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# Journal of Global Analysis

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## **Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power**

**By Oluwaseun Tella\***

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### **Abstract**

Academic scholarship on Nigeria's regional credentials and influence has focused on its hard power (economic and military capability). Despite the increasing relevance given to soft power in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, this aspect of the country's status has been neglected. This article contributes to the literature on Nigeria's foreign policy by engaging the currencies of its power of attraction and the limitations that constrain the optimization of this source of power. It employs constructivism as its theoretical lens and concludes that addressing challenges such as ubiquitous corruption and Boko Haram terrorism would enhance Nigeria's credibility and ultimately its soft power projection in the international arena.

**Keywords:** Soft Power, Nigeria, Nollywood, Technical Aid Corps, Boko Haram, Corruption

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## Attractions and Limitations of Nigeria's Soft Power

### Introduction

Regionally, Nigeria is a force to be reckoned with. Globally, it cannot be ignored. Abuja's status in the international arena largely hinges on its economic endowment and military muscle; in other words, its hard power currencies.<sup>1</sup> This perhaps explains why policy makers and academics have not paid adequate attention to the soft power of this state which has been significant in its foreign policy since independence.

Tella<sup>2</sup> have defined soft power elsewhere as 'a state's non-coercive capability (ranging from its foreign policies and political values to its cultural exports) that engenders other states' attraction, admiration and aspirations'. Rather than relying on its coercive capability, a state that is endowed with soft power harnesses the attractiveness embedded in such power to pursue its foreign policy objectives. Nigeria's soft power portfolio includes its democracy; its peace keeping role; its entertainment industry, including music and movies. The country's aid and peace keeping roles radiate across Africa and beyond. Nigerian movies (Nollywood) and music are widely admired in Africa and further afield, while its democratic credentials over almost two decades have been internationally recognised. This article draws attention to Nigeria's soft power by engaging with its cultural exports in the form of Nollywood and the Technical Aid Corps (TAC) Scheme as a foreign policy tool. The choice of these soft power attributes is informed by the fact that Nollywood is the most important cultural promoter of Nigeria's soft power and the TAC appears to be one of the most significant foreign policy instrument that enhances such power.

However, domestic challenges, including corruption, Boko Haram terrorism and an image problem have weakened Nigeria's capacity and subsequently circumscribed Abuja from effectively wielding its soft power. These limitations are examined in the latter half of the article.

### Constructivism and Nigeria's Moral Identity

Constructivist theory is a reaction to the Realists' position on the primacy of material factors. Instead, constructivists argue that ideational and normative factors shape states' international relations. 'In the absence of norms, exercises of power, or actions, would be devoid of meaning. Constitutive norms define an identity by specifying the actions that will cause others to recognize that identity and respond to it appropriately'<sup>3</sup> The theory offers an explanation of international politics in terms of how identities and interests are knitted together. Constructivism was introduced to the parlance of international relations by Nicholas Onuf in his masterpiece, *World of our Making*. He argues that it:

does not draw a sharp distinction between material and social realities – the material and social contaminate each other, but variably – and it does not

grant sovereignty to either the material or the social by defining the other out of existence. It does find socially made content dominant in and for the individual without denying the independent, “natural” reality of individuals as materially situated biological beings.<sup>4</sup>

According to Copeland<sup>5</sup>, there are three major tenets of constructivism. Firstly, international politics is determined by the players’ shared norms, ideas and values. Second, the ideational structure influences actors’ interests and identities in their international relations. Third, circular causality provides an apt description of the relations between ideational structures and actors. This implies that a state’s actions in relation to other states are significantly shaped by the inter-subjective shared ideas and norms which make states redefine their interests in accordance with the ideational structure. While actors’ interests and identities are determined by ideational and normative structures, the structures could also be refined or altered by actors’ practices. Over time, the structures are codified into formal rules which are internalized by actors.<sup>6</sup> A state’s identity explains the predictability of its international behaviour. Expectations can only be sustained between states when there are stable intersubjective identities that enable ‘predictable patterns of behavior’.<sup>7</sup> Thus, a state’s action or inaction in relation to other states is largely determined by its identity. States’ behaviour towards friends and enemies is different because unlike friends, enemies are threatening.<sup>8</sup> ‘Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests’. ‘A world without identities is a world of chaos, a world of pervasive and irremediable uncertainty, a world much more dangerous than anarchy’.<sup>10</sup> In a nutshell, identities determine states’ interests.<sup>9</sup>

Against this background, Nigeria has striven to promote a positive image across Africa and beyond through its soft power attributes. The regional power has constructed the identity of a peace builder. There is no gainsaying that it is a major peace builder on the continent and the globe at large. Nigeria’s peace keeping role in Africa such as in Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone has significantly boosted its soft power in Africa. Furthermore, it is a significant aid donor and big brother in its engagement with other African countries and has provided aid to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries as a means to strengthen South-South cooperation. Abuja has thus created the identity of a benign regional power in the eyes of its African compatriots and globally. However, Nigeria has also been ascribed negative identities such as drug trafficking, corruption and terrorism. It is imperative that Abuja effectively mobilise its soft power credentials to counteract these negative images and promote its positive attributes that have been recognised in the international arena.

## Soft Power Attractions

### *Cultural Attraction: Nollywood*

Given the ubiquity and admiration of Nigerian movies and music in Africa, African entertainment arguably wears a made in Nigeria label. Prentice<sup>11</sup> argues that in

terms of its movie and music exports, 'Nigeria has the most "soft power" of any African country'. The movie industry (Nollywood) in particular has become the most significant platform to transmit Nigerian culture across Africa and beyond. It is interesting to note that Nollywood is not confined to Africa. It is visible in countries with large African diaspora such as the US, UK, Caribbean countries (Haitians in particular) and to a lesser extent in countries such as Germany, Italy and Spain.<sup>12</sup> Thanks to the DSTV (a South African satellite television provider) platform, Nollywood movies are screened across the continent. Indeed, it seems to be challenging the dominance of Hollywood because its audience can relate to the African cultural heritage and the circumstances depicted in its movies, unlike Hollywood that exhibits Western values and experiences. Miller<sup>13</sup> argues that 'in Nigeria and in countries throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, it (Nollywood) has eclipsed Hollywood, Bollywood and much local production to dominate the movie sector ...' Thus, it has also displaced local content in African countries. Indeed, Nollywood has replaced Hollywood as the second largest film industry in the world based on the volume of movies produced.

Nollywood has provided a platform for Nigerians to tell their own stories and challenge the unsubstantiated and stereotypical portrayal of the country and its citizens in foreign media. Among others, these include criminals, drug dealers and terrorists. A series of interviews conducted by the BBC in 2010 on other African nationals' perceptions of Nigerians revealed that Nollywood has been a critical promoter of Nigeria's image.<sup>14</sup> The movie industry has generated admiration and fame for Nigerian artists such as Genevieve Nnaji, Patience Ozokwor, Ini Edo, Mercy Johnson, Funke Akindele, Olu Jacobs, Pete Edochie, Mr Ibu, Osita Ihome (Aki and Pawpaw), and Jim Lyke, among others. Popular soap operas such as *Tinsel* and *Jacobs Cross* add to this positive image.<sup>15</sup> Against this backdrop, celebrity diplomacy could be employed to promote Nigeria's interests. This would entail promoting the country's culture and values in engagements with the foreign public.

Beyond their entertainment value, Nigerian movies have promoted the country's foreign policy objectives in two significant ways. First, they serve as a significant source of national wealth. Nigeria's recalculation of its GDP in mid-2014 revealed that the entertainment industry (particularly Nollywood) is a significant contributor to national revenue. Thus, as other African nationals consume Nigerian movies, the regional power derives economic gains. Second, Nollywood transmits Nigerian culture across Africa. This is evident in the embrace of Nigerian traditional attire, mimicking of the Nigerian accent by other Africans and appreciation of Nigerian Pidgin English. According to Nye<sup>16</sup>, a state's culture is an important source of its soft power 'in places where it is attractive to others'. Thus, admiration of Nigerian culture exhibited by Nollywood has reinforced Nigeria's soft power. Ukwueze and Ekwugh<sup>17</sup> observe that Nigerian movies have promoted an understanding of Nigerian culture in the hearts and mind of its audience. Nollywood could therefore play a pivotal role in the Nigerian government's attempts to revamp the country's image that has been punctured by negativity. This would require increased appreciation of the utility of Nollywood to achieve this end. It is therefore important that the Nigerian government empowers the industry to boost the quality of production and possibly

take advantage of its advancement in space technology to encourage homegrown satellite television with Africa-wide coverage. This would mean that it would no longer have to rely on South African owned DSTV to transmit its movies and culture to its African audience.

More importantly, if well deployed, Nollywood could be a tool to advance Nigeria's hegemonic potential in Africa. Adebajo<sup>18</sup> observes that Nollywood 'is a veritable source of 'soft power' that could be a cultural resource to challenge French artistic hegemony in Africa'. This is significant in the light of France's remarkable influence in Africa which seems to counteract that of Nigeria and South Africa. Nollywood provides the platform for Nigeria to enjoy cultural hegemony in Africa and stand tall above its regional challengers like South Africa, Egypt and Algeria and above great powers like the US, UK and France. It is also instructive that Nigeria uses Nollywood to showcase its military strength, economic endowments and its contribution to public good in Africa and the world at large. Hollywood has been successful in this regard. Nollywood's display of Nigerian military and economic power has the tendency to make its audience look at the regional power in awe. Broadcasting the country's contribution to public good in Africa such as its participation in the struggle against colonialism across the continent and its leading role in African integration will also boost the image of the regional powerhouse. This would promote a more positive image of Nigerians, possibly forestalling xenophobic attitudes and attacks targeting Nigerians particularly in South Africa and anti-Nigerian sentiments across the world.

#### *Foreign Policy Attraction: Technical Aid Corps Scheme*

The TAC is a voluntary international service scheme that was established by the Ibrahim Babangida administration in 1987 to provide technical assistance to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. Unlike traditional financial aid, it aims to provide Nigerian technical knowhow to developing countries in critical skills such as medicine, engineering, law, and lecturing, to name but a few. Nigerian professionals volunteer to serve in developing countries for two years.<sup>19</sup> Their salaries are paid by the Nigerian government, easing the financial burden on recipient states. This undoubtedly enhances Nigeria's image and South-South cooperation. As outlined on the website of the Directorate of Technical AID Corps (DTAC), its major objectives include:

- 1) Sharing Nigeria's know-how and expertise with other African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries;
- 2) Giving assistance on the basis of assessed and perceived needs of the recipient countries;
- 3) Promoting cooperation and understanding between Nigerian and beneficiary countries; and
- 4) Facilitating meaningful contacts between the youth of Nigeria and those of the recipient countries.

It thus ensures that Nigeria enjoys international goodwill. Nye<sup>20</sup> notes, that, 'sometimes countries enjoy political clout that is greater than their military and

economic weight would suggest because they define their national interest to include attractive causes such as economic aid or peace-making.' Nigeria's peacekeeping role in places such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Chad and Mali and its aid under the umbrella of the TAC in states like Angola, Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ethiopia, Kenya, Fiji Island, Dominica, Guyana, and Jamaica reinforce its soft power. Since the establishment of the TAC, it has provided technical aid to more than 30 countries. While there were 102 volunteers at the inception of the scheme between 1987 and 1988, by 2013, more than 200 volunteers were working in recipient countries and 1 500 were providing technical knowhow in fields as diverse as engineering, agriculture, law, medicine, architecture, accounting, radiology, meteorology and lecturing between 2014 and 2016.<sup>21</sup>

This novel initiative means that, unlike other African states, Nigeria is not only a recipient of aid, but an important aid donor, boosting its image in the international arena. Its contribution to the development of Africa rekindles its role of big brother on the continent. It also reinforces NEPAD's vision of African ownership of development initiatives and African solutions to African problems. Through the TAC, Nigeria (the primary impetus alongside South Africa in the formation of NEPAD) has proven that its commitment to this vision goes beyond rhetoric and has taken practical steps and led by example in realising its objectives. This enhances its image as a significant promoter of African cooperation in particular and broader South-South cooperation. Former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, H.E Meles Zenawi highlighted the TAC's contribution to the socio-economic development of African, Caribbean and the Pacific states.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, high-ranking Ethiopian officials stated that: 'even though their country was receiving similar manpower training aid from Japan and Britain, their observation in the two years of the TAC scheme in Ethiopia has shown that Nigerian volunteers were the most dedicated.' They added that 'Nigeria's efforts in deepening South-south cooperation ... had renewed their faith in the ability of Africans to help themselves'.<sup>23</sup> Similarly, former President of Namibia, Sam Nujoma said that, 'Nigeria has continued to grant development assistance and personnel to support my government's socio-economic programs, including the Technical Aid Corps Agreement under which Nigerian experts work in Namibia'.<sup>24</sup>

The international goodwill derived from the TAC is highlighted by the fact that it has received accolades from international organisations and bodies such as the Commonwealth, the United Nations Volunteer Service, ECOWAS Volunteers Programme and the Japanese Agency for International Cooperation.<sup>25</sup> Personal contact between Nigerians and recipient countries' nationals is critical in transmitting Nigerian culture in these countries and has endeared the state to other countries. It is perhaps for this reason that the Nigerian government has considered sending Nigerian teachers to teach Yoruba (one of the dominant Nigerian languages) in Brazil. Furthermore, centres for the study of Yoruba culture and language have been established in countries such as Benin and Brazil.<sup>26</sup> Continual requests for Nigerian volunteers under the TAC among APC countries and beyond testify to the fact that skilled Nigerian workers are admired. This serves as a veritable tool to debunk the unsubstantiated negative portrayal of Nigerians across the globe. In the words of former Nigerian foreign minister Bolaji Akinyemi who was responsible for the establishment of the scheme:

... So, that when people talk about 419 [Advance Fee Fraud] and the 'ugly Nigerian' in a particular country, they will remember that there was that engineer who helped to build our express road, he was a Nigerian; or the nurse who helped save my baby when my baby was sick, was a Nigerian; or the medical doctor that was attached to the State House was a Nigerian ....<sup>27</sup>

In summary, the TAC is a significant image booster for Nigeria. Other sources of Nigerian soft power that endear the regional power to other states include its peace keeping role in Africa and beyond, its music and multinational corporations, and its democratic credentials. It goes without saying that Nigeria's peacekeeping role, especially in Liberia and Sierra Leone has accorded Abuja the status of a major peace maker in Africa. Its music industry has transmitted Nigerian culture across Africa, while its multinational corporations have established their footprint on the continent and its successful transition from authoritarianism to democracy, global commendation of the 2015 presidential election that ushered in Muhammadu Buhari and its promotion of democracy across the continent are worthy of emulation. However, despite such robust soft power, there are inherent contradictions in Nigerian domestic politics that circumscribe Abuja from effectively mobilising its soft power to achieve its foreign policy objectives. The following section examines these limitations.

## Soft Power Limitations

### *Pervasive Corruption*

It is axiomatic that corruption is one of the ills that Nigeria has been identified with in the international system. This clearly has dire consequences for its soft power. Countries such as Russia, Indonesia and even China with similar levels of corruption have different levels of economic performance.<sup>28</sup> Nigeria's decentralised or disorganised corruption is very destructive not only to the economy but to the image of the country. As opposed to centralised or organised corruption, in such a situation, an investor has to bribe different agencies and individuals to obtain a licence for the provision of government goods or services. Corruption is pervasive in Nigeria at all levels, across the public and private realms. Since independence, successive regimes, both authoritarian and democratic, have been enmeshed in devastating corruption. It therefore came as no surprise when former British Prime Minister David Cameron recently described Nigeria as 'fantastically corrupt'.<sup>29</sup> This illustrates the damage corruption has caused to Nigeria's image in the eyes of the global audience.

Nigeria's ranking and scores in the Transparency International corruption perception index have further compounded its image problem and ultimately the attractiveness of the country. Azeez<sup>30</sup> observes that this has caused embarrassment to Nigerian government officials during visits to other countries and has significantly dented Nigeria's leverage in the international community and its ability to attract foreign direct investment (FDI). Indeed, aside from factors such as its economic prowess and military arsenal, its image and soft power are major sources of any country's influence in the international arena. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, states that are serious about achieving their foreign policy objectives understand the significance of soft power to

supplement their hard power. Perceptions of Nigeria as a corrupt country limit its soft power and capacity to play a hegemonic moral role in its region and beyond. States such as Switzerland and Canada enjoy prestige and influence in the international arena arising from their soft power and positive image.<sup>31</sup> Nigeria's influence has been constrained by its levels of corruption. For example, on what moral grounds can Nigeria as a regional power preach for the eradication of corruption and embrace of good governance in countries such as Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Angola and Sudan when it is notorious for corruption in the eyes of the global audience? Its preaching will definitely fall on deaf ears. Table 1 below shows Nigeria's ranking and score in the corruption perception index between 2010 and 2015.

**Table 1: Corruption Perception Index 2010-2015**

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Score/Scale	2.4/10.0	2.4/10.0	27/100	25/100	27/100	26/100
Rank/Number of Countries Surveyed	134/178	143/183	139/176	144/177	136/175	136/168

*Source: Adapted from Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2010-2015.*

Table 1 clearly reveals that Nigeria's levels of corruption are significantly high, ranking among the countries with the highest levels of corruption. Corruption dents the attractiveness of a state and discourages FDI that is critical for economic development such as creating employment, boosting productivity and the transfer of technology and technical know-how.<sup>33</sup> In their empirical analysis of the nexus between corruption and FDI in 33 less developed countries including Nigeria, Azam and Siti<sup>34</sup> note that corruption hinders FDI inflows partly because it raises business costs; ultimately, multinational corporations are not inclined to invest in such countries. Over a decade ago, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) argued at a forum in Lagos that Nigeria's bad image has hindered the attraction of much-needed FDI to grow its economy.<sup>35</sup> Similarly, foreigners are very cautious about engaging in economic and business activities in Nigeria for fear of being swindled.

In an age of unprecedented interconnectedness, states have realised that they cannot influence other states through coercion alone. Prestige, respect, attraction and admiration matter. Accordingly states often endeavour to project a positive image and counteract any negative one that they have been identified with. In this light, successive Nigerian governments have attempted (at least at the level of rhetoric) to combat the country's corruption through various institutional

frameworks. Notable among these initiatives are the Obasanjo military administration's Jaji Declaration (1975-1979), the Buhari military regime's War against Indiscipline (1983-1985) and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) which were launched by the Obasanjo civilian administration in 2000 and 2003, respectively. Despite these efforts and the EFCC's notable successes such as the prosecution of Tafa Balogun, then Inspector General of Police, Bode George, then deputy national vice chairman (South-West Zone) of the ruling People's Democratic Party, and James Ibori, the former Governor of Delta state, corruption is still pervasive. This is a consequence of among other factors, the lip service paid to these initiatives rather than actual crusades against corruption and the use of the agencies to witch hunt political opponents. While many politicians are alleged to have been involved in corrupt practices, very few have been convicted.<sup>36</sup> The Halliburton scandal comes to mind. Nigerian public officials were bribed to the tune of about \$200 million for the award of a \$6 billion Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas construction contract. Despite the global ignominy and public outcry in the country that accompanied the scandal, no charges have been laid against the culprits because three former head of states and other power brokers were allegedly involved.<sup>37</sup> Adebaw and Obadare<sup>38</sup> capture the activities of the post-1999 fight against corruption thus:

In the case of Nigeria, the civilian regime's prosecution of an anticorruption campaign has ironically coincided with the reported theft of state resources on a scale that is unprecedented, even by the standards of the country's egregious history of official larceny. Indeed, instead of being eroded, existing networks of patronage and clientelism have consolidated, even expanded, whilst the shady mutuality of state and informal institutions has further encrusted the country's iconography as one of Africa's myriad "shadow states".

It is important to put this observation into proper perspective. Agbibo<sup>39</sup> shows that 'between 1960 and 1999 alone, Nigerian leaders siphoned more than \$440 billion out of the economy. This is six times the Marshall Plan, the sum total needed to rebuild devastated Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War'. If the scale of corruption of the civilian regime that began in 1999 is truly unprecedented as argued by Adebaw and Obadare, one can only imagine the extent of the damage it has caused to Nigeria's economy. Former foreign affairs minister Ike Nwachukwu argues that Nigeria's battered image in the international arena is largely a consequence of the high levels of ubiquitous corruption which have engendered disregard for good governance, transparency and accountability.<sup>40</sup> Given this reality, it is not surprising that corruption has constrained Nigeria's moral authority, dented its soft power and punctured its regional hegemonic potential.

### *Boko Haram Terrorism*

It is common knowledge that Boko Haram terrorism is the major challenge confronting Nigeria. Indeed, the activities of the sect have threatened the territorial integrity and survival of the state. Boko Haram has challenged one of the pillars of

Nigeria's hegemonic claim – its military prowess. While it has been successful in conflict zones in African countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, the Nigerian military has struggled to cope with the terrorist group. This begs the question of hegemony or survival. Does Nigeria desire and have the potential to assume a hegemonic role in Africa or is it struggling for domestic survival amidst Boko Haram terrorism?

There can be no doubt that Boko Haram has dented Nigeria's credentials as a powerful military force to be reckoned with on the continent. In the 2015 global terrorism index, Nigeria ranks 3<sup>rd</sup>, below Iraq and Afghanistan at 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup>, respectively. Nigeria scored 9.213 out of a possible score of 10 in the global levels of terrorism. Similarly, the report shows that the sect has emerged as 'the most deadly terrorist group in the world' even deadlier than the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).<sup>41</sup> While Boko Haram's killing of innocent civilians and bombing of symbolic buildings captured global attention, the incident that reverberated across the world was its kidnapping of around 200 schoolgirls in Chibok in 2014. This was complicated by the Jonathan administration's handling of the matter. Indeed the incident revealed the ineptitude of the Nigerian government in its fight against the Islamic sect. For instance, the Jonathan administration only made an official statement about the girls three weeks after they had been kidnapped. Furthermore, it claimed it was negotiating with the sect for the release of the girls but the sect denied the claim. By the time the president vacated office in mid-2015, the government had still been unable to locate the girls. This caused global anger and condemnation of the Nigerian government by world leaders, media houses such as CNN and the BBC, civil society organisations like Transparency International and ordinary citizens across the globe, culminating in the popular campaign, #Bringbackourgirls. Transparency International<sup>42</sup> noted that 'the slow response to Boko Haram's abduction of the girls is a legacy of an institution not fit for the purpose.'

Warner<sup>43</sup> argues that '... the nature of the Nigerian government's reactions to the Chibok kidnapping has come to stand as a microcosm of its larger approach to Boko Haram, which many have read to be half hearted, confused, self-damaging, and duplicitous.' Clearly, rather than been perceived as a hegemon, Abuja is seen as a safe haven for terrorist activities. Nigeria has become a laughing stock and its government has lost face in the international system due to its seeming incapacity to tackle Boko Haram. The audacious bombing of symbolic buildings such as the United Nations building and the Police Headquarters in 2011 and the on-going killing of innocent civilians in the northern part of the country are just two examples of a reign of terror that has undermined Abuja's soft power in the eyes of the global community and raised questions about its capacity to protect life and property. Indeed, some observers and civil society organisations have likened Nigeria to a failed state. For instance, in the 2016 Fragile States Index (formerly Failed States Index), Nigeria ranked 13<sup>th</sup> out of 178 countries.<sup>44</sup> In summary, Boko Haram terrorist activities have undermined Nigeria's regional hegemony in its West African sub-region<sup>45</sup> and have punctured its pretensions to be a continental hegemon. While the country's peace-making efforts on the continent and further afield garnered it enormous soft power, Boko Haram has challenged this status. Rather than being

perceived as a guarantor of peace in the region, Nigeria is increasingly seen as a source of insecurity.

The manner in which the Nigerian government has conducted itself in its fight against Boko Haram has also raised global eyebrows. There have been gross violations of human rights including extrajudicial killings, rape and the intimidation of residents in Boko Haram hotspot states.<sup>46</sup> These tactics have been condemned by governments around the world, nongovernmental organisations such as Transparency International, and Human Rights Watch and even some Nigerian citizens. For instance, Human Rights Watch<sup>47</sup> observes that:

When the army has acted it has often done so in an abusive manner, rounding up hundreds of men and boys suspected of supporting Boko Haram, detaining them in inhuman conditions, and physically abusing or even killing them. Many other community members have been forcibly disappeared, allegedly by security forces. When Boko Haram suspects escaped in March from a famously abusive detention center, Giwa Barracks, Nigerian security forces reportedly recaptured and summarily executed hundreds of them.

While it is understood that the fight against terrorism is not an easy one and sometimes calls for desperate measures, the Nigerian forces' counter-terrorism operations relegate human rights issues to the backburner. Their disregard for international human right laws might have been responsible for some of the great powers' reluctance to supply the weaponry required to tackle Boko Haram. Human Rights Watch<sup>48</sup> notes, that, Nigeria's allies' reluctance to provide security assistance stems from the fear of complicity in such abuses. It should be noted that the extrajudicial killing of the founder and former leader of Boko Haram partly contributed to the hibernation and re-emergence of the sect as a more brutal and ruthless group in 2009.<sup>49</sup> Since 2009, the security forces have arrested tens of thousands of suspects, many of whom have died in prison.<sup>50</sup> Human rights and democracy are political values that are widely admired across the globe. A state that upholds such values enhances its soft power in the international system. The activities of the Nigerian military have shown that the country does not take human rights values seriously. This damages its soft power in the hearts and minds of global audience.

Boko Haram's effect on Nigeria's soft power is seen in fewer tourists visiting sites in the northern part of the country and the country's increasing unattractiveness to foreign investors. For instance, the Canadian Prime Minister noted in 2012 that, 'we cannot allow our citizens to be killed unwarrantedly ...'<sup>51</sup>

However, the Buhari administration has achieved noticeable success in its fight against the group, including the recapture of major towns, the seeming weakening of the group and the recent release of 21 and later 82 of the around 200 kidnapped Chibok girls. It remains to be seen if these gains will be maintained and sustained in the near future. Despite the president's claim that Boko Haram had been technically defeated in late 2015, the killing and bombing of civilians across the northern part of the country still make headlines in Nigeria and other parts of the world.

The twin challenges of Boko Haram and corruption seem to be the most damaging for Nigeria's image and its capacity to exert its soft power. However, other negative perceptions have punctured the country's image. Chief among these are drug trafficking and advance fee fraud (popularly called 419 in Nigeria). While these perceptions are often exaggerated, they contain elements of truth. For instance da Cruz & Stephens<sup>52</sup> note that Nigeria is responsible for a third of the heroin and half of the cocaine seized by the US and South African authorities, respectively.<sup>53</sup> Bach observes that, as early as the 1990s, the US authorities identified Nigeria as the hub of the illicit drugs that emerged from Asia and Latin America en route to North America and Europe. This negative image is compounded by Nigerians' notoriety for advance fee fraud. The Nigerian criminal network is visible across the globe, including the US, Britain, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan and other African countries and many have fallen victim to Nigerian scammers.<sup>54</sup> Clearly, these criminal acts have painted Nigeria in a negative light across the globe, undermining its soft power and influence among the community of nations.

### Conclusion

While successive Nigerian administrations have not adequately recognized the significance of soft power, the country can be argued to have some elements of such power. Nollywood radiates beyond Africa and has emerged as veritable cultural diplomacy. Nigeria is the largest democracy in Africa and its success in the last presidential polls is worthy of emulation by other African countries where democratic consolidation is still a major challenge. Abuja's big brother role exemplified by its peace keeping role and its aid, particularly through the TAC, has enhanced Nigeria's soft power.

However, Nigeria's soft power has been constrained by its negative image in the international system. This stems from among other things, Boko Haram activities, endemic corruption and Nigerians' role in drug trafficking and advance fee fraud. This negative image has frustrated the gains the country has garnered through its soft power sources. This suggests that they have overshadowed Nigeria's soft power attributes. Thus, Nigeria is unable to effectively harness its soft power resources and will continue to punch below its weight if these challenges are not mitigated. Addressing these constraints would enhance the country's credibility and ultimately its soft power projection in the international arena. This would translate into moral authority and influence and ultimately promote Nigeria's global admiration. More importantly, the effective combination of the regional power's soft power and its hard power will be fundamental to its aspiration of a hegemonic role on the continent.

In a nutshell, Nigeria's capacity to effectively influence decisions of regional consequence and assume its 'manifest destiny' to champion the cause of Africa at the global level will be largely determined by the extent to which Nigeria is able to counteract the impediments that obliterate its sources of soft power and fine-tune this source of power with its hard power resources. This will entail paying more attention to the utility of soft power in the international system, directing global attention to the country's soft power and embarking on carefully crafted soft power initiatives that have the potential to accrue regional and global admiration.

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# Journal of Global Analysis

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## **Turkey-KRG Energy Relations: Internal and External Dynamics** By **Remziye Yılmaz\***

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### **Abstract**

This paper aims at exploring internal and external dynamics of Turkey-KRG energy relations. It argues that Turkey's fight against the PKK, its increasing energy need, the target of Turkish energy decision-makers to decrease the high reliance of the country on Russian and Iranian gas, Turkey's goal of emerging as an energy hub, the economic interests of Turkish business groups, the strained relations between Ankara and Baghdad, and Erbil-Baghdad conflict have been the major determinants of Turkey's energy strategy towards the KRG. The paper concludes that the independence referendum held by the KRG in September 2017 has serious implications for the future of the Ankara-Erbil energy partnership, depending on measures to be taken by Kurdish and Iraqi leaders.

**Keywords:** Energy Security, (Inter)Dependence, Energy Collaboration, Energy Hub, National Interest, Security

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
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# Turkey-KRG Energy Relations: Internal and External Dynamics

## Introduction

Turkey has one of the largest energy markets in Europe. The significant growth in its economy, population, urbanization and industrialization has recently caused a rapid increase in the energy demand of the country. The average annual increase rate in its energy need since 1990 is 4,6 per cent.<sup>1</sup> The annual energy need of the country is envisaged to double in 10 years and grow annually 4,5 per cent until 2030.<sup>2</sup> However, since the country does not have sufficient domestic energy resources to meet its energy demand, it has to import around 75 per cent of its energy demand. More particularly, the country needs to import around 98 per cent and 90 per cent of its gas and oil supplies, respectively. While some volatility has been observed in the oil and gas imports (see Figure 1 and Table 1) parallel to the economic growth of the country, Turkey's oil and gas imports have generally been augmenting.

Figure 1. Turkey's Crude Oil Imports (Thousand Tonnes) (2004-2016)



Source: The figure is based on the data compiled from EMRA annual oil reports and "Energy Policies of IEA Countries Turkey 2016 Review", 2016, <https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/EnergyPoliciesofIEACountriesTurkey.pdf> (Accessed 15 November 2017).

Turkey's total gas imports in 2016 were 46.352 million cubic meters (Mcm), originating mainly from Russia (52,94 per cent), Iran (16,62 per cent), Azerbaijan (13,98 per cent) and other countries (16,46 per cent).<sup>3</sup> The country imported 40,064 million tons of petroleum in the same year, mainly from Iraq (23,09 per cent), Russia (19,38 per cent), Iran (17,32 per cent) and other suppliers (40,21 per cent).<sup>4</sup> These figures clearly indicate that Turkey is highly reliant on Russia and Iran to meet its energy need.

**Table 1: Turkey's Natural Gas Imports (Mcm) (2005-2016)**

Year	Russia	Iran	Azerbaijan	Algeria	Nigeria	Others*	Total
2005	17.524	4.248	0	3.786	1.013	0	26.571
2006	19.316	5.594	0	4.132	1.100	79	30.221
2007	22.762	6.054	1.258	4.205	1.396	167	35.842
2008	23.159	4.113	4.580	4.148	1.017	333	37.350
2009	19.473	5.252	4.960	4.487	903	781	35.856
2010	17.576	7.765	4.521	3.906	1.189	3.079	38.036
2011	25.406	8.190	3.806	4.156	1.248	1.069	43.874
2012	26.491	8.215	3.354	4.076	1.322	2.464	45.922
2013	26.212	8.730	4.245	3.917	1.274	892	45.269
2014	26.975	8.932	6.074	4.179	1.414	1.689	49.262
2015	26.783	7.826	6.169	3.916	1.240	2.493	48.427
2016	24.540	7.705	6.480	4.284	1.220	2.124	46.352

\* Others represent the countries of imported spot LNG.

Source: "Turkish Natural Gas Market Report 2016", <http://www.emra.org.tr/EN/Documents/NaturalGasMarket/PublishmentsReports> (Accessed 2 June 2017).

Turkish leaders are not worried that much about the security of oil supplies due to the existence of global oil markets and thereby various possibilities and routes to import oil. Nonetheless, they are greatly concerned about the security of gas supplies due to several causes. First, the country needs to import almost all its gas demand. Second, gas has the high share in its electricity generation and is growingly utilized in the industrial sector. Thus, any disruption of natural gas flows might importantly jeopardize the Turkish economy. Third, natural gas exporters have more inclination of utilizing their gas exports as weapon in bilateral contacts because of the inflexible manner of gas transit, which includes permanent infrastructure and long-term gas deals. Hence, Turkey's high dependence on external natural gas suppliers can limit its foreign policy maneuvers.

Thus, Turkey's external oil and natural gas strategy aims at meeting the increasing energy demand of the country, reducing its high reliance on Russian and Iranian gas and turning the country into an energy hub between energy producing countries in the Middle East, Caspian Sea and East Mediterranean and European markets. Becoming such a hub will enable Turkey to enhance its economy, boost its energy security, strengthen its leverage towards the EU, Russia and energy exporting countries, and bolster its regional power. The KRG can play an important role in terms of succeeding the targets of Turkey's foreign oil and natural gas strategy, taking into account its large oil and gas reserves and its geographical closeness to Turkey. Thus, this paper intends to discover internal and external dynamics of Turkey's energy partnership with the KRG.

The existing studies on Turkey-KRG energy relations acknowledge that the energy resources of the north Iraq have key significance for meeting Turkey's energy demand, and for helping the country to emerge as an energy hub.<sup>6</sup> Besides, the studies emphasize that Ankara's close energy relations with Erbil have been

especially improved due to the importance of the KRG's support in Turkey's struggle against the PKK.<sup>7</sup> By building on the existing academic literature, this paper attempts to contribute to further understanding of the energy partnership between Ankara and Erbil by comprehensively analyzing the internal and external dynamics of the partnership. In this respect, it will cover several important issues such as which elements determine the partnership, what kind of dependence Turkey and the KRG have established in the field of energy and how this dependence shapes Turkey's maneuvers in the foreign policy. More importantly, considering potential serious implications of the referendum organized by the KRG on 25 September 2017 for the future of Ankara-Erbil relations, this paper will also attempt to explore the potential impact of the referendum on Turkey-KRG energy cooperation.

The paper is organized in four sections. First, it looks at the KRG's energy profile in order to see to what extent the north Iraq can contribute to Turkey's energy security and to the achievement of the goals of its foreign oil and natural gas strategy. Second, it examines Turkey's bilateral political and economic relations with the KRG. Third, the paper scrutinizes in details the energy partnership between Turkey and the KRG. In this regard, it analyzes internal and external issues that have considerably influenced their partnership. In this section, it also explains some obstacles to the partnership, including the KRG's independence referendum. Finally, based on all this information, the paper ends with its assessment and main findings.

### **The KRG's Energy Outlook**

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the KRG region holds 4 billion barrels (Bbl) of proved reserves.<sup>8</sup> But, the KRG's anticipation is much higher since it includes unproven resources. The Kurdish Administration envisages to have 45 billion Bbl<sup>9</sup> even though this figure has not been independently confirmed and likely contains at least certain resources in disputed areas - particularly Kirkuk.<sup>10</sup> Except from the super-giant Kirkuk field, oilfields in the north are smaller (even though still large by international standards), frequently holding 0.5 to 1.0 billion Bbl of recoverable oil. Nevertheless, the region's favorable geology is generating wells with high initial oil production rates, in many cases higher than that are informed elsewhere in Iraq.<sup>11</sup>

According to the Kurdish Administration, its potential gas reserves are over the present federal estimate stating 165 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) gas is in place, including 38 Tcf that is recoverable.<sup>12</sup> The KRG anticipates that reserves could be as much as ten times the initial figures estimated by the Ministry of Oil of Iraq.<sup>13</sup> In the north Iraq, recently there have been a number of discoveries of natural gas of enough size to demonstrate the probability of commercial production there.<sup>14</sup> Meanwhile, the leading impetus to develop Iraq's non-associated gas resources has come from companies with an eye on the higher value proposed by international markets. This has exactly been the case in the KRG area, where the region's gas resources have been offered as a way to meet Turkey's gas demand and fill pipelines onwards to southeast Europe.<sup>15</sup>

### **Baghdad-Erbil Energy Dispute**

The strained relations between Baghdad and Kurds over hydrocarbon explorations

date back to 1950s. The nationalization of the majority of Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC)'s concession area after the July 1958 revolution ended the exploration in the country, and its assets were completely nationalized by the end of 1975. Before 2004, exploration in the areas which are now part of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) was very limited due to several explanations including opposition of the Baathist government<sup>16</sup> to developing the region and, conversely, the Kurdish opposition to central government activities.<sup>17</sup>

Legal framework of the Iraqi energy sector works within the general boundaries initiated by the 2005 constitution. The constitution states that oil and gas resources are "owned by all the people of Iraq in all the regions and governorates."<sup>18</sup> The federal government, with the producing governorates and regions, oversees the management of oil and gas extracted from present fields and the necessary strategic policies to develop Iraq's oil and gas assets in a manner that succeeds the highest interest of Iraqis. However, the constitution does not clearly address the question of jurisdiction over hydrocarbon exploration and development, and has been subject to different interpretations.<sup>19</sup>

Baghdad and the KRG dispute over which entity has the right to develop the resources in the KRG region. The constitution involves unclear language on this issue, proposing that Baghdad will have the main authority over "existing" fields. Kurds argue that "new fields" fall into the purview of the regions and can be developed according to Kurdish decisions without input or approval from the federal government.<sup>20</sup> Baghdad and Kurds have also differed over what are appropriate contracting mechanisms for the development of Iraq's resources. Baghdad has stuck to technical service contracts (TSCs), while the KRG has awarded profitable production-sharing contracts (PSC) to international oil companies (IOCs). Other related issues have put additional annoyances to the Baghdad-Erbil relationship, including who has the authority to market and sell production, and how earnings are allocated.<sup>21</sup> Besides, there have been disputes between Baghdad and Erbil regarding the use of the Iraq-Turkey pipeline (ITP) since oil production began in Kurdish region in 2009. As the KRG provides oil companies with exploration contracts independently of the central government, the Iraqi government increased the pressure on the KRG by declaring that it would not allow the KRG oil to be exported using the pipeline to Ceyhan.<sup>22</sup>

With the aim of overcoming disputes on these issues and allowing Kurdish oil to be exported with approval of Baghdad, over the past years, the Iraqi government and the Kurdish Administration concluded a series of agreements, through which export revenues would accumulate to the federal budget and Baghdad would recompense producing companies in the region.<sup>23</sup> However, the implementation of the agreements was marred by disputes over Baghdad's partial and postponed payments to the companies and the KRG's non-obedience with agreed-upon export volumes.<sup>24</sup>

Baghdad's control of oil and gas exports is considered as a significant manner of keeping oversight on the north as Baghdad can also control the region's economic development through managing its hydrocarbon exports. Baghdad's will of managing the awarding of exploration licenses is also a way to keep economic dominance over Kurds.<sup>25</sup> The oversight of Kurds' hydrocarbon exports is also considered as a manner

of limiting the Kurdish links with other countries. If Kurds were to develop independent trade connections with near neighbors such as Turkey, Iran, and Syria; it may start to see itself as having an international role distinct from that of Baghdad.<sup>26</sup>

### Ankara-Erbil Bilateral Relations

The KRG was established in 1991, after the Iraqi military and state apparatus pulled out of the three Kurdish provinces of Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Dohuk, following Iraq's defeat in the First Gulf War. At that time, the KRG had de facto autonomy. But, it acquired a greater level of autonomy after 2003 [following the US' invasion of Iraq]. While during the 1990s its legitimization endeavors were mainly dependent on its successful democratic transition, in the post-2003 era its legitimization has been extended to involve other aspects, such as the KRG's victorious state-building process and its economic capacity.<sup>27</sup> The KRG's wealth and grown independence amid the complete collapse of the Iraqi state were the embodiment of Ankara's concerns before the US invasion in 2003.<sup>28</sup> Thus, Ankara was swift to condemn any indication of the Kurdish separatism and in some cases, took a proactive approach, either undercover or openly, to restrict the Kurdish independence.<sup>29</sup> Thus, throughout the 1990s and the early 2000s, the principal strategic target of Ankara's policy towards Iraq was to impede the emergence of a Kurdish state in the north. Even after the federal government in Baghdad acknowledged the KRG's right to administer the northern Iraq in 2005, Ankara still rejected to have any official contacts with Erbil.<sup>30</sup> However, later Turkish leaders came to the conclusion that Ankara's policy towards Iraq would have challenges, particularly in eliminating the threat from the PKK, without the contribution of Kurdish groups in Iraq. As a result, in order to solve the security problems stemmed from the northern Iraq, Turkish policymakers and politicians contacted Kurdish authorities.<sup>31</sup> The shift in Turkey-KRG relations might also be a function of the decreased extent enjoyed by Turkey's once hardline general staff to proclaim on foreign policy matters. Besides, the Turkish government started to be more active in the region since Ankara sought for preventing the Iranian influence in the KRG region after withdrawal of the US army. Moreover, the importance attached to trade by Turkey's current government has been as a catalyst of the Turkish soft power [towards the KRG].<sup>32</sup> The Kurdish region emerged as an important market for Turkish business groups. Last but not least, increasing closer ties with the KRG has become part of Turkey's strategic calculations in Syria.<sup>33</sup> Although Turkey's links with Iraqi Kurds have ameliorated in recent years, its relations with Syrian Kurds have continued to be quite bitter. This is due to the fact that unlike in the KRG where Iraqi Kurdish groups hold more sway than the PKK, the PKK is very popular among the Syrian Kurds.<sup>34</sup> Since Syrian Kurds are cautious about Ankara's close links to the Syrian opposition, Turkey has little leverage on them.<sup>35</sup> Thus, being unaware of Barzani's little impact on Syrian Kurds, Turkey aimed at using its leverage over Barzani to marginalize the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (Democratic Union Party-PYD) [a Syrian opposition group that promotes Kurdish autonomy and federalism] in the Syrian opposition and among Syrian Kurds.<sup>36</sup>

On the other hand, from the KRG's point of view, ameliorating relations with Ankara was an evident policy option. Despite its history with Kurds, Turkey continued to be

the best-positioned state to provide the landlocked Kurds with a crucial lifeline to the outside, particularly to the West.<sup>37</sup> Above all, Turkey, which has the most developed economy among all of the KRG's neighbors, is a member of NATO, an EU candidate, and, most importantly, a close partner of the US.<sup>38</sup> In addition, the increasing power of a Shia-dominated central government in Baghdad and the fading impact of the US only added to the Iraqi Kurdish persuasion that their best choice is to improve relations with Turkey.<sup>39</sup>

In October 2009, then Foreign Minister Davutoğlu visited the region with a delegation of officials and businessmen and declared the opening of a consulate in Erbil. In March 2011, Erdoğan paid a visit to the Kurdish Region – for the first time by a Turkish Prime Minister. KRG leaders also repeatedly visit Ankara.<sup>40</sup> In just five years, Ankara has utilized its soft power to transform a once conflicted relationship with the KRG into an economically and politically beneficial one.<sup>41</sup>

### Turkey-KRG Energy Partnership

Ankara has recently established a strong energy partnership with Erbil. According to the Kurdish newspaper Rudaw, the share of Turkish oil companies is 25 per cent of the total Kurdish fields in the KRG region.<sup>42</sup> Genel Energy [independent Turkish Anglo company], in partnership with other international energy companies, has acquired rights in several fields in the region. Powertrans is another Turkey-based company which is active in the KRG region. The company acts as the intermediary for the KRG's oil exports via tankers. It has been sending Kurdish oil to the world markets through Turkey since 2012.<sup>43</sup> Ankara has preferred to keep the state-owned energy companies Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) and Turkish Petroleum International Company (TPIC) out of the KRG contracts. Initially, this action was political, supposedly having to do with Turkish worries to legitimize the KRG and boost its autonomy against Baghdad. Besides, it was commercially driven, with Turkey refraining from taking sides in the tug-of-war between Baghdad and Erbil on the Natural Resources Law in order not to give Baghdad any excuse to ban TPAO and TPIC from Iraqi oil contracts.<sup>44</sup>

In March 2013, Erdoğan and KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani discussed a framework agreement including several multi-billion-dollar oil and gas deals. According to these deals, two oil and one gas pipelines would be constructed.<sup>45</sup> Besides, the parties agreed to govern export pipelines, sale of gas, oil trade, the revenue sharing mechanism and acquisition of oil fields by the state-backed Turkish Energy Company (TEC).<sup>46</sup> According to a source close to the negotiations, "this is the most comprehensive energy deal in Turkey's history."<sup>47</sup>

In an effort to prevent political tension with Baghdad, the KRG and Ankara did not sign an intergovernmental agreement; instead, they left the KRG energy portfolio to public and private energy companies. In November 2013, the TEC signed a multi-billion-dollar energy package that includes exporting 2 million barrels (MMbbl) of oil and 10 Bcm of gas per year to Turkey.<sup>48</sup> Additionally, it was agreed that the TEC will participate in six blocks of the ExxonMobil's 13 exploration blocks in the Kurdish region.

In compliance with this deal, with Turkey's political and financial assistance, the KRG finished constructing its independent pipeline, called the KRI-Turkey Pipeline, inside the Iraqi territory that could export crude oil beyond Baghdad's control.<sup>49</sup> The commencement of oil exports through the pipeline in 2014 was historical for the Kurdish oil industry, and helped production to increase from 75,000 Bbl/d in 2011 to over 600,000 Bbl/d in the second quarter of 2015.<sup>50</sup> In addition, the DNO-KRG connection to Turkey pipeline transports oil produced at the Tawke field, operated by DNO, to Fishkhabur. From there, it links to the pipeline in Turkey for export at the Ceyhan port.<sup>51</sup> The new pipelines provide the KRG with the opportunity of exporting its oil resources to world markets independently of Baghdad.

Turkish and Kurdish leaders have often asserted that any export agreement between Ankara and Erbil would respect the current revenue-sharing scheme, under which the KRG is authorized to get 17 per cent of the total hydrocarbon gains.<sup>52</sup> However, the Iraqi government refused the suggestion by Ankara to act as an independent mediator by having oil revenues deposited into an escrow account at a Turkish state bank and dispensed between Erbil and Baghdad from there.<sup>53</sup>

Turkey's energy cooperation with Erbil in spite of Baghdad has been a controversial issue in Turkey. While Turkish officials claim that the agreement reached with Erbil is in the boundaries of international law, some critics argue that such a deal is against the Iraqi constitution and international law and will damage Turkey's international prestige. Furthermore, some observers state that Turkey should not jeopardize its relations with Baghdad given that the south Iraq has much larger energy reserves than the north Iraq does, thereby good relations with Baghdad are in the interest of Turkey. Meanwhile, the official position of Turkey is that its energy partnership with Erbil is beneficial for all Iraqis and this partnership is not alternative to Turkey's energy cooperation with Baghdad.<sup>54</sup>

### Drivers of the KRG-Ankara Energy Partnership

There are several important political, economic and geopolitical factors pushing for strong energy cooperation between Ankara and Erbil despite the continuous opposition by Baghdad.

#### *Internal Drivers*

Ankara's desire to permit natural-resource exports from the KRG territory without Baghdad's approval signifies that fears of boosted KRG autonomy causing more unrest among Turkish Kurds has broadly abated in Turkey's calculations. On the one hand, Kurdish areas in the south of Turkey would handsomely profit from more extensive economic links with the KRG, which in turn should decrease Turkey's Kurdish population's desire to support armed struggle against the Turkish state. On the other hand, the growing economic and political dependence of the KRG on Turkey will probably enhance Ankara's leverage in the relationship, thus guaranteeing that Erbil will adhere to approaches on the PKK and the Kurdish issue which are to Ankara's liking.<sup>56</sup> In other words, the Turkish government expects that closer economic, energy, and trade relations with the KRG will result in closer cooperation over security issues and end incursions by the PKK across the border.<sup>57</sup> In addition, Turkey should guarantee sufficient energy supply in order to deal with its

fast-growing economy and rising demand for energy. Its power generation has largely been dependent on Russian and Iranian imports. But, the Syria crisis caused a rift between Turkey and these suppliers, making the Turkish economy vulnerable to regional dynamics and price shocks.<sup>58</sup> Therefore, the energy collaboration with the KRG provides Turkey with the opportunity of diversifying its energy suppliers, reducing its dependence on Russian and Iranian resources and thereby enhancing its energy security. Besides, Turkish leaders seek for turning the country into an energy hub between European markets and energy producers, including the KRG. Kurdish oil and gas resources can boost the potential of Turkey to emerge as an energy hub. In this regard, the TANAP pipeline provides an exceptional opening for exports of natural gas from Iraq. The connection of gas fields in the northern Iraq to the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) necessitates comparatively small investments and offers cheapest mean of transportation.<sup>59</sup> Iraq – after Azerbaijan – is the solely natural gas producing country that might turn in the medium term its availability of natural gas resources into deliverance<sup>60</sup> to European markets. Thus, Ankara seeks for elevating Turkey's geopolitical importance by attracting natural gas from the Kurdish region into the SGC, and increasing Turkey's strategic significance as an energy transit hub for Europe, the Caspian, and the Middle East.<sup>61</sup> Hence, the access to the Kurdish resources serves Ankara's aim of becoming a major energy hub, gathering both geopolitical advantages and economic advantages in the form of transit fees.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, to fuel its growing economy and decrease its account deficit driven by high prices of oil and gas, Turkey has been struggling to find alternative and low-cost energy resources. The value of imported energy constitutes large percentage of the total imports and of the total trade deficit of the country.<sup>63</sup> The KRG's oil and gas resources have lower-cost compared to energy resources of other suppliers. Some argue that the KRG's supplies could be three times cheaper than Russian and Iranian resources. Therefore, Turkey's trade deficit will decline with cheap natural gas and oil production in the north Iraq.<sup>64</sup>

Last but not least, the business and trade partnership between the Kurdish region and Turkey has considerably contributed to their energy cooperation and vice versa. In addition to the Turkish state, Turkish business groups have a key role in bolstering Turkey's bilateral (energy) relations with Erbil. Several Turkish business groups lobby in the Turkish state to encourage it to develop a strong (energy) relationship with the Kurdish administration as it provides these firms with considerable economic interests. Hence, material interests of these firms have, to a certain degree, determined Turkey's energy and economic relations with Erbil.

### *External Drivers*

Both Ankara and Erbil are close allies of the US. For long time, the US encouraged Ankara to have good relations with the KRG, trying to convince Turkish leaders that the administrative gains of Iraqi Kurds would not cause the disintegration of Iraq.<sup>65</sup> Such push of the US encouraged Ankara to have direct and close contacts with Kurdish leaders, which in turn has contributed to the development of strong energy relations between Ankara and Erbil.

In addition, the KRG's domestic market for oil and gas is small and is probably to stay so in relation to future levels of production. Thus, it needs to find export outlets for

its energy resources. Turkey is obviously a natural market for both its oil and gas, as a large and swiftly increasing economy with a few energy resources of its own.<sup>66</sup> The economic survival of the region is dependent on accessing consumers via the Turkish territory, given that more than 90 per cent of its budget before the breakdown in negotiations with Baghdad was reliant on oil revenues.<sup>67</sup> In addition, Turkey provides the region with refined products that the region lacks, which has helped the KRG decrease its dependence on the products from southern Iraq.<sup>68</sup> Thus, these drivers push the KRG to further bilateral and energy relations with Ankara.

### **(Potential) Problems in the Turkey-KRG Energy Partnership**

While Turkey's energy cooperation with the KRG provides both sides with significant advantages and several elements even push for furthering the cooperation, there are a set of issues which may seriously challenge this cooperation in the future. First of all, the achievement of the Turkey-KRG energy collaboration hinges on the peaceful solution to Turkey's Kurdish problem. The PKK has used pipeline attacks as a way of attacking Turkey's strategic assets. Until very recently, PKK assaults on pipelines knocked out oil and gas flows, propelling Ankara to buy Russian and Azeri gas at higher prices and keeping the Iraq-Turkey route mostly inactive.<sup>69</sup> Furthermore, the KRG was confronted by significant interruptions in oil flows via the pipeline in Turkey because of sabotage and theft, resulting in decreased export levels and the loss of revenue to the KRG of \$501 million.<sup>70</sup> Additionally, the PKK issue continues to be an important obstacle to Turkey's bilateral relations with the KRG. Due to the outbreak of the PKK conflict, Turkey has conducted cross-border operations against the PKK camps in the north Iraq. This has serious potential of harming Turkey's relations with both Baghdad and Erbil.<sup>71</sup>

Secondly, Baghdad has vehemently objected to the Turkey-KRG rapprochement, being worried that it would increase the Kurds' leverage in Iraq's domestic politics and might represent a springboard for the Kurdish autonomy.<sup>72</sup> Baghdad blamed Ankara of interfering in Iraqi affairs by "backing radical Sunni elements" in the country and signing "illegal" energy agreements with the Iraqi Kurds.<sup>73</sup> Consequently, Baghdad attempted to prevent Turkey from benefitting from Iraq's rich energy opportunities. For example, in November 2012, Baghdad suddenly cancelled TPAO's permission for operating in a field in the southern Iraq.<sup>74</sup> Shortly after that, Baghdad rejected to grant its consent for a natural gas project in the north [in the Block 9 concession].<sup>75</sup> Moreover, Baghdad has utilized any number of creative tactics to upset Ankara, threatening to close its airspace to Turkish planes<sup>76</sup> and refusing the permission of Turkey's Energy Minister to land in Erbil in an attempt to prevent Turkish discussions on energy cooperation with the KRG.<sup>77</sup> Additionally, Iraqi authorities tried to impede the export of the Kurdish oil via Turkey to world markets. For instance, in 2014, several oil tankers carrying cargos of the Kurdish oil that had been transported via the new Kurdish pipeline left Ceyhan port to be sold on the world markets. However, for long time tankers sat at several ports around the world since countries and companies hesitated to buy the Kurdish oil because of Baghdad's rejections. Then Oil Minister of Iraq Abdul Karim Luabi told that "The Iraqi government is going to file a lawsuit against the Turkish government ... which

resulted from the violation of the signed agreement between the two countries.”<sup>78</sup> The Iraqi government filed for arbitration against Turkey at the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, seeking damages of \$250 million—more than double the value of the tanker’s cargo.<sup>79</sup> Hence, Baghdad has played an “inhibitor” role in Turkey-KRG Energy cooperation.

Thirdly, the US is against to a strong energy partnership between Ankara and Erbil as it is worried that Turkey’s firm energy cooperation in particular and bilateral relations with the KRG in general will push Baghdad’s Shia government closer toward Tehran. Besides, US policymakers have been concerned that Turkey-KRG energy cooperation could really destabilize Iraq, starting a chain reaction that could result in the violent breakdown of the country.<sup>80</sup> The divergence between Washington and Ankara regarding the intensified Turkey-KRG energy relations has negatively affected Turkey’s close energy cooperation with Erbil. Baghdad has already been able to secure Washington’s support against the Kurdish oil contracts.<sup>81</sup> Behind the scenes, Washington attempted to prevent sales of the Kurdish oil, which was sent to world oil markets through Turkey in 2014.<sup>82</sup>

Last but not least, Iran has the tendency of competing with Turkey for being an energy transit country in the region. This approach is in fact a part of Tehran’s policy of lessening Ankara’s regional influence. In this respect, Iran has been trying to convince the KRG for becoming a transit country for the Kurdish gas and oil exports. Thus, in 2014, Tehran started negotiations with Erbil. On 4 April 2016, Kurdish and Iranian officials concluded an understanding on the technical details of the energy export project, but the KRG has yet to express “its readiness” to Iran with regards to a date to sign the agreement.<sup>83</sup> Such a transit option would provide the KRG with an alternative transport option and less dependence on Turkey for energy exports.<sup>84</sup>

### **The KRG’s Referendum and the Future of the Ankara-Erbil Energy Partnership**

Over the years, Barzani has frequently referred to his desire for a sovereign Kurdish state.<sup>85</sup> According to Barzani, Baghdad’s “undemocratic, sectarian, centralizing and unconstitutional” behavior was emboldening for a reconsideration of the Kurdish loyalty to Iraq’s territorial integrity and federative system.<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, the issues about the national budget, a territorial dispute over Kirkuk and the exploitation of Kurdish oil reserves exacerbated the KRG’s dissatisfaction with Baghdad. Iraqi Kurds consider Baghdad as an obstacle to their progress.<sup>87</sup> That is why the KRG held a referendum on the independence on 25 September 2017. Around 93 per cent of voters voted for independence. But, the Iraqi government and the international community, including Iran, Turkey, the US and EU, did not recognize the result of the referendum, as it could cause Iraq’s breakup. Instead of boosting the Kurds’ political leverage and independence, the referendum has misspent international goodwill toward Kurds, angered Baghdad and its neighbors, and increased economic risks and societal fractures. It has also prompted the loss of the KRG’s command over significant territories and resources. Iraqi security forces have reasserted control over Kirkuk and its oil assets, other “disputed territories,” and Iraqi border crossings after a discussed withdrawal of Peshmerga forces.<sup>88</sup> Iraq’s occupation of the disputed territories in Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Diyala provinces has brought about the KRG losing

almost half of its oil production and income. While the KRG had produced 610,000 barrels a day (bbl/d) and exported around 560,000 bbl/d via Turkey, it is now left with approximately 327,000 bbl/d of production, of which around 280,000 bbl/d are exported.<sup>89</sup> The federal government now appears firm about controlling the oil sources, particularly in Kirkuk and the disputed areas. Iraq's Oil Minister warned all states and international petroleum firms against signing agreements with any Iraqi side without first discussing with Baghdad.<sup>90</sup> In addition, the Minister instructed immediate repairs to Iraq-Turkey pipeline (ITP), a measure that may abolish Baghdad's necessity to export crude via the Kurdish region and further isolate the independence-seeking Kurds.<sup>91</sup> Moreover, the repercussions from the referendum also indicate reordering in the KRG's internal politics; President Masoud Barzani has resigned from his post.<sup>92</sup> Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has now been in a difficult position and the power struggles between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have deepened following the referendum.

Turkey rejected the referendum since it is against to the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in its region as this may negatively affect Turkey's territorial integrity and national security, considering the fact that the country also has a large Kurdish population. Turkish leaders have been also concerned about the territorial integrity and stability of Iraq. Furthermore, their objections were intensified after the KRG determined to include Kirkuk in the referendum (it is a multi-ethnic city and inhabited by Turkmens).<sup>93</sup> Erdoğan stated that "Regardless of the results, the referendum, which is not in conformity with the current law in Iraq, is null and void for us, and we call it illegitimate."<sup>94</sup>

The referendum caused a serious dilemma for Turkish politicians. When determining their position on the vote, they needed to take into account their close relationship with the KRG on the one hand and the referendum's potential results on the other.<sup>95</sup> Imposing sanctions against the KRG would not only damage the Turkish economy, but also debilitate one of its very few partners in the region, which could have extensive effects on Turkey's regional strategy. It would also strengthen Barzani's domestic opponents which have close ties to Iran, affording Tehran more power in northern Iraq at the expense of Ankara.<sup>96</sup>

While Erbil considered that the energy trade generated some interdependence, expecting this would cause a more measured reaction to the referendum from Turkey<sup>97</sup>, Ankara imposed some economic and political sanctions on the KRG. The direct Turkish sanctions were stopping flights by all Turkish airlines to Erbil and Sulaymaniyah; prohibiting Rudaw, an Iraqi Kurdish television channel, from Turkish airwaves; and terminating Turkish military training for the KRG armed forces (peshmerga).<sup>98</sup> Besides, the Turkish National Security Council passed a resolution with regards to the transfer of the Ibrahim Khalil border gate, which is situated across from Habur, to Baghdad.<sup>99</sup> In addition, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım said Ankara consented to open another border gate with Iraq as part of a route which would lead to the city of Tal Afar, some 40 km (25 miles) west of Mosul.<sup>100</sup>

On the other hand, while Erdoğan articulated that "The [oil] valve is ours. If we shut off the valve, it will be over"<sup>101</sup>, Turkey did not stop oil flows from the north Iraq. Cutting-off the oil pipeline would impact Turkey as well - the KRG pays transit fees to

Turkey and the country is heavily dependent on imports to meet its fast-increasing energy demand. Such a move would also harm Turkey's aim of becoming a reliable transit route for energy exports from the Middle East and Russia to Europe.<sup>102</sup> Another reason is that Russia and Turkey are in the need of the pipeline conveying Kurdish oil to Turkey. Russia has invested \$4 billion in KRG's oil and natural gas industries in 2016. Rosneft considers to transport large amounts of crude from Ceyhan terminal to Germany. Any tightening of the valves on the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline would prevent that trade<sup>103</sup> and might cause problems between Ankara and Moscow. Furthermore, Turkey is restricted by its own economic interests: according to the Turkish Statistics Institute the country vended \$7.6 billion worth of food, consumer goods, construction materials and other goods to Iraq in 2016, and the Turkish Economy Minister has articulated that non-oil trade with the KRG was worth \$2.5 billion.<sup>104</sup>

Following the referendum, the basic characteristics of the Kurdish region will stay unaltered. It will still be landlocked, economically reliant, bound to Baghdad, Turkey and Iran, and politically divided. The financial repercussions have terminated any expectation the Kurds had of creating an autonomous and self-sustaining economy separate from Baghdad.<sup>105</sup> Under these circumstances, the KRG has little option but to discuss with Baghdad and regional countries to survive, just as it has done for decades. Nonetheless, the KRG now has to deal with Baghdad from a position of weakness.<sup>106</sup>

Without doubt, the referendum will have significant implications for Ankara's relations with the KRG in the future. Turkish leaders may increasingly prefer to improve their relations with Baghdad. After the referendum, the two states approached each other with the common interest to preserve Iraq's territorial integrity. They extended their collaboration and even held joint military drills. Baghdad also showed its support for Turkey's anxieties over the PKK presence in Kirkuk.<sup>107</sup> Besides, as Erdoğan attaches great importance to the 2019 elections in the country, he may limit Turkey's ties with the KRG in order to increase the AKP's votes coming from Turkey's nationalists.

In the field of energy, it seems that Turkish leaders will favor to cooperate more and directly with Baghdad, instead of Erbil. In this regard, Erdogan already said that Turkey is "ready to give all support to Baghdad as it seeks to reopen a crude oil pipeline from the Kirkuk oilfields to Turkey, through which Iraq stopped sending oil in 2014."<sup>108</sup>

On the other hand, Ankara still needs the KDP and improved ties between Erbil and Baghdad due to three main reasons. First of all, the political instability in Iraq in general and in the Kurdish region in particular might enable the PKK to increase its influence in the region. Secondly, after the referendum, Tehran already has boosted its role in Iraqi affairs, which is of course against the Turkish interests. Thirdly, Turkey needs to collaborate with Erbil to import Kurdish oil and gas with the view of meeting its energy demand and becoming an energy hub. Hence, it is in the interest of Turkey to maintain firm economic and political ties with Erbil.

Turkey has disproportionate economic weight, allowing it to determine the KRG's behavior via diplomatic and economic force more than the other way around.<sup>109</sup>

Turkey is considered to have been maneuvering behind the scenes to get Nechirvan Barzani, the Prime Minister of the KRG and the elder Barzani's nephew, to take charge of the Kurdish region in a plan said to be supported by the US.<sup>110</sup> Nechirvan had helped arrange a mega energy agreement between Ankara and Erbil in 2013 and "has long enjoyed close personal ties with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan."<sup>111</sup> But, in order to normalize the relations with Ankara, Erbil has to go back to the status quo – that is, to cancel the referendum results.<sup>112</sup> Ankara has already been calling on the KRG to annul the referendum.

In the post-referendum era, Turkish leaders need to encourage Baghdad and Erbil to improve their ties because political and economic stability of Iraq has key importance for Turkey. Besides, instead of developing good relations with only either Baghdad or Erbil, it is in the interest of Ankara to have firm and balanced relations with both the federal government and the KRG as such relations will provide Turkey with investment opportunities in both sides of Iraq, including the energy sectors of south and north Iraq. Moreover, positive relations with the Kurdish Administration and the Iraqi government may enable Turkey to fight more effectively against the PKK in the region. Last but not least, strong relations with Baghdad and Erbil will help Turkey to increase its influence in Iraq and in the region, at the expense of Iran.

### Assessment and Conclusion

Ankara's energy collaboration with Erbil provides Turkey with a number of benefits. As Turkey does not have considerable oil and gas resources to satisfy its growing energy demand and its energy security has vital importance for the economy, which directly or indirectly affects its national security, regional power and military capabilities; Turkey has endeavored to cooperate with the KRG in order to benefit from the energy resources of the north Iraq, particularly considering that they are geographically close to Turkey. Ankara-Erbil energy cooperation enables Turkey to meet its increasing energy need and decrease its high reliance on Russian and Iranian energy resources. This boosts Turkey's bargaining power in its (energy) contacts with Tehran and Moscow and helps Ankara to adopt a more independent foreign policy. Turkey-KRG energy collaboration also allows Turkish oil companies to carry out energy operations in the north Iraq, which provide them with the opportunity of "internationalizing" their energy activities and supporting the efforts of the Turkish government towards the enhancement of the energy security of the country. Moreover, since the KRG gas resources are cheaper in comparison with gas resources of other exporting states, importing the Kurdish gas will help Turkey reduce its energy bill and trade deficit. In addition, the Kurdish oil (and probably gas in the upcoming years) exports to Turkey will bolster Turkey's potential of becoming an energy hub, which will, in turn, increase its regional power and global standing. Finally, Turkey receives economic gains in the forms of transit fees by delivering the Kurdish oil to world markets.

While there is a mutually beneficial energy interdependence between Turkey and the KRG, this is an asymmetric interdependence since Erbil is more dependent on Turkey than the reverse. The Kurdish region is highly in need of the Turkish market and the Turkish corridor for its energy exports. Because the economy of the region

dramatically depends on energy revenues, Turkey's roles as an importer and a transit country for the Kurdish oil (and gas) resources are crucial for Erbil. As Turkey is the less dependent side in the energy ties with the KRG, it holds more power. Possessing more power, of course, allows Ankara, from time to time, to use the high dependence of the KRG as leverage against it with the view of maximizing Turkey's national interests.

Despite significant advantages, Ankara-Erbil energy relations have resulted in some costs for Turkey. For instance, the close energy cooperation between Turkey and the KRG has caused strains in Ankara's relations with the US and Baghdad. Both Washington and Baghdad reacted negatively to the increasing energy cooperation between Turkey and the KRG and warned Ankara not to cooperate with Erbil without the authorization of Baghdad. Moreover, Turkey's military operations against the PKK in the north Iraq sometimes cause problems in its relations with Baghdad and Erbil, which might have important implications for their energy collaboration in the future.

The referendum held in the north Iraq in September 2017 may negatively affect the energy cooperation between Ankara and Erbil. It is likely that Turkish leaders will growingly favor to increase their energy cooperation with Baghdad, instead of the KRG. To what extent Turkey may limit its energy collaboration with Erbil will depend on the steps to be taken by the Kurdish Administration and the Iraqi government in the post-referendum era.

The energy collaboration between Ankara and Erbil goes beyond energy issues and has been influenced by several non-energy matters. Turkey's energy ties with Erbil include complex and interlinked politics, economy, energy and security-related issues. For instance, the business and trade partnership between the Kurdish region and Turkey has considerably contributed to their energy cooperation and vice versa. Moreover, the strong political relationship between Ankara and Erbil, especially due to their joint efforts towards fighting against the PKK, has encouraged them to extend their partnership into new fields, including energy and trade.

Against this background it can be concluded that Turkey's campaign against the PKK, its growing energy demand, the will of Turkish policy makers to reduce the high dependence of the country on Russian and Iranian gas, Turkey's target of becoming an energy hub, Ankara-Baghdad and Erbil-Baghdad disputes and the economic interests of Turkish business groups have so far been the main determinants of Turkey's energy policy towards the Kurdish administration in the north Iraq. In the future, the developments following the referendum will also importantly shape the energy cooperation between Turkey and the KRG.

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# Journal of Global Analysis

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## **Nigeria's Leadership Role Quests: The Race of the Crippled** By **Dr. Ebere R. Adigbuo**\*

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### **Abstract**

There is no doubt that Nigerians conceive their country as the giant state in Africa, principally for the country's human and material endowments. In the realm of foreign policy, it is Nigeria's status more than that of any other black African country, that most determines Africa's collective future. Nigeria is determined not just to play its leadership role in Africa, but to also build upon it.<sup>1</sup> It is against this background that Nigeria's problem of capability comes in. A country that utilizes less than 10% of total steel used in Africa, less than 12% of all the power generated in Africa, a country that is associated with institutional failings and where social upheavals threatens the polity because of inept and corrupt leadership, it is doubtful if Africa will entrust its destiny to the crippled state. Using the "leadership role conception"<sup>2</sup> as the theoretical framework, this paper examines the successes and challenges in this monumental task of leading Africa in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

**Keywords:** Leadership, Role, Foreign Policy, National Interest, Nigeria, Africa

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## Nigeria's Leadership Role Quests: The Race of the Crippled

### Introduction

Nigeria is indisputably the most populous country in Africa, with about one hundred and eighty million people. Economically, the country has a huge gas reserves and is supposedly the seventh largest oil producing country in the world. Nigeria is also the biggest economic and trading partner to the West and Asian countries like China. With a vast military resource, it is commonplace to ascribe the role of a sub-regional and continental leadership status to the country. However, the issue is: how has Nigeria's aspiration for regional dominance influenced its foreign policy decisions towards the rest of Africa? It is a truism to state that almost all middle/regional powers are constrained by a number of domestic variables. The state of Nigeria's foreign policy is one characterised by ambivalence. On the one hand, Nigeria's policy-makers envision a future leadership role (regional dominance) for the country, especially within Africa. On the other hand, the complexity of international interactions has conditioned the reality with which Nigeria had to cope as a third-rate power in the international system.<sup>3</sup>

The ambivalence alluded to above demonstrates that Nigeria remains an important actor in the international arena. Thus, the country should not be impervious to the shifting emphasis from confrontation to collaboration in international politics. From the domestic setting, it is even more ambivalent as many observers have wished that Nigeria's show of benevolence to other African states should begin at home. Nigerians have their doubt. Can their nation assume any leadership position in the face of the challenges posed by ethnic and religious conflicts, collapsed infrastructure, weak institutions that encourage corruption and the resultant poverty and hunger? It is along this line of thought that Nigeria's former representative to the United Nations, Simeon Adebó, cautioned his compatriots that "no nation that is weak at home, politically and economically can be strong abroad. Foreign policy is a function of home strength".<sup>4</sup>

Adebó's remark is only recorded on one side of the foreign policy coin. On the other side is Okonjo Iweala's justification for Nigeria multifaceted assistance to other African States:

When there are crises, the (African) countries have looked up to Nigeria to be an arbitrator. If you are the older brother, the stronger brother or sister, you have to help those who come after you. It is engraved in our cultural approach to the pursuit of our foreign [policy] objectives.<sup>5</sup>

It must be appreciated that it was Nigeria's Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa that introduced the African centeredness of Nigeria's foreign policy the moment he proclaimed that we belong to Africa and Africa must first claim attention in our external relationship. On 7 October 1960, the Prime Minister outlined the foreign policy principles of the country when he addressed the United Nations

Assembly: non interference, peaceful settlement of disputes and promotion of functional cooperation among African states, amongst others.

Balewa also promoted the establishment of the Organization of the African Unity at a time the continent was divided into ideological blocks: (a) Casablanca Group, championed by President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana – the group was radical in nature and advanced the political union of African states with an African High Command; (b) Brazzaville Group, mainly the Francophone countries that wanted continued influence of France in Africa; and lastly (c) the Monrovia group, led by Nigeria and other states that sought for the gradualist-functional cooperation among African States. The OAU was finally established under the guidelines of Nigeria's Monrovia ideological leaning. To establish the organization, Nigeria's legal luminary, Teslim Elias, drafted the OAU constitution.<sup>6</sup> There were other accomplishments. It was Nigeria, during Balewa's administration that spearheaded the expulsion of the racist South Africa regime from the Commonwealth in 1963. Nigeria also championed the trade deals between ACP and the EEC-(Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States and European Economic Community) in 1966. Nigeria has on several occasions given aid to needy African states. During the 1973-74 OPEC oil embargoes, Nigeria sold petroleum products at reduced prices to African states, when Yakubu Gowon was the Head of State.<sup>7</sup> Gowon's belief in Africans in Diaspora predisposed him to settle the salaries of protesting workers in the West Indies. Another Nigeria's Head of State, Badamosi Babaginda, introduced in 1987 the Technical Aids Corp Program whereby young Nigerian professionals voluntarily served other African, Caribbean and Pacific countries in need of their expertise. At present, there are 1500 Nigerian volunteers serving in 32 countries, quoting the designer of the program, Bolaji Akinyemi, when he delivered the 2016 convocation speech of the University of Ibadan.<sup>8</sup> Other global, continental and sub-regional accomplishments by Nigeria are highlighted in the subsequent section of this paper.

What has Nigeria gained from the multifaceted assistance to other African countries? How does Nigeria's domestic setting impact on her leadership aspirations and how is her leadership perceived by other African states? Put differently, is Nigeria's *leadership role quests* in Africa the race of the crippled? These research questions will justify the extent to which Nigeria's leadership aspirations face many challenges. In achieving the above and together with this introduction, this article has been divided into five sections with the first schedule serving as introduction; the second part attempts to create a nexus between the theoretical framework and Nigeria's leadership aspirations in Africa; the third section further explores Nigeria's leadership role articulation and expectations. This section demonstrates the link between the country's leadership aspirations in Africa, using two strategies: economic buoyancy and soft power. The concept of soft power was popularized by Joseph Nye to demonstrate a nation's capability to achieve its foreign policy objectives by attraction and cooperation rather than using the traditional coercive means (hard power).<sup>9</sup> The fourth section reveals that leadership is a relational phenomenon and goes further to demonstrate how the crippled giant's aspiration is hamstrung by her domestic problems and how she is perceived by other African states. The paper concludes in the fifth section by insisting that leadership is earned

and needs lots of commitment and hard work from Nigeria. Some theoretical consideration is essential at this point.

### Regional Leadership Role Conception

This study is situated in Holsti's inquiry into how foreign policy makers perceive the roles their states play in the international system. To arrive at a typology of national role conceptions, Holsti reviewed a large number of speeches, parliamentary debates, radio broadcasts, official communiqués and press conferences of 71 governments found in 972 different sources. These sources provided evidence of 17 role conceptions articulated during the period from 1965 to December 1967.<sup>10</sup> Out of the 17 role conceptions Holsti outlined, what is of interest to this study is the Regional Leadership Role Conception.

The leadership role conception according to Holsti refers to duties or special responsibilities that a government perceives for itself in its relations with states in a particular region with which it identified, or to cross-cutting subsystems such as the then international communist movements.<sup>11</sup> Detailed discussion on Nigeria's regional role conceptions will be made in the next section that examines the country's role articulations and expectations.

Meanwhile, it is appropriate to understand that leadership as a concept is vital to organizations and societies. It harnesses, combines and manages men and resources to achieve specified goals. It makes peoples or states to do extraordinary things. From the layman's view, a leader is one that has primary authority and responsibility to plan, guide, control persons or institutions in a way to execute and achieve the societal or organizational goals. The leader is the main actor in the chain of the organizational activities. The leader, an individual or a nation, occupies the primary place in the activities, operations and actions of the groups, societies or states. Leadership is a relationship between the leader and the led. Thus, the leader influences the behaviour of the followers. In effect, leadership is an act of getting things done by others.

In today's world, the concept of leadership confronts enormous challenges, opportunities and possibilities. From the corporate organizations to complex political systems, whether in the North or the global South, the core problems facing institutions is that of leadership. The challenge of leadership today is global, whether in France where the electorate rejected all the presidential aspirants of known political parties to settle for the young Macron or in the United States where the unpredictable Trump, was elected America's 45<sup>th</sup> President.

The consequences of leadership failure are bizarre, most especially in the developing world unlike the global North that has strong institutions. But which country can alter Africa's narrative from that of abject poverty and a worsening dependence on foreign aid to an era of scientific innovation that can uplift Africans and make the continent competitive? As a universal phenomenon, leadership involves the attainment of societal or group objectives. For groups or states to achieve their set objectives, there is the need to believe in the leader. Leadership motivates, it does not rely on coercive measures. There should be the willingness on the path of the

followers to comply voluntarily with the vision of the leader. Other leadership ingredients as applied to this paper are economic capability, domestic political stability, and diplomatic use of soft power. Africa needs a leadership that understands this encompassing ideology; a worldview that can re-build the African nation-states from the medley of ethnic nationalities packaged by Europe in its Berlin Conference of 1884-85.<sup>12</sup> It is a worldview that appreciates that a market for globalization is not beneficial to the continent. Rather, what is beneficial is finding a niche in the production value-chain of economic globalization. That worldview should be able to create a common goal and destiny around which citizens in our countries can unite and strive together for progress. This is different from the narrow views that fuel the ethnic and religious-identity irredentism that has dominated the domestic political space in many African countries.<sup>13</sup>

How does the above narrative apply to Nigeria? Nigeria's quest for leadership in Africa is based on certain criteria: economic capability, sprawling demographics in human and material resources, and the use of soft power particularly in helping to decolonize Africa's dependent territories and settle its conflicts. Nigeria's Afro-centrism has been the kernel of her foreign policy since independence. To achieve her national interest couched in Afro-centric terms, Nigeria developed the doctrine of concentric circle that begins with safeguarding her sovereignty and territorial integrity in the innermost circle, followed by her interests towards the immediate West African neighbours in the second circle, and her interests in other African states and the world at the third and fourth part of the circle. The concentric circle doctrine enables Nigeria to pursue her leadership position in the continent and the entire world. It is in recognition of Nigeria's potentials that immediately after her 1960 independence, Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations scribe, appointed a Nigerian, General Aguiyi Ironsi as the African to command the UN peacekeeping force in the Congo. Nigeria also chaired for over two decades the United Nations Special committee against Apartheid. Nigeria understood its role in championing the cause of the black race, as she stood against the French government's atomic test in the Sahara desert, even when such a position was at odds with her economic survival as an emergent nation.<sup>14</sup>

### **Nigeria's Leadership Role Articulation and Expectation**

#### *Geo-political and economic considerations*

Nigeria's aspiration to African regional dominance has elicited commentaries. On the one hand, are analysts and practitioners that justify their country's claim for the continental leadership. The factors that influence this school of thought range from geo-political considerations, as Nigeria is strategically located within Africa to demographic justifications: Nigeria is the most populous nation in Africa and the largest black nation in the world. Economically, Nigeria is today branded as the largest economy in Africa. From this backdrop, the proponents of Nigeria's regional leadership were elated the moment their country helped to establish the OAU.<sup>15</sup> Nigeria's Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, saw the establishment of the OAU as a foreign policy accomplishment and a vindication of his leadership. He declared *inter-alia*:

The Addis Ababa Charter is ninety-nine percent what I hoped for. I would not have signed it if it did not satisfy me...Just as we in Nigeria have been laying down one stone after another in the process of nation building...just as we were determined to preserve our unity in diversity; so the Addis Ababa conference...recognized the fact that unity should not be tantamount to uniformity.<sup>16</sup>

The Prime Minister, Balewa, carried his advocacy on behalf of Africans to the United Nations as he canvassed for the restructuring of the global body. He strongly felt that Africans should be given a slot in the United Nations Security Council:

We believe the United Nations Organization is the only one sure guarantee of preserving the sovereignty of all states that are weak....The whole structure of the United Nations needs to be re-examined and the United Nations Security Council should be composed in such a way that the new independent African countries can have an effective voice.<sup>17</sup>

Other analysts that belong to this school of thought are Aluko<sup>18</sup> and the one-time permanent representative of Nigeria to the United Nations, Gambari.<sup>19</sup> These scholars are of the view that the liberation of Africa from all forms of domination, exploitation and foreign manipulation was dependent on Nigeria's leadership. This assertion was not limited to Nigerian scholars. In 1981, *The Times* of London re-stated that "Nigerians justifiably see themselves as the giant of Africa. It is the one element they are agreed upon. And they are now seeking to use their oil and emerging industrial muscle to influence opinion and guide events. It is Nigeria's foreign policy, more than that of any other black African country, that most determines Africa's collective future. Nigeria is determined not just to play its national leadership role in Africa, but to also build upon it".<sup>20</sup>

Nigeria's leadership aspiration in Africa needs to be positioned in the context of the country's broad foreign policy objectives which constitutionally are tied to Nigeria's national interest as prescribed in Section 19 of the 1999 Constitution. In this statutory provision, Nigeria's national interest can only be achieved through the promotion of African integration and unity, respect of international law, settlement of the continental disputes and the promotion of a just world economic order. In effect, Africa remains the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy. The leadership school of thought is convinced that Nigeria is bound to lead Africa.<sup>21</sup> It is in this context that these Nigerian analysts and practitioners are persuaded to accept that Nigeria is destined to champion Africa's socio-economic and political transformation and development:

Playing such a noble role in the economic construction and reconstruction of the region presents Nigeria with an opportunity to assert her dominant position in the region as a matter of prestige. [Practitioners] argue that if Nigeria fails to do so, other credible and contending regional challengers such as Ghana, Egypt, Cote d'Ivoire and South Africa would take such responsibilities.<sup>22</sup>

It is an irony of history that issues of leadership that confronted the OAU at inception also befell the African Union (AU). Ghana's independence was in 1957. That feat

made President Nkrumah to lay claims on African leadership. He passionately sought for the political union of African states. He pursued an activist policy and canvassed for political freedom as a prelude to the economic and social developments of African countries. Moammar Ghadafi of Libya also labored assiduously for the establishment of the African Union and sincerely wished to be named the president of the African Union Government. His book titled *“Brother Leader Moammar El Gaddafi, Founder of the African Union and His Leading Role in the Face of Current African Challenges”* was published and released to commemorate the 13<sup>th</sup> AU Summit held in Sirte Libya, July 1-3, 2009. It is left to history to adjudicate whether the Libyan strongman was the founder of the AU. Other countries like Egypt and South Africa had at one time or the other expressed some leadership aspirations in the continent. But the concern in this study is Nigeria.

The establishment of the OAU and AU certainly reveals Nigeria’s regional leadership roles in articulating how African unity should be achieved and how the issues of the AU’s foreign policy agenda have to be prioritized. Nigeria’s leadership role is shown in the synergy between the preoccupation of Nigeria’s African policy and the policy agenda of the OAU and now the AU. That synergy between Nigeria and OAU ended the outrageous white minority rule and the enthronement of democratic governance in Southern Africa. Nigeria’s leadership role during the apartheid era earned her the status of a Frontline State.

However, it is a leadership role that has financial implications. During the struggle for majority rule in Southern Africa, Nigeria spent billions of dollars in pursuit of this questionable foreign policy goal. Nigeria’s Commissioner for External Affairs during Gowon’s administration, Okoi Arikpo, testified thus:

We have demonstrated our strict compliance with the OAU resolutions which called on all independent African countries to increase their material and moral support for the liberation movements, not only by making the obligatory annual contributions to the fund of the Liberation Committee of the OAU, but also by giving direct financial and general technical assistance and advice. In addition we give substantial financial aid where necessary to countries having common borders with the racist regimes.<sup>23</sup>

President Shehu Shagari reinforced the above foreign policy statement. Comparing Nigeria at independence and twenty years later, Shagari promised total support to the liberation of Africa. The cost of that policy statement was enormous, particularly, to a country saddled with innumerable socio-economic problems. In 1980, Shagari overlooked those problems, brought about by the decline in oil rents and the heightening of ethnic suspicions and rivalries to commit the country financially to an extraneous non-core foreign policy goal:

At independence, when economically, this nation had so little, Nigeria did not commit itself politically as well as financially to the struggle for the liberation of Africa. Today Nigeria is economically better off...Nigeria’s support will be total.<sup>24</sup>

President Shagari’s statement quoted above is a demonstration of Nigeria’s perceived economic viability in pursuing her leadership role conception. Possibly,

the huge petrodollar windfalls of the 70s that followed the Yom Kippur Arab-Israeli war, must have provided the Nigerian leaders the confidence to articulate and pursue their leadership role conception.

*Nigeria's usage of soft power*

Nigeria's contribution in ending colonialism and racist minority policy in Southern Africa was unprecedented. She openly supported armed liberation fighters in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa, even without engaging with the racist regime militarily. Nigeria was not only the foremost contributor to the OAU Liberation Committee; she was also a regular point of call to the Southern African freedom fighters. Students from the Southern African dependent territories were offered scholarships to study in Nigeria, indicating Nigeria's belief in soft power. Nigeria's use of soft power is also shown in the manner she has helped to resolve inter and intra African conflicts. This is mostly achieved through diplomatic shuttles and appealing to the rivals in conflicts on the need for peace; these appeals were based on African identity.

Nigeria worked hard also to ensure the realization of the OAU's 1993 Cairo Declaration on the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. Today, the AU has the African Peace and Security Architecture and Nigeria's uncontested leadership role is displayed in the resolutions of African conflicts. Besides all these, Nigeria has contributed over 200,000 troops to the United Nations peacekeeping forces. Nigeria has also played critical roles in Africa by single handedly spearheading the formation and funding of ECOMOG – the ECOWAS Peace Monitoring Group - that restored peace to the war torn Liberia and Sierra Leone. Nigeria's peacekeeping missions in Africa and beyond are many. In Africa, Nigeria has sent her peacekeeping forces to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Guinea Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire, etc. Nigeria as earlier observed, resisted France and went further to sever diplomatic relations when the country tested her atomic bomb in the Sahara desert. That singular act earned Nigeria some leadership applause as a nation that could resist a major power when the African territory is violated

Besides the undue extravagance displayed by Nigeria in what might today be described as an ethical issue in international politics – issues of ethnic segregation or apartheid - the country remains undaunted about African affairs. Nigeria and four other states – Algeria, Egypt, Libya and South Africa – contribute 75% of the total annual recurrent budget of the African Union, with each of these countries contributing 15%.<sup>25</sup> Though Nigeria continues to shoulder the continental budgetary allocation, the remaining 25% remained unsettled by the 49 member states of the African Union. As at 2011 and 2012, the sum of US \$72.4 and US\$ 43.8 million was yet to be settled by the 49 members of the AU.<sup>26</sup> Quite ironically, it is these 49 member states in Africa that actually hold the lens through which Nigeria's leadership role in the continent is perceived.

In addition to the huge financial and human resources Nigeria exhausts on African matters, the country is still playing an activist role on AU's bodies, like the AU Parliament, NEPAD - the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development - and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Even at this, it is debatable whether

Nigeria has articulated the national interests that should be achieved through these agencies. It is a political truism that countries maintain relations with others in order to goad their own interests which form the basis of their foreign policies.<sup>27</sup> This role expectation is not so with Nigeria. Nigeria's perception of an African centered foreign policy has overstretched the country. This has made Nigeria to pretend to be what she is not. Even at this, many African states have shown open hostility to Nigeria. The details of this hostility are reserved to the next section.

### Leadership in Africa – a Relational Phenomenon

Leadership, and in particular that of the African continent, is a relationship between the leader and the led. It is a reciprocal process that is based on some measures of consent among followers.<sup>28</sup> A state's political efficacy, or what can be termed self-image, that is, the state's belief in its capacity to control events in the continent, combined with other African states desire for leadership will help resolve Nigeria's quests for leadership in the continent. Two issues present themselves in this section. On the one hand, is how Nigeria's domestic problems have impacted upon her leadership aspiration in the continent; on the other hand, is the African states' perception of Nigeria's leadership.

#### *Nigeria's Domestic Problems*

With all sense of modesty, it is difficult to understand in what areas Nigeria is aspiring to lead the continent. Understandably, Nigeria's notion of leadership is viewed in spatial terms since its focus is on Africa. This leadership aspiration must be distinguished from the functional one that focuses on specific issues. Thus, while regional leadership requires certain military and economic capabilities, functional leadership demands expertise in particular areas, like scientific and nuclear capabilities or even issues about environmental degradation, to mention but a few. Functionally, there are doubts whether Nigeria is skilled both scientifically and technologically to lead the continent. Also, Nigeria's security challenges and the yet to be resolved economic recession has latently and manifestly crippled the African giant. Nigeria's economic recession brings to fore the ranking of top African businesses in 2006, years before the present economic quagmire.

In the 2006 *African business* Report, Nigeria's highest ranked firm that year was the Nigerian Breweries in the 44<sup>th</sup> position and only four Nigerian firms made the top 100 companies in Africa.<sup>29</sup> On the other hand, the South African companies occupy the top ten positions, 68 companies of the top 100 African countries also came from the country. Egypt and Morocco have 18 and seven companies respectively. The situation has remained unchanged these years with the South African companies maintaining their predominant position; the tide changed slightly in 2014, with Nigeria's Dangote Cement and the Nigerian Breweries occupying the 7<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> positions respectively. It must also be acknowledged that South Africa is the only African country included in BRICS and G-20. Established in 1999, the G-20 focuses on global economic policy coordination. It is conceptualized to stabilize and strengthen the global economy by bringing together the major advanced and emerging market economies.<sup>30</sup> Nigeria is excluded in this club. South Africa's membership of BRICS and G20 and her successful hosting of the 2013 World Economic Forum are unassailable factors working in her favour over Nigeria.

Niyi Akinnaso, a Nigerian analyst, berates his country's poor domestic setting as responsible for her exclusion from the G-20.<sup>31</sup> To him, since Nigeria lacks good leadership and sound governance, global and regional competitiveness will keep on eluding the country:

[Nigeria's] leadership crisis, accompanied by a political culture of corruption, has persisted and deepened in spite of various experiments with parliamentary, military, and presidential systems of government. Nigeria still reels from light to darkness; from crisis to crisis; and from one form of corruption to the other.<sup>32</sup>

Educationally, out of 100 top African universities, South African universities maintained the lead with 21 slots, while Egypt came second with 13. A Nigerian top university in the 2009 ranking occupied the 44<sup>th</sup> position, going by the Webometric Ranking of World Universities. The situation of the university ranking has not substantially changed all these years. Nigeria lags behind in areas of science and technology, the basis for industrialization. That Nigeria has the greatest number of universities in the continent and has many scientists scattered all over the globe is a fact that should be acknowledged. But there is still a gap in the sense that the country's education has not functionally addressed the socioeconomic needs of the nation. It is against this backdrop that an African Union Senior Expert on Higher education in Addis Ababa, Professor Olushola Oyewole, a Nigerian, lamented that "most of the projects embarked upon by African researchers were usually of no relevance and out of tune with the realities of the African communities".<sup>33</sup> It is a source of regret that despite Nigeria's abundant petro-carbon reserves, the country imports fuel for her domestic use. Nigeria is still confronted with power outages. The world economy is knowledge driven; it is an economy that thrives on creativity and innovation- the basis for industrialization. In this area, Nigeria is lacking the basic credentials of leadership. Leadership is undoubtedly measured in functional terms.

Many analysts malign the downgrading of Nigeria's status in the international forum in recent years. In 2013, Adebajo decried his country's sliding in global reckoning and relevance particularly on the foreign policy platform.<sup>34</sup> Years earlier, Bolaji Akinyemi was worried on how other African states refuse to identify with Nigeria on crucial matters that affect his country's national interests:

If Nigeria as the foremost black African power has certain responsibilities to Africa, then there should be no disputing the fact that Africa also has responsibilities to Nigeria. Nigeria, too, has definite interests to promote and protect, which will require the support and assistance of other African states. If when we say that Africa is the centerpiece of our foreign policy, we mean that Nigeria should identify with and defend the legitimate interests of Africa. Collectively, it also means that Africa and African states should identify with and defend Nigeria's interest. However, these four years of economic crisis in Nigeria have yet to elicit a supportive response from the few African states which are in a position to do so, such as in the areas of smuggling and currency trafficking.<sup>35</sup>

Though elites like Akinyemi solicit for Nigeria's respect in Africa, it is enlightening that the contrary prevails. Definitely, the fault is not from the stars. Has Nigeria's

internal contradictions contributed to the way the 'giant of Africa' is perceived by other African states? Gambari once argued that the formulation and execution of Nigeria's foreign policy "must be situated in its domestic, political and socioeconomic environment on the one hand and the external milieu on the other".<sup>36</sup> It is ironic that Nigeria's immense resources, coupled with the lofty foreign policy objectives pursued by her political elites, have not been supported by effective domestic governance. Though the country is endowed with huge natural resources, including massive oil and gas reserves, Nigeria is ranked among the poorest in the world. Nigeria's domestic setting had been confronted by violent conflicts from independence. Ehusani, a Nigerian cleric, gives an account of the violent conflicts that had crippled the African giant:

From the operation *wetie* that rocked Western Nigeria in 1964, through the unfortunate civil war of 1967 to 1970, to the Niger Delta militant uprising of recent years; and from the Sharia riots of year 2000 and 2001, through the sporadic carnage in Jos and its environs that has not abated since the year 2004, to the yet ongoing Boko Haram terrorist bombing campaigns, it has been a litany of violent conflicts that have tended to pitch the North against the South, Christians against Muslims, and the so called Indigenes against the so-called Non-Indigenes highlighting very graphically the failure of the critical institutions of state and the fragile and tenuous nature of our corporate existence as a nation.<sup>37</sup>

Members of the clergy were not the only crusaders of Nigeria's domestic malaise. Those in the nation's ivory tower joined in singing Nigeria's domestic songs of sorrow. Sam Ukala, a scholar that won the 2014 Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) sponsored prize for literature, lamented Nigeria's plight as she yearns for an African and foreign leadership applause:

Nigerian peace-keepers are everywhere, but Nigeria has not found peace to keep in her own home: Kano, Benue, Plateau, Osun, Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta – in all these states and more, at any point in time in the last decade, there has been either a smoulder or a full blaze of crisis. Destruction of lives and property by criminals or angry youths, seizure of oil-flow stations, oil-pipe blow-outs and consequent roasting alive of thousands of our compatriots have become regular menu to our eyes, regular depressants of our psyche, and formidable impediments to sustainable development.<sup>38</sup>

Several factors have engendered Nigeria's vulnerability to ethno-religious extremism. These include governance failure occasioned by corrupt tendencies, increased proliferation of Small Arms and light Weapons (SALW), widespread poverty, porous land and maritime borders and ineffectual national security system. Pervasive poverty which must have resulted from governance failure has contributed to Nigeria's worsening external image. Poverty has exacerbated Nigeria's vulnerability to terrorism. In 2007 as an example, it was estimated that over 70 percent of Nigeria's 180 million people live on less than 1 dollar per day, with 35 percent living in abject poverty. Of this figure, Nigeria's 3 Northern zones have an average poverty incidence of 70.1percent as compared to 34.9 percent for the 3 southern zones.<sup>39</sup> Boko Haram has a pronounced presence in the North East of the country.

The above narrative is never to denigrate Nigeria. But it must be emphasized that international politics is a continuation of domestic politics. As Nigerians, we market ourselves to other African states. The second segment in this section is about the manner Nigeria is perceived by other African states.

#### *African states' perception of Nigeria*

The previous sections acknowledged the achievements of Nigeria in many areas, like, the establishment of OAU/AU, decolonization, alleviating the economic plights of some African states, and ensuring global peace and security through peacekeeping. Some African states recognize these exemplary gestures by Nigeria as shown in the concluding part of this section. In spite of these few acknowledgements, one might state that the level of consent from other African states on the issue of Nigeria's regional leadership was and is still uncertain. There is no doubt that Nigeria's position on certain continental matters had been challenged and in many cases overturn by other African states. Nigeria has for years made Africa the focal point of its foreign policy. Her pioneering efforts to the growth of the continent particularly through the OAU and now AU can never be overemphasized; yet the leadership of the African Commission has eluded Nigeria since 2003. Another Nigerian analyst, Dickson Monday, wondered how a nation that has the largest population in Africa is not qualified to represent the African Commission. "Burkina Faso defeated Nigeria in 2007"<sup>40</sup> A number of other cases attest to the assertion that Nigeria's leadership aspiration is a mirage.

First, without counting on Nigeria's contribution of over 72 percent of the ECOWAS funds, its neighbouring Francophone states had repeatedly battled to relocate the organization's parliament from Abuja to Cote d'Ivoire.<sup>41</sup> Second, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling that Nigeria has no sovereign rights over the Bakassi Peninsula was, to say the least, a devastating blow to Nigeria's acclaimed regional leadership.<sup>42</sup> Nigeria's hasty acceptance of the ICJ ruling had brought untold hardship to the Nigerians living in the disputed territory. Tales of harassment by the Cameroon gendarmes have been recorded against Nigerians still living in Bakassi. Again, Nigeria's preparedness to cede its Bakassi region [listed in the 1999 Constitution as one of Nigeria's local Government Areas] shows the ineptitude of Nigeria's foreign policy in defining what constitutes her national interest. Ceding the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon is an act of humiliation, particularly to the giant state in Africa. In realist terms, territories are hardly ceded.

In 2009, Nigeria expressed an interest to represent Africa as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. In spite of the AU support for Nigeria's interest, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo almost frustrated the efforts by voting for themselves. Thus, while all participating African states voted for Nigeria, it was these West African states that did otherwise. That was how Nigeria was repaid for its pioneering ECOMOG peace efforts to these war torn West African states. However, self interest reigns supreme in international politics, with minimum regard to morality. Along this line, Saliu argues that a nation cannot hope and expect that having extended a good gesture towards another nation, the recipient will always want to reciprocate the gesture.<sup>43</sup>

Many Nigerians have been humiliated abroad for coming from this part of the world. Nigeria's relationship with its neighboring states like the Republic of Benin, Chad, Cameroon Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Niger has seen odd times, particularly in maltreating Nigerians. For the incessant harassment of Nigerians at the Lake Chad region by the Chadian soldiers, Nigeria was forced to deport 700000 Chadians from its shores in 1983.<sup>44</sup>

The 2015 South African xenophobic attacks meted principally against Nigerians and other Africans are another classic example. The incident marked the 21 years the apartheid minority rule ended in the Southern African sub-region. The house of Nigeria's High Commissioner in South Africa was attacked with gun shots and her children abducted.<sup>45</sup> Nigerians visiting South Africa had on many occasions been deported for allegedly lacking vaccination papers. At one instance, Nigeria's Minister of Aviation, Kema Chikwe, was detained and denied entry into the country for similar reasons. Nigeria was forced to express its disgust over the unfriendly acts. Olugbenga Ashiru, Nigeria Foreign Minister under the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan, described South Africa's behavior to Nigeria as 'unacceptable', 'unfortunate' 'totally unfriendly' and 'un-African and an affront to diplomatic norms'.<sup>46</sup> Reciprocity is a fundamental principle of international relations. What leadership privileges can Nigeria claim when its nationals are slaughtered and their properties destroyed for residing in South Africa, a country Nigeria lavished its resources as a Frontline State?

Before the xenophobic ordeal in South Africa, the Ghanaian authorities descended on Nigerians for engaging in retail businesses, hoping in the process to reserve such for its nationals. The Ghanaian authorities acted contrary to the ECOWAS statute which inter-alia, recommends the removal between member states, of obstacle to free movement of persons, goods, service and capital, and to right of residence and establishment. It is the same country that in 2007 praised President Obasanjo for extending a 90-day credit to Ghana for 90000 barrels of crude oil. "Nigeria's big brother status has never been in doubt" a Ghanaian paper acknowledged.<sup>47</sup> Assuredly, Ghana is not the only country that remembers Nigeria's show of generosity. As soon as Sam Nujoma became the president of his country, Namibia, he showered praises on Nigeria:

The racist South African regime...held on to Namibia and tried to establish a puppet regime here, the so-called Government of National Unity. But we intensified the armed struggle, with the support of the Nigerian government.<sup>48</sup>

Nigeria marked its centenary (100) celebration in 2014, taking the country's existence from 1914, the colonial year the Northern and Southern Protectorates were joined together as one state. Some African heads of state poured encomiums on Nigeria. President of Gambia, Yahya Jammeh asserted that Nigeria had invested financial, material and human resources to bind the continent together. To him, Nigeria holds the key to the continued relevance of the continent on the global map. On the same note, the President of Malawi, Joyce Banda, also praised Nigeria for its commitment to peace, security and the development of the continent.<sup>49</sup> These and other praises showered on Nigeria proves the wastage on the side of Nigeria in

pursuing non-core foreign policy goals - issues of regional leadership. How those issues have addressed the plights of Nigerians is yet to be seen. Nigeria's foreign policy pursuits have not resolved her governance problems.

Before the conclusion, it must be observed that Nigeria has taken some measures to change the perception of foreigners about the country. The *rebranding project* was specifically undertaken by the Ministry of Information and Communication during President Umaru Y'Adua era. Unfortunately, the rebranding exercise had little to do with the country's gateway with the outside world, the Federal Ministry of External Affairs. That is another evidence of poor coordination amongst Nigeria's ministries and agencies. In addition to lack of coordination among the governmental agencies is poor funding which adversely affects foreign missions, the in-fighting and clique politics on issues of external posting and promotions.<sup>50</sup> This is part and parcel of the domestic constraints to effective pursuit of foreign policy goals.

### Conclusion

This study is guided by Nigeria's leadership role conception for Africa. The leadership role concept is unquestionably an elitist theory, given its concern with the rulers' perceptions rather than that of the ruled. It is a top-down leadership strategy. From that standpoint, Nigeria refers to the perception of the political elites that have governed the country since its independence in 1960. The political elite's idea of leadership has not profited the generality of Nigerians whose interest the country's foreign policy is supposed to serve. Richard Joseph observed quite appropriately that in the case of Nigeria, the state has been greatly eroded by excesses of prebendalism (official corrupt practices) to the extent that the Nigerian state has been weakened by the low identification of Nigerian communities with the various units of governance.<sup>51</sup> To boost the Nigerian economy, he suggested a sharp reduction in the funds stolen from the country's annual earnings, the dramatic reduction in lavish projects undertaken solely as means of siphoning wealth, and the conversion of the billions stashed abroad into investible capital at home.<sup>52</sup>

Nigerian foreign policy from 1960 has been guided by the same principles and objectives. Nonetheless, different regimes in the country had emphasized on a non-core foreign policy objective – leadership status in Africa. But leadership is earned. Many African states have not accepted Nigeria's leadership in African matters. At many instances Nigeria's perception on continental matters have been challenged and in many cases overturn by some of these African states. The situation is worsened by events that occur in Nigeria's domestic environment, particularly in areas of insecurity, corruption and poverty that had afflicted Nigerians. But can Nigeria lead a continent that has the lowest score in virtually every developmental index. Africa has the highest number and the largest concentration of poor nations in the world. It is a herculean task asking the poor to lead the poor. Akinterinwa's observation is apt:

Several countries, including some African states, have raised issues about contradictions between Nigeria's quest for permanent seat on the UN Security Council on the one hand and Nigeria's high level of indebtedness and inability to put her domestic situation in order on the other. In other

words, how can Nigeria fund the maintenance of regional or international peace and security operations with her level of financial insolvency and much dependence on the developed world assistance?<sup>53</sup>

Nigeria contradictory domestic setting has eroded the country's quest for prestige and honour. In as much as Nigeria performs poorly in the socioeconomic index, and the nation continues to have unresolved governance problems, it follows that the quest for continental leadership in Africa will remain a cherished dream. Nigeria's leadership role quest from this context is to say the least, the race of the crippled.

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**Michael Pillsbury**

**The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower**

(New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2015, ISBN: 978-1250081346, 352 pp., \$11.55)

Amidst tectonic shifts in international relations in recent years due to China's ever assertive presence on the world stage, Michael Pillsbury's *The Hundred-Year Marathon* serves as a timely reminder to readers around the world as to the consequences of China's rise in power. Pillsbury, a long time government official and currently a consultant at the US Department of Defense, is a standing insider on American foreign policy and US-China relations over the past three decades. Pillsbury's unique experiences in government have allowed him to interpret the development of China from a position not afforded to academic and media personnel.

In contrast with various treatises since the mid-2000s that have expounded on rising China and its benefits for the world such as John and Doris Naisbitt's *China's Megatrends* (2010) and Martin Jacques's *When China Rules the World* (2009), Pillsbury offers a different plot on China, a narrative that describes the rising colossus as an ambitious player that seeks to replace the US as the dominant superpower in the world while destroying democracy, freedom of speech and the global environment. Pillsbury argues that the "end game" or China's takeover will occur in 2049, or the centennial of the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In the meantime, adopting the posture of "hiding one's light under a bushel," China will continue to maintain a superficially humble façade while applying various strategies to weaken the US. The Warring Period in ancient China offers practical lessons for Chinese strategic thinkers and policymakers to take away. In order to complete China's rise by 2049, Beijing will do whatever it takes; cyber warfare, acquisition of US military technology and intelligence and cultural propaganda are all part of the game.

As a specialist versed in Chinese, Pillsbury looks into history for clues on China's political ambition. Noting Mao Zedong's liking for the ancient wisdom elaborated in the Chinese classic *Comprehensive Mirror in Aid of Governance*, in the opening chapter, Pillsbury points out that the Chairman took the Confucian saying that "there cannot be two suns in the sky" to heart and planned for the rise of China as far back as the 1950s. Mao's aspiration was most recently reincarnated as the "China Dream," Beijing's latest call for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in the twenty-first century. Liu Mingfu, CCP designated author of *China Dream*, used the term

“marathon” to describe the power competition between China and the US that will ensue in the new century. Based on the hypothesis of a revisionist China, in the remainder of the volume (chapters 3-8), Pillsbury elaborates on China’s covert strategy for global domination and his insights and policy advices for Washington (chapters 9-11).

Since its release, *The Hundred-Year Marathon* has remained controversial, particularly in light of China’s proclaimed desire to strive for win-win and mutual prosperity with the world through various initiatives and institutions such as the One Belt One Road, the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and the G-20. For supporters of China’s peaceful rise, Beijing’s recent moves are merely testament to the chronic call for China to play a larger and more active role in the international community. Yet for skeptics noting tensions in the South China and East China Seas, the future is unclear and Pillsbury describes a situation that may not be far off from reality, confirming their hunches. As a figure who has played a sizeable role in US foreign policy making over the past decades, Pillsbury’s argument is persuasive. The fact that Pillsbury is trained in Chinese reinforces his claims against China and sets him apart from academics and reporters who write from secondary sources.

Nonetheless, while Pillsbury lays out a strong argument against China’s peaceful rise that may be useful for US policymakers and serve as a warning for pessimistic observers, one must also ponder whether China’s presumed global dominance is simply a nightmare scenario or remains promising in other ways. In other words, if China’s rise is inevitable, are there more reasons to keep such progress at bay than to embrace the phenomenon and try to bring China into the fold of great powers that contribute to international order? For optimists who would like to see a strong and more assertive China that can continue to spearhead growth in the international economy and invest efforts into the reduction of greenhouse gases, nuclear non-proliferation and providing the Global South with a stronger voice in international community, China is welcomed like a superstar. Hence, a potential critique of *The Hundred-Year Marathon* lies in the US centered approach adopted by the author. Under the presumption that China seeks to dominate, the conclusion to be drawn could only be caution and vigilance against the China challenge.

While *The Hundred-Year Marathon* can be read as a warning to the changes that a rising China may bring to the world (including its eventual takeover), one should also keep in mind that considerable time remains between now and 2049, the centennial of the CCP. The complexity and fluid nature of international relations hint at numerous possibilities that may occur in the decades ahead. For one, China needs to maintain its high level of economic growth in order to become an uncontested superpower. On the other hand, the achievement of superpower status comes with a price and it remains to be observed whether China is willing to borne the cost. For example, intense industrialization has already generated heavy pollution and environmental degradation to many parts of China while continued deterioration of the income gap among the population has given rise to popular discontent and social unrest. In short, China has many problems on hand and the search for solutions may

not be easy. Therefore, whether China will come out on top in the hundred year marathon remain to be observed.

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Mark T. Berger and Heloise Weber

*Rethinking the Third World: International Development and World Politics*

(London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, ISBN: 978-1-4039-9589-6, 200 pp., \$48.00)

In their wide-ranging, erudite, and thick overview of the origins and evolution of “Third Worldism”, Mark T. Berger and Heloise Weber revisit our most fundamental assumptions about international development and its complex connections to security. The authors accomplish this by providing a chronological account of the idea of “the Third World” and the various forms that it has taken since the end of the Second World War. The book’s point of departure is the process of decolonization and the hopes of new nations to achieve modernity on their own terms. If Third Worldism provided an ideological and political space in the international system for these newly-decolonized nations, then why did these young nation-states fail to achieve their main goals? More importantly, with the relative decline of Third Worldism, what explains the continuing ineffectiveness of international development projects?

To answer these central questions, the authors skillfully synthesize the vast literature in multiple yet connected subfields including development economics, post-colonial studies, and ‘nation-building’ and ‘state-building’ theories. They argue that the modern framework of international development, with its ontological assumption that nation-state is the ultimate unit of analysis and the “object of development”, fails to address the transnational and global nature of ‘state failure’. The book goes beyond the interpretation of global modernity as a merely technological and economic network of interdependence that excludes the periphery. The authors argue that the periphery, or the Third World, have not been simply left out, rather, “they have experienced its negative (or dark) side” (p. 144). According to Berger and Weber, while Third World leaders correctly diagnosed the global and transnational causes of their ‘underdevelopment’ in the early years, their fixation on ‘national economy’ based on a ‘stages-of-growth’ temporal logic dramatically decreased the potential impact of their economic policies. Although Third Worldism declined after the end of the Cold War, their fundamental operational assumptions about international development have proven to be persistent.

The book is organized chronologically, encompassing the late colonial to post-Cold War era. In their narrative, the authors attempt to keep the balance between two elements of their argument: on the one hand, they recount a history of ideas and intellectual shifts regarding the Third World and the question of modernity. In this sub-narrative, they introduce the origins of “the idea of progress”, civilizing missions, capitalist and socialist modernization theories, state-centered development, and the neo-liberal agenda. On the other hand, the book emphasizes the material conditions which have constituted the context for concrete practices of modern national and international development. In this vein, they “draw more attention to the social crises, colonial and imperial expansion, and revolutionary politics which were central to modern world history” (p. 22). Therefore, through a systematic analysis, the book shifts the explanatory level of analysis from nation-state to “the broader history of unequal global social relations” (p. 8). As a result of this approach, their ontological assumption approximates that of the world-systems and dependency theories.

Its main arguments aside, *Rethinking the Third World* is an interesting and timely read. It is successful in addressing a wide-ranging history of ideas and social changes in vast and often-disregarded areas in the international system –Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa. The synthesis and cross-fertilization among different subfields enables authors to pose thought-provoking questions and insights. For example, in multiple instances, the authors problematize the commensurability between national interests and elites' interests in the Third World and less developed countries. To what extent do the national interests of these nation-states overlap the interests of their political and economic elites? They also cast doubt on the concept of fixed juridical sovereignty, as not a stabilizing factor, but as a source of intra- and inter-state conflicts in the contemporary international relations. If one accepts the dominant argument that war-making generates the processes of state-making and ultimately nation-building, then “warfare between states no longer works to ‘create’ the nation-state system” (p. 145) due to the *de jure* sovereignty provided by the UN.

Despite the strength of the narrative, what the authors suggest as a “regional development-security framework” in Chapter 6 still needs to address some of its problematic assumptions. First and foremost, if the Third World leaders were correctly aware of the international dimensions of their domestic social and economic problems, then why did most of their transnational efforts prove to be fruitless? After all, Nasser *formed* the United Arab Republic and made substantive attempts to unite the Arab world, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was *established* by the Third World leaders, and the OPEC *did* become functional during the 1960s and 1970s. According to the book, one possible answer to this question might refer to the Cold War dynamics and the international geopolitical competition which rendered these variations of regionalism and Third-Worldism ineffective. If we accept this answer, then the authors must clarify why *their* proposed form of regionalism can prove to be *resilient* when confronted by the similar international and/or transnational geopolitical competitions in the periphery. Will the conceptual shift from nation-state to international/transnational level of analysis be sufficient to overcome other geopolitical and geo-strategic calculations in the contemporary international relations? In short, the security component of the “regional development-security framework” is not as well-rounded as the development module.

In a world where the core principles of the modern nation-state system are increasingly under pressure by non-state and some state actors, any discussion which problematizes our assumptions about sovereignty, development, and security should be encouraged. In this respect, *Rethinking the Third World* is a critical and fascinating starting point to stimulate such debates.

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Saba Mahmood

**Religious Difference in a Secular Age**

(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2016, ISBN: 978-0-691-15327-8, 237 pp., \$14.72)

Recent ban on (and subsequent suspension of) burkini in France as, allegedly, an outfit against good morals and secularism, as well as ISIS's brutal treatment of minorities in Iraq and Syria, have brought to fore once again the issues of religious minorities and secularism which comprise the core themes of Saba Mahmood's latest book.

It is a long-held assumption that religious conflicts, especially in war-torn areas like the Middle East, would have been less severe had the states in the region embraced secularism whole-heartedly by giving all citizens equal rights and by making the state apparatus neutral to religious affiliations of its subjects. Mahmood, however, would object this in the case of postcolonial Egypt, but expectedly in other environments like Europe as well, and would argue that secularism has created or exacerbated the current religious strife rather than ameliorating it. Secularism, her argument goes on, has a contradictory feature: while it is based on the neutrality of the state in religious affairs, separation of the state and church, and relegating the latter to the realm of private sphere, it defines and demarcates the boundaries of religion and regulates it and thereby entangles the state in "substantive issues of religious doctrine and practice" (p. 2). Therefore, secularism makes religion more critical for the identity of the majority and minority. In addition, the state adopts majoritarian values, norms and cultural symbols as representative of neutral identity of the nation and views the minority norms and symbols as a threat to the national identity and, thereby, restricts and represses them whether in Egypt in the case of Baha'i and Shi'ite minority or in Europe in the case of the Muslim minority. Declaring veil (or burkini, though Mahmood does not mention it) as a symbol of gender inequality and enslavement of women, hence, banning it in the public institutions, and in contrast, portraying crucifix as a symbol of liberty, equality, religious freedom, and human dignity in the Europe are striking examples of how majoritarian values and norms permeate the state laws; an institution which is supposed to be neutral about the religious difference. These majoritarian biases, Mahmood would argue, are at work both in assertive models of secularism like Turkey and France and at the purportedly "incomplete" secularism like Egypt.

Mahmood contends that values like religious equality and freedom of belief which are hailed as neutral and universal are, also, shaped, articulated, and enforced in a historical trajectory for the advancement of colonial interests. Recurrent interventions in the internal affairs of independent states in the name of protecting human rights of religious minorities like Christians in Ottoman Empire, or Copts in the modern Egypt, were pushed for by geopolitical interests. Similar concerns are raised by the article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) about protection of the religious beliefs which is adopted because of a campaign by American Evangelicals and European missionaries to facilitate their proselytizing campaigns in the Islamic world and communist countries, so, "it is hard to separate the religious elements of [these] campaigns from secular ones" (p.46-47).

The book is organized into two parts and five chapters. Chapter one is a genealogy of two concepts of religious liberty and minority rights in the modern Middle East. Three historical developments are covered in this relation: Ottoman Empire and how its sovereignty was undermined by European powers in the nineteenth century in the name of protecting Christian minorities, the shift from imperial rule to popular sovereignty in the form of nation-states, and the interwar period in which the League of Nations adopted an agenda to protect minority rights in the non-Western countries which resulted –ironically- in the ascendancy of Nazism in the heart of the Europe. Then in chapter two, the controversy over the concept of minority in the Egypt is investigated. This chapter deals with how colonial connotations of the term, as well as its implications in the international law, has persuaded the Copts and the Egyptian government to reject identifying the former as a minority for a large part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. More recently, however, the discourse of religious liberty has dominated the human rights organizations and the Copts and the government increasingly use the term “minority”. This shift in the discourse was a result of three developments: the shift to the paradigm of good governance which implies more attention to the human rights, the growth of the American evangelicals in their claims of protecting the persecuted churches in the 1990s, and the 1998 adoption of the International Religious Freedom Act by the US Congress. In chapter three, the issue of privatization of the family and religion in the modern secular state is discussed with a particular focus on the role of modern family laws in creating tensions resulted from inter-religious marriages and conversions, and allegations of abduction as in the famous cases of Camilia Shehata, Wafa Qustuntin, and others in Egypt.

The issue of regulation of the Baha’i’s religious differences by the Egyptian courts by recourse to “public order” is investigated in the fourth chapter and striking similarities are drawn between the Egyptian courts’ decisions about religious minorities and the European Court of Human Rights’ decisions about Muslim minorities in Europe. Chapter five deals with the controversies aroused by the publication of the novel of *Azazeel* which is written by Youssef Zeidan and has questioned the orthodox beliefs of the Coptic Church. Mahmood argues that conceptions of the factual historicity of the sacred texts (which is a modern, secular understanding of historicity) underlies both sides of this dispute. In the Epilogue, Mahmood reiterates the major argument of the book that “the principle of religious equality, when the provenance of the state, is subject to majoritarian norms and sensibilities” (p. 209).

Overall, *Religious Difference in a Secular Age* is an enlightening exposition of the politics of secularity and minority issues in the age of dominance of the Western notion of the secular. This book shall be seen in line with the intellectual trajectory consolidated in Talal Asad’s *Formations of the Secular* (2003) and continued with Mahmood’s previous brilliant book *Politics of Piety* (2005).

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**Kiran Klaus Patel**

**The New Deal: A Global History**

(America in the World.) Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016. pp. xii, 435. \$35.00.)

According to Patel, historians such as Hofstadter, Burns and Schlesinger presented the New Deal as a national answer to the double crisis of capitalism and democracy and as the result of pressures from the Progressive movement in the United States. In contrast, Patel argues that the New Deal was a part of a broader movement worldwide and makes the case for a global history approach to illuminate the international origins of the New Deal. Global for Patel means to undertake an analysis at two levels: a comparison of developments in the United States with processes elsewhere, and to look at transnational connections, network and transfers (7). In his opinion, a global history approach to the New Deal allows us to see that the 1930s mark a defining moment in how the US saw itself in the world and how it mirrored key developments elsewhere (4) even though economic globalization itself was markedly reduced in the 1930s. One of the interesting insights from this book is in fact that policy discussions were still remarkably globalized despite the shrinking of the global economy visible in the ongoing League of Nations Conferences. Another example is Kagawa Toyohiko, a Japanese Christian missionary, who was the most important foreign advocate of cooperatives in the United States (233). In addition, Pan-Africanism created many alternative linkages between the US and abroad outside the mainstream (176).

In chapter one Patel begins by outlining how American practices were already travelling around the world in the 1920s. However, US policy itself was characterized by “insulationism” (Vandenberg, 4). The US had not participated in the League of Nations, the Immigration Act of 1924 reduced immigration dramatically, and racism was rampant (23). It was in this context that the stock markets crashed in 1929, triggering the greatest economic crisis since the onset of capitalism and leading to the near collapse of economic globalization and of economic liberalism. Chapter two shows that the Great Depression was also a crisis of political order. This led to the development of a Middle Way discourse, in between Fascism and Communism that brought Roosevelt and the New Deal coalition to power in 1932 (47). The New Deal program was less a fully developed policy than an ad-hoc approach to problems discussed in the chapter with regard to banking, agriculture, industry, workers’ rights, unemployment, and state intervention (or absence thereof, and the need to build up entirely new administrations such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, 97). The chapter shows that Roosevelt borrowed from all over the world for the New Deal. For example, the Civilian Conservation Corps was a labor service whose ideas originated in similar programs elsewhere (87). Chapter three discusses the failure of the United States to provide leadership in international economic cooperation (124). The chapter moves on to a general discussion of foreign policy whose relevance to the overall book is a bit unclear but it contains very interesting sections e.g. on Puerto Rico. Chapter four surprisingly goes back to the 1930s and introduces labor questions (Wagner Act 191), the Social Security Administration (193) and its international predecessors, housing policy in international context, electrification in

international context (e.g. the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario and its program of public electrification, 219), consumer cooperatives, and the role of Sweden in the discussion on the role of state intervention in the United States (228). The chapter concludes by showing that Great Britain had its New Deal announcement in 1933, Canada in 1935, and other countries followed suit such as the Dominican Republic and Colombia (239). Unfortunately, as Patel points out several times and in different places, the New Deal in the US did not touch upon immigration policy, nor did it do anything about internal racism (258). Chapter five discusses how the New Deal created the basis for an American World order and how it cemented the role of the US in international economic policy.

The book contains an impressive amount of research but it makes for a rather difficult reading since no overarching story is told and it is more of a collection of “the alphabet soup” that is the New Deal with its many new administrative agencies. This story is coupled with a bewildering array of globalization examples. Patel assumes familiarity with the New Deal and its key components, so the book is not recommended to any beginner. For International Political Economy (IPE) and International Relations (IR) this book does not deliver much that is new since both disciplines already evaluate the New Deal in its global context. It is unfortunate that Patel does not build upon Polanyi’s work (*The Great Transformation*) as he could have presented his impressive list of country studies more systematically when discussing the different responses to the depression. Interestingly, Patel spends more time discussing the 1943 Atlantic Charter than the Bretton Woods Conference that for IPE epitomizes the partial internationalization of the New Deal via US hegemony even though he bemoans the lack of hegemonic leadership in chapter three. Patel also overlooks that the 2008 crisis is practically a re-run of the Great Depression; instead, he seems to assume that the New Deal still lives on, overlooking the turn towards neoliberalism since the 1970s that overturned key components of the New Deal (see *Invisible Hands* by Phillips-Fein). For the IPE specialist, the book may serve as a useful starting point for specific questions regarding the many agencies created during that period in the US. Historians of Puerto Rico, Brazil or Ghana (to name just a few) may also find the book to be a useful source for their own national histories in a global context. One wished that the author had included a methodological discussion of global history given that the field has seen a tremendous upsurge with the creation of the *Journal of World History* in 1990 and to distinguish his study more from the IR transnational relations approach that he seems to follow. All in all, for any historian or political scientist still convinced of the state as the key unit of analysis, the book convincingly shows that even a national policy such as the New Deal was developed by borrowing from abroad.

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**Young Islam: The New Politics of Religion in Morocco and the Arab World**

(Princeton University Press. 2015. ISBN: 978-0-601-15984-3. 264 pp, £22.95, hardback)

Many observers have suggested that Political Islam is in a state of crisis. The world's oldest and most influential Islamist movement the Ikhwan al-Muslimun (the Muslim Brotherhood) is still banned in Egypt and most of the Middle Eastern states. Other organizations that have drawn inspiration from it are often labelled as terrorist groups in Arab countries while the few that participated in power sharing experiences have jettisoned their original religious ideology such as in Tunisia or Morocco. The most disturbing development of this crisis has been the proliferation of extremist groups such as ISIS in Syria and Iraq. This book examines religious revivalism in modern Morocco attempts to challenge a number of assumptions associated with Islamism within the MENA region by contrasting two movements – the Justice and Spirituality Organization (Al Adl wal Ihsan) and Party of Justice and Development (PJD). The former is a hybrid Islamist-Sufi group founded by Abdussalam Yassine (1928-2012) in the early 1980s and latter was founded by Abdelkrim Al Khatib (1921-2008) in the 1960s. The first movement is perhaps the largest Islamic group in Morocco and is currently outlawed while the second has been the ruling political party of the country since 2011.

The text examines the evolution and contestation between the two by offering a case study of how contemporary forms Islamism function in highly competitive religious landscapes and identifies the ideological and generational dynamics that shape internal change. Understanding internal diversity within Islamic groups is important as there is no monolithic 'Islamic movement,' but rather a complex constellation of trends and orientations vying with one another to increase membership, exert influence and most importantly survive. The book is structured over nine chapters and divided in four parts – 'Relationships,' 'Identities,' 'Shadows' and 'Individuals.' The first two chapters describe the methodological challenges encountered by the author during his fieldwork and apply the idea of the "coevolution" among religious actors in the Moroccan context. This leads to the core idea of the book and its proposition that Islamism is relational, not only in regard to the state but also to other Islamic actors which means that they are shaped by competition with each other for resources, recruits and a shared urbanized base. The author contends that these two movements 'mirror one another depending on the competitive context, sometimes reflecting, sometimes refracting, sometimes borrowing, sometimes adapting or even reorganizing in order to keep up with the other,'(p.36) and also leads to activists leaving one to join the other.

The next two chapters attempt to understand how they have transitioned over time and give a sense of the political and religious contexts and go on to examine the incentives and decision making processes employed by young people to join these movements and locates this choice within the fluid realities of their everyday lives. The recruits to these movements range from the unemployed to middleclass professionals and join for broad variety of reasons. Contrary to explanations that suggest youth participation is for purely religious salvation –the author found that

activists were looking for ‘nothing less than a new sense of the self. Their decisions are multiple, multilayered and constantly renegotiated,’ (p.88) within the collective activism of the group. This new identity helped them to reconfigure their identities within what the author calls the *new politics of personal empowerment* –which were actually secular, experiences and the desire to acquire skills such as training, leadership opportunities and expanding their professional connections.

The two chapters in Part Three reassess the activists relationships with the state and other Islamist organisations and concluding chapters explore the internal dynamics of these groups and the extent to which they abide by authority structures by demonstrating that far from being blind supporters of hierarchy –young activists are open to new ideas and creative reinterpretation to attract new members. Here the author points out that the Moroccan monarchy has skillful manipulated various religious currents as tool of social control, which some argue has occurred with the PJD being used to counter the appeal of Al Adl wal Ihsan. However, the author shows that the young activists in both organisations negotiate around the King’s authority and have occasionally spoken out against his policies. The final section explores how religious authority is constructed and reconstructed. The author found that young Islamists grow to question a single, centralized authority and somewhat counter intuitively, challenge it. This illustrated by the fact that activists not only study the Quran and Hadith, but also read Samuel Huntington, with the works of its founders being viewed as ‘inspirational rather than directional, constantly being interpreted and reinterpreted by young people who apply them to their own lives and experiences,’ (p.171).

The book manages to balance observation, textual analysis and theoretical reflection, but is let down in places by the authors overly self-referential writing style, ethically dubious research tactics and crude phrasing, for instance he ‘...snuck into the conference with no credentials, I often waited for a large group to gather at the door, rattled off some greetings in Arabic and then made my way past security,’ (p.27), ‘...Yassine for much of the movements existence, controlled with a wave of his hand, lecturing when healthy to his minions weekly,’(p.166), ‘Both men had beards, though Yassine’s was longer, scragglier and greyer,’ (p.13). These passages detract from scholarly tone expecting in such a study and comes as journalistic. The book focused on the relationships between the two main Islamist forces in Morocco, though it could have given a fuller sense of the other religious actors operating in the state had more attention been given to how they interacted with the Salafi and Sufi currents. Overall, the book is useful for illuminating internal contestations within Islamist movements who have different and sometimes conflicting visions of Islam itself and how they might shape the future religious reform in the Middle East and for due to their ability to adapt to rapidly changing socio-political change.

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Edited by Karim H. Karim and Mahmoud Eid

**Re-Imagining the Other: Culture, Media, and Western-Muslim Intersections**

(Palgrave Macmillan. 2014. ISBN 978-1-137-40366-7. 250 pp, £66 hardcover)

Edited by Mahmoud Eid and Karim H. Karim, *Re-Imagining the Other: Culture, Media, and Western-Muslim Intersections* (2014) is a welcome contribution that provides a balanced insight into interactions between Western culture and societies with their Muslim counterparts. The volume's overall concept indicates that the book is not merely a collection of thought-provoking scholarly studies, but also an intellectual statement in the face of simplistic discourses and narratives fueled by the decade-long and disastrous "War on Terror" and the recent emergence of anti-Islamic sentiments in a number of Western countries.

One of the volume's primary goals is the exploration of the concept of the "Clash of Ignorance", an idea first voiced by Edward Said in an interview given in 2001, which was then taken further by the volume's editors in a 2012 article. The volume is therefore professedly influenced by Said's ideas on Orientalism, with whom the editors agree that Orient and Occident are mere ideological constructs and that what is called the Orient is not inherently alien from the Western self. In line with the sound conceptual chapter written by the editors, the nine contributing scholars principally focus on various examples of the mutual intellectual ignorance between the West and the Muslim world, highlighting the cultural debt owed by the Self to the Other. The volume takes a multidisciplinary approach, as it investigates this complex issue from the perspectives of architecture, communication and media, conflict resolution, education, international relations, Islamic studies, law, literature, Middle Eastern studies, political psychology, politics, social anthropology, theology, and translation.

The introductory chapter by the editors provides a comprehensive overview of the concept of the "Clash of Ignorance" from a theoretical and historical perspective. Exploring the various layers of ignorance, the authors argue that ignorance is not caused solely by a lack of knowledge, but that it can also be regarded as a pre-constructed and even intentional state of mind in support of particular interests and struggle for power.

Jack Goody explores how early Muslims of the Arabian peninsula adopted the cultures of neighboring civilizations, and the ways in which Jewish and Christian thinkers contributed to the formulation of Islamic law, philosophy, and theology. The chapter by Nabil Matar investigates the accounts of Christian Arab travelers to Europe before Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, highlighting the fact that unlike their Christian peers, Muslim Arabs remained relatively unaware of Western achievements. Mohammad R. Ghanoonparvar's essay provides an insight on Persian writers' perceptions of Europeans and Americans in the wake of European colonialism and before the 1979 revolution. This chapter also offers an intriguing glimpse of how returning Iranian émigrés view Iran and participate in an "othering of the former Self". John M. Hobson explores the early roots of the Huntingtonian idea of the "Clash of Civilizations" dating back to the times of colonialism, which laid the foundations of later Western conceptualizations of Muslims and of the Other. In his

own contribution, editor Mahmoud Eid provides a critical summary of stereotypical and homogenizing Western narratives on Muslims.

Yasmin Jiwani analyzes media narratives on Muslim men killing Muslim women in Western societies, shedding light on the continuity between colonial and actual perceptions and narratives. Karim H. Karim investigates the politically and ideologically motivated use of language and terminology in contemporary political and media narratives on Muslims, highlighting the potential of such loaded terminologies in fueling ignorance and even clashes. The essay by Richard Rubenstein is a brave attempt to challenge general views of religion being a potential cause of conflicts, exploring the important potential religion could have in conflict resolution. Though loosely connected to the otherwise integral corpus of the volume, the chapter by Salah Basalamah highlights the many ways in which translation can bridge gaps in cultural understanding between the Self and the Other.

Despite its declared ambitious goal of addressing the historical and contemporary ignorance towards the Other by both Western and Muslim societies, the essays largely maintain a focus on Western ignorance towards Muslims. With the exception of the remarkable contributions by Jack Goody, Nabil Matar, and Mohammad Ghanoonparvar, the focus largely remains on the already well-researched field of Western perceptions of the Other. Although adding relatively little to the existing knowledge of their own fields, the essays altogether underpin the editors' general argument. This makes *Re-Imagining the Other* an important milestone in developing the concept of the *Clash of Ignorance*, and proves the potential for the authors to take the implications of the idea further, perhaps even moving beyond the conceptual and terminological framework set by Said. *Re-Imagining the Other* is not only a timely statement, but also an important contribution and a must-read for scholars and students working on Western and Muslim relations.

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