that the female characters, student prostitutes, who interact with the men are interested only in their money and not in what they do to get the money. Therefore, their identity is less important. None-the-less, the language choice of these men also shows that English is used in their interactions either alone or mixed with Yoruba. This indicates that they do not belong to the class of the uneducated and they too, consciously or unconsciously, will like to make this known. For instance, at the hotel where Becky leads Tracy and Jenifa to meet three men, the conversation confirms this fact:

First Man: Hello Baby! E kaabo, you are welcome, you are welcome. Mi o ba oju yi pade ri lodo Gbogbo Big Girl.



Second Man: Iyen ma wa romantic ke. Iyen ni wipe iwo le handle eeyan meji po leekan naa; inu film ni mo ti ri last.

Third Man: Wo, my dear, emi ni mo le handle eeyan meji leekan soso. Action ti bere.

(**First Man:** Hello Baby! You are welcome, you are welcome, you are welcome. I haven't met these faces with Gbogbo Big Girl.

Second Man: That one is romantic. That translates to the fact that you can handle two men at the same time. I saw it last in a film.

Third Man: Look! My dear, I'm the one that can handle two women at the same time. Action has started.)

The extracted speeches of the three men indicate the deployment of English in their verbal interactions. It reveals that the men are educated. The first sentence by the first man is significant in two ways. Firstly, it shows how anxious the men are to make the ladies feel welcome. This explains the use of Yoruba greeting form "e kaabo" which is reduplicated in English as "you are welcome" and is said two times. Secondly, reduplication is a by-product of multilingualism as one language readily comes to the rescue of another in a speaker's attempt for clarity and emphasis. In this case, it is English that has been used to aid Yoruba. It is important to stress that the men are meeting the ladies for the first time and this requires a negotiation of identity. Therefore, it is important on both sides to get as much respect as possible and the starting point for this is a conscious or unconscious effort to start with English by using it or making it to occur in Yoruba speeches.

Conclusion

This study has examined the languages used in the production of movies in Nigeria with particular emphasis on *Jenifa*. A combined application of Mares'(2003) classificatory strategies for the analysis of multilingual discourse in fictional texts and Irvin and Gal's(2000) ideological representations of linguistic differences provide the framework for the analysis. The study reveals that the evidence of multilingual practice in Nollywood movies are of two types. The first relates to the number of languages that are used in Nigerian movie industry while the second deals with the number of languages that are used in a particular movie. As regards the first, the study found that there are only six languages that are used in Nollywood, English and five Nigerian languages – Yoruba, Hausa, Bini, Ibibio and Efik. It is also discovered that of the three major Nigerian languages – Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba – only Yoruba was heavily used in movie production while Hausa was sparsely used. Igbo was not used for production at all. Of the numerous minority languages in Nigeria, only three – Bini, Ibibio and Efik – were represented in movie production. The conclusion one can draw from this is that there is an under-utilization of indigenous languages in the production of movies in Nigeria and this has negative consequences on the survival and growth of these languages. I shall return to this shortly.

The official statistics of the Nigerian Film and Video Censor's Board revealed that Yoruba was the only indigenous language that was heavily subscribed to in the production of



movies in Nigeria. This led to the selection of *Jenifa*, a Yoruba movie, as my case-study to understand the multilingual practice in specific movies. The study reveals that though *Jenifa* is tagged a Yoruba movie, it is difficult for a monolingual Yoruba speaker to comprehend because of the degree of English switching that is found there. Nearly all the characters found it expedient to use English in their speeches and this happened in nearly all the scenes regardless of the topic being discussed. From the fore-going, it is convenient to conclude that the multilingual practice in *Jenifa* is manifested in the types of switching between English and Yoruba. It should be stated that switching in this study is not considered as a stylistic strategy; rather, it is seen from an ideological perspective – the perspective of linguisticism, ideologies and practices of unequal division of power and resources which are tied to language.

Linguicism is evident in the distribution of languages involved in movie production. Majority of the linguistic groups in Nigeria prefer to produce their movies in English.

Films that are produced in indigenous languages also have a lot of English switching (or intrusions?). English is not just a language in Nigeria; it is a super language that is associated with education, prestige, class and opportunities. It is a language that everyone strives to use and this is reflected in the movies. This situation has led to what Bamiro describes as “subtractive polyglossia”.³⁵ According to him, “subtractive polyglossia is my term for the dominance and ascendancy of the English language at the expense of the regression and decline of the local languages”. This is a re-affirmation of an earlier point made by Ng and Bradac that “competence in the foreign language is acquired, but only at the expense of the native language”.³⁶ As a result of the powerful influence of English in Nigeria, which is also reflected in Nigerian movies, Adedun (forthcoming) has found that parents consciously encourage their children to gain mastery of English while discouraging them from learning their first language. The resultant effect is that most children are now monolingual Nigerian speakers of English or at best “defective bilinguals”. Defective bilingualism is my own term for describing Nigerians who claim they understand but cannot speak their mother tongue and the only language they claim mastery of is English. The unfortunate thing is that this attitude is popular especially among the elite and most people are even proud of the situation. The implication is that if no appropriate response is given, it portends a great danger to the sustenance and growth of indigenous languages. A Nigerian national newspaper, *The Punch*, in a screaming headline proclaims that hundreds of Nigerian languages face extinction.³⁷ The paper cites *Vital Signs 2006-200*, a publication of the United States based research group, Worldwatch Institute, that includes Nigerian languages among over 3,500 languages of the world that are likely to disappear by the turn of the century.

Insights from different aspects of language study reveal that languages do not just disappear, they follow some processes before they go into oblivion. The first sign is noticed when a language does not appeal to a young generation of people and when the

35 Edmund O. Bamiro, “The Politics of Code-switching: English vs Nigerian Languages”, *World Englishes*, 25, 1, 2006, pp. 23-35.

36 Sik H.Ng and James J.Bradac, *Power in Language: Verbal Communication and Social Influence*, Newbury Park, Sage Publications, 1993, p. 179.

37 Omolola Awe, “Hundreds of Nigerian Languages Face Extinction”, *The Punch Newspaper*, July 20, 2006, p. 3.



older generation does not feel bothered about the apathy of the younger generation to the mother tongue. When in the name of style and modern practice, English is encouraged above an indigenous language, it is a matter of time, such an indigenous language is on its way to extinction. One of the tools for perpetuating a language is fiction, literature or creative writing. A language that has a rich repertoire of creative writing or filmic documentation will be preserved and subsequent generation can be relied upon for its continued propagation. But in the event of a scenario whereby the documentation of a people's history and culture is done either wholly in English by way of projecting such culture in English or partly in English by way of according more relevance to English in the simultaneous use of English and a local language, to record a people's worldview and experience, subsequent generation cannot be relied upon to propagate such a language and such a language is already endangered.

The issue of language choice is not new to African creative writers but there is no consensus on it. Indeed, there are three divergent positions about the choice of language for creative purposes³⁸. The first is the unapologetic use of English for African creative writing. The second is the cautious use of English because of the power of its publicity while being conscious of its unfair advantage over indigenous languages. The third is the unequivocal advocacy that indigenous languages be used as vehicle for African literary expression. Chinua Achebe and Wole Soyinka, the two frontline creative writers in Nigeria can be said to belong to the first group, though with varying degrees. While Chinua Achebe is of the view that African writers should feel free to adapt English to suit African surroundings and sensibilities³⁹, Soyinka has been accused of being deliberately complex and inaccessible in his literary works because of his penchant for the use of English to reflect both the style and sensibilities of its native speakers⁴⁰.

Social, political and economic considerations are the reasons why producers of creative endeavours, including film producers, prefer the use of English in their creative enterprise. Every creative writer or film maker wants to break the barrier of being restricted to his linguistic group and wants to reach a larger audience in order to promote his message, become more popular and at the same time earn more money. English becomes the only language that makes these possible in Nigeria. This explains why English dominates this sphere in Nigeria just like any other endeavour. However, these considerations are at the expense of local Nigerian languages. This makes Gikandi to declare that "what is important about language use in Africa is not what languages African writers prefer, but the ideological and cultural uses of such languages"⁴¹.

One recommendation that may address this problem is that film producers and creative writers generally should display language patriotism by encouraging productions in

38 Niyi Osundare, "What is the Nationality of your Idiom?: African Writers and the Language Question", Kola Owolabi, and Ademola Dasylva (eds.), *Forms and Functions of English and Indigenous Languages in Nigeria*, Ibadan, Group Publishers, 2004.

39 Chinua Achebe, *Morning Yet on Creation Day: Essays*, London, Heinemann Press, 1975, pp. 55-66.

40 Chinweizu; J. Onwuchekwa, and M. Ihechukwu, *Towards the Decolonization of African Literature*, Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980.

41 Simon Gikandi, "Ngugi's Conversion: Writing and the Politics of Language", P. J.O. Smith and D. P. Kunene (eds.), *Tongue and Mother Tongue: African Literature and the Perpetual Quest for Identity*, Trenton, New Jersey, African World Press, 2002, pp. 21-38.



local Nigerian languages. This can then be translated into English for wider circulation. For films, this can be done through the use of sub-titles for movie dialogues. In spite of the criticism that subtitling typically results in a quantitative reduction of the original dialogue because of the limitation of the amount of written words that can appear on screen⁴², I submit that there is no better alternative to solving the problem. Also, there should be a positive projection of the local languages and the audience should be made to see the positive sides of the local languages either through what the characters are made to say directly or through an indirect interpretation of intentions or overall assessment of the movie. Again, while switching of codes is a multilingual reality, this practice should be extended to local Nigerian languages, that is, one Nigerian language can be made to switch with another Nigerian language. This will not only reflect the reality of co-habitation of different linguistic groups in Nigeria, it will also promote peaceful co-existence, mutual cooperation between and among different linguistic groups in Nigeria.

In addition, nobody can take away English from the place of honour the language occupies, not just in Nigeria, but in the world. It will amount to linguistic ignorance and intellectual arrogance for anyone to suggest that English does not have a place in Nigerian movie world. Of course, it does and that is why the movie industry has gained an early recognition and popularity. The issue here is that care should be taken so that one is not carried away by the assumed benefits of English and unwittingly play the scripts of the mindsets that historically conferred the assumed benefits on English. In other words, the issue being discussed goes beyond the assumed benefits derivable by producing Nigerian films in English. These assumed benefits are a tool that will eventually lead to the nunc dimitis of Nigerian languages if conscious efforts are not made to address the problem. The danger posed to Nigerian languages by English is hidden and can not be obvious to the undiscerning. It is historically ideological and "dually indexical". Dual indexicality is an expression used by Jane Hill to describe the strategy used by dominant groups to indirectly ascribe certain stereotypes to subordinate groups which constitute the basis upon which the minority groups are excluded from certain rights and privileges⁴³. According to Elinor Ochs as cited by Hill, it is through these covert indexes that the deepest structures of the self, those that are least accessible to inquiry and modification, are laid down.⁴⁴ Hill emphasizes that covert semiosis is very powerful in the "construction of the world through linguistic practice". Therefore, brandishing the more obvious benefits of English in Nigerian movies will automatically blind one to the covert dangers the use of the language poses to the survival of Nigerian languages.

42 H. Gottlieb, "Subtitling", M. Baker, and K. Malmkjaer (eds.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies*, London, Routledge, 1998, p. 247.

43 Jane Hill, *Mock Spanish: A Site for the Indexical Reproduction of Racism in American English*. <http://language-culture.binghamton.edu/symposia/2/part1/index.html>, (Accessed 26 May 2009), p. 2

44 Elinor Ochs, "Indexicality and Socialization", J. W. Stigler; R.A. Shweder, and G. Herdt (eds.) *Cultural Psychology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 245.



Bibliography

- Achebe, Chinua, *Morning Yet on Creation Day: Essays*, London, Heinemann Press, 1975, pp. 55-66.
- Adedun, Emmanuel A. "Bilingualism and Parental Attitude to Nigerian Indigenous Languages", *Nigerian English in Sociolinguistic Perspectives: A Festschrift in Honour of Prof. Funso Akere*. Lagos: University of Lagos Press, forthcoming.
- Adedun, Emmanuel A. "Linguistic Plurality and Language Policy Decision in Nigeria", C. S. Momoh & Jim Unah (eds.), *Nigerian Integrative Discourse: Vol. V, Intergroup Tensions*. Lagos: Faculty of Arts, University of Lagos, 2006, pp. 68-91.
- Awe, Omolola "Hundreds of Nigerian Languages Face Extinction", in *The Punch Newspaper*, July 20, 2006, p. 3.
- Bamiro, Edmund O. "The Politics of Code-switching: English vs Nigerian Languages", *World Englishes*, 25, 1, 2006, pp. .23-35.
- Blackledge, Adrian "Constructions of Identity in Political Discourse in Multilingual Britain", Aneta Pavlenko and Adrian Blackledge (eds.), *Negotiations of Identities in Multilingual Contexts*, Clevedon, Multilingual Matters, 2004.
- Bleichenbacher, Lukas. *Multilingualism in the Movies: Hollywood Characters and Their Language Choices*, Tübingen, Narr Francke Attempto Verlag, 2008.
- Blench, Roger. "The Linguistic Geography of Nigeria and its Implications for Prehistory", Koln, Kpppe verlag, 2009, pp. 187-206.
- Busch, Brigitta. *Sprachen im Disput: Medien und Öffentlichkeit in multilingualen Gesellschaften*, Klagenfurt/Celovec, Drava, 2004.
- Chinweizu, J. Onwuchekwa, and M. Ihechukwu, *Towards the Decolonization of African Literature*, Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980.
- Coupland, Nikolas. *Style: Language Variation and Identity*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Coupland, Nikolas. "Stylised Deception", in Adam Jaworski et al. (eds.), *Metalanguage: Social and Ideological Perspectives*, Berlin, Mouton de Gruyter, 2004.
- Crozier, David and Blench, Roger. *An Index of Nigerian Languages*, Dallas. SIL, 2nd ed., 1992.
- Ekwenchi, Ogochukwu, *Popular Fiction Television Production in Nigeria: Global Models, Local Responses*. Unpublished Ph.d Thesis, London, University of Westminster, Faculty of Social Sciences, 2008. p. 186.
- Gikandi, Simon, "Ngugi's Conversion: Writing and the Politics of Language", P. J.O. Smith and D. P. Kunene (eds.), *Tongue and Mother Tongue: African Literature and the Perpetual Quest for Identity*, Trenton, New Jersey, African World Press, 2002, pp. 21-38.
- Gottlieb, H., "Subtitling", M. Baker ,and K. Malmkjaer (eds.), *Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies*, London, Routledge, 1998, p. 247.



Hill, Jane, *Mock Spanish: A Site for the Indexical Reproduction of Racism in American English*. <http://language-culture.binghamton.edu/symposia/2/part1/index.html>, (Accessed 26 May 2009), p. 2

Hill, Jane, "Mock Spanish, Covert Racism, and the (Leaky) Boundary Between Public and Private Spheres", Roxy Harris and Ben Rampton (eds.), *The Language, Ethnicity and Race Reader*, London and New York, Routledge, 1995, p. 11

Irvine, J. and Gal, S., "Language Ideology and Linguistic Differentiation", Kroskrity, P. V. (ed.), *Regimes of Language: Ideologies, Politics, and Identities*, Santa Fe, School of American Research Press, 2000, pp. 35-83.

Jaworski, Adam et al. (eds.), *Metalanguage: Social and Ideological Perspectives*, Berlin, Mouton de Gruyter, 2004.

Haynes, Jonathan and Okoome, Onookome (eds.), *Nigerian Video Film*, Jos, Kraft Books Limited, 1997.

Kelly-Homes, Helen, *Advertising as Multilingual Communication*, Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Kozloff, Sarah, *Overhearing Film Dialogue*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2000.

Kremnitz, Georg, *Mehrsprachigkeit in der Literatur: Wie Autoren ihre Sprachen Wahlen*, Wien, Edition Prasens, 2004.

Lippi-Green, Rosina, *English with an Accent: Language, Ideology, and Discrimination in the United States*, USA, Routledge, 1997, pp. 63-76

Ludi, Georges, 'Le 'melange de langues' comme moyen stylistique et/ou comme Marqueur d'appurtenance dans le discours litteraire', in Bem, J. and Hudlett, A. *Ecrire aux Confins des Langues*, Mulhouse, Centre de Recherché sur l'Europe littraire, 2001.

Mares, P., "Mnogojazyczna komunikacija I kinofil'm, in Rossijskaja Akade-mija Nauk (ed.) *Jazyk kak Stredstvo Transljacii Kul'tury*. Moskva, Nauka, 2000.

McCall, John C., "Nollywood Confidential: The Unlikely Rise of Nigerian video Film", *Transition*, 95, 13, 1, pp. 98 – 109.

Ng, Sik H. and Bradac, James J., *Power in Language: Verbal Communication and Social Influence*, Newbury Park, Sage Publications, 1993

Ochs, Elinor, "Indexicality and Socialization", Stigler, J.W.; Shweder, R.A. and Herdt, G. (eds.) *Cultural Psychology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 245.

Oguntokun, Wole, "Movie Review: Nigerian Playwright Deconstructs Nollywood's 'Jenifa', – AfricanLoft – [http:// www.africanloft.com](http://www.africanloft.com) – (Accessed 30 May 2009), p. 1.

Osundare, Niyi, "What is the nationality of your idiom?: African writers and the language question", Owolabi, K. and Dasyuva, A. (eds.), *Forms and Functions of English and Indigenous Languages in Nigeria*, Ibadan, Group Publishers, 2004.

Pable, A., "Archaische Dialekte im Vergleich: Das Fruhamerikanische in filmischen Adaptioen von Nathaniel Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter* und Arthur Miller's *The*



Crucible”, in Helin, I. (ed.) *Dialektübersetzung und Dialekte in Multimedia*, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 2004.

Phillipson, Robert, *Linguistic Imperialism*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992.

Reyes, Luis and Rubie Peter, *Hispanics in Hollywood: An Encyclopedia of Film Television*, New York, Garland Publishing, 1994.

Tan, E. S., *Emotion and the Structure of Narrative Film: Film as an Emotion Machine*, Mahwah, Lawrence Erlbaum, 1996.

United Nations, “Nigeria Surpasses Hollywood”, *Scoop Independent News*, www.scoop.co.nz. (Accessed 05 June 2009), p. 1.

Williams, Raymond, *Marxism and Literature*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977.

Journal of Global Analysis

Turkey's Increasing Role in Afghanistan

Muharrem EKSI*

This paper is briefly dealing with the current situation in Afghanistan within the context of Turkey's increasing role in Afghanistan. Turkish-Afghani relations are examined in terms of politics and economy while Turkish foreign policies towards Afghanistan and the Turkish-Pakistani-Afghani triple summit attempts are analyzed. Additionally, Turkey's security and socio-economic contributions in Afghanistan are emphasized. Turkey's unwillingness to send troops to Afghanistan for operational purposes that is frequently debated in national and international circles has been evaluated by stating the advantages and disadvantages of such decision. Turkey's quiet approach between 2001 and 2004 towards Afghanistan, which have been energizing since 2005 and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's visit to Afghanistan on June 2009 have been dealt as well. By considering Davutoglu's policies, aiming to introduce Turkey as a global actor and as the term President of the UNSC (the UN Security Council), it seems that Turkey is preparing to play a more active role in Afghanistan.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Turkey-Afghanistan Relations, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey-Pakistan-Afghanistan Triple Summit.

Muharrem EKSI
Foreign Policy Expert (TBMM)
PhD Scholar, International Relations
Faculty of Political Science(SBF),Ankara University, Turkey

e-mail: meksi@politics.ankara.edu.tr.

* Muharrem EKSI is currently a PhD candidate at International Relations, Faculty of Political Science (SBF), Ankara University. Also he is presently working in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Directorate of External Affairs and Protocol as a Foreign Relations Expert. His research interests include Public Diplomacy, Turkish Foreign Policy, International Relations Theories, Critical Security Studies, Energy and Asian Politics.



CESRAN SARAM

STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR VE ANALİZ MERKEZİ - SARAM
CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS - CESRAN

www.cesran.org

Turkey's Increasing Role in Afghanistan

Introduction

Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's four-day visit to Afghanistan and Pakistan reawoke debates dealing with Turkey's increasing role in Afghanistan once again. Intensifying mutual visits since 2005 also designate Turkey's increasing role and influence in Afghanistan. Prime Minister Erdoğan's visit to Afghanistan on 20-21 April 2005 and Afghan President Hamid Karzai's visit to Ankara on 4-7 January 2006 expedited mutual contacts. Later, President Abdullah Gül held a visit to Afghanistan on 26-27 February 2007 which clearly emphasized Afghanistan's priority for Turkey, was followed by several visits on different levels. Those visits are significant as they are the most effective tools of foreign policy and give clues about the foreign policy which is pursued at the time. In this context, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu's visits are indicating that Turkey is planning to play a proactive role in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the near future. Moreover, Davutoğlu's visit is a sign that Turkey is playing the global actor and consolidating her role as the term President of the UNSC (the UN Security Council).

This way, Turkey who is pursuing a multi-dimensional and proactive foreign policy since 2003, is becoming a global actor and consulting authority whose expertise in Afghanistani and Pakistani issues -such as global terrorism- which occupy the global agenda since 2001, is widely used. While the instability in Afghanistan is shifting to Pakistan, Turkey's attempt to hold a Turkish-Pakistani-Afghani triple summit is of vital importance. Turkey became a consulting authority in the region for her deep historical and cultural connections with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, Turkey's attempts to solve Afghanistan's issues by activating socio-economic mechanisms next to military means, seems to have been recognized by NATO and the UN.

The Current Situation in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is a buffer zone among the greater powers such as the USA, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and Iran. The politically and militarily active arena in Afghanistan is destabilizing the region, particularly Pakistan. When it comes to energy, Afghanistan forms a critical bridge as a transport route between Euro-Asia and North-South. For these reasons, Afghanistan stands out as a country of great geopolitical importance. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US launched an anti-terror struggle in Afghanistan through NATO but after 8 years, stability and security is not maintained in the country yet. In reality, the issue seems to have exceeded beyond both the limits of terrorism and borders of Afghanistan. Moreover, attempts to deal with Afghanistan's non-



military but structural issues -such as the socio-economical bottlenecks- by military means, caused further security and stability deficiencies. Since Afghanistan is located close to rising powers of the Asia-Pacific and on the cross-routes, the country became the battle ground for such interests. Although there was cooperation between the US and Russia against terror in the region, it was merely a short honeymoon¹.

In fact, the US increased its powers in Afghanistan as the global super-power and deployed in military quarters of neighboring states such as the Hanabad Base in Uzbekistan and Manas Base in Kyrgyzstan². Such move caused suspicion among the regional powers; Russia and China. US existence and activity in the region even paved the way for a Russian-Chinese solidarity and strategic co-operations. As a result, both states issued a resolution through the SCO (Shangai Cooperation Organization) to make the US withdraw from the region³. However, the US's fading influence in the region and the tension of 22 February 2009 between Russia and China which occurred due to a problem in the Pacific Ocean and resulted in delivery of a diplomatic note, indicates that the Russian-Chinese cooperation is subject to turn into rivalry⁴ soon.

What is more, SCO can be considered as the NATO of Asia. At least Russia is seeing it that way. But SCO is not as developed as NATO and there are distinctive contrasts between the two organizations. Still we can say that SCO is developing into a power-source just like NATO. PM Erdoğan's initiatives indicate that Turkey is willing to develop relations with SCO. But we cannot speak of a clear SCO policy yet.

Today, the US that is in a vicious cycle in Afghanistan in terms of security and stability, had to abandon the neighboring country's bases due to Russia's counter-moves. The most recent example occurred in February this year when Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev declared his decision to close the US Manas Base in Kyrgyzstan⁵. The base was closed immediately at the end of the same month. Thus, the US had to evacuate its last base in the region within 180 days. Similarly, NATO's operations in Afghanistan have also turned into a struggle of existence. Such developments prove that the Afghanistan-centered NATO and the US military operations have failed. However, US decision to withdraw from regional bases in different countries, particularly from those in Afghanistan, serves the interests of Russia China, Iran and even India. But when we take a closer look, we see that the relation between those states (great powers) is not as clear as it seems; in fact it is based on complex policies. For instance, India pursues balance policies with USA against China, while China wants USA to completely withdraw from the region. In the meanwhile, USA is the greatest commercial partner

- 1 Kuniharu Kakihara, "The Post-9/11 Paradigm Shift and Its Effects on East Asia", IIPS Policy Paper 292E, The Institute for International Policy Studies, pp. 1-15, p. 9-10, January 2003. [<http://www.iips.org/bp292e.pdf>]. Accessed on June 18, 2009.
- 2 Lionel Beehner, "ASIA: U.S. Military Bases in Central Asia", Backgrounder, The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), July 26, 2005. [<http://www.cfr.org/publication/8440/>]. Accessed on June 18, 2009.
- 3 http://www.sectSCO.org/news_detail.asp?id=1753&LanguageID=2, http://www.sectSCO.org/news_detail.asp?id=1848&LanguageID=3. Accessed on June 18, 2009.
- 4 Marcel de Haas, "Russia-China Security Cooperation", 27 Kasım 2006, PINR, Accessed on June 18, 2009. [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=588&language_id=1].
- 5 David Trilling and Deirdre Tynan, "Kyrgyzstan: President Bakiyev Wants to Close US Military Base Outside Bishkek", Eurasia Insight, EurasiaNet, February 2009. [<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav020309b.shtml>]. Accessed on June 18, 2009.



of China. China and Russia established common strategies as a part of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) but the medium and long term policies of the two states are controversial as both China and Russia want to establish their own hegemony in the region. Especially the Central Asia energy-economy centered expansion of China is considered as a move to break Russian cartel in the region. On the other hand, all of these states are trying to become influential on Afghanistan for their own interests. Russia supports Tajik groups and Iran supports the Shiite Hazaras for this purpose. Therefore regional states are disturbed of US existence and military actions in the region. To them, Pakistan is drifting into instability because of US policies.

But on the other hand, the US⁶ and NATO are pushed to develop new strategies, which can be regarded as a positive development. In fact, NATO's decision to develop new civilian-military strategies in its December 2008 Summit ⁷ and Obama's search for similar strategies can be evaluated within the same context. Obama's decision to send additional military troops according to the suggestions of Pentagon indicates that he still relies on military strategies. When compared with his predecessor Bush's unilateral policies, the Obama Administration seems to follow a more collaborative policy in International Relations in general and in Afghanistan in specific. Lastly, Afghanistan is the primary issue of the agenda for both the US and NATO. Similar to those of 2001, it is expected that instead of a zero-sum game, relative gains and mutual interests based on the regional state's co-operations will be regarded in Afghanistan policies from now on. In this manner, the US and Russia and NATO and CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) are expected to enter a process of convergence. In such circumstances, Russia and Turkey's contributions are expected as well as those of NATO and the US. Afghanistan increasingly needs Turkey's contribution. Turkey's decisions will affect not only her internal and foreign policies but also the relations of NATO, the US, Russia and Afghanistan. Players such as the US, NATO and Russia want to pull Turkey to the region. Therefore, Turkey's interest for the region will increase in the near future. The question is; what will Turkey's status be within the context of these Afghanistan-centered developments?

One of the major issues of the global agenda became clear when Obama declared in his election campaign that Afghanistan is the major subject of his agenda. In fact, he made the decision to sent 17 to the US and additional troops to Afghanistan as a first act which was not surprising at all⁸. When super power the US stated Afghanistan as its primal issue, the power policies in the region gained momentum instantly⁹. Afghanistan-centered US-Russian, NATO-CSTO, Turkish-US and Turkish-Russian relations showed signs of improvement. This paper is questioning Turkey's position within these Afghanistan-centered developments. Turkey is expected to face internal issues and external decision making processes regarding her relations with

6 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/03/27/A-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan/>. Accessed on June 18, 2009.

7 <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-153e.html>. Accessed on June 18, 2009.

8 Helene Cooper, "Putting Stamp on Afghan War, Obama Will Send 17,000 Troops", New York Times, February 17, 2009. [<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/washington/18web-troops.html>]. Accessed on June 18, 2009.

9 "Heading Into NATO Summit, Obama Pushes Afghanistan Agenda", PBS,3 April 2009. [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/europe/jan-june09/obama_04-03.html]. Accessed on June 18, 2009.



the US, NATO, SCO and Russia because of Afghanistan. Therefore, it was considered to be necessary to make a pre-evaluation regarding Turkey's approach towards the developments in Afghanistan.

Turkey-Afghanistan Relations: Political Relations

Relations between Turkey and Afghanistan go back to Ottoman Empire Period. As for the state of the Republic of Turkey, the official foundations of the relations between two states were laid with signing of the Turkey-Afghanistan Treaty in Moscow in 1921. The most important aspect of this treaty is Afghanistan's being the first state, which recognized Turkey and its national struggle in the international arena and also for being the first international treaty of the Ankara government. After that, the relations between the two states gained a strategic depth with Turkish-Afghani Treaty of Eternal Amity, which was signed in Ankara on 25 May 1928. The USSR occupied Afghanistan in 1979. During the 1980s, Turkey chose to stay away from Afghanistan. During the Cold War Era, Afghanistan became a battle field between the USSR and USA. In the 1990s Turkey restored its Afghanistan policy due to changing interests when General Dostum formed an autonomous government in North Afghanistan between 1992 and 1997. Energy policies became matter of struggle during these years.

Turkey, which began her supports for formation and development of Afghanistan's government agencies, continues them until today and this situation has become traditional. Today, at this point intensive efforts are made at NATO level in the first place and also in all international platforms in order to save Turkey out of the situation, which Afghanistan currently experiences. In this context, former foreign minister and president of Turkish Assembly Hikmet Çetin's assignment as NATO's Afghanistan Senior Civilian Representative¹⁰ for two consequent terms upon intensive demands, is proving that NATO needs Turkey's expertise in Afghanistan where she has deep historical and cultural boundaries.

Turkey's Afghanistan Policy

Turkey builds her Afghanistan policy on parameters such as the protection of country's independence and its territorial integrity, procurement of security and stability while saving the country from being the source of radical and fundamentalist trends, terrorism and drug smuggling¹¹. Turkey's amicable approach, through which she embraces all groups of the country without any discrimination, makes Turkey a role model to be adopted for her political approach by other regional players in resolution of Afghanistan's issues. It was observed that military means fall short in Afghanistan and the theses, which enable the reconstruction of the country have been lately adopted in NATO-Bucharest summit dated April 2008, which was actually too late. It is striking that in spite of NATO's declaration¹² to apply a civil-military approach, which

10 <http://www.nato.int/cv/scr/cetin-e.htm>. Accessed on June 18, 2009.

11 "Turkey's Political Relations with Afghanistan", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-afghanistan.en.mfa]. Accessed on February 03, 2009.

12 "Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008"
[<http://www.otan.nato.int/docu/pr/2008/p08-049e.html>]. Accessed on March 16, 2009.



failed later, Turkey already managed to initiate such approach with the formation of Vardak Provincial Construction Team on November 2006¹³. In this way, by focusing on the reconstruction of Afghanistan, Turkey put diversified projects worth of 77 million dollars into effect. Besides, she has increased her contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan up to 200 million Dollars after the June 2008 Paris Conference¹⁴. Furthermore, since 2001 the overall value of Turkey's contributions in the military field (training of the Afghan army and police forces etc.) has reached 100 million U.S. dollars already.

As an effect of its rising military existence in the region, Turkey's relation with these countries can shift from economy-energy to military-security axis. For instance, Turkish-Russian relations based on the fields of economy-energy are leading both countries towards a strategic partnership. Turkey is focused on developing commercial and energy based relations also with China. These relations may shift to a military-security axis and can cause controversies in the future. On the other hand, Turkey's expanding military influence in Afghanistan and its developing profile as a UNSC temporary member indicates to potential gains for Turkey as a security producer. In fact, we see that Turkey's influence on Afghanistan and Pakistan is increasing since 2001. When it comes to security issues, Turkey also stands out as one of the most frequently mentioned states by the international media.

The Triple Summit Initiative of Turkey-Pakistan-Afghanistan

Turkey-Pakistan-Afghanistan Triple Summit conference (by realizing that the US had failed in gathering Afghanistan and Pakistan before) and Ankara process constitutes the regional dimension of Turkey's policy, which she carries out on socio-economic and security level. At the end of Ankara process, which was initiated among three countries on April 2007, Turkey began to employ the regional approach in the resolution of problems in the region by gathering Afghanistan and Pakistan together. Thus, it was decided that among three countries a joint working group should be established by making Pakistan, which is one of the important sources of the problem in Afghanistan, undertake a constructive role for the solution of the problem. The development of cooperation was aimed by organizing the very first conference of joint working group on July 2007. On October 2007, the constitutional structure of the cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan was formed under the leadership of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). As for December 2008, by arranging the second triple summit conference in Istanbul, a consensus in bringing security into being in struggle in the fields of military cooperation, terror and drug smuggling was reached between the parties. Intelligence cooperation was determined to be made in third and the last summit realized on April 2009. Summit's procurement of cooperation in a field such as intelligence proves strikingly the distance covered thanks to conferences. Moreover, the fact that the US, Russia and Iran's efforts to

13 "Turkey To Open 27th Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan", The U.S. Department of Defense, November 5, 2006. [<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=2026>]. Accessed on April 23, 2009.

14 "Security Council, 5930th Meeting", [<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9392.doc.htm>]. Accessed on May 03, 2009.



implement the triple summit conferences, which were initiated under the leadership of Turkey, shows not only that these countries follow in Turkey's wake but also that Turkey pursues a leader policy in the region. On the other hand, shifting of terrorism and violence from Afghanistan to Pakistan make triple summit and joint working group more functional and vitally important. The facts that Taliban attacks in Afghanistan arise from Pakistan and the augmentation of the US's NATO losses have started to increase the constraints on Pakistan. In shifting of instability from Afghanistan to Pakistan, the cases of not bringing the boundary of 2430 km. between Afghanistan and Pakistan under control and terror groups' meeting their safe region needs, which are their sine qua non (prerequisite) on this boundary. As a result of the US's pressures, Pakistan army's launching operations in the region augments the existing instability and terror activities paradoxically in the country. Because of the risk that the nuclear weapons in possession of Pakistan, which has become a failed and weak state, could pass into the hands of Taliban and Al Qaeda terrorist organization, the US's following Pakistan-oriented nuclear disarmament policy increases instability in the region. Therefore, nuclear weapons factor attracts attention as another reason in this shifting of instability to Pakistan. In spite of these, the importance of cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan increases and Turkey's role in these issues has an importance, which would influence/determine the regional policy and the fate of Pakistan.

Most importantly, Turkey's Afghanistan-Pakistan common project, its military existence in the region and policies focusing also on the socio-economic aspects besides the military issues, is affecting USA's Afghanistan policy deeply. We also see that Turkey's views on the re-structure process and establishment of a functional economic and political system in Afghanistan are influential in changing USA's related policies. President Obama's new Afghanistan strategy contains issues previously expressed by Turkey, (especially about the handling of Afghanistan and Pakistan issues from a common perspective) which shows Turkey's influence clearly.

Turkey's contributions in the field of security

The constructive activities, which Turkey carries out in Afghanistan under the leadership of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) provide enhancement of visits between Afghanistan and Turkey and they also form the fundamental basis of Turkey's increasing role and efficiency. Her contributions in Afghanistan in the framework of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are not only highly appreciated¹⁵ by Afghanistan, the US and NATO but also by the international community. It is expected that the fact that TAF, which has taken over ISAF's Kabul Regional Command twice, is taking over this mission for third time in the following term (August-November 2009), will increase Turkey's importance in the region. In a sense, it can be asserted that primarily local community and then Afghanistan administration, NATO and the US also expect that Turkey's taking over the command. As for the reason of this expectation, it is the belief that TAF, which accomplished all international peace and assistance activities in which it took part, will augment the security and stability in the country by this takeover of command. The fact that the NATO forces hoisted the Turkish flag on their convoys while launching an

15 "Turkey contribution in Afghanistan important: US", ReliefWeb, 01 July 2008, [<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KKAA-7G55LL?OpenDocument>]. Accessed on June 02, 2009.



operation and returning from the operation in order not to be attacked although it is forbidden, shows the respectability and importance of TAF in Afghanistan. For this reason, TAF's taking over ISAF command has become the expectation of all the players in the region. TAF's this respectability results from the years of the War of Independence and the importance attributed to Afghanistan by Ataturk. It is understood that this importance will increasingly continue in Davutoğlu's period.

Turkey's Contributions in Socio-economic Field and Economic Relations

Turkey's contributions¹⁶ in Afghanistan, which have become traditional, are enforced in military, security, economic and social fields. In military field, Turkey not only plays a role to provide security and stability in ISAF with approximately 700-800 military and civil personnel in average under the leadership of TAF, but also works intensively for the education of Afghan National Army and Police Forces. The number of trained Afghan policemen and soldiers has reached up to 6.289. In the field of socio-economic development, Turkey carried out construction, repair and furnishing activities with 41 schools, dormitories, 4 hospitals which enable 1 million patients to be treated, 7 clinics, 2 mobile clinics, water tanks, cold storages, sport complexes, children parks. Turkey spent 200 million dollars voluntarily to carry out those activities¹⁷. By this way Turkey, contributes to establish a socio-economic order in Afghanistan where there isn't a working economy, but smuggling and drugs dominate the economy.

On the other hand, while today in the schools that Turkey founded in Afghanistan 56 to the US and students have education, thanks to the exchange students programs, Afghan students are enabled to receive education in big cities such as Ankara and Istanbul. Together with these long term investments for the development of Afghanistan, studies are carried out simultaneously in a number of fields from education to health, agriculture and employment projects. It can be expressed that Turkey accepts these studies as historical responsibilities¹⁸. Turkey is appreciated by international society due to her activities in the issue of women, one of the important points of invisible side of Afghanistan that coalition powers aren't interested in and the whole world is not aware of. Turkey is organizing literary, carpet weaving and nutrition courses for the rehabilitation of Afghan women and trying to lay a foundation for a healthy society by performing briefing and awareness-raising studies about the forgotten women rights in Afghanistan.

Lastly, the trade volume between Turkey and Afghanistan reached to 145 million dollars by 2008 and also Turkey became the biggest investor in Afghanistan with her 200 million dollars investment. Apart from these, 63 Turkish companies invested 1.6

16 "Turkish Contributions to Security and Development in Afghanistan", The UN, 22 March 2007, [<http://www.un.int/turkey/page167.html>]. Accessed on June 05, 2009.

17 "Turkish Contributions to Security and Development in Afghanistan", [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Turkish_contributions.pdf]. Accessed on January 15, 2009.

18 Altay Atli, "Afghanistan Looks to Turkey for Development Assistance", A EurasiaNet Commentary, January 24, 2006. [<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav012406.shtml>]. Accessed on June 17, 2009.



billion dollars by undertaking 157 projects in the field of Afghan private sector¹⁹. On the other hand, the corporate basis was laid to develop economy between two countries with the foundation of Mixed Economy Commission (the first period meeting was held on 26-27 of April 2005 in Ankara). Otherwise, economic field was included in the process of triple summit and economic cooperation platform that the chamber of commerce and industry representatives of these three countries could participate in, was formed.

The Issue of Turkey's not sending operational soldiers to Afghanistan

The possible benefits of Turkey's sending soldier to Afghanistan can be listed as follows:

- Increase of Turkey's prestige in the international policy,
- Increase of Turkey's Army's prestige, the emerge of the reality that even a global power like the US and a global security power such as NATO need the power of Turkey's army,
- Reinforcement of the US-Turkey alliance,
- Reinforcement of Turkey's situation in NATO,
- Easing of Turkey's return to Central Asia
- Attendance of Turkey to the Central Asia energy game as an active player,
- Increase of the possibility that the relations between Turkey and Turkish Republics can be developed in strategic level;
- The US's minimize of the policies in Iraq strategy that are contrary to the benefits of Turkey and Turkey's gaining an active role in the reconstruction forces of Iraq,
- Increase of the US support in Cyprus and EU membership issues.

Turkey's sending troops to Afghanistan operational purposes can provide benefits as stated above, but it must be expressed that this may result in vital risks. In this sense, the risks can be listed as follows:

- Martial loses and domestic public pressure,
- The reaction of Turkish public against soldier transfer to Afghanistan while in fight with PKK,
- The risk of becoming an enemy for the Afghan people to whom we have been loyal since the war of independence,
- The danger of being the direct target of Al Qaeda,
- Getting worse of the relationship between Russia and Turkey, Russia's energy intimidation against Turkey, the possibility that Turkish Republics may decline relationships with Turkey and their policy of closing the region to Turkey

19 "Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations with Afghanistan", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-afghanistan.en.mfa]. Accessed on June 19, 2009.



- In the international policy, Turkey's being perceived as stalking horse of the US and Turkey's loss of prestige,

Possible negative and positive results of soldier reinforcement of Turkey to Afghanistan should be considered thoroughly before making decision. However, if the aim is really to solve the Afghan problem, the 7 year period after 2001 has put the case clearly that the solution can't be ensured with military tools. There are both external (geopolitical, global and regional) and internal (Afghanistan's structural problems) sides of the issue. It is clear that a security problem exists in the country, but this is a socio-economic security problem, not military.

Namely, it is essential to reconstruct socio-economic life in the first place instead of drug production, the most important source of income in the country, to solidify political power and improve safety. However this is not a simple problem to be resolved by raising number of soldiers. It is not difficult to perceive the presence of some structural issues such as poverty, unemployment in Afghanistan. In the long term, settling of matters requires enhancing education opportunities and increasing investments in economy. Shortly, since Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan-for 30 years now- efforts to normalize Afghanistan has failed, conversely it has to deal with domestic and foreign affairs. In this sense, it is foreseen that it would be useful to involve life in Afghanistan in normalization process in the first place and notably involvement of Russia and China along with the US, NATO and other regional countries to the process should contribute to the internationally common request.

Conclusion

Turkey's Afghanistan policy is established on an approach which is based on fellow neighbor concept, although Turkey and Afghanistan do not share common borders. Turkey's establishment of a state in Afghanistan and increasing role of ensuring security and stability was approved, as the US Special delegate of Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke pointed out by saying: "Turkey is an important factor in Afghanistan." Since the very first years of the Republic, Turkey has supported to build governmental institutions and public buildings. Turkey, having a privileged status in her relations with local Afghans based on trust and love, gained influence in the region through its cultural and historical ties with Afghanistan. Therefore, it can be claimed that, NATO and especially the US are pursuing policies to utilize Turkey's position. Though as seen in her Afghanistan policies, Turkey is pursuing a unique policy towards regional issues apart from policies of the US and NATO. Thus, inviting especially Turkey for the first time to the Afghanistan meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which was held in Moscow, in spite of not being a member, can be evaluated as the outcome of the policies. In conclusion; as a term president of UN Security Council, Turkey's role that is based on problem-solving and reconstruction in Afghanistan, occupying an international security agenda for a long time, is considered to make Turkey a global actor.

Until today, as a term president of UN Security Council and a member of NATO, Turkey has played a crucial role in solving problems and contributing Afghanistan. She should



endeavor to be a leader in such a way that increases her global role. What is more, with international organizations, global and regional actors, Turkey should pay a special attention to assure political stability in Pakistan. Therefore, Muslim theological schools are required to be amended and the leaders of different fractions should be gathered for reaching an agreement. In addition, as a country which knows the region perfectly and has both cultural and historical depth, Turkey should strengthen her pioneering and guiding role in using especially socio-economic mechanisms efficiently besides military means on the face of Afghanistan problem. However, as a member of NATO and term president of UN Security Council, it should be ensured that neighbor countries platform is established as in Iraq case by the expertise of Turkey and these countries undertake constructive role and responsibilities in their Pakistan and Afghanistan issues. Triple summit platform which Turkey initiated by its private enterprise should focus on a solution for border issue which is non-controllable. It is necessary to constitute an active economic order which involves getting rid of drugs, playing a crucial role in resolving problems in Afghanistan. Accordingly for realizing, what Turkey has done in Vardak, in overall country, as a term president of UN Security Council and member of NATO, international organizations should be canalized into this field. United Nations and NATO should be included to Turkey's efforts for normalization of life in Afghanistan. Coalition powers should follow Turkey's relationship with the local people based on trust and love to win Afghans' heart. Thus, wining hearts and mind as a Public Diplomacy strategy is needed in Afghanistan.

In a nutshell, Turkey should keep following a proactive policy rather than being a silent actor (2001-2005) in finding solutions to Afghanistan and Pakistan issues and Turkey should increasingly go on its assistance and contributions until Afghanistan reach a level to be self-sufficient. Through her contributions, Turkey should call out OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference) to disseminate its efforts to form a basis for peace and development in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's presidential elections in August 2009 might be a critical milestone. Up till today, distribution of all groups to political process was neglected in Afghanistan. Thus, with Turkey's leadership, many efforts should be made to involve Afghanistan's different fractions in political process and especially Taliban's moderate elements.



Bibliography

Altay Atli, "Afghanistan Looks to Turkey for Development Assistance", *A EurasiaNet Commentary*, January 24, 2006. [<http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav012406.shtml>]. Accessed on June 17, 2009.

David Trilling and Deirdre Tynan, "Kyrgyzstan: President Bakiyev Wants to Close US Military Base Outside Bishkek", *Eurasia Insight*, EurasiaNet, February 2009.

Helene Cooper, "Putting Stamp on Afghan War, Obama Will Send 17,000 Troops", *New York Times*, February 17, 2009. [<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/washington/18web-troops.html>]. Accessed on June 18, 2009.

Kuniharu Kakihara, "The Post-9/11 Paradigm Shift and Its Effects on East Asia", IIPS Policy Paper 292E, *The Institute for International Policy Studies*, pp. 1–15, p. 9–10, January 2003. [<http://www.iips.org/bp292e.pdf>]. Accessed on June 18, 2009.

Lionel Beehner, "ASIA: U.S. Military Bases in Central Asia", Backgrounder, *The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)*, July 26, 2005. [<http://www.cfr.org/publication/8440/>]. Accessed on June 18, 2009.

Marcel de Haas, "Russia-China Security Cooperation", 27 Kasim 2006, PINR, Accessed on June 18, 2009. [http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=588&language_id=1].

Turkey's Political Relations with Afghanistan", *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-political-relations-with-afghanistan.en.mfa]. Accessed on February 03, 2009.

"Heading Into NATO Summit, Obama Pushes Afghanistan Agenda", *PBS*, 3 April 2009. [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/europe/jan-june09/obama_04-03.html]. Accessed on June 18, 2009.

"Turkey contribution in Afghanistan important: US", *ReliefWeb*, 01 July 2008, [<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/KKAA-7G55LL?OpenDocument>]. Accessed on June 02, 2009.

"Turkey To Open 27th Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan", *The U.S. Department of Defense*, November 5, 2006. [<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=2026>]. Accessed on April 23, 2009.

"Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations with Afghanistan", *Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-afghanistan.en.mfa]. Accessed on June 19, 2009.

"Turkish Contributions to Security and Development in Afghanistan", *The UN*, 22 March 2007, [<http://www.un.int/turkey/page167.html>]. Accessed on June 05, 2009.

"Turkish Contributions to Security and Development in Afghanistan", *The Diplomatie*, [http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Turkish_contributions.pdf]. Accessed on January 15, 2009.



CESRAN SARAM

STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR VE ANALİZ MERKEZİ - SARAM
CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS - CESRAM

www.cesran.org

July 2010

Journal of Global Analysis

Risk Politicization Strategies in EU Migration and Asylum Policies

Maria Ferreira*

This article addresses the growing articulation between migration and security in the European Union. Risk politicization strategies are developed as a way of questioning the consequences of framing migration as a security problem. My general research questions are: i) is migration being securitized at EU level? ii) what kind of securitization process is unfolding in the realm of EU migration policies?

My purpose is to combine a sociological-institutional approach to EU migration policies with cultural symbolical theories of risk in an attempt to understand the interplay between institutional contexts and security framing in Europe. My research hypothesis is that, concerning EU migration policies, the intergovernmental nature of its policy-making process is promoting a fettered environment for policy-making, which combined with asymmetrical transactions, favours a hierarchical rationality. As a risk culture, the hierarchical rationality triggers a particular sensitivity regarding border maintenance which means that it articulates between otherness and danger.

Keywords: Migration, Security, Securitization, Risk, Politicization, Borders, Asylum.

Maria Ferreira
Institute of Social and Political Sciences,
Rua Almerindo Lessa,
1300-663, Lisbon,
Portugal.

e-mail: mjmfsp@gmail.com

* Maria Ferreira is Doctoral Researcher at the Technical University of Lisbon.





CESRAN SARAM

STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR VE ANALİZ MERKEZİ - SARAM
CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS - CESRAN

www.cesran.org

Risk Politicization Strategies in EU Migration and Asylum Policies

Introduction

The title of the article *Risk Politicization Strategies in EU Migration and Asylum Policies*, comprises its three main elements: the concepts of risk, security and European Union (EU) policies in the wide field of migration and asylum.

Policy-making in the European Union is often dependent on the balance between member states' preferences and the Union's interests represented by the non-intergovernmental European institutions. Thus, I can claim that European policy-making confronts individuation with social incorporation. Sociological-institutional approaches to europeanization, study socialisation and appropriateness mechanisms in European institutions. As such, these perspectives analyse the tensions between individuation and social incorporation. Those approaches drew my attention to the "grid-group" cultural theory as a viable way to understand and explain the political behaviour of European actors. I argue that the policy dynamics of EU migration policies is carving a hierarchical risk culture whose risk politicization strategies reify migrants as a risk group.

I will adopt a constructivist perspective on security. This option will allow me to deconstruct the articulation between migration and identity and to study the implications of claims concerned with societal insecurity. As discussed throughout the article, migration is an example of an area that can be constructed as an existential threat to the symbolic and functional survival of a society. Revealing the close link between migration and the politics of security highlights the fact that identity is a particularly suited element to be tackled by the every day practices of risk control.

Targeted governance and risk profiling are addressed as two of the most important risk politicization strategies. Targeted governance and risk profiling assume a specific importance since they highlight two main components of the politics of security, namely processes of objectivation (identity cards, passports, bureaucratic categories) and subjectivation (individual or group alternative identifications) aimed at delimiting the groups to be "secured".¹

The article is structured into three sections. It starts to look at how migration can be understood as a political arena. Focusing on the security-migration nexus the article discusses discursive and non discursive securitizing strategies in order to illustrate

1 CASE Collective, "Critical Approaches to Security in Europe. A Network Manifesto", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 37, no. 4, 2006, p. 470.



how migratory movements are increasingly being represented as potential threats to societal stability. The second section explores cultural-symbolical theories of risk. The article interrogates the features of hierarchical risk cultures and in what ways the nature of institutional environments, based on diverse cultural bias, produce different political outcomes. In a third section, EU migration and asylum policies are represented as products of an institutionalized threat environment. The article discusses the institutional, political and strategic dimensions of securitizing migration in the EU, highlighting in what ways risk management strategies in this area are not based on exceptional politics but on daily practices of risk control. It is argued that the nature of the policy-making process in the migration arena is promoting a fettered and intergovernmental environment for policy-making and is favouring a hierarchical rationality responsible for triggering a particular sensitivity regarding border maintenance. The rationale for the control of the Mediterranean border of the EU is particularly emphasized. The article concludes by highlighting how security policies are deeply articulated with security knowledge and in what ways that knowledge constitutes the main resource for securitizing migration in the European Union.

Migration as a political arena

In Europe, as in other world regions, authors working in the area of security studies have been acknowledging an increase in the employment of the rhetoric of security concerning societal and internal affairs.² Such an increase is linked with the widening of the security agenda occurred throughout the 1990s which, in turn, resulted in the establishment of a “security continuum”³ whereby issues traditionally characterised as pertaining to an internal security domain, are included in the international / transnational security agenda. Migration is an example of such issues.

Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller define the twentieth century as the “age of migration”.⁴ Two world wars, civil wars, ethnic conflicts, environmental disasters and political oppression transformed the twentieth century in a century of massive population movements.

Throughout most of the twentieth century, migration was taken as “the mediating factor for the production and development of capitalism”.⁵ However, since the 1990s, migratory movements come to be perceived as threats. In Western Europe, restrictive migration policies are a phenomenon of the early 1970s. However, only after the end of the “cold war” was migration included in the international / transnational security agenda. Gündüz states,

- 2 Jef Huysmans, “Language and the Mobilisation of Security Expectations. The Normative Dilemma of Speaking and Writing Security”, Paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop Redefining Security, Mannheim, 1999; Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Security, Migration and Asylum*, London and New York, Routledge, 2006; Didier Bigo “When two become one. Internal and External Securitisations in Europe”, Michael C Williams, Morten Kelstrup, (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community*, London and New York, Routledge, 2000, pp. 171-204; Elspeth Guild, “Introduction”, Elspeth Guild, Florian Geyer, (eds.), *Security vs Justice*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008, pp. 1-19.
- 3 Didier Bigo, “When two become one. Internal and External Securitisations in Europe”, p. 35.
- 4 Stephen Castles and Mark Miller, *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 2nd edition, New York, The Guilford Press, 1998.
- 5 Maggie Ibrahim, “The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse”, *International Migration*, vol. 43, no. 5, 2005, p. 187.



"[w]hereas migration had for long been seen as a topic of economic policy and, therefore, as a part of *economization*, with the end of the Cold War, it became framed as a security problem construed around the fright of difference".⁶

Aradau discusses the security-migration nexus emphasizing the restructuring of the role of the state in the post "cold war" context. She argues that,

"[d]eprived of its Cold War exterior enemy, the bureaucratically fragmented state needs to find another 'enemy' in order to fulfill its essential role of protector of society. The enemy outside becomes the enemy within, disrupter of order and harmony".⁷

International organizations have been particularly important in reifying migration as a security question. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) considered, in its 1994 Report on Human Development, migration as a potential factor of insecurity.⁸ In June 2008, in the context of the reformulation of the European Security Strategy, the EU High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, called upon the need to establish new priorities concerning potential threat factors for European security. Among such new priorities, migration is highlighted. Javier Solana declares:

"[t]he ESS (European Security Strategy) was based on an analysis of the major global challenges as they stood in 2003. But today some of them are more relevant than others of five years ago and we also have new ones. Climate change and its effects on international security, and energy security were not contemplated in the strategy. The same applies to migration, illegal migration in particular, and information security. We have to take account of these developments".⁹

Migratory movements are increasingly being represented as potential threats to a particular kind of stability: societal stability. On behalf of national unity, aliens and migrants are considered as disruptive of cultural cohesion and public order and, frequently, as "(...) fraudulent profiteers capitalizing on the wealth created by the established (...)".¹⁰ The characterization of migration as a danger to collective identity leads, in the perspective of Maggie Ibrahim, to the affirmation of a new kind of racism constructed, not on the basis of biological superiority, but on the belief that cultural diversity can be a synonym for social anomy.¹¹ Cultural difference is used as an argument for migrants' exclusion and for their categorization as a threat.¹² Huysmans

6 Zuhail Gündüz, "From 'Necessary' to 'Dangerous' and Back Again. The Economization, Securitization and Europeanization of Migration", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, annual, no. 12, 2007, p. 75.

7 Claudia Aradau, "Beyond Good and Evil: Ethics and Securitization/Desecuritization Techniques", *Rubikon: International Forum of Electronic Publications*, 2001, <http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/claudia2.htm>, accessed on 20 December, 2008. (Accessed 20 December, 2008), p. 2.

8 United Nations Development Programme, *Report on Human Development: New Dimensions on Human Security*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994

9 Communication of the EU High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana before the European Parliament, June 2008.

10 Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Security, Migration and Asylum*, p. 2.

11 Maggie Ibrahim, "The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse", *International Migration*, vol. 43, no. 5, 2005, p. 187

12 Ibid.



argues that the security / migration nexus, sustains a radical political strategy aimed at excluding particular categories of people by reifying them as danger.¹³ The politics of exclusion concerning migrants is framed by particular discursive and non discursive security practices which are the object of increasing theorization.

Literature concerned with the deepening of the concept of security upholds that security and criminological discourses should not be considered as a neutral language that describes an extra-discursive world. In fact, representing migration in terms of security or crime contributes to the constitution of the policy area as a security arena Huysmans argues,

“[s]ecurity questions such as the internal security continuum result from a work of mobilisation in which practices work upon each other and thus create an effect which we call a security problem. This effect is a structural effect which is beyond the intentions and control of the individual’s practices of definition. Immigration as a security problem is thus not a natural given. It does not just pop up as a new threat manifesting itself and triggering a security policy trying to curtail the danger. Turning immigration issues into a security question for a society involves a mobilisation of particular institutions such as the police, a particular kind of knowledge - security knowledge - and specific expectations concerning the social exchanges between various groups in society. It is an intersubjective rather than subjective understanding of security. The central level is not the individual’s mind or history but the interaction between different actions articulating a security knowledge and mobilising security expectations in a already institutionalised context”.¹⁴

A key concept is that of securitization. Following Buzan *et al.* securitization represents a “(...) move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics”.¹⁵ The articulation of “security” entails the claim that an issue is held to pose an existential threat to a valued referent object and that it is legitimate to move the issue beyond the established rules of “normal” politics to deal with it through exceptional, i.e. security methods. This sets the actor in a very strong position to deal with an issue in a manner represented as appropriate to the level of the threat.¹⁶

As a political strategy, securitization is particularly conditioned in relation to the ability of framing security in such a way as to establish the conditions of possibility for certain actions. This means that, contrary to what Buzan *et al.*’s definition suggests, it is not necessary to use a language of exception in order to perform a securitizing move. In fact, by inserting an issue in the existing security frameworks an inherent securitizing

13 Jef Huysmans, “Defining social constructivism in security studies. The normative dilemma of writing security”, *Alternatives*, no. 27, 2002, pp. 41-62.

14 Jef Huysmans, “Language and the Mobilisation of Security Expectations. The Normative Dilemma of Speaking and Writing Security”, Paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop Redefining Security, Mannheim, 1999, p. 2.

15 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework For Analysis*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 23.

16 Holger Stritzel, “Towards a theory of securitization: Copenhagen and beyond”, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 13, no. 3, 2007, p. 359.

process unfolds, for the representational ambit of discussion and policy-making becomes pre-determined.

Unpacking processes of securitization requires a dual principle. First, that the language of security has a performative function. Second, that such a performative function is embedded in a framework of meaning that turns security intelligible in a wider context of political action.¹⁷ As Doty rightly points, taking seriously the performative character of international practices requires that one starts with the premise that representation is a significant and inherent aspect of International Relations, both as a practice of political actors and as an academic discipline. For instance, the agency-structure debate is void without the study of representational practices. The most important question, in this context, is how representation effects are produced which involves a critical study of the diversified practices that construct meaning, normalizes some modes of being and marginalizes others.¹⁸

How can we relate securitization and migration?

Securitizing migration is part of representing migration as a meta-issue. Meta-issues are at the heart of symbolic politics, particularly, meta-politics. Given that diverse phenomena are associated with the physical mobility of individuals, migration is easily politicized as an overarching issue. In fact, international migrations can be easily articulated with a set of other issues, namely military, social, economic, political and cultural phenomena. Meta-politics relates real world issues with fears around international mobility, disturbing the unsure balance between the material and symbolic content of politics by articulating substantive issues such as unemployment and security with symbols which represent threats without a necessary real world factual support.¹⁹

The constitution of migration as a policy area is dependent upon institutional and discursive practices. The importance of security utterances is vital to define the specificities of a policy area in terms of the articulation between themes, theories and practices. Discursive formations create, therefore, conditions of possibility for the emergence of security practices and technologies and, in particular, for the development of securitization moves. As previously referred, while being a process, securitization is always context dependant, for it mobilizes values particular to specific communities. We can, accordingly, understand securitization as the product of the institutionalization of threat environments.²⁰ These environments define threats and risks and sort out instruments to manage them.

The cultural symbolic approach to risk

The “grid-group” cultural theory was developed mainly through the work of anthropologists Mary Douglas and Michael Thompson and political scientists Richard

17 Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Security, Migration and Asylum* p. 25.

18 Roxanne Lynn Doty, “Aporia, A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory”, *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 3, no. 3, 1997, pp. 365-392.

19 Thomas Faist, *Dual Citizenship as Overlapping Membership*, Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations 3/01, Malmö, School of International Migration and Ethnic Relations, 2001.

20 Jef Huysmans, “Language and the Mobilisation of Security Expectations. The Normative Dilemma of Speaking and Writing Security”, Paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop Redefining Security, Manheim, 1999, p. 19.



Ellis and Aaron Wildavsky. It has been applied to several fields in the social sciences, from public policy to cultural identity studies. The theory claims that social contexts can be framed by two dimensions: “grid” (individuation/regulation) and “group” (social incorporation/membership). From this dimensions four dynamically related cultural types emerged: hierarchy, fatalism, egalitarianism and individualism derived from corresponding cultural biases. Each cultural bias corresponds to a specific kind of threat environment.²¹

A cultural bias is fundamentally a heuristic construction of claims and counter claims, sustained by individuals’ active engagements who, thereby, invoke particular ideas of the self and of society. It is worth quoting Douglas:

“[e]ach culture produces, in the process of negotiating claims, its own compatible theory of the world and the self. It also calls forth the desires from the persons at the same time that it defines good and wrong behaviour. ‘Society prepares the crime’ as Quatelet said, and at the same time it defines the persons, as Durkheim said”.²²

The hierarchic bias is characterised by high levels of both “grid” and “group”, which means high regulation combined with a high sense of belonging. Hierarchical cultures select mainly social risks, namely risks that threaten to disturb the social order and the viability of a particular community itself. They tend to blame foreigners, outsiders and criminals, labelling these groups as unworthy of trust and as potential menaces, as potential “tainted” individuals, that jeopardise the “purity” of the local community. As a risk culture the hierarchical type is depicted as being based in government and administration, institutional formality and compartmentalization, as well as by being reductionist in reasoning method and therefore specially concerned with measuring issues. Risks are treated as objective realities, since objectivity is considered essential for the justification of political action. This quest for objectivity leads this risk culture into taking a longer view on phenomena, which, in turn, allows for a degree of depoliticization of events liable to be considered risks, and the selection of technical vocabulary “(...) that can be formalized without being politicized”²³. Risk cultures are distinguished by how they allocate blame, by the opportunity cost of such allocation and the interest and values that accountability processes are meant to protect.

In *Cultural Theory* and *Culture Matters*, Aaron Wildavsky, Richard Ellis and Michael Thompson, reformulated the cultural typology, adding new analytical elements to it, namely the nature of the transactions between social agents, as well as the type of competition occurring among them. Regarding the “grid” dimension, the authors point that low “grid” corresponds to a social setting of symmetrical transactions, and high “grid” to asymmetrical transactions (weak connectedness). Regarding

21 Mary Douglas, “The Depoliticization of Risk”, Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, (eds.), *Culture Matters. Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, “Introduction”, Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, (eds.), *Culture Matters. Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, pp. 1-21. Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis Aaron Wildavsky, 1990, *Cultural Theory*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1990.

22 Mary Douglas, *Thought Styles*, London, Sage Publications, 1996a, p. 24.

23 Mary Douglas, “The Depoliticization of Risk”, Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, (eds.), *Culture Matters. Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, p. 130.



the “group” dimension, low “group” matches a social setting of unfettered (open) competition, and high “group” to an environment of fettered competition. Following Ellis, Thompson and Wildavsky’s reformulation of the cultural typology, hierarchical solidarity is a product of asymmetrical transactions (weak connectedness) and fettered competition (environments where competition among social actors suffers different sorts of constraints).²⁴ The importance of hierarchical rationality resides in the way it demonstrates the profoundly fragmented nature of EU migration policy as well as the importance of bottom-up causality in explaining migration outcomes. Member-states priorities in the migration domain are diverse which accounts for the weak connectedness between their policies. The way member-states react and adjust to EU policies is also as varied as their responsibility for the security of the Schengen border. The fragmented nature of states’ interests and threat perceptions also results in the pervasiveness of different kind of constraints that characterize the interaction between member-states and European institutions in the migration realm.

Migration and Asylum policies in the European Union

Migration political outputs are often described as the result of closed policy-making environments. European migration and asylum policies seem to be the result of a fettered and asymmetrical environment. In reality, diversified factors such as intergovernmental procedures, political sensitivity and the disparate interests of the actors involved, have transformed the EU migration and asylum policies into a highly contested political terrain. Policy-making is not only contested but also adhocistic.²⁵ In this context, member-states’ reluctance to fully communitarize the policy realm of migration and asylum, and their preference for the externalization of policies that try to deal with migration issues within originating countries is paradigmatic.

Issues related to internal security have always been, in a symbolic way, the reflex of nation-state discourses and practices. Hence, the move towards European high group rationalities is difficult. It defies the socialisation processes in Europe and renders the europeanization of national policies more complex.

A collective normative identity is essential for policy-making. However, for such collective identity to arise, the “group” (as defined by the “grid-group” theory) needs a high degree of membership. Concerning EU migration and asylum policies, “group” rationality is being constructed by Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) officials working on an intergovernmental basis and pursuing national priorities. The predominance of such intergovernmental basis accounts for two fundamental elements of EU migration and asylum policies: the complexities of intra-EU migration and the existence of a dual track approach to migration in the European Union. I will characterize the dual track approach below. Intra-EU migration is not the object of this work. However, it should be noted that migration flows among EU member-states are a highly contentious issue. In fact, the management of migration flows among EU member-states is determined

24 Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, “Introduction” Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, (eds.), *Culture Matters. Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, p. 5.

25 Virginie Guiraudon, “The constitution of a European immigration policy domain: a political sociology approach”, *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 10, no. 2, 2003, pp. 263-282.



by discernible idiosyncratic strategies. The nature and effects of those strategies are more salient in the case of EU member-states that maintain reservations regarding the Schengen cooperation, namely Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland.

The enhancement of intergovernmental high “group” rationalities may provide one possible explanation for the fettered and asymmetrical institutional environment of EU migration policies. Such a fettered and asymmetrical environment seems to be the product of the establishment of a security continuum, whereby issues traditionally characterised as pertaining to an internal security domain are included in the international/ transnational security agenda. Migration is an example of such issues.

As a result, this field might be considered as an interesting locus as it enables the analysis of the dynamic evolution of the europeanization of political action at a micro level. The interplay between cultural contexts and policy-making processes may be a viable analytical field to identify the frame and limitations of socialization mechanisms in Europe.

The institutional dimension of securitizing migration in the EU

The analytical advantage of the articulation between a sociological-institutional approach to EU migration and asylum policies and cultural-symbolical theories of risk, is that it allows the discussion of how the development of institutionalised threat environments, at EU level, is a process that combines the use of criteria in order to organize reality, with the development of mechanisms that allow for the establishment of aesthetic distinctions between social facts and social groups based on Douglas’ notion of “forensic needs”²⁶. Concerning the domain of EU migration and asylum policies, the organisation of reality and the definitions, distinctions and categorizations of social facts and social groups are at the core of the strategies that politicise migration and asylum as a risk to the security of the Union. The social meanings that are crystallized by such strategies can be discussed Mary Douglas’ concept of hierarchical risk cultures.

My research hypothesis is that, concerning EU migration and asylum policies, the intergovernmental nature of its policy-making process is promoting a fettered environment for policy-making, which combined with asymmetrical transactions, favours a hierarchical rationality. My goal is to establish a link between the characteristics of the referred policy-making environment and the features of the institutionalized threat environment that is being carved in the migration and asylum arena at EU level. Therefore, I have to start by arguing on how it can be considered that the EU migration and asylum policy arena constitute a fettered and asymmetrical policy environment.

According to the “grid-group” cultural theory, hierarchies institute closed policy-making environments, defining limits on competition among policy-makers and, by instituting strict forms of behavior appropriate to those of differing rank and station (accountability), define status differences among participants in the policy-making process (asymmetrical transactions). In my perspective, the EU migration and asylum policy arena embodies these characteristics.

26 Mary Douglas, *Risk and Blame. Essays in Cultural Theory*, London and New York, Routledge, 1994.



Concerning the fettered character of the policy-making environment, there are two fundamental elements.

First, the historical evolution of the constitution of a political-sociological domain in the EU migration and asylum arena demonstrates member-states' reluctance concerning the communitarization of this policy area. It is clear that the creation of a common migration and asylum policy for the European Union has been, and continues to be, a slow and long process. As referred, it is noteworthy that, in the context of the Amsterdam Treaty, member-states decided to establish a transition period to delay the communitarization of migration related issues. Moreover, the Title V dispositions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) make it difficult to evaluate the limits of the legal bases defined by the Treaty. In fact, the Title V of the TFEU, comprises general and open-ended articles that guarantee the flexibility, namely concerning the legal obligations deriving from the Treaty's provisions. For instance, the penultimate paragraph of article 79^o of the TFEU allows member-states to preserve or set up national provisions concerning immigration, namely in what concerns integration policies. The public policy and public security clauses that are transversal to several migration related legislative measures also guarantee member-states' control over policy implementation.

The second factor concerns the extent of member-states control over policy initiatives. Due to the late association of the European Commission and of the European Parliament, the institutional structures directly representative of member-states interests kept a tight control over the policy-making process. Not only has the European Council a particularly important role in the definition of the major policy guidelines concerning the European "Area of Freedom, Security and Justice", but also other less visible structures like the Council Secretariat hold a fundamental predominance in the drafting and negotiation of policy measures. The "leverage" intergovernmental structures have in the policy-making process follows from the influence member-states conceded to high level strictly intergovernmental groups such as the TREVI Group or the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Immigration. The fettered character of these groups should be understood in the light of the traditional insulated nature of internal security policy issues. Their work allowed for the carving of an intergovernmental network of policy experts that fuelled its knowledge into intergovernmental structures.

As for the asymmetrical nature of the policy-making environment, that reflects the strict character of the status and policy-making responsibilities between decision-making actors, another two elements are of particular significance.

The first element concerns the reciprocal control of policy-makers' role in the remit of Title V of TFEU. Not only are institutional skirmishes frequent among intergovernmental and supranational institutions, but also the Court of Justice has its role severely limited regarding the legal control of legislative measures which further empower member-states status within the policy-making and policy implementation processes.

The second element relates to the particular characteristics of the association of the European Commission and of the European Parliament (EP) to the policy-making framework. Once more, not only such an association took place after a transitory



period, but also the establishment of that period served a specific purpose: it allowed member-states to define the general policy framework of legislation in migration related areas, thus limiting the possibilities for the future discussion of major policy initiatives that could reflect the traditional more “liberal” approach of the European Commission and of the EP.

As a risk culture the hierarchical type is depicted as holding some particular organizational characteristics. The first characteristic concerns the strict allocation of functions between policy-making actors, ensured by a rule following behavior and by the fact that all claims are considered under the condition of being produced under bureaucratic processes. Institutional accountability, in the EU migration and asylum policy arena empowers member-states mainly through the institution of safeguard clauses that protect member-states’ interests.

Secondly, the hierarchic culture displays a practical propensity to try to foreclose politics favoring the transformation of policy issues into administrative questions. In the realm of Title V of the TFEU, the technological character of a considerable number of legislative measures, particularly in the area of border control, can be interpreted as technical policy solutions that “mask” the deep political nature of decisions whose main goal is to set a balance between the dimensions of freedom and security.

The third organizational feature of hierarchical cultures is the fact that solidarity among members within the culture is achieved through mutual constraints, as well as checks and balances among internal forces and, in particular, by the avoidance of eventual disruptive processes of deep change that may be the result of a choice among fundamental goals. It is visible in the study of Title V of the TFEU, that the allocation of competences strikes a difficult balance between the need to preserve member-states interests, in an area represented as particularly sensitive to domestic political decision, and the need to increase the policy dynamics of European action. Moreover, it is also clear that the establishment of such a balance is achieved through the approval of long-term and general legislative measures, such as milestones (“Tampere Milestones”) and programmes (“The Hague Programme”) whose measurable influence may seem quite abstract and vague but whose importance lays on the setting of schedules for the approval of decisions in areas considered as policy priorities.

In accordance with this third feature, the fourth characteristic of the hierarchical organizational culture is exactly the abstract and modest nature of the goals pursued as well as the incremental and piecemeal mode of their definition and achievement. If we observe the character of the policy documents that the EU has come to agree upon since 1992, it becomes clear that those policies have generally followed a minimalist approach. In practice, this means that few, if any, changes have been necessary concerning member-states’ domestic migration related regulations in order to give effect to EU law in the area. In addition, this minimalist approach also means that a EU law may allow some member-states policies to become more restrictive, even though EU legislation only intends to set a minimum permitted level of asylum or migration practice.

The adhocratic style of decision-making and the vulnerability to unexpected conditions characterize the fifth attribute of hierarchic organizational cultures. Concerning the EU



migration and asylum policies, this attribute is especially important. In fact, the fettered environment that can be observed in the case of policy-making under Title V of the TFEU demonstrates that policy measures follow a piecemeal (non-comprehensive), adhoc logic and are particularly exposed to the triggering effects of contingent security crisis. At the political level, security crises tend to foster the symbolic dimension of existing rules, standard operating measures and structures of meaning. A specific factor that enhances the adhoc nature of policy-making, reflecting the triggering repercussions of security crises in the migration and asylum field, is the selective definition of tight deadlines for policy-making. These tight deadlines tend to promote rule abiding. Above all, decision-making under time pressure enhances the tendency to overstretch security measures. Accordingly, the inherent effects of a particular security crisis have allowed the JHA Council to order its subordinate organs to accelerate the process for achieving early agreements on some important legislative files

Finally, hierarchic organizational cultures develop a particular sensitivity towards border maintenance, the protection of group values and the politics of exclusion, which means that this type of culture easily renders migration problematic from a security perspective.

Hierarchical cultures focus on social risks, namely the ones that threaten to disturb the social order and the viability of a particular community in itself. They tend to blame foreigners by criminalizing migratory movements and classifying migratory groups as undeserving of trust and as potential threats to the integrity of the political community. This final characteristic is fundamental in the light of the lines of inquiry pursued in our work. Directly questioned by this last organizational feature, is how the hierarchical culture politicises migration as a risk. In other words, which risk politicization strategies are characteristic of the hierarchical risk culture?

In the realm of EU migration and asylum policies, the “danger” of migration is politicized through risk management strategies whose main feature is the fact that they are not based on a politics and on a language of exception. Risk management strategies represent threats through an impersonal correlation of factors liable to produce risk based on the establishment of a “friend/enemy” continuum. Such a form of threat representation is based on “normal” measures such as surveillance and pre-emptive risk profiling that contribute to the social control of a population, through the targeted governance of their composition. The goal is to perform the management of risks against the background of uncertainty and contingency, preventing them from reaching the eventual nature of existential threats.

Measures such as surveillance, pre-emptive risk profiling and targeted governance are at the core of the policy framework of EU action in the area of migration and asylum.

The political dimension of securitizing migration in the EU

The article 7 of the Schengen Agreement signed in 1985, undertaken outside the Community realm, states the following:



“[t]he Parties shall endeavor to approximate their visa policies as soon as possible in order to avoid the adverse consequences in the field of immigration and security that may result from easing checks at the common borders. They shall take, if possible by 1 January 1986, the necessary steps in order to apply their procedures for the issue of visas and admission to their territories, taking into account the need to ensure the protection of the entire territory of the five States against illegal immigration and activities which could jeopardize security”²⁷.

This article embodies the spill-over rationale that presided to the strengthening of external border control policies: the easing of checks at common borders resulted in the functional need to reinforce the protection of the territory of the five signatory states against international threats, namely irregular migration. When, in 1986, the Single European Act defined the internal market as “(...) an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is insured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty”²⁸, an articulation was established with the logic of the Schengen Agreement. In this context, calls for the deepening of integration and the abolition of internal border controls caused a debate on the inevitability of the concession of powers to the Community to act on issues like crime and migration. Those issues were considered as fundamental for an area without internal frontiers and, consequently, compensatory measures were deemed imperative.²⁹

The introduction of the third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs, in the Maastricht Treaty and the latter incorporation of the Schengen agreements in the *acquis communautaire* in Amsterdam meant the formalization of the spill-over effect from the socio-economic project of the internal market to an internal security project:

“[t]o make the issue of border control a security question (...) the internal market had to be connected to an internal security *problématique*. A particular key element in this process was the identification of a particular side-effect of the creation of the internal market. One expected that the market would not only improve free-movement of law abiding agents, but would also facilitate illegal and criminal activities by terrorists, international criminal organizations and immigrants”³⁰.

Moreover, the domination of agenda-setting in the migration and asylum arena by interior ministry officials resulted in the securitization of European migration debate. The language of security and control was empowered whereas the language of rights and freedoms was restrained. As Hix argues,

27 Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, 1985. Collected from the Schengen *acquis* as referred to in Article 1(2) of Council Decision 1999/435/EC of 20 May 1999, OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 1, article 7.

28 Single European Act of 1986, Official Journal L 169 of 29 June 1987, article 13.

29 Valsamis Mitsilegas, “Border Security in the EU”, Anneliese Baldaccini, Elspeth Guild, Helen Toner, (eds.), *Whose Freedom, Security and Justice. EU immigration and Asylum Law and Policy*, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007, p. 360.

30 Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Security, Migration and Asylum*, London and New York, Routledge, 2006, p. 360.



“[w]hereas freedom of movement implies a reduction of the state’s role in regulating the movement of persons, ‘controlled migration’ implies a legitimate role for the state and state officials in monitoring the movement of persons and prevent activities that threaten state security”.³¹

In “The Hague Programme on Strengthening Justice, Freedom and Security” of 2004, the European Council underpinned the necessity to maximize the effectiveness and interoperability of the EU information system in tackling irregular migration and improving border control³². In its “Communication on the implementation of The Hague Programme”, issued in 2005, the Commission defined the ten priorities of the European Union for the next five years in the field of the “European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”. In the Communication, the Commission linked the establishment of an area of free circulation of persons with the need to develop an integrated control of the access to the territory of the EU, namely through the use of biometric technology³³. Both “The Hague Programme” and the Communication from the Commission embody the institutionalization of an internal security project based on the spill-over effect. The point six of the Commission’s Communication on “The Hague Programme” states that

“[a]n area where the free movement of persons is fully ensured demands further efforts leading to integrated control of the access to the territory of the Union, based on an integrated management of external borders, a common visa policy and with the support of new technologies, including the use of biometric identifiers”.³⁴

One of the most important components of “The Hague Programme” is the balance it tries to establish between freedom and security. In fact, “The Hague Programme” understands the concept of freedom as a fundamental right and relates it to the freedom of movement and residence of citizens of the Union in the European area. As a result, freedom is reduced to equal treatment between EU citizens within the European Union area. In “The Hague Programme”, freedom is primarily seen as freedom of circulation and establishment inside a territorial area. Such a restrictive interpretation may account for the fact that most of the text of “The Hague Programme” concerns limits to freedom, namely policing, controlling and punishing mechanisms that can be implemented at a distance. As Bigo points, regarding the concept of freedom present in “The Hague Programme”:

“[t]he proper notion of an active defence of freedom is distorted into a war for a kind of freedom – war against threat and fear where freedom is seen as a right to be protected by the state(s) and not a capacity to act. This rendering

31 Simon Hix. *The Political System of the European Union*, 2nd edition, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 368.

32 Council of the European Union, “The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union”, 16054/04, Brussels, 13 December 2004, point 1.7.2.

33 Cf. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years The Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice”, COM, 2005, 184 final.

34 *Ibid.*, point 6.



of freedom may contradict freedom. Each form of freedom is then defined by its limits and its antagonism with other freedoms and other freedom of others. Liberty as a unified and generic concept has no place”.³⁵

The definition of freedom through the establishment of its limits is particularly visible in the way “The Hague Programme” refers to the balance between security and privacy concerning the exchange of information between member-states. “The Hague Programme” introduced the principle of availability as the main rule for the sharing of information between law enforcement and judicial authorities in the EU member-states.³⁶ In its point 7, the Communication from the Commission states that

“[e]ffective maintenance of law and order and the investigation of cross-border criminality in an area of free movement cannot be allowed to be impeded by cumbersome procedures for the exchange of information (...). In this area, the right balance between privacy and security should be found in sharing information among law enforcement and judicial authorities”³⁷.

The highlighting of the importance of the sharing of information shows how European institutions link border and migration control to the safeguarding of European internal security. The gathering and sharing of information is achieved through the establishment of databases at EU level covering different purposes. Data protection and privacy are downgraded on behalf of the collective right to security.

It is important to note that “The Hague Programme” is paradigmatic of the effects that the communitarisation and centralization of the Schengen *acquis* have represented to the quantitative and qualitative nature of border control policies in Europe. Such transformation resulted in “(...) a shift of terminology from ‘border control’ to ‘border security’”.³⁸ This shift is influenced by the international political context post 9/11, that has been characterized by calls to maximum surveillance, namely through the use of biometric technology, and by the reification of the articulation between crime, migration and the movement of people. In “The Hague Programme”, it can be read:

“[t]he management of migration flows, including the fight against illegal immigration should be strengthened by establishing a continuum of security measures that effectively links visa application procedures and entry and exit procedures at external border crossings. Such measures are also of importance for the prevention and control of crime, in particular terrorism. In order to achieve this, a coherent approach and harmonized solutions in the EU on biometric identifiers and data are necessary”.³⁹

35 Didier Bigo, “Liberty, whose Liberty? The Hague Programme and the Conception of Freedom”, Thierry Balzacq, Sergio Carrera, (eds.), *Security vs Freedom. A Challenge for Europe’s Future*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, pp. 36.

36 Evelien Brouwer, “Effective Remedies in EU migration law”, Anneliese Baldaccini, Elspeth Guild, Helen Toner, (eds.), *Whose Freedom, Security and Justice. EU immigration and Asylum Law and Policy*, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007, pp. 57-85.

37 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years The Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice”, COM, 2005, 184 final, point 7.

38 Valsamis Mitsilegas, “Border Security in the EU”, pp. 359.

39 Council of the European Union, “The Hague Programme: strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union”, 16054/04, Brussels, 13 December 2004, point 1.7.2.



These new measures of border surveillance target third country nationals, in particular, since they are left without or with few rights when confronted with extra controls and possible wrongful identification.⁴⁰

The shift from “border control” to “border security” and “border management” in the EU was stimulated by a debate, initiated at the Laeken European Council of December 2001, on “integrated border management”. The concept of “integrated border management” was developed in the 2002 Commission Communication to the Council and European Parliament “Towards Integrated Management of the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union”.⁴¹ In the Communication, the Commission stressed the need to implement a coherent set of legislative, operational and financial measures capable of ensuring an integrated system to efficiently manage the external border of the EU, concerning namely the control of people at the border.⁴² Accordingly, “The Hague Programme”, although recognizing control and surveillance of external borders as a member-states’ prerogative paved the way for the development of a European External Borders Agency (Frontex). The agency, that became fully operational in 2005, has its own staff, is not dependant on liaison officers detached from member-states and holds operational capability and mandate. One of the main competences of the Agency is to provide organizational and operational assistance to member-states in case of need and at their request, which includes the support and the deployment of its experts. However, the European External Borders Agency legal framework is very unclear concerning accountability questions and in the future its mandate will have to be revised.

Another important competence is the development and application of a common integrated risk analysis system. In addition to Frontex, a “Community Code on the rules governing the movement of people across borders” (Schengen Borders Code)⁴³ was established. The Code clarifies, codifies and develops, through a single instrument, the whole Community *acquis* concerning internal and external borders, thus replacing part of the Schengen Convention and other pieces of the Schengen *acquis*.

Integrated border management strengthens the selective nature of border control in Europe. In fact, border security is being increasingly developed through a rationale of risk profiling and targeted governance. Borders became a considerable obstacle to the groups of people not welcomed inside the territory. On the other hand, “(...) technology-based and coherently structured controls will present no obstacles to licit travelers – they are likely to even speed-up clearance procedures”.⁴⁴ Following Laura Corrado, the notion of “border management” instead of “border control” implies a conceptual shift from a security related approach to a more global one centered “(...)

40 Valsamis Mitsilegas, “Border Security in the EU”, in Anneliese Baldaccini, Elspeth Guild, Helen Toner, (eds.), *Whose Freedom, Security and Justice. EU immigration and Asylum Law and Policy*, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007.

41 Cf. Communication from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament “Towards Integrated Management of the External Borders of the Member-States of the European Union”, COM, 2002/1233 final.

42 Laura Corrado, “Negotiating the EU External Border”, Thierry Balzacq, Sergio Carrera, (eds.), *Security vs Freedom. A Challenge for Europe’s Future*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, pp. 184, 185.

43 Regulation 62/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006, establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, OJ L 105, 13/04/2006, pp. 1-32.

44 Peter Hobbing, “Securitizing migration, (in)securitizing migrants. The EU’s Commission new Border Package”, paper delivered at Workshop Migration, Justice in Canada and the EU, September 24, 2008, p. 180.



not only on the prevention of illegal immigration and of security threats but also on a smooth border crossing for *bona fide* travelers".⁴⁵

Risk profiling and targeted governance in the field of European border management, can be understood in terms of the development of biopolitical technologies. In fact, integrated border management in Europe is articulated with the emergence of a supranational biometric control regime. Eurodac is a case in point.⁴⁶

The Eurodac Regulations, adopted by the Council in 2000 and 2002⁴⁷, constitute the legal basis for the establishment of an automated European dactylographic system in the European Union, enabling the instant and exact comparison of distinct biometric features for law enforcement purposes. The impact of such mechanisms on the relationship between the EU and third country nationals (TCNs) is compelling. The goal of the Regulations is to establish a system for comparing the fingerprints of asylum seekers and irregular migrants in order to determine whether an asylum applicant or a foreign national irregularly present in the territory of a member-state has previously claimed asylum in another member-state or whether an asylum applicant has entered unlawfully in the territory of the Union. Eurodac is, therefore, associated with the application of the European legislation regarding asylum procedures. Asylum-seekers are a group of people particularly targeted by the EU supranational biometric control regime. Following Elspeth Guild, the application of Eurodac Regulations impacts on asylum-claimers concerning their identification and their ability to become a subject in law within the jurisdiction of EU member-states. In opposition to what is established in the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, under EU law the figure of the asylum-seeker as a rights holder is closely associated with his or her status (regular or irregular) on the territory of the state of refuge. As Guild argues,

“[t]he existence in law of the asylum-seeker as a person seeking a right to reside, access to the labour market or benefits remains allocated to a Member State on the basis of rules which are determined by the EU itself but without regard to the preferences or wishes of the asylum seeker”.⁴⁸

According to the biopolitical rationale, under EU law the body of the asylum-seeker is reduced to the distinguishable evidence of his or her existence.

The strategic dimension of securitizing migration in the EU

Inadmissible, deportable, undesirable, dangerous, terrorist, all of these categories exist on a continuum that marks the politics of migration. The act of border crossing

45 Laura Corrado, “Negotiating the EU External Border”, p. 184.

46 Jonathan Aus, Eurodac: a Solution Looking for a Problem”, European Integration Online Papers, vol. 10, no. 6, 2006.

47 Council Regulation 2725/2000 /EC of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, OJ L 316, 15/12 /2000, p. 1 -10; Council Regulation 407/2002/EC of 28 February 2002 laying down certain rules to implement regulation 2725/2000 /EC concerning the establishment of “Eurodac” for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, OJ L 62, 573/2002, p. 1-5.

48 Elspeth Guild, “The Bitter Fruits of a Common Asylum Policy”, Thierry Balzacq, Sergio Carrera, (eds.), Security vs Freedom. A Challenge for Europe’s Future, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, p. 75.



frequently reveals the production of distinct racial ontologies of migrant communities located within nation-states. As Bhandar notes, the experience of border crossing is an ontological one “whereby both the technologies used in border security and the mode of securitization are understood to have a profound effect on the immigrant and migrant communities within nation-states”.⁴⁹ In Europe, as well as other securitized regions, the articulation among racial profiling strategies and the lurking politics of nationalizing identity as a response to the post 9/11 context has exposed the nature of the racial ontological formation of border crossing.

In fact, the post 9/11 context, growing securitization has produced distinct imaginary geographies on the war against terrorism.⁵⁰ Among these imaginary geographies, the borders surrounding the western world and Europe in particular, have acquired the character of dangerous places. Narratives on “leaky” and “suspect” borders gave an unparalleled impulse to European cooperation in the sensitive realm of migration. Formal and informal practices of border control have been instituted in order to regulate the mobility of nationals and non-nationals in distinct ways. The highly categorized control of mobility in Europe is framed by its politics of identity within which tensions about the illiberal practices of liberal states have emerged. Both at national and EU level, decision-makers uphold competing claims about legitimacy and authority that directly focus attentions on “the people”, the core community on behalf of whom security actions, that seldom curtail freedom, are.⁵¹ The contested politics of migration in Europe occurs within a wider debate about the identity of EU member-states and of the political community they have created. As Guild, Carrera, Groenendijk refer:

“[t]he central debate about what identity is and to whom it belongs, and the much larger contest about legitimacy and authority in the EU, has engulfed the world of migration. Suddenly it is the image of the immigrant that acts as a magnet for the understanding of what community is and who is entitled to belong to it. In seeking to find their own image, the EU and its member states have turned to look at the ‘other’ that they are not, in so doing hoping to find clarity about ‘who they are’” .⁵²

Due to a dual track approach persistent in EU migration policy⁵³ and to the use of the principle of subsidiarity-related arguments, member-states have only agreed to harmonize matters related to migration *strictu sensu*, namely issues associated with entry for short term purposes, visa policy, some specific aspects of return policy and circulation questions stemming from the abolition of internal border controls. The

49 Davina Bhandar, “Resistance, Detainment, Asylum. The onto-Political Limits of Border Crossing in North-America”, Deborah Cowen, Emily Gilbert, (eds.), *War, Citizenship, Territory*, London, Routledge, 2008, p. 281.

50 Angharad Stephens, “Beyond the imaginary geographies of the War on Terror?”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 50th Annual Convention Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future, New York, Marriot Marquis, USA, 2009, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p312923_index.html. (Accessed 1 July, 2010), no pagination.

51 Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera, Kees Groenendijk, “Understanding the Contest of Community: illiberal practices in the EU”, Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera, Kees Groenendijk, (eds.), *Illiberal Liberal States, Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2009, p. 1.

52 Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera, Kees Groenendijk, “Understanding the Contest of Community: illiberal practices in the EU”, p. 1.

53 Georgia Papagianni, *Institutional and Policy Dynamics of EU Migration Law*, Boston and Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006.



regulation of classical migration issues, such as the rights of third country nationals to enter for long-term purposes and to reside in a member-state, integration policy, employment, social rights and the articulation between migration and development policy remain under states' competence. The result is the pervasive importance of bottom-up causality in explaining EU migration policy and the persistent will of states to guarantee sovereignty over the constituency of their communities.

From an ontological point of view the securitization of border control highlights in what ways the border can be represented as a dangerous place. The elements that cross the border have the potential to weaken the authority of the border and to contaminate the inside. Within this narrative, the border is identified as the limit between the inside and the outside, safety and danger. It should be noted that, as a site of control, borders play a performative role that goes beyond discourse: the danger represented by the outside, and that the border is supposed to contain, is constructed as a reality that turns the inside coherent to those who live in it. This happens because the distinction between the inside and the outside, that the border embodies, is dependent on cultural codes that allocate blame. As Bhandar notes, border technologies allow the state to authenticate the ontological status of an individual who is subjected to modes of categorization like terrorist, inadmissible or deportable.⁵⁴ The performative role of borders and the articulation between representations of danger and allocations of accountability can be studied through Mary Douglas's cultural symbolic approach to risk.

Mary Douglas' cultural symbolic approach to risk posits that in a community there are diverse attitudes to authority and fairness directly linked to disparate ideas of justice and allocations of blame. Those divergences have an impact upon the social organization of a community, namely at the level of the political choices concerning public policies. Such choices mirror a normative debate framed by a culture of opposition for "(...) blaming the adversary is how the culture defines its own logical structure".⁵⁵ When depicting risk cultures, Mary Douglas states that blaming precedes and determines risk perception, for each social group starts by selecting whom it wants to consider accountable for risk allocation and, dependent on such judgment, it then chooses which kind of risk it wants to focus on. Thus, forensic needs - decisions on "who to blame" and "who to trust" - become the fundamental questions in terms of cultural types and their respective risk allocation and politicization strategies. Mary Douglas also argued that not only blame but also cognition is a focus for politicization. Claims on the politicization of cognition are vital in order to understand the discursive nature of border construction in Europe.

Klaus Eder argues that the social construction of borders in Europe is the combined result of a historical course in which the construction of its inner and outer boundaries interact. European borders are grounded on narrative resonance, which means that they are constructed and diffused bearing in mind the need to guarantee social plausibility and narrative sense. Eder claims that borders have a dual nature: they are,

54 Davina Bhandar, "Resistance, Detainment, Asylum. The onto-Political Limits of Border Crossing in North-America", 2008, p. 281.

55 Mary Douglas, *Thought Styles*, p. 174.



simultaneously, “hard” and “soft” facts. Border technologies and modes of border containment reveal the “hard” side of boundary building. The cultural boundaries that are established between groups of people and that are dependent on discourses and images people have of their world constitute “soft borders”. Such discourses and images are fundamental in what concerns European boundary building. As Eder writes:

“[d]efining who the Europeans are and who are not indicates a soft social fact. The difference between both is that the former, the hard borders, are institutionalized borders, written down in legal texts. The soft borders of Europe are encoded in other types of texts indicating a pre-institutional social reality, the reality of images of what Europe is and who are Europeans and who are not... soft borders are part of the ‘hardness’ of borders in the sense that the symbolic power inherent in soft borders helps to ‘naturalize’ hard borders, to produce the effect of taking borders for granted... This meaning production becomes more important, the more the institutional borders of Europe are not finalized and open to political struggles. In such cases, meaning production is more than a naturalization of existing hard borders; it is part of the political struggles over possible hard borders, thus providing a particular mechanism in the construction of hard borders. Defining an imaginary Europe impinges heavily upon the legal construction of the borders of Europe. Thus, Europe can be taken as a case of how border discourses on imaginary boundaries (i.e. soft facts) can play a causal role in the making of institutional (hard) Europe which we call the European Union.”⁵⁶

The main question of creating a European identity is the construction of narratives able to substitute the abstract, theoretical and elite based claims of a European cultural identity. In order to establish a European boundary building process with narrative sense, Europe had to search for narratives able to give a collective binding meaning to its borders. One of the strategies employed was the recreation of Europe as an identitarian space created around the separation between southern and northern Europe. The millenary division between the cultivated peoples of the south Europe and the “barbarians” from the north was reshaped through the European integration process. The distinction is now based on economic performance and it clearly favors northern Europe. For instance, in the context of Europeanization literature, several authors identify the so-called “Mediterranean Syndrome” approach. The approach departs from the meager compliance record with EU environmental legislation of southern member states (Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece). Proponents of the “Mediterranean Syndrome” approach point to a number of endemic deficiencies intrinsic in the socio-political and administrative structures of southern member states that are thought to account for their profound incapacity to adapt to the internal logic and the specific criteria of European policies, namely a weak “civic culture” that does not support the emergence of co-operative and compliant behavior and administrative structures and traditions such as fragmentation and ineffective coordination, lack of

56 Klaus Eder, “Europe’s borders: the narrative construction of borders of Europe”, *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 9, No. 2, 2006, pp. 256.



technical expertise, weak implementation capacities and ineffective monitoring and enforcement policy instruments as well as widespread incapacity to adjust to the internal logic and the specific requirements of European policies.⁵⁷ The “Mediterranean Syndrome” approach demonstrates in what ways to define Europe by the north is to define it by its welfare and by its social and economic mission.

What is important in terms of our discussion on narrative boundary building is that the north-south divide has created the image of an open and fragile southern border in the context of which the defence of Europe remains contested. In particular the south-eastern border has been constructed as the defence against the Muslim world. The allocation of accountability is fundamental in this respect: southern member-states are held accountable for the defence of a portion of European borders continuously depicted as vulnerable. It should not be forgotten that the southern enlargement of the European Economic Community, that occurred on the 1980s and that involved Spain, Portugal and Greece, represented what Liliana Suarez-Navaz designates as the “rebordering of the Mediterranean”.⁵⁸ This process of rebordering was conditional upon the close up of the southern border that was achieved, for instance, through the Spanish 1985 new alien law. In consequence, the European north-south divide was redrawn in order to include new southern countries that had to demonstrate to be “trustable” regarding border control. Such redrawing became symbolized in the belief that the Pyrenees had moved south. The need to protect the new European imagined community was achieved through the cultural and political closing of the southern border that, for instance, motivated a racial discourse against the presence of African workers in southern Europe. The cultural closing of the southern border involved the exclusion of the peoples of the southern rim of the Mediterranean Sea. As Eder argues:

“[t]he South ends in a frontier which begins with the Southern rim of the Mediterranean Sea. Arabic North Africa could have been considered ‘European’ when opposed to ‘Black Africa’. It could claim a long common tradition of being part of the Roman Empire, over centuries of an intellectual common ground of the Christian-Islamic culture up to the colonization of North Africa by the French (and less by the Spaniards). Yet this Southern rim is fixed with the consequence that Southern Italy (Sicily, Apulia) together with Greece, play the role of the ambiguous yet unchangeable border towards a non-European South. Even this obvious border of Europe needed a political act of closing it off culturally: the decline of the demand for EU membership by Morocco”.⁵⁹

The debate over Turkey’s accession to the European Union resumes the belief that the European south and south-eastern borders represent defence poles against Europe’s threatening “other” since they embody the difference between Christendom and Islam. The cultural divide has a life of its own and is reproduced through “hard”

57 Tanja Börzel, *Environmental leaders and Laggards in Europe. Why there is not a ‘southern problem’*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003.

58 Liliana Suarez-Navaz, *Rebordering the Mediterranean: Boundaries and Citizenship in Southern Europe*, Berghahn Books, 2004.

59 Klaus Eder, “Europe’s borders: the narrative construction of borders of Europe”, p. 283.



and “soft” practices of border control. The narrative construction of the southern European border follows, therefore, a logic that is based on narrative fidelity rather than on cognitive arguments.

Narrative boundary building in southern Europe is achieved through the institutionalization of “hard” and “soft” borders. The question of European borders obliges us, in fact, to change the mental map through which we usually think about borders. We traditionally think about European borders by establishing an immediate association with the borders of EU member states. The traditional tale about the border of the EU is that the EU border is like a line that encircles almost all EU member-states. The reality is very different from this traditional narrative. The border control system instituted in the EU leads to a situation whereby the borders are not necessarily connected to national borders, since border controls are often delocalised in relation to the location of real borders. European border controls, in fact, follow, track and target people’s movements through risk profiling mechanisms.

The EU visa regime is paradigmatic in this respect. The result of the sum of EU legislation in the realm of visa policy is the institution of essentially three categories of TCNs: i. TCNs who do not need a visa to enter in the Schengen territory; ii. TCNs that need a visa to enter the Schengen territory and iii. TCNs, or specific categories of TCNs (namely Palestinians, stateless persons and refugees), that are subject to prior consultation among member states.⁶⁰ The requirement for prior consultation among member states means that regarding certain TCNs, EU member-states do not trust each other enough in order to dismiss reciprocal consultation prior to the issue of the visa. This lack of trust among member-states mirrors the degree of danger that is associated to specific TCNs. We should bear in mind that the list of countries whose nationals are subject to prior consultation among member states for the issuing of a visa is an absolute product of bottom-up causality.

What that this means for the European border? The European border is located in different locations according to the visa regime instituted for each country. So, we have different and gradual zones of exclusion that target migration flows that are considered eventual overstayers or that are connected with countries or cultural groups regarding whom the terrorism risk is considered high. It is a logic of sovereignty associated with two other logics: a pastoral logic of individualization, whereby the individual must confess a priori his travel reasons and surmount the initial suspicion and a statistical logic through which risk groups are identified and individuals classified according to these groups. In practice, any visa candidate may be judged as potentially dangerous even in the absence of any individual criminal record. The goal is not to block everyone but only certain population groups. This border regime does not mirror a Huntingtonian view on the class of civilizations. In fact, 90 % of all visa requests are granted. The border risk profiling mechanisms target the remaining 10%. Such mechanisms of border target governance follow political and cultural criteria, namely

60 Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild, Jef Huysmans, Francesco Ragazzi, Liberty & Security. Multi-media Teaching and Training Module, Challenge, 2009, <http://libertysecuritymodule.org/module>. (Accessed 20 June, 2010). No pagination.



the fear of terrorism and the fear of the widespread diffusion of poverty in the territory that receives immigration flows. Some categories of TCNs are constructed as risks while others are deconstructed as risks, namely through visa facilitation agreements. If we look at the Schengen Visa Map (Figure 1) we realize that most TCNs whose visa requests are subject to prior consultation among member states come from countries situated in the Mediterranean rim. The concept of “Fortress Europe” is only accurate if we take into consideration such selective and categorized nature of border profiling controls. In this context, the farther the border is from mainland EU the higher the probability of preventing unwanted categories of TCNs from entering in Europe. In order to fulfill this goal not only the territorial border of the EU has been broadened but also dubious agreements have been reached with some key countries that now border the EU. These new border countries, like Libya, have been compelled to receive EU foreigner camps where several categories of TCNs are held. Figure 2 (Foreigners camps in Europe and in Mediterranean countries) shows the widespread diffusion and diverse nature of these camps in the southern rim of the Mediterranean as well as their expansion into the North African interior. In fact, the overall EU extraterritorial and pre-emptive strategy to reduce migratory “pressure” includes as a fundamental element, the use of political leverage in agreements with migrant’s countries of origin and transit in order to make development aid dependant on visa questions, border crossing dependant on guarantees of readmission and trade dependant on effective measures to reduce push factors. Among those agreements, the bilateral cooperation between Italy and Libya and the so-called Mobility Partnerships are particularly important, particularly regarding the allocations of accountability: “who to blame” and “who to trust”.

The cooperation between Italy and Libya emerged in a context described as a “migration crisis” in the central Mediterranean area due to a significant rise of irregular boat migration from African countries to the EU. In 2008, more than 30000 sea borne migrants arrived at Lampedusa, an increase of at least 10000 individuals in comparison to previous years. These numbers carry with them the reality of a tremendous humanitarian crisis since it is estimated that thousands of individuals drown each year in Mediterranean shores. The Libyan reluctance in supporting EU efforts in the field of irregular migration, trafficking and readmission agreements revealed the impotence of EU efforts in border control. In 2008, Illka Laitinen – Director of the EU border Agency Frontex – mentioned that without Libyan cooperation EU border control efforts would be ineffective. In result, EU member-states, namely Italy and Malta, engaged in what Lutterbeck calls the “Italian-Maltese blame game” over the respective responsibilities in patrolling the central Mediterranean region and in admitting migrants rescued at sea.⁶¹ This “Italian-Maltese blame game” revived the “burden-sharing” question regarding migration control efforts among European partners, which reveals not only the specific terminology employed to characterize unwanted migration flows but also in what ways the extraterritorialization of migration control is a valuable tool to ease intra EU cooperation. In 2009, Libya accepted to take back undocumented migrants

61 Derek Lutterbeck, “From Blame Game to Cooperation. Coping with the Migration crisis in the Central Mediterranean”, Timon Mürer, (ed.), Dossier Border Politics. Migration in the Mediterranean, 2009, http://www.migration-boell.de/web/migration/46_2180.asp. (Accessed 20 June, 2009), p. 37.



intercepted at sea. In May 2009 hundreds of undocumented migrants had already been taken back to Libya in Italian ships. For Italy and Malta, cooperation with Libya was seen as a “golden opportunity”. However, the human rights dimension of the partnership was clearly overlooked since Libya has not signed the Geneva Refugee Convention and there are widespread reports of abuses on undocumented migrants in the region. It is, nevertheless, considered by member-states as a “trustable” country.

A different approach to migration control is the one represented by the new Mobility Partnerships. Mobility partnerships are intended to provide an overall framework for managing various types of legal movements between the EU and third countries provided that they have effective mechanisms for readmission. This kind of partnerships constitute a political framework, that derives from the 2005 EU Global Approach to Migration, based on reciprocity agreements and encompassing an array of issues that go from development aid to temporary entry visa facilitation, temporary migration schemes and the fight against illegal migration. The rationale for the adoption of mobility partnerships involves two main assumptions: pragmatism and changed power relations. The EU has adopted a more pragmatic approach to migration management due to the recognition that migration flows, namely circular migration are an unpreventable reality and that relations with third countries of origin or transit should be enhanced in order to persuade them to cooperate on migration and border management. Such pragmatic approach has promoted the proactive involvement of several African countries in the reinforced control of EU external borders, which has been conducting to unprecedented links of interdependence between law enforcement agencies in receiving, sending and transit counties. Mediterranean and African countries have, to a certain extent, been empowered by these mobility partnerships. However, such empowerment has conducted the EU to the need to balance the security concerns of some member-states with the increased expectations of some Mediterranean and African third countries. That balance is achieved through the specification by the EU that mobility partnerships are tailor-made and selective since they are addressed only to countries who meet certain criteria, such as cooperation on illegal migration and the existence of effective mechanisms for readmission.⁶² This kind of conditionality demonstrates how security concerns trumps over development issues and how risk politicization strategies in the EU are dependent on the institutionalization of threat environments.

Conclusion

Migration and asylum are politicized through strategies that render them problematic from a security perspective. The governance of migration related areas is, consequently, based on such a rationale. The “danger” posed by migration and asylum is characterised as occurring in an uncertain and contingent international environment, framed by the

62 Jean Pierre Cassarino, “Mobility Partnerships: rationale and implications for African-European relations”, Timon Mürer, (ed.), *Dossier Border Politics. Migration in the Mediterranean*, 2009, http://www.migration-boell.de/web/migration/46_2180.asp. (Accessed 20 June, 2010), p. 39.



“security continuum” discourse, and where strategies that pre-empt dangers from becoming existential threats are clearly favoured.

The strategy of pre-emptive risk profiling targets migration flows coming mainly from developing countries. The distinction between EU citizen and non-EU citizen is based on a “friend/enemy” continuum that establishes selective differences among categories of foreigners. Therefore, we can observe an impersonal correlation of factors liable to produce risk based on strict border control. Representing migrants as risk factors is an important dimension among the set of strategies through which a politics of (in) security in the European arena is gradually gaining momentum.

In Europe, the politics of (in)security is closely articulated with the establishment of a clear differentiation between the safety of the European territory and the risky nature of the international environment. The external border thus represents both the physical and moral limit of our space of security.

The strengthening of the mechanisms for external border management and control highlight how the politics of (in)security is dependent on the symbolical dialogue between elites and its publics. In this context, to “speak security” and to “work security” became fundamental elements of the politics of (in)security, since securitization processes can be developed through discursive acts or through technocratic modes of policy-making. The fettered and asymmetrical character of EU policy-making in the realm of asylum and migration empowers technocratic rationalities and allows them to develop risk politicization strategies. Those strategies are based on specific claims to security knowledge. The framing of migration as a security question is a product of a specific risk culture that is being developed on an intergovernmental and technocratic bases. This technocratic risk culture utilizes its professional legitimacy to claim access to security knowledge and to security policy-making. The empowerment of security professionals, at both domestic and EU levels, has allowed them to reify a “security continuum” narrative based on the externalization of security factors and on a spill-over rationale that constructs European cooperation in the fields of migration, asylum and external border control as a compensatory instrument in the light of the abolition of internal border controls. Risk politicization strategies in the realm of EU migration and asylum policies are, therefore, the products of technocratic arenas for whom security lies at the interstice between the social construction of fear and a sociological institutional mode of claiming, securing and framing security knowledge.

Bibliography

Academic and policy literature

Claudia Aradau, "Beyond Good and Evil: Ethics and Securitization/Desecuritization Techniques", *Rubikon: International Forum of Electronic Publications*, 2001, <http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/claudia2.htm>, pp. 1-10. (Accessed 20 December, 2008), no pagination.

Jonathan Aus, "EU Governance in an area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Logics of Decision-Making in the Justice and Home Affairs Council", *Arena Working Papers*, no. 15, Arena, Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, 2007, pp. 1-40.

_____, "Eurodac: a Solution Looking for a Problem", *European Integration Online Papers*, vol. 10, no. 6, 2006.

Davina Bhandar, "Resistance, Detainment, Asylum. The onto-Political Limits of Border Crossing in North-America", Deborah Cowen, Emily Gilbert, (eds.), *War, Citizenship, Territory*, London, Routledge, 2008, pp. 281-302.

Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild, Jef Huysmans, Francesco Ragazzi, *Liberty & Security. Multi-media Teaching and Training Module*, Challenge, 2009, <http://libertysecuritymodule.org/module>. (Accessed 20 June, 2010), no pagination.

Didier Bigo, "Liberty, whose Liberty? The Hague Programme and the Conception of Freedom", Thierry Balzacq, Sergio Carrera, (eds.), *Security vs Freedom. A Challenge for Europe's Future*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, pp. 35-45.

_____, "When two become one. Internal and External Securitizations in Europe", Michael C Williams, Morten Kelstrup, (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community*, London and New York, Routledge, 2000, pp. 171-204.

Tanja Börzel, *Environmental leaders and Laggards in Europe. Why there is not a 'southern problem'*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003.

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework For Analysis*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

Evelien Brouwer, "Effective Remedies in EU migration law", Anneliese Baldaccini, Elspeth Guild, Helen Toner, (eds.), *Whose Freedom, Security and Justice. EU immigration and Asylum Law and Policy*, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007, pp. 57-85.

Thierry Balzacq, Sergio Carrera, "The Hague Programme: The Long Road to Freedom, Security and Justice", Thierry Balzacq, Sergio Carrera, (eds.), *Security vs Freedom. A Challenge for Europe's Future*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, pp. 1-35.

Jean Pierre Cassarino, "Mobility Partnerships: rationale and implications for African-European relations", Timon Mürer, (ed.), *Dossier Border Politics. Migration in the Mediterranean*, 2009, http://www.migration-boell.de/web/migration/46_2180.asp. (Accessed 20 June, 2010), p. 39-43.



CASE Collective, "Critical Approaches to Security in Europe. A Network Manifesto", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 37, no. 4, 2006, pp. 443-487.

Laura Corrado, "Negotiating the EU External Border", Thierry Balzacq, Sergio Carrera, (eds.), *Security vs Freedom. A Challenge for Europe's Future*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, pp. 183-205.

Stephen Castles, Mark Miller, *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*, 2nd edition, New York, The Guilford Press, 1998.

Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Aporia, A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International Relations Theory", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 3, no. 3, 1997, pp. 365-392.

Mary Douglas, "The Depoliticization of Risk", in Thompson, Michael, Ellis, Richard, (eds.), *Culture Matters. Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, pp. 121-133.

_____, *Thought Styles*, London, Sage Publications, 1996a.

_____, *Natural Symbols. Explorations in Cosmology*, London and New York, Routledge, 1996b.

_____, *Risk and Blame. Essays in Cultural Theory*, London and New York, Routledge, 1994.

Klaus Eder, "Europe's borders: the narrative construction of borders of Europe", *European Journal of Social Theory*, vol. 9, No. 2, 2006.

Thomas Faist, *Dual Citizenship as Overlapping Membership*, Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations 3/01, Malmö, School of International Migration and Ethnic Relations, 2009.

Virginie Guiraudon, "The constitution of a European immigration policy domain: a political sociology approach", *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 10, no. 2, 2003, pp. 263-282.

Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera, Kees Groenendijk, "Understanding the Contest of Community: illiberal practices in the EU", Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera, Kees Groenendijk, (eds.), *Illiberal Liberal States, Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2009, pp. 1-29.

Elspeth Guild, "Introduction", Elspeth Guild, Florian Geyer, (eds.), *Security vs Justice*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2008, pp. 1-19.

_____, "The Bitter Fruits of a Common Asylum Policy", Thierry Balzacq, Sergio Carrera, (eds.), *Security vs Freedom. A Challenge for Europe's Future*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, pp. 61-77.

_____, "Cultural and Identity Security", in Elspeth Guild, Joanne van Selm, (eds.), *International Migration and Security: Opportunities and Challenges*, London and New York, Routledge, 2005, pp. 101-113.



Zuhal Gündüz, "From 'Necessary' to 'Dangerous' and Back Again. The Economization, Securitization and Europeanization of Migration", in *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, annual, no. 12, 2007, pp. 70-98.

Jef Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Security, Migration and Asylum*, London and New York, Routledge, 2006.

_____, "Defining social constructivism in security studies. The normative dilemma of writing security", *Alternatives*, no. 27, 2002, pp. 41-62.

_____, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 38 (5), 2000, pp. 751-777.

_____, "Language and the Mobilisation of Security Expectations. The Normative Dilemma of Speaking and Writing Security", Paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions, Workshop *Redefining Security*, Manheim, 1999.

Simon Hix, *The Political System of the European Union*, 2nd edition, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

Peter Hobbing, "Securitizing migration, (in)securitizing migrants. The EU's Commission new Border Package", paper delivered at *Workshop Migration, Justice in Canada and the EU*, September 24, 2008.

Maggie Ibrahim, "The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse", in *International Migration*, vol. 43, no. 5, 2005, pp. 183-187.

Derek Lutterbeck, "From Blame Game to Cooperation. Coping with the Migration crisis in the Central Mediterranean", Timon Mürer, (ed.), *Dossier Border Politics. Migration in the Mediterranean*, 2009, http://www.migration-boell.de/web/migration/46_2180.asp. (Accessed 20 June, 2009), p. 36-39.

Valsamis Mitsilegas, "Border Security in the EU", in Anneliese Baldaccini, Elspeth Guild, Helen Toner, (eds.), *Whose Freedom, Security and Justice. EU immigration and Asylum Law and Policy*, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007, pp. 359-395.

Georgia Papagianni, *Institutional and Policy Dynamics of EU Migration Law*, Boston and Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006.

Steve Peers, *EU Justice and Homme Affairs Law*, 2nd edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006.

Holger Stritzel, "Towards a theory of securitization: Copenhagen and beyond", *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 13, no. 3, 2007, pp. 357-383.

Angharad Stephens, "Beyond the imaginary geographies of the War on Terror?", Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA's 50th Annual Convention *Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future*, New York, Marriot Marquis, USA, 2009, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p312923_index.html. (Accessed 1 July, 2010), no pagination.

Liliana Suarez-Navaz, *Rebordering the Mediterranean: Boundaries and Citizenship in Southern Europe*, Berghahn Books, 2004.



Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, 1997, "Introduction" in Thompson, Michael, Ellis, Richard, (eds.), *Culture Matters. Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky*, Boulder, Westview Press, pp. 1-21

_____, Aaron Wildavsky, 1990, *Cultural Theory*, Boulder, Westview Press.

United Nations Development Programme, *Report on Human Development: New Dimensions on Human Security*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1994.

Dan Wilsher, "Immigration Detention and the Common European Asylum Policy", Anneliese Baldaccini, Elspeth Guild, Helen, Toner, (eds.), *Whose Freedom, Security and Justice. EU immigration and Asylum Law and Policy*, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007, pp. 395-427.

Official Documentation

Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders, 1985. Collected from the Schengen acquis as referred to in Article 1(2) of Council Decision 1999/435/EC of 20 May 1999, OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 1, article 7.

Single European Act of 1986, Official Journal L 169 of 29 June 1987, article 13.

Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15/16 October, 1999, point 14.

Regulation 62/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006, establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders, OJ L 105, 13/04/2006, p. 1-32.

Council Regulation 2725/2000 /EC of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, OJ L 316, 15/12 /2000, p. 1 -10;

Council Regulation 407/2002/EC of 28 February 2002 laying down certain rules to implement regulation 2725/2000 /EC concerning the establishment of "Eurodac" for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, OJ L 62, 573/2002, p. 1-5.

Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ L 328 of 5.12.2002, articles 1(1) (a) and 1(1) (b).

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, "The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years The Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice", COM, 2005, 184 final, point 7.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: "Preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union", COM 2008, 69.



Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “The Hague Programme: Ten priorities for the next five years. The Partnership for European renewal in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice”, COM/2005/0184 final.

Communication of the EU High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana before the European Parliament, June 2008.



CESRAN SARAM

STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR VE ANALİZ MERKEZİ - SARAM
CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS - CESRAN

www.cesran.org

BOOK REVIEW

Janne Haaland Matlary

European Union Security Dynamics: In the New National Interest,

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 2009, ISBN 9780230521889, 248 pp., £ 55.00 hb.

The notion of security has changed significantly in the post-Cold war era. Security is not anymore understood in the traditional sense as state-centric and military-oriented. In fact, the concept of security now encompasses different sectors such as economy, society and environment, different actors such as soldiers, terrorist groups, non-governmental organizations and pirates, and wide range of issues such as terrorism, organized crime, disarmament, peacekeeping operations and piracy. Security concerns defined by the bipolar system gave way to the re-nationalization of defence and security policies in the post-Cold war era. As this has been probably the general trend in world politics for the last twenty years, in the course of the development of European security architecture we have witnessed 'de-territorialization' and 'de-nationalization' of security policies of European states (Matlary 2009:23).

Janne Haaland Matlary, in her book 'European Union Security Dynamics: In the New National Interest' explores the development of the security and defence policy in the European Union starting with the assumption that "the national state model of defence in Europe is disappearing" (p.16), because European states no more need mass armies and conventional military power that solely provide territorial defence. Addressing the non-existential threats and wide-ranging risks has become the main priority of European states. Notwithstanding the author's post-Westphalian understanding of nation-state, her perspective by and large corresponds to the liberal intergovernmentalism approach in European studies. First of all, the unit of her analysis is member states. The author focuses on the three big players namely, Britain, France and Germany who are considered the main engines of the development of a European security and defence policy. Second, the explanatory variable Matlary applies in her analysis is the national interests. The argument she makes throughout her book is that European states, particularly Britain, France, Germany and Italy have attained so-called *new* national interests and 'foreign policy prerogatives' as a result of the new *raison d'état* which helps them maintain their strengths vis-à-vis other actors in the domestic and international arena (p.71). In other words, the European Union Security and Defence Policy has been developed out of economic and strategic necessities of the big three and a half member states rather than neither the aim



to balance US power nor the construction of a European security identity through supranational institutionalization. According to Matlary, ESDP is a new and arguably favourable policy domain where the member states can 'share risk, cost and blame and legitimize the use of force' in an era that European publics are extremely averse to any kind of use of military force (pp.73-74).

The book is organized in seven chapters in three parts. In the first part under three chapters the author dwells on the post-national security concerns and dynamics prevailing since the fall of the Berlin wall. Of these security dynamics the most important ones are the dilemma over how to modernize armies and cut the defence budgets at the same time; and how to be visible, present in world politics and contributor to international security while facing domestic reluctance driven by high concerns for legitimacy and commitment to the military operations.

The second part is devoted to understanding the big three and a half member states' political aspirations and strategies about the development of a European security and defence policy. Deriving from the Putnam's well-known two-level game model the author makes an argument that even great powers of Europe have to give up some of their sovereign rights so that they can design intergovernmental institutions and policies in line of their grand strategies. To put it more bluntly, cooperation among member states arises out of the dysfunctions at both international and national levels. At the international level the dysfunction pertains to state's ineffectiveness and inability to deal with new threats and risks on its own. At the national level the dysfunction appears due to the predominance of economic objectives over security concerns and the existence of social constraints on the use of force. In order to by pass domestic constraints and to treat the dysfunctions, member states need to collude with each other in the realm of security and defence. Matlary asserts that the European Union is the scapegoat used by member states whenever they want to divert the domestic criticisms from themselves.

The last part of the book discusses the recent developments in ESDP. The creation of battlegroups and the foundation of the European Defence Agency suffice to name some of the efforts to enhance capabilities of the EU. Nonetheless, for Matlary, the military capabilities do not fully correspond to the political will. Due to the gap between capabilities and political commitments some of the initiatives proved futile at best or still born at worst. In the last chapter, Matlary asks whether the member states are fully committed to the transformation of the EU into a global actor. Matlary strongly contends that even if the EU acquires military capabilities on the paper, the EU's ability to use military force and coercive diplomacy backed by a big stick will remain limited in practice (p.202). Besides, 'a lack of political direction and the EU's lack of unitary decision-making capacity'(p.180) compound the inability of the EU to use military force in the foreseeable future.

If there is one weakness, it is the author's overemphasis on the role of France and Britain in the development of ESDP because of her intergovernmentalist standpoint. Therefore, she underestimates the effect of political cooperation on the incremental development of a common European security culture from scratch, which in turn



facilitates further cooperation in the security and defence. Her focus on domestic politics and the formation of national interests under domestic pressure offers insightful account for the influence of domestic factors at play in ESDP. However, more thorough analysis should elaborate the interplay between international and domestic dynamics. From a constructivist standpoint, one cannot help but wonder if identity construction and reconstruction at the national level and international level can bridge the gap between capabilities and political will and turns the EU into a fully-fledged global actor with a military arm use for a just and legitimate cause. Overall, this book is lucid and well-argued, and reminds us the recently neglected influence of member states' national interests in the development of ESDP. All in all, I think that Matlary's analysis is genuinely interesting for the students of European studies and it would be an essential reading in undergraduate and postgraduate courses of European integration.

Kadri Kaan Renda

King's College London



John N. Paden

Faith and Politics in Nigeria: Nigeria as a Pivotal State in the Muslim World,

Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008, ISBN: 978-1-60127-029-0, ix-140 pp., \$12.00 (pbk.)

The book under review examines John Paden's incisive analysis of how the Nigerian state has been able to manage ethnic/religious diversity in the midst of violent confrontations across ethno-religious and regional fault-lines on one hand, and its relations with the U.S as a pivotal state in the Muslim world within the framework of the United States Institute of Peace's Muslim World Initiative and the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. The author locates the nexus between faith and politics in Nigeria historically and demographically, as well as demonstrates a profound awareness of the convergence of interests between U.S and Nigeria, which has security, religious, political and economic undercurrents.

In chapter one, the author gives an overview of Nigeria in global perspective, in terms of its demographic importance, with a population of over 140 million people, its being the most populous country in Africa, the fourth largest member of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), has the six largest number of Muslims in the world, it is the only country with an approximate balance between its Muslim and Christian population. Above all, its ethno-linguistic and religious diversity makes it one of the most complex countries in the world. All of these constitute the driving force in the quest for nation building and stability since independence in 1960 (p1), which also explains the link between Nigeria and the global economy. The author is categorical about intensity of religious identity in Nigeria, which accounts for one of the highest in the world. This religious identity grew during the military era (1984-1999) and was very pronounced and dominant during the Fourth Republic. He argues superficially that Nigeria is probably the least well known of the Muslim world's pivotal states. Its role as the dominant African state, its extraordinary influence in West Africa, its significance as a major world oil producer, and its experience with democratic rule since 1999 makes it a critical country, especially in its relations with the United States (p.3-4).

Chapter two looks at the geo-strategic significance of Nigeria in term so of the sources of its influence within a sub-regional, regional and global realm. The author argues forcefully that Nigeria is not a Muslim state in Africa, but a multi-religious country that operates under a secular constitution that serves as a bridge between Muslims and Christians in Africa within the framework of the Federal Character Model and the 'People of the Book Model', as political solution, which is premised on the assumption that Muslims and Christians felt they had more in common than they had with indigenous, animist (or polytheist) communities (p.21-23). This assumption has been contested on the grounds that the use of derogatory words such as 'arna' or 'kafiri' (pagan) by the Muslims to describe their Christian counterparts contradicts this claim, which has been a major source of violent confrontation in Jos, Plateau State. This was one of the burning issues at the Plateau Peace Conference, after a state of emergency was declared on Plateau state by the former President Olusegun Obasanjo (Plateau



State Government, 2004:46). The introduction of Shari'a law in some northern states of Nigeria as well as the delicate relationship between the Muslims and Christians are major threats to the '*People of the Book Model*' as a framework for building inter-faith harmony in Nigeria.

Largely due to oil wealth and demographic resources, Nigeria's influence in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and African Union (AU), its status in the OIC, as well as the Roman Catholic Church, Nigeria would continue to play a pivotal role globally. The author also highlights the growing influence of an avalanche of Muslim identities and organisations such as the Sufi Brotherhood and the Izala, students and youth organizations, women's organizations, national umbrella organizations and antiestablishment networks, which include the so called Shiites and Taliban organizations respectively (p.27). All these identities and organisations would remain relevant as far as politics and society are concerned.

In chapter three the author analyses the challenges to nation building in Nigeria, and provides a great deal of insight into the challenges the Nigerian state is confronted with, within its quest for national stability and development. This include; establishing a workable political system that is impervious to manipulation, consolidating the rule of law as the cornerstone of social justice, developing capacity for conflict resolution as one of the pillars for peace, security, stability and economic development, stemming corruption at all levels of government through effective leadership and civic culture respectively (p.51-74). While Paden's proposal provides a window of optimism for Nigeria in its effort at nation building, politics in Nigeria since has been seen as a matter of 'do or die' by the political class, to the extent that the electoral process has remained flawed as a result of cases of electoral fraud, corruption, the monetization of politics as well as the god-father phenomenon (Ibrahim, 2007:12; Gambo, 2006:89). This has dented Nigeria's image as a dominant African state, and has made her influence in the West African sub-region shrink. It is evident from Nigeria's inability to come to terms with these challenges that the conduct of elections, and the workings of government makes national reconciliation a daunting task, and the quest for democratic consolidation remain fragile.

Conditioned by the foregoing, in chapter four the author discusses the pathways to change, in the face of the challenge of national building staring Nigeria in the face in terms of what the future holds for the stability of the country? Paden seeks to reflect on some of the scenarios that have been painted based on the 1996 Shell Oil Vision 2010 Scenarios for Nigeria, the 2005 U.S National Intelligence Council Report, which considered a worst case scenario for Nigeria. In fact, the quest by former President Olusegun Obasanjo and some of the State governors to change the constitution so as to allow them have a third term would have plunged Nigeria into the worst-case scenario, which would have unleashed major ethno-religious violence in the polity, disrupted oil supply, heightened secessionist moves by regional governments, major refugee flows as well as instability in other parts of the West African sub-region (p.75-81). The series of protests by Nigerians both at home and in Diaspora, forced the Senate to reject the third term option, which put to an abrupt end the third term option. Notwithstanding these developments, the Federal Government decided to



frustrate the political ambition of some politicians such as the former Vice President Atiku Abubakar through the anti-corruption agency, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), which came up with an advisory list of politicians that should not be allowed to contest for the 2007 general elections. This approach placed the Peoples Democratic Party's Presidential candidate Umaru Yar'adua at a vantage position over majority of the presidential aspirants. Amidst all these, the three major political parties; the Action Congree (AC), All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) considered ethno-religious power sharing a very sensitive issue that could mar or make their mandates if not handled effectively. Thus, they all allowed power to shift from a Southern Christian to a Northern Muslim candidate, since the Southern Christians had being in the presidency for eight years (p.82).

Despite the flaws and characterized the presidential elections, Paden is no doubt right on the fact that the election was significant in the sense that it sought to balance the interests and identity of the two major regions in terms of the Muslim dominated North and the Christian dominated South within the context of ethno-regional and religious identity (p.87). In fact, he attributes the ability of the Nigerian state to manage these ethno-religious diversities through several mechanisms that have been in put n place such as the notion of power sharing between the two religions, the implementation of the policy of North-South power sharing, the introduction of the Federal Character Commission, the location of the Federal Capital Territory close to the centre of the country with a national Mosque and a Christian Ecumenical Centre the establishment of the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) so as to foster Inter-Faith dialogue and harmony respectively (p.89).

The protests and violence that characterized the November 28th 2008 Local Government elections in Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State, which led to the death of over six hundred people and the wanton destruction of lives and properties means that the Muslim-Christian identity politics can not be taken off the front burner was Paden wants us to believe in this book (p.93). Paden also raises a fundamental question about how the goals of national unity can be achieved. Thus, he identifies three approaches to national building; partition the country into component parts; the use of force or the threat of force to hold the country's unlikely components together; or devise mechanisms of democratic federalism suitable to the demographic and political realities at hand. As reported by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF):

Over the last year, Nigeria continued to experience incidents of violent communal conflict along religious and ethnic lines, which are often intertwined. The popular movement in 12 northern Nigerian states to expand the legal application of sharia to criminal matters continues to spark communal violence and is an ongoing source of volatility and tension between Muslims and Christians at both the national and local levels. Serious outbreaks of Muslim-Christian violence in the last few years threaten to divide further the populace along religious lines and to undermine the democratic transition and the foundations of freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or belief in Nigeria. Social, economic, and political conditions have not improved in the country, fostering a climate of even greater tension among ethnic and religious communities (USCIRF, 2008:241).



Events in the country has shown the option that the Nigerian state has chosen as reflected in the use of force to suppress militancy in the Niger Delta region as well as the massacre of some Islamist fundamentalists popularly known as 'Boko Haram', (which means western education is a forbidden), in some Northern states such as Borno, Yobe, Bauhi, Kano and Niger. In fact, contrary to perceptions that Sharia will fizzle out in Nigeria, the Boko Haram phenomenon shows that support for Sharia has not waned (Afrobarometer, 2009:10).

In chapter five the author does a critical review and assessment of the relations between the U.S and Nigeria from several perspectives; military and security, diplomatic and political, economic, business, educational, cultural, religious and non-governmental. Based on these, the interests of the U.S and that of Nigerian do converge in terms of the intensive search for evidence linking northern Nigerians with international Islamist terrorism, the need to institutionalize democracy in the Niger Delta region so as to eliminate militancy and the disruption of oil flows, local insurrection, criminal syndicate, kidnapping, environmental pollution, and oil piracy (Lubeck et.al, 2007:17-18). Paden provides insights into how the establishment of the American Command in Africa (AFRICOM) highlights the growing importance of U.S - Nigeria relations due to terrorism and oil (p.106).

How the Nigerian state consolidate its grip within the context of the these ethnic and religious diversities poses a grave challenge for the future of the state and its sovereignty in the future, in the light of the internal resistance to the secularity of the state as being challenged through the introduction of Shari'a law in some Northern States. In fact, the commonality shared between the U.S. and Nigeria in terms ethnic and religious diversity also reveals how religious and ethnic groups constitute the widest and deepest expression of popular politics (p.120). Though, while these diversities often result in violent confrontations in Nigeria, the reverse is the case in the U.S., whereby these diversities have been effectively managed.

While the strength of the book lies in Paden's analysis of how Nigeria has managed its ethnic and religious diversities and relations, he was not able to provide a model for Nigeria in terms of how the U.S. has been able to manage its diversities with no violence, in spite of the fact that the Muslim population in the U.S is not as significant as Nigeria. The fact remains that in the coming years, pervasive communal and sectarian violence, the agitation for the implementation of strict shari'a law, discrimination against religious minorities as well as the increased Islamic extremism will remain a dominant feature of politics Thus, the Nigerian government should be proactive in taking the necessary steps to maintain religious freedom. In the final analysis, whether one disagrees with Paden is not the point, since the book opens up an important debate about the role of faith as a driving force in Nigerian politics and its relations with the international community. Thus contrary to the author's assumption that Nigeria could uniquely serve as both a model for inter-religious political accommodation, and as bridging actor in global politics between the West and the Muslim world, violent ethno-religious confrontations remains a major threat to political stability, which also poses grave danger for its image in the global economy.



References

- Afrobarometer (2009) Popular Perception of Shari'a Law in Nigeria, Afro-barometer Briefing Paper, No. 58, February.
- Gambo, A.N (2006) Godfatherism and Electoral Politics in Nigeria, in IFES, Money, Politics and Corruption in Nigeria, Abuja: IFES.
- Ibrahim, J (2007) Transforming Elections in West Africa into Opportunities for Political Choice, Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development, CDD Paper, No.1, January.
- Lubeck, M.P et.al (2007) Convergent Interests: U.S. Energy Security and the Securing of Nigerian Democracy, International Policy Report, January.
- Paden, N. J (2008) Faith and Politics in Nigeria: Nigeria as Pivotal State in a Muslim World, Washington, D.C., United States Institute for Peace Press.
- Plateau State Government (2004) Plateau Resolves: Report of the Plateau Peace Conference, Jos, Plateau State: Government Printer.
- USCIRF (2008) Annual Report, Washington, D.C. pdf version available at www.uscirf.gov.

Chris, M. A. Kwaja

Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies

University of Jos, Jos, Nigeria



Mark Bevir

Democratic Governance,

New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010, ISBN 978-0-691-14539-6, 320 pp., £20.95

Democratic Governance is concerned with the challenge to democracy posed by the spread of new forms of governance. From the 1980s, the rise of New Public Management theories and practices have heralded a positivist approach to politics and policy that prizes scientific expertise and its apparent neutrality above all else. Bevir soundly argues that this has encouraged the promulgation of nonmajoritarian, and therefore non-democratic, modes of state organisation and public administration. At the heart of this critique lies a disparaging evaluation of the influence of modernist social science on today's public administration and a subsequent call for a new focus of analysis and practice in order to restore faith in democratic institutions.

Bevir's definition of new governance is composed of three principal aspects: firstly, the replacement of central bureaucracy with marketization, new public management and co-governance; secondly, the inclusion of new social actors in policy networks, policy communities and issue networks; and thirdly, a shift in theoretical outlook from developmental historicism to modernist social science. The originality of the argument of *Democratic Governance* is the positing of this final aspect as a factor that constitutes the previous two. Modernism and positivist social science have had an undeniable influence on today's political practice. Indeed, the relationship between academic ideas and political practice is nothing new, noticeable from the pamphlets of John Stuart Mill to the think-tanks and research institutions of contemporary society. Bevir is specifically interested in the way that the shift in knowledge production to modernist social science has inspired theories on public administration that have in turn inspired new policies and practices.

The spread of the analysis is wide-reaching and impressive, touching on issues of representative democracy, public administration and public policy through the lens of theories from politics, economics and sociology. The book is divided into nine chapters spanning across three sections. The first, *The New Governance*, offers a theoretical background in the form of an historical review of modernist theories of governance. Here the argument outlines the way in which rational choice theory and new institutional theory have fed into reforms of political practice. On the one hand, in the 1980s the New Public Management reforms introduced the marketization of public duties to the private sector in an attempt to lower costs through competition and raise efficiency through the setting of targets and rewards. This was fuelled by rational choice theory and the belief that the market constituted a collection of rational individual interests. On the other hand, moreover, towards the end of the 1990s sociological institutional theorists argued that individual choices were constrained and directed by formal and informal institutions, rules, norms and practices. These theories inspired a second wave of reforms, in Britain associated with the rise of New Labour, that promoted networks and partnerships in an effort to rebuild an institutional framework that linked actors in



a way that was not previously possible. In this way new institutionalist theories had a direct bearing on more recent public reforms.

The second and third sections, *Constitutionalism*, and *Public Administration* examine, with the aid of a study of Britain's New Labour reforms and illustrative cases from the European Union and United States, how these theories have influenced the development of governance, constitutional and judiciary reform, public policy, and police reform. These chapters illustrate how the State today attempts to coordinate between a range of private actors in order to steer policies in a desired direction. Yet imperfect markets and long chains of command from principal to agent also mean that responsibility, accountability and legitimacy of public service providers are difficult to control. Rather than restore faith in unresponsive public administrations, these developments have limited the democratic nature of contemporary society. In response, Bevir advocates greater public participation in the processes of governance, rather than reforms based on institutional assumptions.

There is a set of theoretical, methodological and practical implications to be taken from *Democratic Governance*. Firstly, we are shown how political theories are more than simply academic visions, but that 'they are beliefs that have inspired political actors to remake the world in ways that have created the very worlds of governance to which they refer' (p. 121). Secondly, positivist knowledge is rejected in favour of a historicized account of governance which follows the development of beliefs over time and suggests that theories of governance, and their impact on democratic practices, are historically contingent. Thirdly, the author promotes a plural, participatory brand of democratic governance that does not simply rely on expertise and the apparent truths of modernist social science. The argument suggests that 'once we recognize that governance consists of contingent, changing and contested practices, we may rethink democratic ideals and practices' (p. 269).

However, there are methodological shortcomings that should be noted. Bevir employs an interpretive, historical approach to analyse the beliefs behind New Labour's reforms. Yet at times he simply highlights correlations between ideas and beliefs held by party members in the past and the present. Where do these ideas come from? And how have past ideas and beliefs gained relevance in the present? There is nothing to suggest that the present must necessarily be like the past, and so when correlations do occur we should assess the context critically. For Marx ideas are rooted in human praxis. For Max Weber theories, ideas and institutions reflect a historically contingent legitimate order. An appreciation of how and why certain ideas are influential therefore requires an understanding of the social context in which they have gained dominance and legitimacy. Unfortunately, Bevir concentrates on the theories at the expense of taking them out of their socio-historical context. The consequence is a lean towards teleological reasoning, whereas a more truly interpretive methodological stance would perhaps offer a closer analysis of the development of ideas and their political relevance through the interplay of speakers, socio-political contexts, interests, and so on.

Generally speaking, *Democratic Governance* presents an original approach to the study of contemporary democratic practice and fits into a growing literature around the



concept of governance. The book is clearly written and will provide a solid theoretical background to students of democratic theory and public administration; although as an analysis of the influence of ideas on patterns of governance it falls short of being methodologically and empirically rigorous.

Simon McMahon

Centre for European Studies, King's College London



CESRAN SARAM

STRATEJİK ARAŞTIRMALAR VE ANALİZ MERKEZİ - SARAM
CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS - CESRAN

www.cesran.org

About the

Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis

The CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (CESRAN) is a private, non-political, non-profit, internet-based organization of scholars who are interested in world politics, and enthusiastic about contributing to the field of international relations as not only academics, but also practitioners. The underlying motive behind the foundation of the CESRAN is a need to bridge the gap between the students of international relations and practitioners of international politics. In this regard, the main ideal is gathering people, who come from different backgrounds and have different perspectives, around the CESRAN in order to yield fresh and illuminating insights as to how the international relations is carried out in a globalizing world. To this end, the CESRAN aims at establishing and maintaining close contact with and between politicians, bureaucrats, business people, and academics that would lead to the development of better policies.

We invite anyone who shares these interests to become a member and participate in our activities.

To become a member of CESRAN contact us at the email below. Annual due is £20 or \$30. CESRAN publications, articles and news are available online at: www.cesran.org

Email: info@cesran.org



Members of the Executive Board of the CESRAN:

- Ozgun TUFEKCI, Chairman** (King's College London, UK)
- Alper Tolga BULUT, Vice- Chairman** (University of Houston, USA)
- Kadri Kaan RENDA, Vice- Chairman** (King's College London, UK)
- Aksel ERSOY, Member** (University of Birmingham, UK)
- Ali Onur OZCELIK, Member** (University of Sheffield, UK)
- Husrev TABAK, Member** (UCL, UK)
- Abdullah UZUN, Member** (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey)

Members of the Council of the CESRAN:

- Prof. Mark BASSIN** (University of Birmingham, UK)
- Prof. Bulent GOKAY** (Keele University, UK)
- Assoc. Prof. Bayram GUNGOR** (Karadeniz Technical University, Turkey)
- Prof. Alp OZERDEM** (Coventry University, UK)
- Reader Ibrahim SIRKECI** (Regent's College, UK)
- Prof. Birol YESILADA** (Portland State University, USA)

JOURNAL OF GLOBAL ANALYSIS

CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Journal of Global Analysis endeavours to become the foremost international forum for academics, researchers and policy makers to share their knowledge and experience in the disciplines of political science, international relations, economics, sociology, international law, political history, and human geography.

Journal of Global Analysis is an interdisciplinary refereed e-journal, edited by a group of international scholars indicated in the Editorial Board and International Advisory Board. The journal is published at its own web site <http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis>. Journal of Global Analysis welcomes submissions of **articles** from related persons involved in the scope of the journal as well as **summary reports of conferences and lecture series** held in social sciences.

Prospective authors should submit 4.000 - 15.000 articles for consideration in Microsoft Word-compatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access the Editorial Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the CESRAN website: <http://www.cesran.org/globalanalysis>. Contributors are urged to read CESRAN's author guidelines and style guidelines carefully before submitting articles. Articles submissions should be sent in electronic format to:

Ozgur TUFEKCI - *Editor-in-Chief* - oztufekci@cesran.org

Husrev TABAK - *Managing Editor* - husrevtabak@cesran.org

K. Kaan RENDA - *Book Review Editor* - kkrenda@cesran.org



Copyright Unless otherwise indicated, the materials appearing in **JGA** are not copyrighted and readers are encouraged to copy and distribute such materials as widely as possible for the use of other scholars, students, organizations, and others interested in Social Sciences. In the event that you wish to republish any part of **JGA** not otherwise copyrighted, you require no permission from the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis as long as the republication clearly acknowledges **JGA** as the source, you do not claim copyright, and you insure that prompt notice of such republication is sent to the Editor-in-Chief of **JGA**, Ozgur Tufekci and the Managing Editor of **JGA**, Husrev Tabak.

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND SECURITY

Peer-reviewed Academic journal
by CESRAN (Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis)

www.cesran.org/jcts



Editor-in-Chief

Prof. Alpaslan Ozerdem, Coventry University, UK

Managing Editor

Dr. Rebecca Roberts, Coventry University, UK

Assistant Editors

Mr. Richard Slade, Coventry University, UK

Mr. Husrev Tabak, UCL, UK

Book Review Editor

Ms. Sukanya Podder, University of York, UK

Editorial Board

Prof. the Baroness Haleh Afshar, University of York, UK | **Prof. Bruce Baker**, Coventry University, UK | **Dr Richard Bowd**, UNDP, Nepal | **Prof. Ntudo Edobe**, University of Yaounde II, Cameroon | **Prof. Scott Gates**, PRIO, Norway | **Dr Antonio Giussozzi**, London School of Economics, UK | **Dr Cathy Gormley-Heenan**, University of Ulster, UK | **Prof. Paul Gready**, University of York, UK | **Prof. Fen Hampson**, Carleton University, Canada | **Prof. Mohammed Hamza**, Lund University, Sweden | **Prof. Alice Hills**, University of Leeds | **Dr Maria Holt**, University of Westminster, UK | **Prof. Alan Hunter**, Coventry University, UK | **Dr Tim Jacoby**, University of Manchester, UK | **Dr Khalid Koser**, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland | **Dr William Lume**, South Bank University, UK | **Dr Roger Mac Ginty**, St Andrews' University, UK | **Mr Rae McGrath**, Save the Children UK Somalia | **Prof. Mansoob Murshed**, ISS, The Netherlands | **Dr Wale Osofisan**, Help Age International, UK | **Dr Mark Pelling**, King's College, UK | **Prof. Mike Pugh**, University of Bradford, UK | **Mr Gianni Rufini**, Freelance Consultant, Italy | **Dr Mark Sedra**, Centre for Int. Governance Innovation, Canada | **Dr Emanuele Sommario**, Scuola Superiore Sant'Anna, Italy | **Dr Hans Skotte**, Trondheim University, Norway | **Dr Arne Strand**, CMI, Norway | **Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh**, University of Po, France | **Dr. Mandy Turner**, University of Bradford, UK | **Prof. Roger Zetter**, University of Oxford, UK

The Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (JCTS) provides a platform to analyse conflict transformation as the processes for managing change in a non-violent way to produce equitable outcomes for all parties that are sustainable. Security is understood as encapsulating a wide range of human security concerns that can be tackled by both 'hard' and 'soft' measures. Therefore, the Journal's scope not only covers such security sector reform issues as restructuring security apparatus, reintegration of ex-combatants, clearance of explosive remnants of war and cross-border management, but also the protection of human rights, justice, rule of law and governance.

POLITICAL REFLECTION

MAGAZINE

Chairman
Executive Editor
Managing Editor

Ozgur TUFEKCI
Alper Tolga BULUT
Husrev TABAK

World Stories Editor
Turkey Review Editor
Europe Review Editor
Eurasia Review Editor
Caucasus Review Editor
Middle East Review Editor
China Review Editor
Global City Analysis Editor
Brief History Editor
Film Review Editor
Recent Books Editors

Aksel ERSOY
K. Kaan RENDA
Paula SANDRIN
Duygu UCKUN
Zaur SHIRIYEV
Murad DUZCU
Antony OU
Fatih EREN
Tamer KASIKCI
Alaaddin F. PAKSOY
Umit CALIK
Tamer KASIKCI
Abdullah UZUN

Senior Contributors

Can ERBIL (Dr.)
Kurtulus GEMICI (Dr.)
Bulent GOKAY (Prof.)
Ayla GOL (Dr.)
Bayram GUNGOR (Assoc. Prof.)
Alpaslan OZERDEM (Prof.)
Ibrahim SIRKECI (Reader)
Talat ULUSSEVER (Dr.)
H. Akin Ünver (Dr.)

Contributors

Gabriel Siles BRUGGE
Cemil CENGIZ
Rahman DAG
Enes ERBAY
Arshad ISAKJEE
David JAROSZWESKI
Ali Onur OZCELIK
Fusun OZERDEM (Assist. Prof.)
Kadri Kaan RENDA
Paul RICHARDSON
Dilek YIGIT (Dr.)

Web producer & Developer
Serdar TOMBUL



CESRAN's
Quarterly News-Magazine on
Politics, International
Relations, and Economics

ISSN: 2042-888X

Political Reflection
welcomes contributions from
scholars, students, and
professionals in all aspects of
international relations,
politics,
and political economy.

www.cesran.org/pr