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An Overview of Agricultural Support Policies in Turkey: A Comparative Regional Analysis

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ABSTRACT

The agricultural sector is seriously affected by changes in many economic, social, or environmental factors. Hence, the necessity of supporting the sector by governments in various ways has become an indisputable reality. However, regional characteristics must be taken into account in order for these supports to reach their goals. Using a dataset spanning from 2002 to 2020, the current study comparatively analyses the changes in the agricultural support and agricultural production, income, and the value of products in two agricultural regions of Turkey, Central Anatolia and Southeast Anatolia regions. The results highlight that the increase in agricultural income is very low in both regions compared to the substantial changes in agricultural support policies. Additionally, the increase in the values of agricultural products in both regions is much higher than the increase in agricultural income, suggesting that the costs in agricultural activities are too high in the analysed regions.

Introduction

In today's economies, the agricultural policies implemented to ensure the sustainability of the agricultural sector create different consequences in distinct regions of countries. The main reason for these differences is the dissimilarity of the regions in the number of production factors and the productivity of these factors. Previous studies in the relevant literature also claimed that agricultural incentives and supports would produce diverse spatial results in different geographies (Daniel and Kilkenny 2009; Esposti, 2007). Therefore, it is important for the sectoral efficiency to take into account the characteristics of the regions in the policies to be implemented for the agricultural sectors of the countries. In this study, the agricultural supports given to the Central Anatolian and Southeast Anatolian regions of Turkey, known as the agricultural regions of the country, were statistically compared, and the effects of these supports on the selected agricultural indicators were analysed comparatively.

Agricultural support policies have always existed in the history of Turkey but have experienced substantial changes since the early 2000s. First, the importance of regional support of agriculture in terms of productivity and sustainability in agriculture necessitated the implementation of differentiated agricultural support policies according to regions. Additionally, the agricultural policies implemented in Turkey have experienced important changes in the last century as a result of the agreements with various international organisations. During this period, Turkey has made

agricultural agreements with the World Trade Organization for the development of the agricultural sector, implemented various changes in sectoral policies with the European Union adaptation process and started to implement the ARIP (Agricultural Reform Implementation Project) program within the framework of the agreements signed with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. After these agreements, Turkey ended the implementation of the old agricultural policies and switched to the Direct Income Support method (Bayraktar and Bulut, 2016; Ataseven et al., 2020). In this method, the supports have been given to the producers by taking into account the production area, regardless of the number of products and price (Ates et al., 2017; Ataseven 2016). In 2002, the deficiency payment support was implemented and aimed to pay the difference between the target price and the market price to the producers and to prevent the formation of excess supply or supply deficit in the market (Yüceer et al., 2020). In 2004, the first national document for the development of the agricultural sector, The National Agriculture Strategy Document, was published. In 2006, the agricultural law, which states the purpose and scope of agricultural policies, entered into force (Koç et al., 2015; Demirdöğen and Olhan, 2014). Right after that, the National Rural Development Plan and Strategy were determined in 2007, and it was aimed to ensure the integration of the agricultural sector and the industrial sector at the regional level. Along with all these changes in agricultural policies, the implementation of regional policies was made more comprehensive, and hence, a Basin-Based Agricultural Production and Support Model was developed in 2009. The main purpose of the model is to increase the support for specific products that grow more efficiently in each basin of Turkey. However, this model did not make a noteworthy difference in the sector as these products have already received agricultural support in the basins where they are grown (Doğan and Gürler, 2015; Olhan, 2012). Another important agricultural policy implemented in Turkey is the European Union IPARD (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance-Rural Development) program implemented in the 2011-2020 period. This program aims to determine, develop, and support the agricultural policies that must be implemented in order to realise the rural development of the candidate countries to the European Union. Finally, the National Agriculture Project in 2017 supports sustainable agriculture, food safety and competitiveness of the sector in global markets.

As mentioned above, although there have been significant changes and developments in the agricultural policies implemented in Turkey in the last 20 years, there are still important differences between regions in terms of agricultural production, income, and other sectoral indicators. The existence of these differences in the regions where similar agricultural policies/supports are implemented requires the examination of these policies. Therefore, in order to enhance the sector in several ways, it is important to analyse comparatively whether the supports given to the regions reach their purposes and which supports are more efficient in which regions. Hence, the motivation of the current study is to analyse the changes in the agricultural supports and the changes in agricultural indicators by comparing the two important agricultural regions of Turkey, Central Anatolia and Southeast Anatolia. Specifically, the study comparatively analyses the relationships between the changes in each type of agricultural support given to the Central Anatolia and South-eastern Anatolia regions and the changes in agricultural income, production, and value of products in these regions during the 2002-2020 period. The main reason for comparing these two specific regions is that although the amounts of agricultural support received by these regions are comparable and they are similar in many respects, they have great differences from each other in terms of agricultural indicators such as the amount of production and income.

Given the analysed regions, the results of the study highlight that the increases in agricultural income remained at very insufficient levels compared to the significant increases in agricultural supports. Additionally, the increase in the values of agricultural products in both regions is much higher than the increase in agricultural income, implying that the costs in agricultural activities are too high in these regions. Moreover, the results show that although the deficiency payment support

may have an increasing effect on the amount of production in the Central Anatolia region, it increases the cost of the state to pay the difference, since the agricultural commodities produced in this region have low added value and are sold at low prices in the market.

In the following section, a summary of the related literature is provided. The third section includes more detail on the data and methodology employed in the study. The fourth section reports the empirical findings. Concluding remarks, discussion and policy recommendations are provided in the final section of the study.

Literature Review

In the relevant literature, there are various empirical studies examining the changes in the agricultural sector caused by the agricultural policies and supports implemented in different regions and countries (Arisoy et al., 2017; Arisoy, 2020; Birişik et al., 2020; Eroğlu et al., 2020; Uslu and Apaydin, 2021). However, to the best of our knowledge, no study to date has comparatively analysed this association at the regional level. For example, Direk et al. (2019) investigate the development of agricultural supports and their impact on the sustainability of the agricultural sector in Turkey. Using time-series econometric models and a dataset for the period 2000-2018, they find a positive impact of real agricultural supports on real agricultural production value in Turkey. Baştan and Songül (2019) also studied the relationship between agricultural supports and the value of selected agricultural and animal products for the OECD member countries. Based on OECD and FAO databases for the time period between 2007-2017, their findings suggest that agricultural supports have a significant positive effect on the value of agricultural products but no effect on animal products.

Aktaş Koral (2013), on the other hand, examines the impact of agricultural supports on the exports of selected agricultural products in Turkey. Based on a dataset covering the time period between 1962-2010, the study implies that agricultural supports along with various border measures have mixed effects on the foreign trade of agricultural commodities and that the supports are as important as the exchange rates in foreign agricultural trade of Turkey. Hoekman et al. (2004) also focus on foreign trade and analyse how agricultural subsidies and border protections in OECD countries are related to welfare and agricultural foreign trades of developing economies. Their findings show that reductions in border protection have a larger positive effect on developing economies than reductions in agricultural subsidies. In relation to welfare in rural regions, Daniel and Kilkenny (2009) investigate the impact of agricultural payments on welfare in Europe and suggest that the farm payment policies decrease spatial agglomeration of farms and raise welfare in both rural and urban regions in Europe.

Eroğlu et al. (2020) analyse the impact of livestock supports on the amount of production and income in a province of Turkey using the treatment effect model. Their findings show that livestock support has a statistically significant positive effect on the production level while there are no statistical associations between the supports and the income of the farms. Serra et al. (2005) also employ farm-level data and analyse the relationship between replacement of price supports by area payments and pesticide use in the agricultural sector of France. They find that price effects on pesticide use are more elastic than area payment effects which indicate that decreases in price support in favour of area payment may reduce the usage of crop protection inputs.

Brady et al. (2009) aim to assess the effects of Common Agricultural Policy which decouples the direct agricultural payments from agricultural production in EU area on farm structure, landscape mosaic and biodiversity in a sample of EU regions. Their findings suggest that the policy has possible negative effects on the landscape, but it increases the land rental prices. Krishnaswamy (2018) empirically analyses the response of rice and wheat producers to agricultural price supports

in India. The study results suggest that farmers increase the amount of rice production area and hence the amount of rice production in response to the price supports. However, wheat farmers do not change the patterns of land use but increase the total wheat production in proportion to the supports they obtained. Alam et al. (2011) examine the climate change adaptability of producers in Malaysia based on the agricultural subsidies given in the country. They suggest that the adaptation process of producers to climate change is related to their training and motivation rather than agricultural support.

Data and Methodology

Using a panel dataset covering the time period between 2002-2020, the current study employs scatterplots and correlation matrices to comparatively analyse the associations between the agricultural supports given to the agricultural sectors of the Central Anatolian and Southeast Anatolian regions and the agricultural indicators, including income, production and the value of products. Specifically, the area-based supports, deficiency payment supports, and animal husbandry supports given to the agricultural sectors in analysed regions were compared both regionally and within the provinces located in each region. At the same time, the study also employs analyses to compare the changes in agricultural production, income and product values in these regions considering the variations in agricultural supports. Scatterplots were used in order to compare the performances of the provinces located in the regions in terms of agricultural support, production, income and product value.

The main reason for comparing the Central Anatolian and Southeast Anatolian regions is that although the total agricultural support received by these regions in the last 20 years is very close to each other, they have great differences in terms of agricultural indicators. Specifically, in the 2002-2020 period, Central Anatolia is the region that receives the highest share from the total support given in the country with a total of 12 billion dollars, while the Southeast Anatolian region received agricultural support of 11.1 billion dollars, making it the second region in the country that received the highest share from the total agricultural supports. Despite the similarity in the agricultural supports obtained by these regions, the Central Anatolian region ranks first among all regions of the country in agricultural production, while the southeast Anatolian region is in the last place in agricultural production. Although both regions are the two regions of the country that receive the least rainfall, Central Anatolia is the region with the highest agricultural income in the country, while Southeast Anatolia is the region with the second least agricultural income in the country. Therefore, it is important for the future of the agricultural sector and the policies to be implemented in the region to analyse why the Southeast Anatolian region receives higher agricultural support compared to other regions and why it has lower agricultural production and income than other regions.

The panel data set used in the analysis includes the agricultural indicators of the Central Anatolia and Southeast Anatolia regions for the 2002-2020 period. The data on the variables of agricultural income, production and product value used in the analyses to examine the changes in the agricultural sector were obtained from TURKSTAT. Agricultural production is defined as the amount of product expected to be obtained from the cultivated area in the current production year. The agricultural product value expresses the total monetary value of crops and other planted products. Income is defined as the monetary value obtained by agricultural producers as a result of their agricultural activities and the goods and services they produce in a certain period. The data on agricultural supports were obtained from the Agricultural Economics and Policy Development Institute affiliated with the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The types of support analysed in the study are field-based supports, deficiency payment supports and livestock farming supports, which make up the majority of all agricultural supports given in the country. Area-based supports are the agricultural supports given as direct income support to the producers in

proportion to the area of agricultural production. Deficiency payment is a type of product-based support, and it aims to allow the producers to sell their products in the market at high prices and provides price and purchase guarantees to the producers. Livestock support is a type of support that encourages agricultural producers to continue both animal husbandry and animal feed production.

All the variables used in the analysis were obtained from the relevant databases in the Turkish lira. However, since many inputs such as energy, fertiliser and seeds used by agricultural producers in production are imported and therefore dependent on changes in foreign currencies, these variables have been converted into US dollars using the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey annual exchange rates. Although these variables are included in both TL and USD in the comparative analysis tables, the analysis and interpretations are based on the information reported in US dollars.

Panel A in Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the study and correlation matrix for the Southeast Anatolia region, and Panel B reports pairwise correlations for the variables included in the analyses and descriptive statistics for the Central Anatolia region.

Empirical Findings

According to the pairwise correlation matrices in Table 1, total agricultural supports have a high correlation with agricultural income and product value in the Southeast Anatolia region, but there is a low correlation between the supports and income and production in the Central Anatolian region. Total supports have a low positive correlation with the amount of agricultural production in the Southeast Anatolian region, but the correlation between agricultural support and production in the Central Anatolian region turns negative. Area-based agricultural supports have a negative correlation with all agricultural indicators in both regions. While the deficiency payments have a positive correlation of over 80% with agricultural income and product value in both regions, it has a correlation of around 40% with the amount of production. The supports for livestock and agricultural indicators have a positive and high correlation in both regions. Agricultural income is in positive correlation with the amount of production and product value in both regions. Finally, the correlation coefficient between the agricultural product value and the amount of production in the Southeast Anatolian region is 0.58, while it is 0.38 in the Central Anatolian region.

In the following part of the empirical findings section, firstly, the changes in agricultural indicators of the Southeast Anatolia region and the results of the analysis in terms of agricultural support and sectoral development of the provinces located in the region will be reported. In the next part, the findings of the agricultural sector in the Central Anatolian region will be reported. The results of both regions will be discussed comparatively in the conclusion section of the study.

Southeast Anatolia Region

Table 2 reports the annual percentage changes in agricultural supports and sectoral indicators in both Turkish lira and US dollars in the 2002-2020 period of the South-eastern Anatolia Region. The last row of the table shows the 19-year percentage change in the analysed variables. Accordingly, while total agricultural supports on TL basis increased by 1.126 per cent in the last 19 years when these subsidies were converted into US dollars, the increase in total supports goes down to 165 per cent. While a total of 178 million dollars of agricultural support was given to the region in 2002, this amount reached 472 million dollars in 2020. Until 2010, the percentage increase in the total agricultural support in US dollars is greater than the percentage increase in TL. Although the total supports given to the agricultural producers in the region have increased in nominal terms in almost all study years, it has been observed that converted to US dollars, these

supports have decreased continuously since 2014. Considering that the prices of most of the inputs (e.g., energy and fertilisers) of the producers in the region are indexed to the dollar, the gradual decrease in the supports against the dollar causes negativities for the producers. According to the types of agricultural supports, it is seen that the agricultural support that increased the most in the analysed period was the support given to animal husbandry. Although the support given for livestock farming have increased from 320.000 dollars to 67 million dollars since 2002 and exceeded approximately 20.000%, there has been a gradual decrease in this particular support in recent years. In the same period, field-based agricultural supports decreased by 36%, from 145 million dollars to 92 million dollars. Deficiency payments have increased by 700% in this period, rising from 33 million to 278 million. While the agricultural supports given to the South-eastern Anatolia region generally decreased in 2009 in all support types due to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, these supports have also decreased against the US dollar, especially in recent years.

In the last 20 years, compared to the above-mentioned changes in agricultural supports in the South-eastern Anatolia Region, the sectoral indicators of the region such as production, income and the value of products have not displayed a similar performance. While the total agricultural income in the region was 3.5 billion dollars in 2004, it increased to 4.9 billion dollars in 2020. In the 2002-2020 period, the value of agricultural products increased from 3.3 billion dollars to 34.4 billion tons, and the amount of agricultural production increased from 6.4 million tons to 10.8 million tons. In recent years, while agricultural income and product value have decreased significantly against the dollar, there has been instability in the amount of production. Agricultural income increased continuously until 2012, except for the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, but there was a continuous decrease in agricultural income in the following years.

In order to provide a better context of the bivariate associations between the agricultural supports and the sectoral indicator across the Southeast Anatolia region, Figure 1 is a scatterplot of the association between per cent change from 2002 to 2020 in total agricultural supports (in the US $) and per cent change from 2002 to 2020 in total agricultural production (in tons). According to Figure 1, Şanlıurfa and Siirt are the provinces that experienced relatively large per cent increases in both agricultural supports and production. Although the total agricultural support in Adıyaman has increased by over 100% between 2002 and 2020, there has been a very little increase in the amount of production during this period. In the province of Gaziantep, despite an increase of approximately 50% in agricultural support, the amount of production in this province has doubled. In the same period, Kilis was the province with the highest increase in agricultural production among other provinces in the region, although there was almost no change in agricultural support. Considering the relationship between the change in total agricultural supports and the change in production, Gaziantep and Kilis can be shown as the most successful provinces in terms of agricultural support-production performance among the provinces of the region, while Adıyaman is the least productive province in this respect.

Figure 1: Scatterplot of the association between the total agricultural supports (US $) and the production (both measured as percentage change scores for 2002 and 2020)

Figure 2 displays a scatterplot of the relationship between percentage changes from 2002 to 2020 in total agricultural supports (in US $) and percentage changes from 2002 to 2020 in the value of agricultural commodities (in US $) produced in the provinces located in the Southeast Anatolia region. Based on the scatterplot, it can be said that Siirt is the province with the highest per cent increase in both total agricultural support and the value of agricultural products. In this particular province, specifically, the agricultural support has increased by more than 200%, and the agricultural products have been valued at around 450%. In Kilis province, on the other hand, there has been almost no increase in agricultural support and a slight decrease the province has experienced in the value of agricultural products produced in this particular province. In Batman province, although agricultural supports have increased by nearly 100%, there has not been a noticeable increase in the value of agricultural products. Compared to other provinces in the region, Gaziantep was the province where agricultural products were valued the most in proportion to the increase in agricultural support. In this province, while agricultural support increased by around 50%, the value of agricultural products increased by around 200%.

Figure 2: Scatterplot of the association between the total agricultural supports (US $) and the value of agricultural products (both measured as percentage change scores for 2002 and 2020)

Total Agricultural Supports and Value of Products, 2002-2020

Figure 3 is a scatterplot of the association between percentage changes from 2004 to 2020 in total agricultural supports (in US $) and percentage changes from 2004 to 2020 in agricultural income (in US $). According to Figure 3, although Şanlıurfa received the highest amount of agricultural support among other provinces in the region, it was the province with the least increase in agricultural income in the 2004-2020 period. On the other hand, although the increase in agricultural support in Siirt province was very limited, agricultural income increased by more than 160%. In the same period, agricultural support decreased only in the Gaziantep and Kilis provinces among the provinces of the region. However, the agricultural income of these provinces increased by approximately 70% and 25%, respectively. In the rest of the provinces located in the region, agricultural supports increased by 5%-35% on average, while agricultural income increased by 30% to 90% during the 2004-2020 period.

Figure 3: Scatterplot of the association between the total agricultural supports (US $) and the agricultural income (both measured as percentage change scores for 2004 and 2020)


Taking all these scatterplots together, Kilis and Gaziantep provinces can be considered as the most productive provinces in the region in terms of agricultural support-production performance, respectively. In terms of agricultural support and the value of products, Gaziantep and Siirt provinces appear to be the provinces where their products are valued the most, respectively. Finally, in terms of agricultural support-income performance, Siirt province is by far ahead of the other provinces in the region.

Central Anatolia Region

Panel A and Panel B in Table 3 report the percentage changes in agricultural supports and sectoral indicators, respectively, in both Turkish lira and US dollars for the 2002-2020 period of the Central Anatolia region. According to the table, while total agricultural supports increased by approximately 700% in nominal terms, this increase was around 70% in US dollar terms. The total amount of support given to the region increased from 355 million dollars in 2002 to 600 million dollars in 2020. The amount of area-based agricultural support, on the other hand, decreased by 53% from 347 million dollars to 162 million dollars. In the 2002-2020 period, the highest amount of support given to the region among other agricultural supports is deficiency payment supports. In this period, the deficiency payments increased by 42.000%, from 360 thousand dollars in 2002 to 153 million dollars in 2020. The nominal increase in the deficiency payments support has reached 200.000 per cent in 19 years. The year in which the difference payment supports increased the

most in percentage term was 2005 with an increase of around 2.200%. Significant increases were also reported in the support given to animal husbandry in the region. In this period, supports for livestock farming increased from approximately 8 million dollars to 220 million dollars, an increase of around 2.500%.

Although significant fluctuations have been observed in the amounts of agricultural supports over the years, there have been increases in both nominal and dollar terms in all supports given to the Central Anatolia region, especially in 2019 and 2020. According to Panel A in Table 3, while there is an increase in a type of support in a given year, there is a decrease or relatively less increase in another type of support in the same year. These unequal increases or decreases in the amounts of different agricultural support types, which vary from year to year, cause inconsistencies in the agricultural supports and, therefore, negative consequences on agricultural income or production.

Panel B of Table 3 reports the annual percentage changes in agricultural income, production, and the value of products in the Central Anatolia region for the 2002-2020 period. According to Panel B, agricultural income obtained from agricultural activities in the region increased by 40%, from $6.7 billion in 2004 to $9.4 billion in 2020. However, the agricultural income in the region, which has increased in only two years since 2012, is in a general downward trend. Compared to the percentage increase in agricultural supports given to the region, the increase in agricultural income of the region is insufficient. In this respect, it can be asserted that agricultural supports cannot be converted into agricultural income in the region. According to the reported percentage changes in the amount of production in the last column of the table, agricultural production in the region has increased by nearly 100% since 2002. Specifically, the total amount of agricultural commodities produced in the region increased from 23.4 tons in 2002 to 46 tons in 2020. A decrease was observed in the amount of agricultural production in the region only in 5 of the last 19 years. Despite this significant increase in production, the value of agricultural products in the region has increased by only 76% in the last 19 years. In detail, the monetary value of the agricultural products increased from 3.9 billion dollars to 6.9 billion dollars in the analysed period. Considering all these changes, it can be concluded that although the agricultural supports given to the region promote the amount of agricultural production, they do not lead to significant increases in the value of the agricultural products, and hence they do not cause significant increases in the income of the producers.

Similar to Figure 1 discussed above, Figure 4 displays a scatterplot for the relationship between per cent change from 2002 to 2020 in total agricultural supports and per cent change from 2002 to 2020 in agricultural production in the Central Anatolia region. According to Figure 4, with an increase of more than 200 per cent in agricultural supports in the 2002-2020 period, Niğde is a province that received the highest share of agricultural support compared to other provinces located in the region. However, this increase in agricultural support did not affect the agricultural production in Niğde sufficiently, and therefore, a limited increase of around 20% has occurred in agricultural production during this period. Similarly, despite the relatively larger increases in agricultural supports in Çankırı, the increase in agricultural production was limited. Among other provinces in the region, Nevşehir was the only province where agricultural production decreased in this time period. In detail, although agricultural support in this particular province has increased by around 50%, production has decreased by around 15%. In the same period, according to the agricultural production in proportion to the agricultural supports given to the region, the province with the highest increase in agricultural production is Konya, with an increase of 180%. Similarly, agricultural support increased by approximately 100% in Aksaray and Karaman provinces, while agricultural production increased by around 140% in both provinces. According to Figure 4, the most productive provinces in the region in terms of agricultural support-production performance are Sivas and Kayseri, respectively. In the 2002-2020 period, while agricultural supports increased

by 50% in Kayseri, production increased by 160%. In Sivas, although there was a 20% decrease in agricultural support, agricultural production increased by 120%.

Figure 4: Scatterplot of the association between the total agricultural supports (US $) and the production (both measured as percentage change scores for 2002 and 2020)


Total Agricultural Supports and Production, 2002-2020

Figure 5 displays the scatterplot showing the percentage changes from 2002 to 2020 in agricultural supports and the value of agricultural products in the Central Anatolia region. According to the scatterplot, in the 2002-2020 period, the provinces with the highest increase in the value of agricultural products were Kayseri (165%), Konya (160%) and Sivas (120%), respectively. Within these three provinces, agricultural supports increased by over 100% in Konya, increased by around 50% in Kayseri, and decreased by 20% in Sivas during the same period. In this period, Sivas was the province with the highest increase in the value of agricultural products with respect to the increases in agricultural supports followed by Kayseri. While Niğde received the highest amount of agricultural support compared to the provinces in the region, the increase in the value of agricultural products remained at a limited level of 40%. Similarly, while the supports increased significantly in Çankırı, there was no noticeable increase in the value of agricultural products. In Nevşehir, there was no significant increase in the value of agricultural products compared to the 50% increase in agricultural supports.

Figure 5: Scatterplot of the association between the total agricultural supports (US $) and the value of agricultural products (both measured as percentage change scores for 2002 and 2020)

Total Agricultural Supports and Value of Products, 2002-2020

When the scatterplot for the association between agricultural supports and the values of agricultural products given in Figure 5 is compared with the scatterplot for the relationship between agricultural supports and the agricultural production amounts in Figure 4, it can be realised that many provinces show similarities in terms of the amount of production and the value of products, but there are significant differences especially in the provinces of Karaman and Aksaray. Accordingly, while the production amounts in these two provinces increased significantly, the increase in product values remained limited during the analysed period.

The association between per cent change from 2004 to 2020 in agricultural supports and per cent change from 2004 to 2020 in agricultural income is displayed in the scatterplot of Figure 6. According to Figure 6, the province with the highest relative increase in agricultural income in the 2004-2020 period was Aksaray, with an increase of 120%. This particular province is followed by the province of Konya, with an increase of 80% in agricultural income. Agricultural supports in both provinces increased by around 40%. However, while agricultural supports also increased by 40% in Kırıkkale province, agricultural income remained almost unchanged. On the other hand, although Niğde province has experienced more increase in agricultural support compared to other provinces in the region, the agricultural income of these provinces increased by around 40%. In the provinces of Yozgat and Nevşehir, a decrease was observed in both agricultural support and agricultural income. In the provinces of Eskişehir and Sivas, where agricultural subsidies have

decreased, agricultural income has increased by around 30%. Kayseri province, on the other hand, has succeeded in increasing its agricultural income, although there has been no change in agricultural supports given to this particular province. In other provinces of the region, both agricultural support and agricultural income increased in limited amounts. In terms of the agricultural support-income performance association provided in Figure 6, it can be said that Kayseri and Sivas are the provinces that increased their income the most in the region compared to the changes in agricultural supports given to these provinces.

Figure 6: Scatterplot of the association between the total agricultural supports (US $) and the agricultural income (both measured as percentage change scores for 2004 and 2020)


When Figure 6 is compared with Figure 4, which shows the relationship between agricultural support and production, the provinces of Konya and Aksaray, among other provinces in the region, appear to be the provinces with the highest increase in both agricultural production and agricultural income compared to changes in agricultural supports. In addition, the increase in agricultural income was limited in Kayseri and Sivas provinces compared to the significant increases in agricultural production in these provinces.

According to Figures 4, 5 and 6, the provinces with the highest increase in agricultural production with respect to the changes in agricultural support were Sivas and Kayseri, respectively. In

addition, the provinces with the highest increase in the value of agricultural products compared to agricultural supports were again Sivas and Kayseri. Finally, the provinces with the highest increase in agricultural income compared to the amount of agricultural support given are Kayseri and Sivas, respectively.

Concluding remarks and discussion

In this study, the associations between the changes in the agricultural supports given to the Central Anatolia Region and Southeast Anatolia Region, which are known as the agricultural regions of Turkey, and the changes in agricultural production, income and product values were examined comparatively at the regional and provincial levels for the time period between 2002 and 2020. The associations were analysed using tables and scatterplots, and both regions and provinces located in the regions were compared with each other.

The results of the analysis for the Southeastern Anatolia region showed that all agricultural supports in the region increased in nominal terms in the period subject to the analysis. However, when these supports are converted into US dollars, it has been revealed that all agricultural supports have decreased significantly compared to previous years, especially in recent years. In terms of agricultural support types, area-based supports have been the type of support that has decreased the most in the last 20 years, while the highest increase has been in agricultural supports given to livestock farming. However, although these supports are for animal husbandry, producers channel a large part of these supports to the production of agricultural products such as grain, corn, grass, and straw. Agricultural income, production, and product value, which are used to analyse the changes in the agricultural sector in the region, have also shown significant decreases and fluctuations in recent years. The comparative analysis for the provinces located in the region revealed that Gaziantep, Siirt and Kilis were the provinces that increased their agricultural production, income, and production values the most compared to the agricultural supports they received.

The results of the analysis for the Central Anatolia region, on the other hand, showed that this region has some differences from the South-eastern Anatolia region in terms of agricultural support. Therefore, there are significant differences in the agricultural indicators of this region, especially in terms of agricultural production. For example, during the analysed period, there has been a very large increase in deficiency payments compared to other supports given to the Central Anatolia region. In addition, the region doubled its agricultural production during this period. Finally, significant increases have been observed in all agricultural supports in this region in the last two years.

In the 2002-2020 period, when Central Anatolia and Southeast Anatolia regions are compared in terms of the indicators used in the analysis, the change in the total amounts of support given to the Southeast Anatolia region (165%) is more than twice the change in the amounts of support given to the Central Anatolia region (70%). In both regions, there are decreases at similar rates in area-based supports. The type of support that has increased the most in the Central Anatolia region is the deficiency payments support, and the rise in this particular support is approximately 60 times higher than the rise in the deficiency payment supports in the Southeast Anatolia region. In the Southeast Anatolia region, the most increasing support type is animal husbandry support, and there was an increase of 8 times more in the Southeast Anatolia region compared to the Central Anatolia region. Compared to these changes in agricultural supports, both regions have experienced limited growth in agricultural income. On the other hand, while production doubled in the Central Anatolia region, more limited growth in production occurred in the Southeast Anatolia region. Finally, although significant enhances were observed in the value of the agricultural

commodities produced in the South-eastern Anatolia Region, the rise in the value of the products in the Central Anatolia region was insufficient compared to the growth in agricultural supports.

Based on the results of the analysis, it is possible to make recommendations for policymakers. First of all, the increase in agricultural income remained at very insufficient levels compared to the improvements in agricultural supports given to both regions. Therefore, policymakers should conduct studies/projects on why the agricultural supports implemented do not turn into agricultural income. There may be various reasons why the growth in agricultural income lags far behind the increases in the support provided. One of these reasons is the fact that climatic changes such as drought and agricultural diseases expand agricultural costs and decrease production, resulting in negative effects on agricultural income. Therefore, producers should be supported according to these specific problems in years when such problems are experienced. In addition, considering that the rate of insurance in the agricultural sector in Turkey is still around 20%, encouraging producers to insure their agricultural products will prevent such problems from reducing agricultural income. Another reason is that the production costs in the sector increase significantly from year to year, although the number of products per unit area (productivity) and market sales prices do not show significant changes from year to year. In other words, the fact that the rate of increase in costs is much higher than the rate of increase in sales prices and productivity has a distorting effect on agricultural income. Hence, policymakers have to make cost-reducing policies to eliminate this imbalance in order for agricultural supports to generate more income. Secondly, the fact that the increase in the values of agricultural products in the regions is much higher than the increase in agricultural income indicates that the costs in agricultural activities are too high and should be reduced. Thirdly, although the deficiency payment support in the Central Anatolia region may have an increasing effect on the amount of production in this region, it increases the cost of the state to pay the difference since the agricultural commodities produced in this region have low added value and are sold at low prices in the market. Since the South-eastern Anatolia region has agricultural products with higher added value and which can be sold at higher prices in the market, there has been a significant increase in the value of agricultural products in this region. Therefore, policymakers can reduce the cost of deficiency payments in the Central Anatolia region by encouraging the production of agricultural commodities with more value in the market. Finally, based on these analyses, it is important that policymakers change the direct income support method for the agricultural sector with cost-reducing methods.

Future studies may employ comparative analyses using other regions in the country and other sectoral indicators such as mechanisation in the agricultural sector, agricultural area and foreign trade.

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Tables

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix (Million USD)

	Total Support	Area-B. Support	Defic. Support	Animal Support	Income	Value of Product	Product.
PANEL A: Southeast Anatolia Region							
Observation	19	19	19	19	19	19	19
Mean	582	161	342	44.5	4,660	4,370	8.3
Std. Dev.	179	69.8	160	28.8	1,900	993	1.5
Min	178	82.7	33.2	0.3	3518	2,190	5
Max	827	281	521	82.5	6,810	6,070	10.9

Correlation matrix:

	Total Support	Area-B. Support	Defic. Support	Animal Support	Income	Value of Product	Production
Total Support	1						
Area-B. Support	-0.128	1					
Defic. Support	0.967	-0.328	1				
Animal Support	0.672	-0.708	0.732	1			
Income	0.801	-0.473	0.854	0.764	1		
Value of Product	0.797	-0.399	0.830	0.755	0.894	1	
Production	0.283	-0.716	0.381	0.679	0.627	0.584	1

PANEL B: Central Anatolia Region

	Total Support	Area-B. Support	Defic. Support	Animal Support	Income	Value of Product	Product.
Observation	19	19	19	19	19	19	19
Mean	647	323	129	141	8,790	7,210	31
Std. Dev.	131	188	80	84.1	3,510	1,470	7.6

Min	355	139	0.4	8.4	6,739	3,900	20.8
Max	947	725	265	277	12,500	9,600	46.1

Correlation matrix:

Total Support	1						
Area-B. Support	0.391	1					
Defic. Support	0.406	-0.533	1				
Animal Support	0.254	-0.729	0.622	1			
Income	0.409	-0.552	0.805	0.786	1		
Value of Product	0.462	-0.506	0.862	0.764	0.910	1	
Production	-0.220	-0.849	0.387	0.764	0.523	0.380	1

Note: The numbers reported in descriptive statistics represent annual totals in the regions in billions of dollars. The figures for agricultural production in the last column show the total production amount in the regions as billion tons.

Table 2: Southeast Anatolia Region: Percentage changes in agricultural supports and sectoral indicators in Turkish Lira and US dollars (2002-2020)

| | PANEL A: Agricultural Supports | | | | | | | | PANEL B: Sectoral Indicators | | | | |
| | Total Supports | | Area-Based Supports | | Deficiency Payments | | Animal Husbandry | | Agricultural Income | | Value of Products | | Production |
Year	TL	$	TL	$	TL	$	TL	$	TL	$	TL	$	Tons
2002	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	N/A	N/A	-	-	-
2003	73.4	74.9	89.9	91.5	0.9	1.8	127.5	129.4	N/A	N/A	39.5	40.7	-1.1
2004	-3.5	1.3	-17	-12.9	88.3	97.6	843.3	890.2	-	-	0.9	5.9	4.5
2005	39.4	47.9	-1.7	4.2	195.1	213	-23.5	-18.8	8.9	15.5	6.8	13.3	9.4
2006	30.5	22.3	11.3	4.2	46.9	37.6	197	178.2	6.8	0.1	12.1	5	3.3
2007	23.5	35.8	-2.6	7.1	44.4	58.8	-22.6	-14.9	3	13.2	2.8	13	3.6
2008	5.8	6.5	-18.9	-18.4	13.2	13.9	321.7	324.5	-9.1	-8.5	-7.8	-7.2	-35.6
2009	-20.1	-33.3	-41.2	-50.8	-9.1	-24	-36.6	-47	31.7	10	26.1	5.4	54.2
2010	21.4	25.2	20.9	24.7	21.7	25.5	19.8	23.6	41.4	45.8	29.6	33.6	6.6
2011	23.6	11.1	4.1	-6.5	12.5	1.1	122.5	99.9	12.1	0.7	17.7	5.8	5.7
2012	6.5	-0.7	12.6	4.9	7.8	0.4	-9.8	-16	3.6	-3.5	-4.8	-11.3	4
2013	10.7	4.6	1.4	-4.1	8.8	2.8	33.1	25.8	4.1	-1.6	8.7	2.8	11.7

2014	1.2	-12	7.4	-6.7	-2	-14.8	7.8	-6.3	2.3	-11.1	3.7	-9.8	-11
2015	13.7	-8.6	11.4	-10.4	14.3	-8.1	9.4	-12	26.5	1.8	25.2	0.7	13.2
2016	4.1	-6.3	7.2	-3.4	-5.1	-14.5	6.5	-4.1	-0.5	-10.4	0.6	-9.4	-13.8
2017	17.7	-2.5	-6.6	-22.7	31.2	8.6	15.9	-4	19.2	-1.3	9.5	-9.3	14.2
2018	22.6	-7.1	58.9	20.4	10.8	-16	16.7	-11.5	29.4	-1.9	43.3	8.6	-13.1
2019	10.5	-6.2	24.7	5.8	16.3	-1.3	3.5	-12.1	9.6	-7	-11	-24.5	4.5
2020	14.2	-7.6	8.3	-12.4	10	-11	70.7	38.1	28.7	4.1	79.3	45	19.7
2002-2020	**1126.7**	**165.2**	**195.8**	**-36.3**	**3780.8**	**737.3**	**96777.3**	**20783.1**	**586.4**	**39.8**	**939.5**	**124.2**	**69.5**

Note: The numbers reported in the Panel A and B of the table shows the annual percentage changes in agricultural supports and the sectoral indicators, respectively. The last row of the table shows the percentage changes in the variables between 2002 and 2020 except for the agricultural income due to the data unavailability. Hence, the numbers reported at the bottom of agricultural income columns indicate percentage changes in agricultural income between 2004 and 2020. The table is created by the author using the dataset of the Turkish Statistical Institute and the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

Table 3: Central Anatolia Region: Percentage changes in agricultural supports and sectoral indicators in Turkish Lira and US dollars (2002-2020)

| | PANEL A: Agricultural Supports | | | | | | | | PANEL B: Sectoral Indicators | | | | |
| | Total Supports | | Area-Based Supports | | Deficiency Payments | | Animal Husbandry | | Agricultural Income | | Value of Products | | Production |
Year	TL	$	TL	$	TL	$	TL	$	TL	$	TL	$	Tons
2002	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	N/A	N/A	-	-	-
2003	78.3	79.9	79.3	80.9	549.2	554.8	17.1	18.1	N/A	N/A	27.8	28.9	-11.3
2004	-16	-11.8	-19.8	-15.8	21.1	27.1	210.4	225.8	-	-	8.1	13.5	9.6
2005	9.6	16.3	-4.5	1.3	2086.3	2219.2	23.7	31.2	11.4	18.2	5.4	11.8	9.4
2006	18	10.5	14	6.8	-2	-8.2	84	72.4	-3.7	-9.8	-3	-9.1	1.1
2007	18.8	30.7	15.4	26.9	82.5	100.6	-21.1	-13.2	2.3	12.5	4.4	14.8	-17.6
2008	-19	-18.4	-36.5	-36.1	-0.9	-0.3	160.1	161.9	12.3	13.1	19.2	20	13.8
2009	-20.2	-33.3	-46.4	-55.2	86.2	55.6	-38.4	-48.6	24	3.7	16.6	-2.5	22.3
2010	19.6	23.4	12.6	16.1	22.7	26.5	28.7	32.8	16.9	20.5	5.8	9.1	2.6
2011	26.8	13.9	3.8	-6.7	17.3	5.4	65.1	48.4	17.6	5.6	21.9	9.5	4.4
2012	4.4	-2.7	15.4	7.5	-40	-44.1	47.9	37.8	3.9	-3.2	-4.9	-11.4	-2.6
2013	21.3	14.7	2.4	-3.2	50.2	42	25.7	18.8	13.6	7.4	23.4	16.6	13.1

2014	6.7	-7.2	7.7	-6.3	18.7	3.2	-10.9	-22.5	8.4	-5.7	1.8	-11.5	-4.4
2015	-6.3	-24.6	4.4	-16	-48.1	-58.3	22.2	-1.7	18.1	-5	25.2	0.7	13.4
2016	37.8	24	5.3	-5.2	120.4	98.4	12.5	1.2	-0.8	-10.7	-2.3	-12	3.3
2017	-2.2	-19	-4	-20.5	-14.5	-29.2	11.9	-7.3	16.9	-3.2	13.1	-6.3	3.4
2018	16.9	-11.4	44.9	9.8	-6	-28.7	5.3	-20.2	21.3	-8.1	20.5	-8.7	-1.8
2019	33.9	13.7	25.7	6.7	59.9	35.7	46.6	24.4	26.1	7	31	11.2	7.8
2020	31.2	6.2	23.1	-0.4	53.7	24.4	39.8	13.1	22.3	-1.1	19.2	-3.6	10.3
2002-2020	**691.9**	**70.7**	**117.0**	**-53.3**	**196983**	**42421.6**	**12114.6**	**2533.5**	**588.4**	**40.1**	**721.7**	**76.9**	**96.6**

Note: The numbers reported in the Panel A and B of the table shows the annual percentage changes in agricultural supports and the sectoral indicators, respectively. The last row of the table shows the percentage changes in the variables between 2002 and 2020 except for the agricultural income due to the data unavailability. Hence, the numbers reported at the bottom of agricultural income columns indicate percentage changes in agricultural income between 2004 and 2020. The table is created by the author using the dataset of the Turkish Statistical Institute and the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

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Digital Marketing of Political Parties in Turkey

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ABSTRACT

The only legitimate way for the political parties to get power in democratic countries is to achieve victory in the elections. In order to get more votes than the rival parties and thus win the election, political parties must offer political products that will meet the needs of the voters. In terms of determining the right political products, political parties need to be in constant communication and interaction with the voters to understand the needs of the voters. With the developing technology, new communication channels have emerged. Digital marketing channels, which are widely used mainly in marketing, attracted the attention of political parties over time and started to be used to communicate with their voters. Digital marketing channels, used extensively, present a significant opportunity for political parties to reach current and potential voters. In this study, digital marketing channels used by all political parties represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly will be examined by the content analysis method. Thus, the usage rates of digital marketing in the political field will be comparatively revealed.

Introduction

Throughout the history of humanity, different forms of government have existed for societies to live together and in prosperity. Democracy, which can be defined as the people's self-government, is one of the most widely used forms of government today. In countries with a democratic administration, the people vote for the political actors they see fit to govern themselves, thereby ensuring that they come to power. Political actors who want to be in power have to produce political products that can meet the wishes and needs of the people. Therefore, political actors need to collect and analyse the related data to find out what the public wants or needs. In this context, political marketing offers political parties an opportunity to meet the demands of the people most effectively (Less-Marshment, 2003: 29).

The concept of marketing has evolved beyond traditional products and services to include the offerings of non-profit organisations (Kotler and Levy, 1969). The scope of the marketing concept has gradually expanded to include goods or services and ideas, values, or organisations. The marketing techniques used to identify consumers' needs, desires, and demands started to be also

used by political actors. As a result, the product, price, distribution, and promotion marketing mix elements in the field of marketing have been reinterpreted from the political science perspective.

Thanks to the developing technology, new and different channels emerged to communicate with consumers, especially in the internet and digital tools. It is possible to resemble digital marketing with traditional marketing methods conducted through digital systems. Consumers having access to computers, smartphones, tablets, and internet-connected TVs at any time and anywhere, using digital marketing tools such as websites, social media, mobile ads and apps, online video, e-mail, blogs, and other digital platforms have increased their significance (Kotler, Armstrong, Harris, & He, 2020: 23-24). It is precisely what is happening once political actors use these new digital marketing channels to communicate and interact with their voters.

Conceptual Framework

Although political marketing, which emerged with the use of marketing techniques in politics, is a new concept, it has attracted the attention of academics and political actors in recent years. In particular, developing technology and increasing competition cause political actors to be more interested in political marketing.

Political parties are organised groups with a particular way of ideas and values and aiming to implement them in a country they intend to rule. Everyone with a political identity is a political actor at different levels (Aziz, 2011: 22). Political marketing includes applying marketing techniques by political actors and organisations to achieve their goals (Ingram and Lees-marshment, 2001: 44). Political marketing is the process by which political candidates and ideas are presented to the electorate to meet the voters' political needs and thus to get their support (Cwalina, Falkowski, & Newman, 2009: 67). Political marketing can be defined as establishing, maintaining, and developing long-term relationships with voters to achieve their goals in the interests of society and political parties. This can be achieved by mutual exchange and fulfilling promises (O'Shaughnessy, 2001: 1048; Shama, 1976: 766).

Political marketing is how politicians use various marketing tools to communicate with their political markets (Antoniades, 2021: 60). It is assumed that political actors implementing political marketing tools generally perform better (Henneberg, 2006: 15). Political marketing is about communicating with voters and party members, media, and possible sources of funding (Lock and Harris, 1996: 14). Within the scope of political marketing, political parties and actors try to influence as many voters as possible, especially during election campaigns. Therefore, marketing techniques are essential for political candidates in catching the symbiotic relationship between marketing and politics (Mochla and Tsourvakas, 2020: 2). Today, political parties prefer mobile communication, a dimension of digitalisation in mass communication (Kamal, 2016: 5302).

The product, price, distribution, and promotion elements, known as the marketing mix, are reinterpreted within the scope of political marketing. Political parties have to use the elements of the political marketing mix effectively and efficiently to gain the voters' support and competitive advantage. To briefly explain the scope of the elements of the political marketing mix;

Political Product: There are different opinions in the literature about the scope of political products. The political product is a broad product that covers the physical and institutional structure of the party, its leader, candidates, members, volunteer (or paid) personnel, symbols, party policies, projects, solution proposals, the services of the party, the ideas presented to the voters, the discourses, and even the attitudes and behaviours of the party representatives. It is like a package that each element in it impacts the voters at different levels (Polat, 2015: 423). In

general, the political product is a very complex element that makes voters believe it is beneficial if the candidate wins (Niffenegger, 1989: 47).

Political Price: The political price is the votes given to the candidate or the party during the election in return for the services promised by the political actors, the membership fees, and the services rendered to the party or the candidate (Tek, 1999: 42). In terms of political parties, price is an element that defines the expected income not only in money but also in votes (Farrell and Wortmann, 1987: 299). Within the scope of political marketing, what is actually meant as the price is the vote used to support the policies of the parties and candidates (Polat, 2015: 442).

Political Distribution: Political distribution is defined as the delivery of political products and related messages (party program, leader, candidate, practices, organisation) to the voters most shortly and conveniently, economically and effectively (Islamoğlu, 2002: 135). Political distribution includes the methods and channels used to personally communicate political actors with the electorate (Niffenegger, 1989: 49).

Political Promotion: Political parties should deliver their new products to their voters using the most appropriate and effective communication techniques (Ingram and Lees-marshment, 2001: 46). Promotion is generally accepted as the fundamental marketing element (Niffenegger, 1989: 49). The political promotion aims to draw attention to the political product, inform, promote, create sympathy, and sell (vote) the proposed political product package (Polat, 2015: 447). The primary purpose of political marketing is to produce and manage political products that can meet the demands of the targeted audience (Lees-marshment, 2018: 4). As a result, it is possible to define the concept of political marketing as a set of activities that start in the pre-election process, during the election process and after the election, to gain a competitive advantage in the political arena and to ensure that the voters act in line with the party's preferences.

Digital Marketing

The concept of digital marketing has evolved from the marketing of goods and services through digital channels. It is defined as an adaptive, technology-enabled process in which organisations collaborate with customers and partners to create, communicate, share, and maintain common values for all stakeholders (Kannan and Li, 2017: 23).

Digital marketing is the management and execution of marketing using digital data and electronic media such as web, e-mail, interactive TV, wireless media in connection with customer characteristics and behaviours (Bhatia, 2017: 17; Charlesworth, 2021: 1). In recent years, marketers have been using many new communication channels along with traditional marketing methods, from creative websites and smartphone apps to blogs, online videos, and social media. These new channels offer the opportunity to send direct, personal, and interactive messages beyond sending messages to the masses (Armstrong and Kotler, 2014: 33). Thus, organisations can interact with the target audience (Zahay, 2020: 30).

Compared to traditional marketing, digital marketing enables faster and easier campaigns to be created, reaching a wider audience and measuring its effectiveness more easily (Rana et al., 2020: 6). Digital marketing is not meant to replace traditional marketing, but both should be used in communication with the customer (Kotler, Kartajaya, & Setiawan, 2017: 52). Digital marketing is not about technology but people, as in traditional marketing. In this context, digital marketing is about connecting people (marketers) with other people (customers) and increasing sales as a result (Ryan, 2021: 17).

According to the data in the report published by Hootsuite and Wearesocial in 2021, 59.5% of the world population of 7.83 billion are internet users, and 53.6% are active social media users. In the same report, 77.7% of Turkey's population of 84.69 million are internet users, and 70.8% are active social media users. While the average daily internet usage in the world is 6 hours 54 minutes, it has been determined that Turkey is above the world average with 7 hours and 57 minutes. The most used social networks worldwide are Facebook, Youtube, Whatsapp, FB Messenger and Instagram.

The developments in technology and the increasing use of technology in recent years offer new opportunities for organisations to communicate with their target audiences. This is valid for political parties' communication with their voters and society. Today, digital platforms are used to be aware of social events, follow the agenda, share their thoughts, communicate with others, and for many other reasons. Therefore, it is crucial for political parties to exist on digital platforms.

Literature Review

In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of studies on political marketing and digital marketing in national and international publications. Likewise, there are researches on the importance of digital marketing for political parties or the use of digital marketing channels by political parties. To start with the relevant studies in Turkey, Tan and Armutçu (2020), in their study examining the contributions of digital marketing to the field of political marketing, concluded that the two political parties that received the most votes in the 2018 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections actively employed digital marketing channels. In his research, Arğın (2019) comparatively analysed the parties' websites with a group in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey during the 2019 local election process. As a result of the research, it has been determined that political parties instrumentalised their corporate websites intensively for propaganda and informing the public.

Yalçınkaya (2018) examined the use of digital marketing channels by the top three political parties in Turkey and found that these parties actively engage with digital marketing channels. Yalçınkaya and Ay (2017) developed a political marketing model for political parties based on the thesis that political marketing is a philosophy that should be applied not only during election periods but also throughout the years between elections. Sarıtaş (2016) determines the visual and technical criteria that should be on the websites of political parties. In addition, analyses have been made by determining the functionality and design functions (Güler and Ülker, 2010).

Methodology

The aim of this research is to examine the political parties operating in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in terms of their usage of digital marketing. Digital marketing tools and channels offer essential opportunities to interact with citizens. Especially before the elections, it is vital for political parties to provide effective communication with their current and potential voters on the way to power. This study is important in terms of determining the ways in which political rivals communicate with citizens in a country where political competition is intense. This situation reveals the importance of the study for political parties.

The universe encompasses all research-related entities such as individuals or groups, institutions, and companies. The universe of this study consists of political parties operating in Turkey. When the relevant data are examined, there are a total of 123 active political parties (Supreme Court of Appeals, Chief Public Prosecutor's Office, 2021). Due to time and cost constraints, the sample of the research includes the political parties represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM). The distribution of seats in the TGNA is given in the Table below. In this context, the

sample of the research consists of 13 political parties represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Table 1: Distribution of MPs in the Parliament

Name of the Party	Number of MPs	Est. Date	Number of Members
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) Justice and Development Party	286	14.08.2001	11.011.725
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) Republican People Party	135	09.09.1992	1.299.235
Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP) People's Democratic Party	56	15.10.2012	41.022
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP) Nationalist Movement Party	48	07.07.1983	473.192
İYİ Parti (İYİP) Good Party	36	25.10.2017	425.619
Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP) Turkish Labour Party	4	07.11.2017	5.092
Memleket Partisi (MP) Homeland Party	3	17.05.2021	12.992
Demokrat Parti (DP) Democrat Party	2	23.06.1983	406.280
Zafer Partisi (ZP) Victory Party	2	26.08.2021	0
Büyük Birlik Partisi (BBP) Grand Union Party	1	29.01.1993	59.830
Demokrasi ve Atılım Partisi (DAP) Democracy and Progress Party	1	09.03.2020	58.418
Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi (DBP) Democrtic Regions Party	1	02.05.2008	7.017
Saadet Partisi (SP) Felicity Party	1	20.07.2001	269.538
Yenilik Partisi (YP) Novelty Party	1	20.07.2020	1.767
Bağımsız Milletvekilleri Independent MPs	5	---	---
Total	**582**	---	---

Source: *The author designed the Table according to the data available on the websites of TGNA and the Supreme Court of Appeals. The number of party members is given as from 04.10.2021.*

Content analysis method, one of the qualitative research methods, was used in the research. Content analysis is a method of systematically, objectively, and numerically examining and analysing the variables in a text (Wimmer & Dominick, 2014: 159). For the research, a scanning model was applied. Scanning models aim to describe the past or current situation as it exists without changing or manipulating it. The event, individual or object that is the subject of the research is tried to be defined in its own conditions (Karasar, 2012: 77).

Results and Discussion

Usage of Websites by the Political Parties

A web page is a document defined by its URL in the World Wide Web, which can contain text, images, audio, and links to other pages (Özmen, 2009: 39). The website, on the other hand, consists of a group of web pages that are usually linked to each other and have a home page as a starting point (Brown, 2002: 2; Onursoy, 2001: 90).

The website is one of the most effective digital marketing channels where political parties can communicate directly with the target audience. Websites can be used as a communication channel or information platform in the internet environment (Aksoy, 2009: 41). The most important innovation brought by web pages is the use of many different forms of electronic data such as pictures, movies and video images, sound, and text, and enabling various users from different environments to access information independently of hardware and software (Erbaşlar and Dokur, 2012: 28).

Web pages serve to describe and introduce a candidate. It can also be used as a meeting place to enable potential voters to participate in campaigns (Güler and Ülker, 2010: 103). The increasing development and essential role of digital marketing tools, especially for services, has directed the attention of experts to research the factors that play an important role in creating efficient and quality websites (Mochla and Tsourvakas, 2020: 1). It is essential for political parties to have a user-friendly website in order to increase the effectiveness of digital marketing. Websites of political parties are useful for voters to access information about the party and candidates and influence their voting preferences (Jain, 2018: 404).

Political parties should consider websites as a central base that citizens can access anytime and anywhere. It is important for current and potential voters that all the information that is published on the websites are accessible to everyone. In particular, the opportunity of political parties to publish their political products through their websites offers the opportunity to express themselves better. In addition, websites can be used to support other promotional activities. Within the scope of political marketing, political parties appear before the voters with a political product package, within the political product, the party leader, party ideology, party policies, the history of the party, the solution proposals of the party, the goals of the party, the deputies of the party, the party organisations, the news of the party etc. It is a package consisting of an extensive range of many elements. The elements within the scope of the political product package have different levels of influence on the voters. Within the scope of the research, the institutional web pages of political parties were analysed in terms of political product package and content.

Table 2. Analysis Results of the Web Pages

	AKP	CHP	HDP	MHP	İYİP	TİP	MP	DP	ZP	BBP	DAP	DBP	SP	YP
Party Leadership	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+
Party Regulations	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+
Party Instructions	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	+	+		-	+
Party Programme	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+
History of the Party	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	The webpage is not online.	-	-
Party News	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+
Visions and Missions	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-
Party MPs	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-		-	-
Party Organization	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+		+	-
Election Declarations	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-
Mobile Compatibility	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+
Foreign Language Option	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	-		+	-

Source: *The author designed the Table based on the data obtained from party webpages, as from 02.01.2022.*

When Table 2 is examined, it is striking that political parties actively use their websites. In general, some functions are not working on the sites, while others are under construction. The necessary data could not be obtained because the website of the Democratic Regions party was not reachable.

The party leader, one of the most important elements of the political product package, is the centre of the websites of all political parties. One of the most important reasons for this positioning is that party leaders are influential on voter preferences in the Turkish political arena. There are party bylaws on the websites of all parties except for the İyi Party. The websites of political parties are mainly designed to be open to one-way communication and are used to inform voters. Likewise, party regulations and party schedules are mostly available on their website. Party histories are only available on CHP, MHP and DP websites.

All political parties aim to inform the voters about the activities of the party by intensively giving news about the party in accordance with the construction of their websites. Party targets are only available on AKP, CHP and MHP websites. Since the deputies of the party are one of the important elements of the political product package, almost all political parties have reserved a place for their own deputies on their websites. Election declarations, which generally include promises of political parties before the election, are not available on the websites of most parties. This may also be due to the fact that their party has not yet entered an election after its establishment. While there are election manifestos on the websites of the CHP and MHP parties, the visions to be achieved with Target 2023 are stated on the website of the AK Party.

Mobile compatibility, which can be defined as the ability of websites to be adjusted automatically according to phone or tablet screens, has been implemented in the websites of political parties in the sample. Each website was checked one by one via https://search.google.com/test/mobile-friendly?hl=tr. As a result of the control, it was determined that the websites of all parties were mobile compatible. As it is known that today people mostly prefer phones or tablets to access the internet, this situation is favourable for political parties. Thanks to mobile compatibility, voters can easily access the websites of political parties from small-screen devices. Finally, the foreign language option has been examined to understand the websites by voters who do not speak Turkish. While AKP, HDP, MHP, TİP, MP and SP parties have the option to translate the site into a foreign language, this option is not available for other parties.

Usage of Social Media

Social media is an umbrella concept that includes tools, services and applications that enable users to interact with other users by using network technologies (Boyd, 2008: 92). The concept of social media includes social networking sites, video sharing sites, blog or microbiology platforms that emerged in the early 2000s, using Web 2.0 technology and allowing users to create and share their own content. Having social media accounts has been inevitable for political actors who want to exist on the internet (Jain, 2018: 406). Recently, social media techniques have been used extensively in successful election campaigns, and the success of the elections has been attributed to the use of social networks (Aziz, 2011b: 108).

When the websites of political parties are examined, it is seen that there are social media applications that allow two-way communication with the voters on the home page. In this part of the research, social media applications on the websites of political parties will be examined. Social networking sites are applications that allow users to create personal profiles, invite their friends and colleagues to access their profiles, and send e-mails or instant messages among themselves (Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010: 63). Although there are many social networking sites or applications, the social networking sites used extensively by political parties will be examined here.

Founded by Mark Zuckerberg in 2004 for Harvard students to communicate, Facebook has quickly become a social network that allows users to communicate with others and exchange information all over the world. Over time, it has begun to be used not only by individuals but also by businesses and other organisations to communicate with their target audiences. Political actors share photos, send short messages, virtual gifts and invites via Facebook (Aziz, 2011b: 109). Twitter is a social networking application with all current events. The latest news, the newest brands or products, anything that happens about anyone, or anything is primarily shared on Twitter (Jain, 2018: 403). Founded in 2006, Twitter has transformed from a niche service to a massively used platform (Weller et al., 2014: 29). In the report published by Twitter in 2021, he stated that their aim is to serve social communication. They stated that they allow all people to produce, distribute and discover free information about the issues and events they care about (Dorsey, 2021: 4). Twitter has received significant attention from both mass media and communication experts due to its role in the political arena, especially in the election and campaign process (Weller et al., 2014: 36). Founded in 2010, Instagram is a social networking application that allows people to easily edit their photos, stories or status and share them with people in their network. Instagram, whose number of users has increased rapidly in a short time, is one of the popular sharing applications today. The social networking platform Instagram, where photos and videos are shared, allows users to communicate by sending, sharing, and liking pictures. Thanks to the increasing popularity of Instagram, it has become an ideal political marketing platform (Muñoz and Towner, 2017: 291).

Table 3. Analysing Results of Social Media Applications of Political Parties

	Facebook			Twitter				Instagram			
	Followers	**Following**	**Date of Est.**	**Followers**	**Following**	**Date of Est.**	**Number of Tweets**	**Followers**	**Following**	**Date of Est.**	**Number of Posts**
AKP	3m	1	17.02.2011	2.832.725	401	01.07.2013	37.336	1,5m	27	17.01.2014	5.373
CHP	1,7m	18	08.02.2011	1.948.144	4	01.02.2011	41.126	515k	4	05.04.2016	2.237
HDP	1,2m	125	14.08.2013	1.153.047	179	01.08.2013	40.223	517k	52	26.02.2014	4.188
MHP	2,1m	0	24.12.2011	2.304.669	1	01.06.2010	32.212	-	-	-	-
İYİP	437k	1	29.08.2017	828.391	4	01.08.2017	7.422	298k	2	09.09.2017	1.322
TİP	34k	1	23.03.2018	167.164	6	01.08.2014	3.662	47k	3	24.03.2018	1.368
MP	14k	0	09.05.2021	52.626	18	01.02.2021	854	20k	1	05.11.2020	470
DP	5k	0	31.08.2016	7.686	26	01.08.2016	744	347	23	-	0
ZP	4,5k	2	14.04.2021	33.001	1	01.04.2019	580	16,2k	1	-	338
BBP	123k	2	03.05.2012	70.508	1	01.12.2011	14.850	20,7k	2	15.11.2015	3.205
DAP	80k	0	09.03.2020	328.546	87	01.03.2020	6.838	61,6k	1	07.03.2020	2.799
SP	191k	1	24.11.2009	19.620	31	01.11.2014	14.799	36,2k	5	02.07.2015	2.481
YP	1,4k	1	19.07.2020	1.734	1	01.07.2020	478	783	2	-	303

Source: *The Table is designed by the author based on the data obtained from party webpages, as from 02.01.2022.*

Although there are different social networking platforms on the websites of a few political parties, they are not included in the review because of not generally found in other parties. In addition, some social networking platforms are examined by the researcher directly from the application, although they are not included on the website of the political party. For example, the CHP and MHP's websites do not have a link to their Instagram accounts. In addition, the Facebook link on the DP's website leads directly to the address of the Chairman. In general, it has been observed that political parties heavily use social networking platforms that allow two-way communication.

When the data of Facebook, one of the social networking platforms, are analysed from the Table, it is seen that the majority of voters are in the AK Party. AK Party is followed by MHP, CHP and HDP, respectively. It was found that the least number of followers were in the Yenilik Party. It has been determined that political parties have their own Facebook account, which was founded in 2004 and whose number of users rapidly increases, and that they make extensive use of this social networking platform.

It is seen that the highest number of followers on Twitter are AK party, MHP, CHP and HDP, respectively. The least followers are in the Yenilik Party. When the membership dates are examined, it is seen that they quickly became members of Twitter, which was founded in 2006, in their political parties. According to the number of tweets, most tweets have been sent by the CHP. It is followed by HDP, AK Party and MHP, respectively. AK party has the most followers on Instagram, followed by HDP and CHP, respectively. Likewise, the AK Party has made the highest number of posts.

In the report published by Wearesoial in 2021, the most used social networking platforms in the 16-64 age group in Turkey have been found to be Instagram (89.5%), Facebook (79.0%) and Twitter (72.5%), respectively (Kemp, 2021: 47). In light of these data, it is crucial for political parties to share more on social networking platforms in order to gain a competitive advantage. It is seen that the number of followers of political parties on various social networking platforms is different. In this case, publishing the posts on different platforms is vital for more effective communication with the voters in general.

Founded in 2005 for the sharing of videos over the internet, YouTube has become widespread throughout the world in a short time. The platform, where amateur videos have been shared since the beginning, has proliferated in time, with the use of it for promotional purposes in institutions and organisations. Especially the fact that YouTube users are from different age groups has been effective in making it a suitable platform for marketing. The most used social media platform in Turkey was determined as YouTube with 94.5% (Kemp, 2021: 47).

Table 4. Analysis Results of YouTube Channel of Political Parties

Political Parties	Number of Subscribers	Number of Views	Date of Est.
AKP	84k	114.820.434	28.02.2014
CHP	98,4k	71.032.857	17.09.2013
HDP	159k	81.863.549	28.10.2013
MHP	101k	47.438.469	21.10.2013
İYİP	44k	39.020.488	19.10.2017
TİP	10,8k	1.028.219	22.05.2018
MP	3,5k	106.309	07.11.2020
DP	483	143.487	29.11.2012
ZP	1,92k	38.769	14.04.2021

BBP	1,62k	336.272	21.10.2011
DAP	59,1k	33.513.297	10.03.2020
SP	32,2k	19.144.104	11.02.2013
YP	-	5.337	22.09.2020

Source: *The Table is designed by the author by relying on the data taken from the YouTube channels of the political parties.*

YouTube data is shown in Table 4, which shows that the first subscriber party is BBP. The party with the most subscribers is HDP with 159,000. The party whose shared videos are most viewed is the AK Party. Yenilik Party has no subscribers. In addition, it has been found out that the links of the YouTube channels of the MHP, İyi Party and Saadet party are not included in their websites.

An e-bulletin (e-mail newsletters) is a less complex version of a magazine, newspaper or report focused on a specific topic (Samara, 2005: 21). It is possible to establish easy personal communication with customers through e-mail newsletters (Ryan and Jones, 2009: 133). The e-bulletin offers political parties the opportunity to send information directly to the e-mail address of the target audience who wants to be informed about the developments. Since users voluntarily give their e-mail addresses and sign up for the e-bulletin list without being a member, it is more likely to reach the target audience directly.

Table 5. Analysis Results of E-Bulletins

	AKP	CHP	HDP	MHP	İYİP	TİP	MP	DP	ZP	BBP	DAP	SP	YP
E-Bulletins	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-

Source: It was arranged by the researcher according to the e-bulletin data on the websites of political parties.

Table 5 shows the e-bulletin subscription opportunities of political parties. Through the e-bulletin, political parties can easily and quickly send their innovations and developments to the people registered in the e-bulletin via e-mail. As seen in the Table, while AKP, CHP, IYI Party, BBP and DAP offer this opportunity, the rest does not have such a policy.

Conclusion

The concept of political marketing, which emerged with the use of modern marketing techniques in the field of politics, which adopts a customer-oriented understanding, has caused political parties to adopt a voter-oriented understanding. It is inevitable for political parties that want to come to power to adopt a voter-oriented approach to politics before, during and after the election. Digital marketing channels, which businesses use extensively to interact with their customers, have also been used by political parties to reach their voters in recent years. Thanks to digital marketing channels that provide two-way communication, voters can access the information they want, share this information on different platforms and add their own comments. In this period, when voters access information very easily and quickly, political parties must present their political products to their voters in an easily and quickly accessible way. In this context, digital marketing offers

important opportunities to political parties. Website, social media, e-bulletin etc., applications are used extensively by political parties.

As a result of the research, it has been seen that political parties use digital marketing effectively. It has also been determined that the functions on the websites of some political parties do not work. It has been observed that Facebook and Twitter are used more intensively than Instagram. In addition, it has been found that YouTube, which is a video sharing site, is actively used by political parties. It has been determined that most political parties do not use e-bulletins that can be used to inform voters. It has been observed that political parties include leader-oriented news, which is a crucial element of the political product package.

Digital marketing will continue to evolve, leveraging new technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data, virtual reality, and cognitive computing. The adoption and application of these technologies, which are expected to shape marketing in the future, by political parties are essential for them to interact with the voters.

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The Cyberthreat in the Contemporary Era: Challenges for the security of Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

Advancement in the field of information and communication technology (ICT) has transformed the world. In the contemporary era, digital technologies are playing an important role in performing daily life operations. This advancement and dependence on ICT also brought with it various types of vulnerabilities. Nowadays, institutions and individuals can be easily targeted by using cyberspace. Dependence on digital infrastructure is also increasing at a very rapid pace in Pakistan. Cyber networks are not only used by common people, but critical institutes like online banking, electric grids, and dams are also connected to digital networks. In the same way, military infrastructures like command and control systems and nuclear power plants are also linked to cyber networks. Due to this reliance on digital technologies, Pakistan is facing a constant threat of major cyber-attacks. So far, Pakistan does not have a proper mechanism to deal with the threat of cyber-attacks. This study analyses the impacts of the possible cyber-attack on the security of Pakistan.

Introduction

In the last couple of decades, information and communication technologies (ICT) have gone through immense growth. This progress in the area of ICT has transformed the lifestyle of people around the globe. Now people are more dependent on digital technologies. The computer and the internet are now part and parcel of modern-day life. This phenomenon is not only limited to individuals, but different kinds of private organisations and even government institutions are now also overwhelmingly dependent on cyberspace to carry out their daily life operations. Technological advancement has not only made life easier for people, but it is also playing an important role in the smooth working of various organisations. With the development of this cobweb of the internet, we are now in an interconnected world that has transcended state boundaries. States no longer have the monopoly to control the flow of information and data within their borders.

Though this progress in the area of cyberspace has facilitated life in many ways, it is also destined for new kinds of problems. More dependence on cyberspace has made us more vulnerable to cyber-attack. A cyber-attack from an opponent can target individuals, a particular group, or society or can also be directed against state networks. Likewise, cyber-attacks can be generated by states, non-state actors, and even individuals having their interests (Burton, 2015). It means that anything that is connected to the computer network is under threat of cyber-attack. Cyber intrusion can produce

three kinds of consequences. It can disrupt a particular system with malware. Cyberattack is also carried out for espionage, i.e., it can steal data from other systems. Last but not least, cyber-attacks can produce a kinetic result. The physical infrastructure that is connected with a computer could be damaged by using computer software (Jensena, 2019). For Example, it can cut off the supply of electricity from an electric grid, or it can produce flooding by disturbing the water stream from dams. In short, every physical network that is connected to a computer system or global internet can be damaged using a cyber-attack with the ability to produce physical results.

Even though so much is happening at the international level, in Pakistan, a debate about cybersecurity and cyberwar is still at the nascent stage. Pakistan's national security is more focused on terrorism-related issues, nuclear catastrophe, and India's aggressive policies in the South Asian region. But the, cyber-related issues are given the least importance in the national security debate (Yamin, 2018). In 2013, the government of Pakistan formed a committee to develop a comprehensive national security policy. Different sessions have been held so far. In his reports, "Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency" (PILDAT) discussed all in the meetings that happened from 2013 to 2018. But what was missing in all those meetings was missing was cybersecurity (PILDAT, 2019). But Pakistan is facing cyber threats against the individual, operating systems of different government and non-government organisations, and critical infrastructure. Most importantly, after the Stuxnet attack, it is now an established fact that cyber intrusions could damage nuclear plants (Amin, 2018). In this anarchic world, with the revolution in the area of information and communication technology, Pakistan has been left under constant threat from different actors in the area of cyberspace. These actors are not only states, but they can also be non-state actors (Amin, 2018). Though Pakistan has not faced a major cyber-attack so far, the threat is always present. Cyber-attack could even damage critical infrastructures like electric grids and nuclear power plants. Moreover, cyberspace is also used to launch information warfare against Pakistan by states and non-state actors. This propaganda war is used to disturb the basic foundation of society in Pakistan (Shad, 2019).

Changing Concept of Security in the 21st Century

Security is a contested concept in the field of international relations. Scholars have provided different definitions of the security of a state. It is generally labelled as the protection of sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state from external occupation (Hare, 2010). Besides these contested concepts, we have some common ground. At the most basic level, national security is defined as "the preservation of the norms, rules, institutions, and values of society". All the institutions, principles, and structures associated with society, including its people, are to be protected from "military and non-military threats" (Osisanya, n.d.). After the end of the cold war, the scope of the security term was enlarged. The protection of individual security is also included in the broader concept of the security of the state. Similarly, the nature of threat also changed with the changing concept of security. At the start of the 21st-century, non-state actors from within the state are also included among major threats to the security of the state (Parmar, n.d).

Digital technologies provided a new realm where the sovereignty of a state could be challenged. For example, if an attack is executed against a nuclear power plant by using cyber-space and it produces physical results, this will be considered a violation of the sovereignty of states (Hare, 2010). Even if a cyber-attack does not produce physical results, it is considered an offence that breached the sovereignty of the state. Nowadays, many institutions are working in the digital realm, and the data that are present in cyberspace is as important as physical infrastructure. For example, if the online banking system is disturbed, it might also be labelled as an attack on the sovereignty of states (Hare, 2010).

Theoretical Underpinning of the Study

The realist theory of international relations recognises states as the primary actor. The relation between states is influenced by two important phenomena. First is the egoistic nature of human beings. Due to this, it is argued everybody wants to maintain dominance over others, and this egoistic human nature is collectively present in state behaviour. Secondly, the anarchy nature of international relations affects the behaviour of states. Without the presence of a hegemonic force or world government, states always feel threatened by the intentions of other states because they do not know about each other's ambitions. Therefore, states try to maximise their power to protect themselves. This maximisation of power is not just about being protected from the bigger threat, but many times, it also involves preventing the domination of other states. Realism emphasises rational behaviour by state actors in achieving their national interests. This national interest is mostly defined in terms of power. It means that states are always power-seekers (Burchill, 2005).

Hans Morgenthau was attributed among the most important scholars of realism. He organised realist thoughts and presented them in the form of realist political theory. Morgenthau's third principle of political realism says it is true that states always try to achieve their national interest. Achieving national interest means that they will try to maximise their power. But these interests and the nature of power change in time and space. When political and cultural context evolves, although states still maintain old thinking maximising power, the nature of power also changes, and it was made compatible with the new era (Morgenthau, 1948).

Having offensive and defensive cyber capabilities is comparatively a new occurrence in international politics. It is another form of power that actors of international politics try to use to achieve their national interests. As Morgenthau explained, the physical nature of the power could change, but the primary goal of the actors that are present in international politics will remain the same. These goals are maximisation of power and attainment of national interests. So, Morgenthau's realist concept about international politics helped to address the research question of the study. It explains that the usage of cyberspace is a new occurrence, but the maximisation of power and the attainment of national interest are still the dominant driving force in international politics.

The Threat of Cyber-Attacks against Pakistan

The revolution in the field of information and communication technology has also affected Pakistan. Dependence on digital technologies is growing at a very rapid pace in Pakistan. Cyber networks are now used by individuals, private groups as well as government intuitions. In Pakistan, a huge population is connected to the Internet. According to the Pakistan telecommunication authority, almost 65 million people have access to the internet. Government and private institutions are now gradually converting their services through online networks (Shad, 2019). It decreases the cost of the project, and it is more convenient for both customers as well as for officials. The number of departments that are using cyberspace as a medium to carry out their operations is increasing every year at a very rapid pace. For example, the banking system, stock exchange, police department, (NADRA) national institute that keeps a record of all the citizens, all are now heavily dependent on cyberspace. Military institutions are now also using computer networks for performing important functions (Shad, 2019).

Pakistan is not very well positioned to protect its digital infrastructure. Many states have now better cybersecurity infrastructure than Pakistan (Khan, 2019). Pakistan is facing a constant threat of cyber-attack that could steal important data, block different websites, and can damage or destroy critical infrastructure like Electric Grids, the Stock Exchange even a nuclear reactor (Shad, 2019). According to a recent report by Comparitech, Pakistan is among those countries which are most

vulnerable to cyber-attack. Pakistan ranked as the 7th most vulnerable country to cyber-attacks in the world. Although Pakistan has made some progress in developing Cyber Security Laws, it does not have a proper mechanism to fight a cyber war or severe cyber-attack against critical infrastructure (Shad, 2019). This is very dangerous for Pakistan, keeping in view the increasing number of cyber-attacks. As Nasir Khan Janjua, former national security advisor of Pakistan, said: "Cyber-attacks are a threat to Pakistan's national security" (Jamal, 2018).

Pakistan is currently under threat of four types of cyber-attacks.

- Cyber-attack on critical infrastructure
- Cyber Espionage
- Cyber propaganda warfare
- Hacking of websites and small-scale cyber-attacks

Cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure

The most dangerous types of cyber-attacks are against the critical infrastructure of a country. Critical infrastructure means that a cyber-attack will damage a vital infrastructure that could produce kinetic results, and even it can result in the loss of life (Kovacevic, 2015). Critical infrastructure includes those institutions. If they are choked, it can create chaos in society. It includes power grids, banking systems, nuclear power plants, military infrastructure, and many other governments and private institutions (Kovacevic, 2015). With advanced malicious soft wares, these organisations are under constant threat of cyber-attack. As it was witnessed in the case of the cyberattack on an Iranian nuclear facility in Natanz, where a malicious code has damaged the functioning of a nuclear power plant (Marie Baezner, 2017). India also acknowledged in 2019 that its Kudankulam nuclear facility was subject to cyber-attack. No physical damage was done, but hackers were successful in stealing important data (White, 2019). In 2015, the Ukrainian Electric power grid also faced a cyber-attack. It resulted in the breakage of electricity to thousands of people. Then again, in 2016 Ukrainian power grid was targeted again (News, 2017). These attacks confirm the vulnerability of nuclear power plants and validate the argument that we might see a more sophisticated cyber-attack against critical infrastructure in the near future.

Many states around the globe are working to develop offensive cyber capabilities. These capabilities will be used not only for small-scale attacks but will help in fighting full-fledged cyberwar (Lin, 2018). Pakistan's arch-rival India also included cyber-attack as part of military strategy. In the joint doctrine of Indian armed forces of 2017, they asserted that cyberwar is now part of modern warfare (Rafiq, 2019). This offensive policy adopted by the Indian government could create serious repercussions for cybersecurity in Pakistan.

Pakistan already faced a severe cyber-attack on its banking system. According to the head of the cybercrime wing of Pakistan's top Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), data and money were stolen from almost all major banking chains in Pakistan (Qarar, 2018). These events show the vulnerability of the strategic infrastructure against the threat of cyber-attack, and Pakistan is not an exception.

Cyber Espionage

Protection from Espionage is also vital for the protection of the sovereignty of a state. Spying on other states is an old policy employed by the states, but with the development of modern technologies, it has also changed its shape. In the past, states used spies who travelled to different countries to get acute information about their adversaries (Banks, 2017). Now with modern technologies, one party tries to steal important data and information by penetrating

communication systems, computer networks, and other digital devices. States no longer risk their people for spying. They do this from their own countries by using different codes (Banks, 2017). The biggest problem with cyberspace is that when a network is penetrated and the adversary is getting information, sometimes it is identified after many months that the information is being stolen. Even if it is identified, it is very difficult to blame someone or give punishment to someone because one cannot surely attribute that who is behind this espionage attack. States always use spying as a tool to protect their best national interests (Warner, 2017). The United States National Security Agency (NSA) was involved in cyber espionage of Pakistan's top political as well as military leaders. NSA penetrated "targets in Pakistan's National Telecommunications Corporation's (NTC) VIP Division" and stole important information (Dawn, 2016). The United States is not the only country that has infiltrated important networks in Pakistan by using digital technologies. Britain has done the same against Pakistan. Even though Britain and Pakistan do not have any kind of open conflict (Yamin, 2018), if this occurred in the past, without proper measures, it could happen in the future again.

Cyber Propaganda Warfare

Cyberspace could also be used for spreading false information to create doubts and fear in the population of the opponent state. Many mediums are used for propaganda campaigns, including social media and mainstream TV channels (Mitrovic, 2018). Targets of propaganda campaigns are usually individual actors, and by targeting a large number of individuals, one can shape the perspective of society. The penetration of false information in enemy states provides a strategic advantage. Because then the local population is confused or sometimes in fear in case of a conflict (Mitrovic, 2018). An appalling example is in this regard is Russian intervention in the US general election. Russia was involved in a massive propaganda campaign to undermine the reputation of the United States' democratic institutions and also to make the US citizens annoyed by their government. Russia also wants to show the dark face of democracy by leaking different emails to the local American population. According to Facebook, this propaganda material was seen by almost 126 million people (Jensena, 2019). After the Pulwama attack on security forces in February 2019, the Indian government and private institutions started an organised propaganda campaign against Pakistan by using cyberspace. This propaganda material is rejected by Pakistan (Tribune, 2019). But it shows the severity of the threat and how misinformation can play an effective role in modern warfare.

Hacking of websites and small scale cyber-incidents in Pakistan

Pakistan had not faced major cyber-attacks that could produce physical results, but limited cyber-attacks against Pakistan are now a continuous process. India is involved in the hacking of different Pakistani websites and spoiling them (Zürich, 2018). It also includes hacking of the website of the foreign ministry of Pakistan and the Ministry of Defense, when Pakistan was celebrating its 70th Independence Day (Amin, 2018). In 2008 Pakistan blocked YouTube due to blasphemous material present regarding Islam. When PTA was blocking access to YouTube in Pakistan, it accidentally blocked its worldwide access for two hours (Could it happen again? Remembering Pakistan's Facebook, YouTube ban 2017). Indian cyber-attacks against Pakistan are not a new story, and incidents of hacking are usually higher when there is tension between two states. For example, after a suicide attack on Indian forces in the Pulwama district of occupied Kashmir, dozens of cyber-attacks against Pakistani websites (Malik, 2019) were conducted. Indian cyber-attack against Pakistan was so intense that Senator Rahman Malik, who was the chairman of the Senate standing committee on interior, said that "India should stop cyber terrorism against Pakistan" (Malik, 2019). In September 2018, the Director of the Federal investigation agency on cyber-crime said that hackers penetrated networks of almost all the major banks and stolen a large amount of money (Qarar, 2018). These cyber-crimes on a daily basis are very disturbing for a state. Moreover,

it creates uncertainty in the masses about the effectiveness of the governmental institution, which might result in the evaporation of belief in the government system. It seems that Pakistan is under a cyberattack from four aspects, as shown below.

Actors involved in cyberattacks against Pakistan

States

The most dangerous cyber threat Pakistan is facing so far is from state actors. States nowadays are using cyberspace to achieve their foreign policy goals. The biggest threat in cyberspace for Pakistan is from India. Pakistan and India are arch-rivals, and both have fought at least three wars (Zürich, 2018). With no peaceful settlement of disputes, the situation remains tense between two nuclear-armed neighbours. Groups that are involved in hacking in Pakistan are called 'Indian hacktivists and patriotic hackers' and are the responsible majority of cyber-attack against Pakistan (Zürich, 2018). India included cyberwar in the "Joint doctrine of Indian armed forces" (Rafiq, 2019), which shows its intentions to use cyberspace for achieving policy objectives.

The USA was also involved in cyber-attacks against Pakistan. The National Security Agency of the United States penetrated networks in Pakistan (Dawn, 2016). It is possible in the near future that there might be a major cyber offence against Pakistan. Edward Snowden, who was the former contractor of the NSA, revealed that even the UK was involved in cyber espionage against Pakistan (Desk, 2015). Israel also targeted networks in Pakistan to record phone calls of high-level officials

(Kirchgaessner, 2019). Due to the fact that cyberspace had already transcended the state boundaries, cyber-attacks against Pakistan could be originated from any state.

Terrorist Groups

Pakistan has been fighting the war against terrorism since 2001. Although Pakistan is successful in drastically reducing terrorism, the threat is still present. Thousands of people and personnel of armed forces lost their lives in this bloody war, and it cost nearly $126.79 billion (Zakaria, 2019). Terrorists employ different types of tactics to terrorise people and to achieve their political end. Cyber terrorism has the same objective, but in it, a terrorist group uses computer networks and malicious software to execute a terrorist attack. If they can manage to target an important infrastructure, it can result in loss of lives and destruction of the physical infrastructure. These cyber-attacks are low in cost, and less physical labour is used (Heickerö, 2014). Cyberspace is also used by terrorist organisations for financing their terror activities. Hacking and extracting money from the online banking system is a big source of robbery in modern days. Moreover, cyberspace helps them to spread their ideology around the globe. Terrorist organisations like Al Qaida and Islamic State had already used these tactics to achieve their goals (Droogan, 2018). Terrorist organisations find it easy to radicalise people using online sources. 'Online Radicalisation 'as it is termed' is done in a very short period and by using a limited resource. A terrorist handler, while sitting in any part of the world, can radicalise youths in Pakistan by using online sources (Saqib Khan, 2017). In this, we can say that cyber threats have transcended state boundaries. As former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon once said, "The Internet is a prime example of how terrorists can behave in a truly transnational way; in response, States need to think and function in an equally transnational manner" (Interne, 2012). Pakistan, as a state that has been the victim of terrorism for the last 18 years, may witness future cyberattacks from terrorist organisations, whether they are local or international.

Individuals

Individuals are also involved in cybercrimes to achieve their interests. These individuals do not have any broader agenda, but they do these criminal activities for their self-interest. Although the constituent assembly has passed a law to prevent cybercrimes, the Cyber Crime wing of Pakistan's elite Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) agreed on the point that cybercrimes are increasing in Pakistan (Qarar, 2018). These crimes do not directly affect state structure, but they have a very bad effect on society. For example, cybercriminals regularly target women in Pakistan. The main purpose of these activities is to involve those women in illegal activities or to get money from them by blackmailing. The problem is almost seventy-two per cent of women in Pakistan even do not know about cybercrime law (Haider, 2020). Other cybercrimes include financial fraud, stealing important data from other networks, money laundering, hacking of social media accounts (Centre, n.d.).

Anti-State Movements

The anti-state movement also uses cyberspace to promote their organisation's interest and to weaken government institutions so that they no longer face resistance from states. It is called Hacktivism. In Hacktivism, different organisations promote their agenda, whether it is legal or illegal. They promote their program through propaganda. Cyberspace provides these organisations with the platform to promote their position (Threat, 2019). Different kinds of political movements use social media and other tools to mobilise their forces in Pakistan. These political organisations are creating a severe problem for the government of Pakistan. Tehreek e Labaik Pakistan and Pashtun Tahfuz Movement effectively used social media to mobilise the population in their favour

and against the government. The government of Pakistan is still facing strong challenges from these organisations (Khan, 2019).

Conclusion

It is a fact that revolutions in the field of information and communication technologies have been transforming the world. States are now more dependent on cyberspace for operationalising their regular activities. Not only smaller institutes are attached to cyber networks, but critical infrastructure like the banking system, Electric grids, nuclear power plants are now using cyberspace for their routine operation. This dependence on cyberspace had brought with its vulnerabilities. More than a hundred countries now have the capabilities to launch offensive cyber operations. Russian cyber-attacks against Estonia are even considered as full-fledged Cyberwar. On the other hand, cyber-attack on the nuclear power plants in Iran produced physical results. Russians in their war against Georgia used cyber weapons in coordination with conventional weapons to achieve their political objectives. Not only weaker or less developed states are prone to cyber-attack, but major powers are also facing a constant cyber threat. The United States has blamed Russia for interference in the 2016 general election. Therefore, threats like cyber Pearl Harbor or cyber 9/11 are now widely believed as a possibility that will have the capacity to paralyse the whole country.

Pakistan, with its growing dependence on digital technologies, is also not immune from major cyber-attacks. The banking system and other critical institutions are targeted in Pakistan by using malicious codes. It is a fact that Pakistan has not faced a major cyber-attack against critical infrastructure so far, but the threat is always present. In the case of Pakistan, India had not used nuclear weapons against Pakistan, but this does not mean they could not use the nuclear option in the future. In the same way, we can expect cyber-attack from India or any other state whose interests are in clash with Pakistan. The chance of cyber-attacks is always higher since the aggressor can mask itself from identifications because of the attribution problem. Even if the aggressor is identified, the response of Pakistan to strike back with conventional weapons is less likely. An aggressor also needs less labour and resources to execute a cyber-attack. All these benefits will seduce state parties to target Pakistan in the realm of cyberspace to achieve their political objectives. Furthermore, in the case of cyberwar, non-state actors also have the same potential to initiate a major cyber-attack against Pakistan. Cyberspace provides more leverage to non-state actors if it is compared with conventional attacks. In the case of cyberwar, non-state actors are not only terrorists but also any other group of people living in any Pakistani city or abroad with political objectives. In the case of a conventional attack, non-state actors need more manpower, resources, and funds, but the execution of a cyber-attack could be done even with a small number of men with limited resources. Therefore non-state actors could easily execute a major cyber-attack against critical infrastructure.

States and non-state actors could use cyber-attack not only to disturb physical networks but also be used for spy and spread misinformation to achieve their political objectives. These activities are also part of modern-day warfare, which is sometimes also termed as hybrid war. Non-state actors like Al Qaida and Tehreek e Taliban had already used online sources to spread their message across the masses. At the same time, anti-state movements like the Baloch Liberation army are using these platforms not only to spread their message but also to propagate false information about the state institutions. This defaming of state institutions by using propaganda techniques was done not only by non-state actors but also by states. All these threats originate in the realm of cyberspace. If Pakistan does not take effective measures, cyber-attack on critical infrastructure could easily undermine the security of Pakistan.

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The Windows in Many Dimensions: Tongdong Bai, *Against Political Equality: The Confucius Case*

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ABSTRACT

The book is essential not because of its intrinsic value. It provides not much new information on ancient or modern China. It is important for other reasons. It provides insight into the views of the Chinese elite. It could also well be an insight into the views of a visible segment of the Western elite, which seems to appreciate Chinese authoritarian practices despite publicly denying them.

Introduction

At the beginning of his book, Tongdong Bai notes with an air of irony that the interest in his manuscript, with ideas so different from what dominates in Western literature, and interest in China in general, is due not to the intrinsic value of his work and Chinese philosophical and political doctrines, but the pragmatic considerations. "If China had not been successful in the past few decades, few would bother to read anything related to China, this book included, even if it were intrinsically valuable." (Bai, 2020: 3)

He implies that China's rise provides him, as a spokesman for Chinese culture, an opportunity to elaborate on his view, which otherwise would be, he implies, discarded without further ado, and he would not have been able to publish his work by a prestigious academic press.

Tongdong Bai is right in his assessment that it was the power that made everything necessary, especially in the USA, where a peculiar Calvinistic-cum-Social-Darwinistic philosophy rules supreme, regardless of numerous fig leaves covering the official/public discourse to hide its nature. Still, the book is interesting not because of its intrinsic value and not even because of China's rise but for other reasons. First, the author is a scholar who was raised in China and taught in China. Thus, his views are a reflection of the predominant intellectual trend endorsed by the Chinese elite. It is, in a way, the official ideology, *sans* the Marxist fig leaf, or at least one of the essential modifications of the ideology. Secondly, its importance is due to the fact that the book was published by the prestigious Princeton University Press and presumably underwent a rigorous peer review. Thus, the views of the author are not out of tune with the trends apparently increasingly popular among liberal American or possibly Western elite in general; it indicates that at least some of its members look for the "Chinese solution," i.e., the transformation of Western capitalism in an openly authoritarian oligarchical rule.

Western Capitalist Democracy as Dysfunctional Institution

The book's central point is clear. The Western capitalist democracy, based on the principle of one man, one vote, does not work for various reasons. The positive alternative is Chinese Confucian autocracy, which ensures China's past, present and future glory. Elaborating on his central premise, which challenges the conventional Western view, the author notes with an air of irony:

"In order not to digress from the main issue, let us assume that these non-liberal thinkers are indeed unreasonable and even crazy." (Bai, 2020: 168). Indeed, he notes that the Western public could not accept the alternative political model, and he states that the liberal model acquires almost a "sacred status" (Bai, 2020: 289), or "metaphysical status," (Bai, 2020: 195) and is seen axiomatically as the best among all possible political systems.

This dogma must be discarded, and one should approach democracy with critical eyes. It should be approached critically, as is the case with any other political model. Tongdong Bai implied that he did not discard democracy and noted that democracy could indeed be the best possible system in the future. This is understood even by the present-day Chinese elite. Indeed, present-day Chinese leaders had not questioned democracy as such. They plainly believe that people are not ready for democracy now (Bai, 2020: 195). Tongdong Bai entirely agrees with this proposition and noted that the notion that people always make rational choices is naïve. "Voters are not even necessarily rational about their short-term material interests, let alone long-term ones" (Bai, 2020: 157).

While ignorant, impulsive and self-destructive, the masses could also be immoral, implying that the hoi polloi should not be left alone without appropriate guidance. Western liberal views on the sacredness of private life are clearly wrong. "As has been shown, to avoid this infringement, liberal-minded people advocate state neutrality on the issue of Good, considering it a matter of free choice of private citizens. To be clear, this value-neutrality only regards what is considered to be in the private sphere and about the Good" (Bai, 2020: 167).

Western democracies' problem is not just that it is made up of ignorant, impulsive and immoral "basket of deplorables," if one would remember Hillary Clinton's definition,[1] Who could not make a sound decision concerning the country's present and future, but the flaws of democracy are much more severe. The present-day West is atomized and has produced a "plebeianized society of strangers" (Bai, 2020*:* xii).

In this stress on loneliness and atomization of the present-day West, the presence of individuals who see no meaning in their lives, Tongdong Bai followed the views, possibly without cognizing this, of the intellectual framework of European existentialists, who often interpreted personal freedom from either direct or indirect restraints of society in a tragic light. They often see humans as alone, facing ultimate death, without a real profoundly emotional connection with fellow human beings. Their socialization is purely external, and they indeed became an aggregation of "strangers," self-centred obsessive individualists.[2]

While Durkheimian "organic solidarity" vanished,[3] It revealed the social and spiritual vacuum, and it makes this society extremely vulnerable, for individuals, drenched in absolute cynicism, and

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[1] Read Hillary Clinton's 'Basket of Deplorables' remarks about Donald Trump supporters (2016) Time, 10 September.

[2] The body of literature on existentialism is enormous. Here are a few examples of recent works that outline the movement's significant trends: Wicks R (2020) Introduction to Existentialism: from Kierkegaard to the Seventh Seal. London: Bloomsbury Academic; Aho K (2020) Existentialism: An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity; Cox G (2020) How to be an Existentialist. London: Bloomsbury Academic; Stewart J (2020) Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism and Existentialism. London: Palgrave.

[3] While existentialists emphasized modern human loneliness, disentanglement with others, and the essential artificiality of the socium in the modern West, Emile Durkheim, the seminal French sociologist, saw modern society differently. He

alienated from fellow human beings, would not sacrifice for the public good. The problem shall be fixed and not necessarily through a totalitarian solution. Elaborating on this notion, Tongdong Bai states that he hardly advocates totalitarian arrangements, in which the state monitors all aspects of the lives of private individuals and societies them, so to speak, in a sort of artificial way, through direct application of force. He noted that the fear of this compulsory collectivity was justified at the time of the Cold War when the USSR seemed to be poised for global predominance.

"As we have seen, a main reason for state neutrality is to prevent the government from stifling the plurality of private lives. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, a highly visible source of this intrusion was the kind of communist governments that imposed values on all aspects of a citizen's life" (Bai, 2020: 168).

Still, the totalitarian model, in the author's view, has gotten out of fashion and could not be seen as dangerous. The problem, however, is with the popularity of democracy and its emphasis on the power of the electorate and unrestrained individualism. "But this danger seems to have disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the loss of attractiveness of communism in much of the world. Now the danger seems to come from liberal neutrality itself, for, in reality, radical individualism and a free-market economy have dominated many, if not most, contemporary liberal democratic societies. The former, in celebrating radical equality and individualism, may have destroyed all authorities except for, intentionally or probably unintentionally, the tyrannical power of the crude and unchecked narrow self-interest of each human being" (Bai, 2020: 168).

Furthermore, this democracy and unrestrained individualism could tear society apart or, at least, external threats could easily destroy this society. "This is worrisome. For example, suppose we are not too naïve. In that case, we know that sacrificing one's life for the common good is a sad and yet sometimes inevitable task for citizens from any regime. So if individualism means the primacy of one's self-interest, and this version of individualism is taken as the sole moral basis of a liberal democratic state with a large population, how can citizens of this state be persuaded to die for his or her country (the following argument can be applied to smaller sacrifices as well)? Why do they wish to join the military, risking their own or their loved ones' interests in order to protect the interests of millions of strangers?" (Bai, 2020: 168) It is clear Tongdong Bai implies that the present-day Western democracy has authorized the rule of atomized and selfish idiots. They could not live on their own and, implicitly, became the slaves of cunning demagogues, who have neither knowledge nor moral fibre and, as implied, are leading the West toward collapse. At the same time, Confucianism, deeply embedded in Chinese tradition, provides a universal solution. The most critical task of any society is the creation of a moral and competent elite, which could replace the society of "strangers," or mechanical, coercive collectivity with harmonious family-type arrangements. Here the elite, competent and moral, played the role of affectionate "father," the leader of "children" – his subjects.

Moreover, in order to create such an elite, one must follow the Confucian template. It implies that the elite selection should not be done by the hoi polloi but should be based on competence, knowledge and moral fibre. It also implies that their peers should choose members of the elite.

Creation of the Rulers

Discarding modern democracy does not mean that the elite should be concerned only with its own pleasurable living. It should exist for the well-being of the majority; the elite should be an attentive

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elaborated on his vision in his book on the division of labour (Durkheim E (1997) The Division of Labour. New York: Lewis A. Coser). In Durkheim's view, members of the modern West are mutually dependent on each other and therefore forge strong bonds with each other. In the Durkheimian narrative, people internalize the needs of the entire society. They can well sacrifice their own interests and even their lives in the interests of society.

father who serves his family. According to Tongdong Bai, traditional Chinese philosophy implied that government should serve the people. "Mencius sounds awfully democratic: he embraced equality and argued that the government is for the people" (Bai, 2020: 43). At the same time, according to Confucians and Mencius, not "everyone is able to become a sage ruler" (Bai, 2020: 34). Chinese rulers have always understood this. Therefore, according to Tongdong Bai, regimes in China have a "meritocratic component" (Bai, 2020: 244). Only the most competent and moral people should rule. Usually, it implies rigorous training. At the same time, the acquisition of knowledge goes along with the development of morality.

Consequently, only "scholar-officials" could have a "stable moral fibre" (Bai, 2020: 36). While the author implies that the direct connection between knowledge and morality is essentially a Chinese design, this is not the case. The notion is rooted in the Western European tradition and could be traced to classical antiquity. It was also widespread during the Enlightenment, at least in the USA. It was the reason why the USA promoted public education, including liberal arts colleges. They were open, not for narrowly utilitarian reasons – to provide skills or trade for future work – but because of the assumption that educated people would be moral and engaged citizens.

Indeed, it was acknowledged by contemporary observers that education shall "integrate intellectuals with moral virtues and connect the value of civic responsibility to the classic academic mission of higher education" (Shulman, 2003).

The quoted author follows this line of thought. He also noted that abilities, knowledge, and high morals are not enough to be qualified to rule, and "the request of practical training may be crucial to the exam-takers" (Bai, 2020: 75). Needless to say, only those bureaucrats who demonstrate their good works are promoted (Bai, 2020: 57), and only "those holding public office (ministers) to perform the task of admonishing the ruler" (Bai, 2020: 266).

As a result of rigorous training and moral improvement, the ideal elite is emerging, which can deal with the masses in a competent and ethical manner. "The 'elitist' design of the Confucian hybrid regime is to give more power to the politically motivated, compassionate, and competent people, and check the influence of politics by those who are politically indifferent, narrow-minded and incompetent" (Bai, 2020: 95).

Elitism Does Not Preclude Social Mobility

Thus, only highly intelligent, moral people with sound practical experience and knowledge could rule, and "... selecting meritocrats has historical precedence in traditional China (Bai, 2020: 75). Still, the Chinese meritocratic system does not create a fixed and pretty much impenetrable caste of political Brahmins. It is open to anyone, regardless of his social position. From this perspective, Confucianism is different from similar ideological constructions prevailing in the West. Its difference from the seemingly structurally similar Socratic and Platonic doctrines should be clear. Socrates and Plato believed that "after the noble lie imposes a fixed and sharp line between those who can have further education and participate in political decision-making and those who cannot. In contrast, the Confucian line is not fixed, and the masses can always achieve high social status" (Bai, 2020: 48).

 Not only is the Confucian elite open to any rank, but – and this also differentiates it from the Western elite – it has easy access to rulers, who implicitly appreciate honesty. "... In contrast to thinkers in medieval and even early modern Europe, the Chinese intellectual elite in the past had far better access to the upper echelons in politics" (Ibid.: 12).

Not only does Confucianism create competent and moral elite, but also ideal, obedient citizens. Confucian analysts stated, "It is a rare thing for someone who is filial to his parents and respectful to his older brothers to defy superiors" (Ibid.: 127).

Thus, Confucianism implied that the competent, moral elite should rule society. It shall achieve power, not via elections, but through rigorous training and experience, and Confucian elite rule shall lead to creating a society of mutual responsibilities and family-type care. Private interests shall be regulated and restrained in the name of the public good. Still, Tongdong Bai insists that the Confucianist order is not totalitarian, for it not only implies the existence of private interests but for other reasons. The very fact that the ruling elite is detached from ordinary folk does not mean that people cannot judge and, in a way, control the elite. Moreover, in some instances, the ordinary folk could, on occasion, participate in decision-making together with the ruling mandarins.

Control From Below

"Although, as we have seen, early Confucians have a broader reading of people's interests, they are not detached from the ordinary, and, more importantly, they trust people for making judgments on whether their interests are served or not" (Bai, 2020: 167). Furthermore, in another place, the author once again emphasizes that it was the people who not only should be the ultimate judge of the elite's work but, implicitly, participate, at least in some cases, in decision-making. The author stated that "it is not enough that the regime endorses the appeal to the people; rather, people's interests have to be accessible to most of the people themselves, and their judgment is the ground of legitimacy to the regime, which is a key Confucian requirement" (Bai, 2020: 166).

Thus, Confucianism implies the creation of the state as a family in which both the "father" (government/elite) and the "children" (subjects) live under the conditions of mutual care and compassion – both in their relationship with each other and themselves. Family-type communitarianism is the prevailing model. It is a much better societal operational model than alienation, conflict or at least social indifference prevailing in the modern West. Indeed, one needs "to develop a bond in a society of strangers" (Bai, 2020: xiv), and traditional Chinese Confucianism provides these bonds. It brings "yin" and "yang" into society, preventing it from lapsing into various versions of Hobbesian "*Bellum omnium contra omnes*" (the war of all against all). Still, while restricting the potential destructiveness of modern Western individualism, Confucianism and, implicitly, Chinese political thought and practice do not advocate totalitarian submissiveness to an omnipotent ruler. As a matter of fact, Tongdong Bai implies that those who describe Chinese political tradition in the context of the totalitarian model are wrong. Here Tongdong Bai implicitly polemicizes with Karl Wittfogel's (1957) famous *Oriental Despotism*, which presented totalitarian regimes in the USSR and China as political derivatives from regimes prevailing in ancient and medieval China.

Confucian Model Is Not Totalitarian

Tongdong Bai noted that the Confucian continuum "denies a sheer separation between the private and public" (Bai, 2020: 171). Still, he implied, those who follow Karl Wittfogel, whose famous, scandalous book openly equated ancient China with totalitarian USSR and Red China, was absolutely wrong.

"In particular, we should not use contemporary criteria to criticize early Confucians for ignoring the possibility of totalitarianism. Indeed, totalitarianism, as we understand it, is a misnomer when describing traditional regimes. That is, there was oppression in traditional regimes, but the oppression was far from totalitarian" (Bai, 2020: 166).

Elaborating on this notion, Tongdong Bai noted that while totalitarian regimes ignore the autonomy of private life and their rulers did not care about their subjects' views, Confucianism implied a different paradigm. Indeed, Confucianism does not advocate the direct election of rulers. Still, in the context of Confucianism, the ruler and the elite should always be concerned with the people's happiness. Elaborating on this notion, Tongdong Bai noted, "With regard to traditional Chinese regimes, there is another reason that 'totalitarianism' can be misleading, because totalitarianism means a comprehensive and complete control of common people's lives, including both the material and the moral, imposing something alien to their interests on the people" (Bai, 2020: 166).

These totalitarian regimes could be different in the sense that rulers could use their absolute power to benefit themselves or, alternatively, they could think about some preconceived goals. Still, in both cases, totalitarian regimes are absolutely alien from the people and care less about their well-being. "What is imposed upon the people can be the private interest of a narrow group (mostly the ruling minority) – we can call these types of regimes 'selfish totalitarianism' – or a 'common good' that is separate from people's interests, which we can call 'idealistic totalitarianism'" (Bai, 2020: 166). The very fact that these totalitarians, especially the "idealistic" types, appeal to the interests of the people does not change the very nature of the regime. This appeal to the people is a sham, for the people in both types of totalitarian regimes are nothing but disposable materials in the hands of the totalitarian elite. If these totalitarians started to think about people, they would become not totalitarian but benign Confucian rulers. "Thus, to appeal to the interests of the people does not really challenge the legitimacy of these regimes internally, that is, within the paradigm on which these regimes are based, and to make this challenge means a paradigm shift. In contrast, in traditional China, thanks to the Confucian influence, the governments have to use the banner 'for the people to justify governmental actions, wars included" (Bai, 2020: 166).

Tongdong Bai acknowledges that not all Chinese rulers followed the benign Confucian path and had moved along totalitarian lines. Still, these cases are rather the exception in the overall Chinese history. "Of course, the banner 'for the people may have been just that, a banner, and it does not mean that there were no oppressive regimes in Chinese history. Nevertheless, it still makes these regimes vulnerable to challenges internal to the political paradigm they allegedly adopt, such as whether the rulers have actually done a good job to serve the people's interests. If the above description is correct, then it may have been misleading to apply the term 'totalitarianism' (as it is understood in Western political philosophy and history) to regimes in Chinese history" (Bai, 2020: 166).

 While rulers must be concerned with the material well-being of their subjects and family members, they must not follow their whims and be concerned with their moral upbringing. Not only must rulers be moral themselves, but they should also strive to engage in the moral uplifting of their "children."

"Although the Confucian idea 'for the people' sounds democratic, as already mentioned, the needs that the government should satisfy include basic relationships and moral needs, not merely material needs, while according to the mainstream understanding of democratic accountability, a government only needs to satisfy people's material needs. This emphasis on moral values can make the liberal-minded people in the contemporary world feel uneasy because they are worried that this emphasis will lead to the infringement of the public and the government on the private" (Bai, 2020: 167).

This is not the case. Confucian traditional government is not privy to each minute aspect of private life. In the same way as a father, he implies, does not observe and regulate every move of his children. The Confucian ruler does not, in most cases, regulate all aspects of the private life of his

subjects. Still, he does not allow "the children" to do something that is clearly wrong from a moral point of view. Furthermore, he implies that those who see the ancient Orient, particularly China, as a hotbed of totalitarianism, in Karl Wittfogelian fashion, are wrong.

Tongdong Bai stated that he does not want to juxtapose Western thoughts and political practices to Chinese tradition. Still, he implicitly does just this. In his view, it was actually the West that preaches true totalitarianism, and it was here that true totalitarianism was born. He admits that Chinese tradition also has similar trends. Still, he implies that it is relatively marginal in the overall palette of Chinese political thought.

West as the Birthplace of Totalitarianism

In the quoted author's view, it was ancient Greece where totalitarian ideas were born, and they are in sharp contrast with Confucianism, regardless of structural similarities and the presence of similar ideologies in Chinese tradition.

It was Sparta, a European, Western state, not China, which provided the template for the first totalitarian design. In Socrates' writings and Plato's *Republic*, private interests are abolished completely. The ruling elite (guardians) shall not have anything private. In *Republic*, "almost anything private is forbidden in two ruling classes (guardians and guardians' auxiliaries)" (Bai, 2020: 155).

"The city has to provide the guardians with sufficient, with no surplus and no lack, sustenance and other necessities of living. The guardians live and eat together, and this communal life is clearly intended to nourish the camaraderie among them" (Bai, 2020: 158).

Not just "guardians" (the elite), but even ordinary citizens are deprived of family, and their sexual life is managed by the state. Socrates "proposed that families be abolished altogether." He believed that "the young who are good in war or elsewhere" and "best women are allowed to reproduce" (Bai, 2020: 158). Thus, the *Republic* is a replica of Sparta and "has inspired various forms of utopianism and totalitarianism" (Bai, 2020: 158). In this totalitarian state, the rulers actually have no moral scruples and can do whatever they want. Socrates "states that a private man cannot lie to rulers, although it is appropriate for rulers to lie for the benefit of the city" (Bai, 2020: 155).

Western totalitarianism, in which the state completely absorbs the individual, is the other side of Western individualism. And, like Western totalitarianism, this extreme individualism is absolutely foreign to traditional China. Chinese rulers, the author implies, act or even fight to keep the public good in mind, and here they are clearly different from Western rulers who, since the time of antiquity, thought only about themselves. "A nice contrast is Alexander the Great, who is said to have conquered the world for the pursuit of glory (rather than for the interest of his people). He is often considered a hero in the West, and this is simply impossible in traditional China" (Bai, 2020: 166).

Ugly European Duckings of Chinese Thought

Tongdong Bai stated that he does not want to juxtapose Western and Eastern/Chinese thoughts and political traditions. Still, he actually implies the distinct difference between East and West. As he implied, one could find only one Chinese philosophical school which has a clear totalitarian streak. It was Legalism, with Han Fei Zi, as one of its most prominent representatives.

Legalism, in the author's view, is not the mainstream in Wittfogelian fashion but an unfortunate aberration. Moreover, while for Wittfogel, Legalism represents the very essence of Chinese political

tradition, it actually, in Tongdong Bai's view, emerged as a manifestation of Westernism, which demonstrates that even benign Confucianism could be subverted.

Han Fei Zi was "allegedly a former pupil of the influential Confucian Xan Zi, but then became a leading voice of the Legalist school, which was harshly critical of Confucianism" (Bai, 2020, p. 149). He was "a fierce critic of Confucians" (Bai, 2020: 122) and, like other legalists, believed that only fear and coercion could compel ordinary folk to follow the public good. From this perspective, Han Fei Zi's philosophy is quite similar to those who propagated Plato's *Republic* (Bai, 2020: 154).

While Legalistic views have evident similarities with those advocated by Plato and Socrates, their ideological construction is marginal, and it is Confucianism that dominated Chinese intellectual and political tradition. And it is absolutely different from that proposed by Socrates and Plato.

> "Compared with the model in the Republic, which is focused almost exclusively on the conflict between the private and the public and thus advocates sheer oppression of (much of) the private, the early Confucian model appreciates the constructive aspect of the private to the public and thus may be less oppressive" (Bai, 2020: 170).

Since Confucianism, with its benign communalism, is intrinsic to Chinese life and thought, totalitarianist Maoism could only be the child of foreign, Western influence. Furthermore, here, Tongdong Bai implicitly polemizes with Wittfogel, who regarded Chinese "hydraulic" civilization as the birthplace of totalitarianism. Later, via the Mongols, they arrived in Russia and later spread everywhere. In the quoted author's view, everything was reversed: it was Western germs that polluted the pristine familistic and benign Confucian polity. China's recent excesses were, thus, explained as a Western plot to harm and exploit China. Thus, Mao's blunders and millions starved and killed could be blamed on Western Marxism-Leninism.

There were several problems with Maoism caused, as Tongdong Bai implies, by the corrosive influence of Marxism-Leninism – Western European and essentially an alien creed. The point here is that Maoism rejected the "three representatives" theory, incorporated into the Party since the time of Jiang Zemin's tenure and which implied that the Party could now embrace all people, regardless of their social position; even capitalists could be members of the Party. In any case, the Party could represent capitalists because they "represent China's advanced forces of production" (Zhao, 2009).

One might add that Stalin also advocated his version of the "three representatives" or "Confucianism", if you will. The late 1930s were an ideological watershed, in a way, and Stalin promulgated that the "exploitive" or "capitalist" classes were no more, and all strata or classes of the USSR had become "socialist." Therefore, the state represented all Soviets from now on. Consequently, all Soviet citizens received voting rights (Konstitutsiia, 1936).

Thus, the "Confucian" theory of "true representatives" was not uniquely a Chinese construct but could be seen as a stage in the development of a revolutionary regime which, in the process of its maturity, increasingly dropped numerous ideological fig leaves from its body and returned, in a way, to the "eternal" political and ideological arrangements. In the process, "Confucian" or post-Mao China, structurally similar to other regimes (e.g., Stalinist Soviet Russia), emerged as a distinctly national force. Its goal became clearly not revolutionary sloganeering but the fulfilment of the national goal – improvement of the socio-economic conditions of its subjects and imperial aggrandizement. This *raison d'etat* was implicitly present, at least in embryonic form, both in Lenin's USSR and Mao's China. Yet, the author does not see this. For him, Mao's and post-Mao China are basically two different species, despite the "Confucian" elements in Mao's policies. To follow "eternal" Confucianism, Mao would have indeed served "the people." Yet, this

"Confucianism" was foreign, in the author's view, to the Maoist model. He acknowledged that Mao supposedly promulgated that the regime should serve the interests of the people. "But there may have been a twist to this banner that is alien to the Chinese traditions. That is, here 'the people' is not inclusive but excludes the classes of 'capitalists,' 'landowners,' and so on" (Bai, 2020: 167).

Second, for Mao, the people's interests were an abstraction, and he actually regarded them as the material for his preconceived plans. The author notes that Mao supposedly thought about the interests of the people. "But there was an abstract, even mythical dimension to the people's interest or the 'common good' under Mao's communist regime, so much so that it could lead to the aforementioned strange phenomenon that the city was happy, but no person or very few in this regime were happy with their lives. Thus, on the normative issue of what makes a regime totalitarian" (Bai, 2020: 166-167). However, despite all of these problems – all of them due to imported Western creeds – Maoism had actually followed at least some aspects of the old Confucian tradition, the central tenets of Chinese culture, implicitly against Mao's will.

Elaborating on this, Tongdong Bai noted, "The communist regime under Mao is a tricky issue. There is no doubt that it was a totalitarian regime, but perhaps partly thanks to the Confucian heritage, even under this regime, 'to serve the people was still often considered the highest good" (Bai, 2020: 166-167). Thus, the continuity of Chinese tradition was not broken altogether.

Because of Confucian elements in Maoism, the transition to post-Maoism, natural for the Chinese social and political order, became smooth. The quoted author noted here, "After Mao, the Chinese regime has gradually gone back more and more to the Confucian understanding of the legitimacy of governance" (Bai, 2020: 167).

The return to Confucian traditionalism implied that rulers and those ruled lived in harmony, and he implies that this has been the case for a thousand years of Chinese history. The cases of revolts and violent collapses of dynasties are overlooked entirely here. Confucian China has always been stable, and this is the reason why the present-day regime is relatively stable and confident. "There may still be Maoist residue, and the regime still has totalitarian elements, but the difference between it and the oppressive regimes in the Arabic world (which are oppression by some minority groups over the majority of the people) is clear: the former has a clear dimension of taking the satisfaction of people's everyday needs as its goal and the foundation of its legitimacy, while the latter doesn't. The failure to appreciate this difference may have been why many Western observers mistakenly believe that following the downfall of some oppressive states in the Arab world. The present Chinese government must collapse soon" (Bai, 2020: 167).

Thus, Confucianism had been so much a part of Chinese culture that it could not be eradicated by imported Western Marxism-Leninism, implicitly a totalitarian philosophy, the product of the divisive and oppressive West. The end of Maoism was implicitly the end of Marxism-Leninism, socialist doctrine as an operational system. Consequently, the present-day regime is actually a Confucian regime, despite its Marxist fig leaf. Confucianism, a Chinese tradition/philosophy writ large, minus, of course, its Legalist perversion, made China a great, powerful and prosperous state in the past. The same could be said at present. China's success should be attributed to the country's old spiritual and socio-political roots.

China's Success Had Nothing to Do with Marxism or Maoism

Tongdong Bai implies that most Western observers mistakenly attribute China's present glory to essential Western doctrines. Some believe that Marxism-Leninism should be credited. Others, the majority, might credit Western market reforms. This approach is wrong. "But instead of proposing Chinese models that are based on the current Chinese regime and politics, I show a different kind

of Chinese model that may have contributed to the stellar performance of China, not so much of the past few decades, but in the past two thousand years or more" (Bai, 2020: 3). In the quoted author's view, the prosperity, stability and might of China have not been interrupted by numerous cases of societal collapse, foreign conquest, famine or similar disasters. He even ignores the official notion about the "century of humiliation" when the very existence of the country was at stake (Kaufman, 2010; Wang, 2020).

Nothing of the sort could happen if one trusted the author, under the guidance of Confucian bureaucracy, which ensures China's everlasting stability and internal peace. Consequently, Confucianism provides not just guidance for domestic policy but also foreign policy as well.

Confucian Foreign Policy

According to Tongdong Bai, foreign policy should be driven by moral considerations, or at least the moral aspects of foreign policy should be taken into account. Moreover, here, he also appealed to the Confucian template. While regarding Confucianism as the only true guiding light for foreign policy, Tongdong Bai does not see Confucianism as being in absolute contradiction to what the international community and, implicitly, the West regards as an appropriate operational model. Here, Confucianism is made adaptive to some Western principles in clear contrast to the applicability of the same Western models to internal policies. He noted that Confucian universalism in no way contradicts present-day international law and principles, and he agreed with the notion that human rights "override sovereignty" (Bai, 2020: xiv). Moreover, the very notion of Confucian designs for foreign policy is the same as those elaborated by people in Washington, and this implies that Confucian China and the USA could work together despite their cultural and civilizational differences. Thus, they could emerge, at least in the foreign policy realm, as "yin and yang," harmonizing global order.

Indeed, interestingly enough, Tongdong Bai finds that both ancient Confucian China and the present-day USA have a common denominator in dealing with foreign policy issues. Both are driven not so much by cynical *realpolitik* but by moral considerations. "Taking this perspective, we can defend the contemporary American and traditional Chinese regimes by arguing that among all the hegemons in history, although state interests are a priority, traditional China and contemporary America do have a moral dimension that distinguishes them from the purely interests-driven hegemons" (Bai, 2020: 196). This implied that "Confucian" and "non"/"anti" Confucian grand powers could coexist peacefully, at least until China would be strong enough to command absolute hegemony.

While Confucianist moralizing could be recorded in American foreign policy, it was only in China where this principle has been fully materialized, and this implied China's leadership. "Confucius made this kind of distinction among the hegemons in his time. He gave conditional praise to Duke Huan of Qu, whereas he was far more critical of Duke Wen in Jin, although both dukes were considered hegemons in those times. Although Duke Huan pursued his state's interests and personal gains, just as other hegemons did during the Spring and Autumn period, he did try, to the extent that immediate harm would not come to these interests, to help the weaker states and restore and maintain the 'world' order, oftentimes through peaceful means, in contrast to a far more ruthless self-interested hegemon such as Duke Wen" (Bai, 2020: 196).

The moral implications of foreign policy are essential. "Failing to understand this and evaluating the moral dimension of a state's policies by asking if its citizens are driven by national interests, we will deny the morality of any state and embrace the relativist view that every state is equally immoral. A significant and realistic perspective, in contrast, is to look at whether a country takes

anything else other than national interests into account, especially when the sacrifice of national interests is not great" (Bai, 2020: 196).

Tongdong Bai acknowledges that the Confucian idea about peaceful and foreign policy has not been translated fully into China's actual behaviour. He acknowledges that quite a few Chinese rulers openly ignore Confucianism as foreign policy guidance. Still, the influence of Confucianism was so strong that even those dynasties which defied Confucianism were nevertheless more peaceful than European states.

 Elaborating on the peaceful nature of Chinese dynasties, even those which did not embrace Confucianism, Tongdong Bai noted,

> "Of course, the way China was unified at the end of the Warring States period was almost opposite to the Confucian ideal. Even among regimes in post-Qin China that allegedly followed the Confucian way, there were discrepancies between historical reality and the ideal types; as is always the case between the normative and the empirical" (Bai, 2020: 196).

Here, these rulers' foreign policy was similar to that of those emperors who followed, as already discussed, Legalism instead of Confucianism. Still, those Chinese rulers who forsook the moral Confucian underpinnings of foreign policy were not as successful as those who followed the strictly Confucian model. "But as I argued above, the important question is whether the traditional Chinese regimes, under the Confucian banner, did better than those states that completely lacked Confucian-style ideals. Arguably, the strongest Confucian elements can be found in the Han and Song dynasties" (Bai, 2020: 196). And in general, the influence of moral and essentially peaceful Confucianism was so strong that even those rulers who formally discarded Confucianism were more peaceful than Western rulers. Furthermore, overall, China was much more peaceful than the West; even Western scholars accepted this notion. The author noted that

> "according to David Kang, between the late fourteenth century and the middle of the nineteenth century, there were only six major wars in East Asia that were allegedly under the Confucian influence, with the remaining four between Confucian states and nomadic and Western powers. He suggests that a strong China was good for the peace and stability of East Asia, while a weak one was not. Giovanni Arrighi's estimate of the number of wars during this period is higher than Kang's, but there were still fewer wars in East Asia than in Europe over the same period. Moreover, even the wars of expansion in Ming and Qing China were deeply defensive" (Bai, 2020: 197).

One might note here that Soviet ideology also emphasized the peaceful nature of Soviets, mainly ethnic Russians. And here, Soviet ideologists actively appealed to the centuries-old Slavophilism, which emphasized the essentially Christian peacefulness of Russian/Orthodox Slavs (Engelsteim, 2009; Walieki, 1989).

There were other similarities. Soviet or actually Russian ideologists noted that the pre-revolutionary Russian Empire and the USSR treated minorities quite differently from Western powers: instead of exploiting the conquered people, Russians allocated scarce resources to them. The "older brother" gave the best of his possessions to the "younger brother." As a matter of fact, some Western observers asserted that concern for minorities, not for downtrodden toilers, was the very essence of the Bolshevik regime (Martin, 2002).

Tongdong Bai followed the same route. He noted that the Chinese state, "instead of exploiting resources from the newly gained territories, as was the case for European colonialists and later the

Japanese, the Chinese government actually used the resources from the 'old' territories to support the new ones" (Bai, 2020: 197).

Moral Underpinning and Internal and External *Realpolitik*

The moral underpinning of the Confucian order does not imply that all states should be treated in the same way. "Confucian order is hierarchical" (Bai, 2020: 194) and does not exclude the justification for "preventive" war. Indeed, people could be pleased by an invasion if it liberated them from tyranny (Bai, 2020: 225). The rulers, with all their moral underpinning, shall be pragmatic in internal policy as well. While Confucianism implied concern for everyone, even for animals, it does not mean that Confucianism implied that everyone should be treated in the same way. Confucians and Mentions believed that "the care should be graded and hierarchical" (Bai, 2020: 133).

Thus, Confucianism emerged as the universal model for both external and internal policies. Indeed, Confucianism is not just appropriate teaching for "ten thousand generations" of Chinese, but for all of humanity. As the author implied, the entire corpus of non-Chinese thought, despite some exciting findings, has been leading humanity astray, at least as political models to be followed. Therefore, the conclusion is clear: world salvation is in the cultural and socio-political Chinization, or at least humanity must accept China's leadership and tutelage.

Confucian Idea and Proposed Political System is Universal

Tongdong Bai noted that some believed that Confucianism could be a workable doctrine only in East Asia (Bai, 2020: 244). This is a wrong assumption, for Chinese philosophy has "universal dimensions" and "continuing relevance" (Bai, 2020: 6). And in another part of the book, he reaffirms that "The Confucian model is meant to universally applicable and showing how it can handle some political issues in China is just an example" Bai, 2020: 207). Confucianism preached universal values of compassion to all human beings and even animals. And even some Western scholars became convinced that Confucian benign family resembles authoritarianism, albeit, the author implies, this Western term should not be applied to characteristic Confucian political arrangements, which are much better than Western democracy. Indeed, the author stated that democracy started to lose influence even in the West. Robert Kaplan saw problems with pure democracy. "The solution Kaplan offers is a hybrid regime that combines democratic elements with paternalistic elements, which, as we will see, is similar to the hybrid regime that a Mencian would support" (Bai, 2020: 165).

Unification of the Motherland

Thus, China's traditional culture is universal, and Chinization is the inevitable outcome of China's increasing influence due to its clear superiority of its socio-political and economic model, and even more, its moral superiority. Still, this process of global Chinization could not be accomplished unless full Chinization takes place at home. And here, two major problems must be solved. First, Chinese minorities must be fully assimilated.

The author of the quoted book believed the very existence of minorities is artificial. They were "constructed" due to the template of foreign, Western doctrine – Marxism-Leninism. Secondly, Taiwan should be returned to the motherland and also full assimilated. Chinization of minorities is an important task, and the author of the quoted book elaborated on this in detail.

The very fact that ethnic minorities are still present in China is due to the influence of Marxism-Leninism, an unworkable creed. Mao, following this Western template, "constructed" minorities and prevented their healthy and natural assimilation.

> "Perhaps for Mao Zedong, being a nation-state was just a means or just an intermediate step, and these ethnic groups would be replaced by class distinctions, which would, in turn, be transcended by communism. In other words, the bond he would eventually adopt for China was the bond gained through classes. In Marx's theory, as Sun Xiangchen points out, nations and classes are all intermediaries, and the ultimate end is communism" (Bai, 2020: 208).

With an oblique reference to Uighurs and Tibetan problems, the author noted that problems with minorities' healthy assimilation are due to residual Maoism in the country's political philosophy and practice. This practice must come to an end, and everyone would then be Chinese.

> "That is, this theory does not take the issue of national identity seriously. After the collapse of communism or Maoism in China, the current Chinese government still holds on to the nation-state model and the related policies introduced at the founding of the People's Republic, without Mao's ultimate solution to the ethical problems (to be clear, this solution is neither desirable nor possible). This is the root of ethnic conflicts and separatist movements in China" (Bai, 2020: 208).

While minorities must be Chinicized, Taiwan must be fully incorporated into the motherland. Some people in Taiwan want independence. It was propagated by "some demagogues" and "the people of Taiwan falsely believe that independence is good for them. In reality, however, an independent Taiwan would become a pawn of Japan and the United States, and its people's interests would be sacrificed for the interests of Japan and the United States (Bai, 2020: 212).

Conclusion: Three Layers Assessment of Book

What was the ultimate meaning of the book, and why is it essential for Western, non-Chinese readers? The narrative should be seen in several contexts, and the comparisons with similar narratives prevailing in the USSR and post-Soviet Russia could be helpful.

To start with, the book presents Red China's elite self-image. It shows how the regime in Beijing wants to present itself to the global community: as benign, peaceful, and family-type collectivism or communitarianism, as the opposition not just to Western capitalist democracy, but also to totalitarianism, seen here as basically a Western import, foreign to Chinese tradition. Indeed, the author implies although totalitarianism and related brutality could be found in China, it is instead an aberration. Even Mao's regime was not really totalitarian, for it was tempered by benign Confucianism. Foreign policy is also projected as benign and peaceful in sharp contrast to the aggressive and exploitative policies of the West. The image is strongly anti-Wittfogelian, not only because of mass starvation – both in the distant and recent past – bloody revolts, Gulag-type methods in building the Great Wall, the Great Canal and similar phenomena are overlooked, but for other reasons. For Wittfogel (1963), the totalitarian tradition was born in the "hydraulic" civilization of the East and was later transmitted to Russia by Mongols. The tradition provides the framework for Soviet totalitarianism, which made the USSR so similar to Mao's China. In the author's view, the totalitarian menace originated in the West and from here, in the form of Marxist-Leninism, was transmitted to China, where it was transformed into benign communitarianism, family-type arrangements which could not, the author implied, be defined in the context of Western thought; the attempt to call them not just totalitarian but authoritarian is misleading. The proposed model is Huntingtonian in a way. It implies a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 2011).

Still, instead of fruitless confrontation, the model proposed peaceful surrender and incorporation into a benign Chinese-led global "family" in which all members would find peace, security and prosperity. The civilizational aspect of the proposal is clearly different from what one could find in the Soviet narrative. It is true that Soviet propagandists, mostly ethnic Russians and/or Russified minorities, elaborated on the old Slavophile doctrine about the benign nature of Russian/Eastern Slavic civilization and, implicitly, praised it as a viable alternative to the individualistic and brutish West. Still, this idea was not at the forefront, besides a possible short period of late Stalinism, with its distinct Russocentric imperial focus (Dobrenko, 2020).

The ideological and geopolitical confrontation with the West was not formulated as Russia against the West, not even as the USSR against the collective West, but as a confrontation between "socialism" and "capitalism." It was "socialism", which would replace "capitalism." The Bolshevik Revolution was also not seen, at least in official discourse, as the launchpad for Russia's rise to global predominance, but as an event that opened the "new era" in world history, that is, the transition from capitalism to socialism. In the book's narrative, the story is different. The confrontation is between the "West" and "China," not socialism, marginal and actually alien to China, vs capitalism. Confucianism, in its Chinese reading, confronts the West, Western civilization in general, as it had been formed at the dawn of history. In this narrative, China's 1949 Revolution is not the beginning of the rise of socialism, but the beginning of China's rise to global predominance or, to be more precise, the restoration of China's global position, which China had enjoyed in the past. The only difference from the past is that China's influence would now be global. Thus, the book presents not only the image or, to be precise, the propaganda image that present-day Chinese leaders project to their domestic and foreign audience but also the outline of the primary goal of China's global ambitions. This layer is clear and could be easily detected by most of those who read the book. Still, it is not the only layer.

The second layer of the narrative implied elaboration on the meaning of the socialist regime. While Western observers usually call the Chinese regime "state capitalism," the leaders in Beijing call their regime "socialist," and they could be right. Socialism, as Marx defined it, is a society in which the state controls the "command heights" of the economy, and this is indeed the case in Red China. Marxism also discards the role of capitalist democracy. In Marx's and his followers' view, it was a sham; it was capitalists who ran the show. Marx believed that the end of private property or "means of production" would lead to grass-roots democracy. Still, the opposite happened. State control over "means of production" led not to democracy but to the emergence of the powerful authoritarian/totalitarian state, and, as in present-day China, the state became structurally quite similar to that in ancient and medieval China. Thus, the leap to the future became, from a political and, in a way, ideological perspective, a leap into the distant past. In the Chinese version, it looked like a restoration of the old, "eternal" Confucian China. Marxism and "eternal" Confucianism do not contradict but actually reinforce each other. Moreover, the Marxist fig leaf, in some cases, could be entirely dropped without much damage to the regime's overall ideological construction. Actually, the rulers might even subtly encourage this ideological disrobing, which demonstrated the naked truth or, to be precise, the clear essence of official ideology: the major virtue of the Chinese is to be obedient to authorities and to strengthen the state. One could find similar arrangements during high Stalinism. The officials, or, to be precise, Stalin himself, openly glorified Ivan IV (the Terrible) and Peter the Great. Ivan, the Russian version of the Chinese First Emperor Qin (Qinshihuang), was not only sadistically brutal but also, if one followed the official Marxist-Leninist creed, should be condemned as a representative of the oppressive feudal elite. Still, in the

Stalinist narrative, he was glorified as a "progressive" ruler, plainly because his purges centralized the state; and worship of the state was the very gist of high Stalinism.[4]

Finally, there is the third layer, and it would most likely not be seen by the vast majority of Western readers. This layer is related to the fact of the book's publication by the prestigious Princeton University Press, presumably after rigorous peer review. The author of the book notes that his manuscript was published because of China's rise, albeit he does not elaborate on what this rise means. This, however, in our view, is not a sufficient explanation. The USSR was rising, an increasingly threatening colossus, and by Reagan's time, fear of the USSR had most likely reached its peak. Indeed, at that time, a film that imagined the USSR invading the USA was produced. For the Right, the USSR was a totalitarian monster whose socio-economic and political systems should have been sent to the dustbin of history. For some on the Left and some liberals, the USSR was a beacon for humanity, not, of course, because it was a totalitarian state but because it represented the highest form of democracy and, literally, libraries of books were published in the West to demonstrate this.[5]

One might also add that in the heyday of "Fukuyamism," the early post-Cold War era, when the notion of the "end of history," i.e., the assumption that American capitalist democracy would be the ultimate result of any historical processes, the fate of the manuscript would have been absolutely different. Not only would the manuscript not have survived a rigorous peer review of a prestigious academic press, but the manuscript would have been rejected in its proposal stage. Indeed, it would be naïve to assume that predominant Western discourse allowed a "hundred flowers to bloom" if one would remember Mao's famous expression. The Western "florists," including those in academia, are very selective and ideologically cautious about what "flowers" shall be planted in front of the major entrances to prestigious publishers and related good jobs. Those "flowers" which clearly depart or, even more so, contradict the mainstream are transformed from "flowers" into "weeds"; they must be, if not eradicated, at least sent to marginal lands, marginal soils of obscurity, where very few would note their existence. Thus, there is no doubt that a book that openly advocates an authoritarian or semi-totalitarian solution for Western society's ills would have zero chance of being published by a leading academic press in the heyday of "Fukuyamism" in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

So why did a book which openly advocated authoritarian rule and cancelling of elections get published now? One might note here that the publication of Tongdong Bai's book was not an accidental malfunction of invisible yet still strict censorship which governs American and, in a way, Western highbrow codified academic discourse. The same Princeton University Press recently published another monograph that openly challenged the idea of democracy (Jason Brennan, *Against Democracy*: New Preface, Princeton University Press, 2017). One could also note that Brennan's *Against Democracy* was a great success and was translated into several languages. This success would be unthinkable in the early 1990s. And 2021 still had another surprise – from the same Princeton University Press. It is a publication from Dennis C. Rasmussen, *Fears of a Setting Sun*. The book deals with the emergence of the American political system, the deed of the Founding Fathers who so recently were viewed by the vast majority almost as creators of a new sacred text – the American Constitution, which laid the foundation for American democracy, supposedly outlining "the end of history." Still, in Rasmussen's views, it was hardly a workable system or global example, and the Founding Fathers regarded the American constitutional/democratic experiment as an absolute failure. Once again, one could hardly imagine that Princeton University Press would

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[4] Stalin's appreciation of Ivan could well be seen in a film about the czar. It was directly sponsored by the state. Moreover, indeed, the comparison between Stalin and Ivan is diaphanous and could easily be seen throughout the movie. For an analysis of the movie, see Neuberger J (2019) This thing of darkness. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

[5] Sheila Fitzpatrick was possibly the major representative of this trend. She also provided a general overview of "revisionism." For example, see Fitzpatrick S (2007) Revisionism in Soviet History.

have published such a work 30-35 years ago. Nevertheless, it was released afterwards, one can assume, after rigorous peer review.

So why did it happen? To understand this, one shall remember that the collapse of the USSR and confirmation of capitalist arrangements indicated to the Western elite that their socio-economic order would be eternal, and the "one-dimensional man," if one would remember the title of the famous book by Herbert Marcuse (1964) would always legitimize their rule by vote. And this would be called "democracy," and the old saying that "*vox populi, vox Dei*" (the voice of the people is the voice of God) is valid. Still, Trumpism, the events on 6 January and similar events in Europe – which commenced long before Trump's victory – indicated that "deplorable" could give the elite – both on the Left and Right -- short shrift, and this hardly pleased the Western elite. All these events indicated to its members that the populace rejected the old elite and was ready to commit violence, ready to smash the old economic and political order. And this horrified the elite's members, possibly on the level of the Jungian collective subconscious. Consequently, benign democracy was immediately transformed into ugly "populism", and increasing musing on how to limit the power of "deplorable," if one would remember Hillary Clinton's expression, became popular. And here, the Chinese model – and of course not only that – became handy. One, of course, should not oversimplify the picture. The predominant trend is still the old one: "democracy" is seen as mainstream, and "populism" is an aberration, the disease from which society must be cured. Still, underneath the assurance or, to be precise, self-assurance, the lingering fear of the "deplorable" continues to be strong, and the thought of what they could do in the case of sharp economic downturns is clearly present in the minds of the members of the economic and political elite and related intellectuals. In addition, the rise of global "deplorable," e.g., Islamists and their ability to deal with what seems to be an indestructible military machine of the West, as Afghanistan has shown, also concerns Western, primarily American, elite. And this defines their approach to the Chinese model.

It is true that they continued to blast the Chinese elite as a cancerous aberration and see the Chinese elite political model as peculiar political pornography – something obscene and ugly. Still, as political tension and fear of the elite grew, some of its members engaged in particular political voyeurism and, watching the Chinese political system, they became dazzled and excited, for it showed how the system in which "deplorable" have no say, could be built. And it was this trend that explains why the reviewed book, together, of course, with similar books, was published. Thus, the most interesting aspect of the book was not what it said about the trends in China, but what it informed the readers about the trends in the USA and possibly the West in general.

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BOOK REVIEW

Daniel A. Bell and Wang Pei

Just Hierarchy, Why Social Hierarchies Matter in China and the Rest of the World

The international system is going through a period in which multi-polarity has increasingly been the main characteristic identifying the whole system. Within such a multi-polar/multi-centred world order, the Eurocentric approach to politics and socio-cultural life has increasingly come under question. Besides these developments, traditional cultural identities and nationalist sentiments have become decisive dynamics in international politics. Even though the world is in need of more integrated policies against global issues such as environmental and security threats, bringing cultural differences to the fore seems to shape the near future of the world.

The cultural and national differences gaining more importance, the need for reciprocal understanding undoubtedly increase more. In such an atmosphere, writing a book that contributes to the different social values has a remarkable meaning. Just Hierarchy was written to highlight traditional social values behind the political and social approaches of the Asian nations. Therefore, this book should be considered as a significant contribution to the new world, which is under transformation. Moreover, as the authors are familiar with the Asian way of life and have particular proficiency in political science and sociology, the central assertion of the book gains more importance.

The book's main point can clearly be identified as distinguishing "just" and "unjust" forms of hierarchies. Authors have an intellectually significant question in their minds. This complex set off the book's central question: which forms of hierarchy are morally justified today, and how can they be promoted in the future? (p.8) By asking this question, the authors aim to reveal the main philosophy behind the social hierarchies in East Asian countries.

Bell and Wang try to support the book's central argument by analysing five different kinds of social hierarchies in detail. The book's main argument is that *different hierarchical principles ought to govern different kinds of social relations* (p.16). For example, a hierarchical order between intimates can be identified as a "just hierarchy" only in case of it is supported by the principle of shifting roles. On the other hand, a just hierarchy between states requires a vital principle of reciprocity.

Book consists of six different chapters, and each has its arguments and explanations. The introduction has been conducted as a space for mental preparation for the rest of the book as a first chapter. The first chapter has the title "Just Hierarchy between Intimates": On the Importance of Shifting Roles, and it looks at the guiding principles of relations with friends, lovers, family members and housekeepers. The second chapter focuses on the hierarchical political system, meritocracy and its justification in the Chinese context under the title of "Just Hierarchy between Citizens: On the Importance of Service". The third chapter has the title of "Just Hierarchy between states: On the Need for Reciprocity" and take a deep look at the hierarchical world

order both in the past and the future. The last two chapters handle the issues such as "hierarchy between humans and animal" and "hierarchy between humans and machines". Within this structure, Bell and Wang try to ease in explaining their arguments in a logical flow.

 In the first chapter, the authors look into the "just hierarchy between intimates" and analyse the nature of the relationship with friends, lovers, family members and housekeepers. Within this chapter, they argue that the main requirement for relations between intimates to be classified as "just hierarchy" is that *they must involve shifting roles. According to this approach, the main reason to make the caste system so morally repugnant is that hierarchical social roles are fixed for eternity* (p. 30).

In the second chapter, "just hierarchy between citizens" is examined. The main idea of imposing the efficiency of the political hierarchy in large communities is deeply mentioned through this chapter. The authors point out that political meritocracy is an ideal order, particularly for China and the rest of the East Asian nations. They also add that *political meritocracy can and should be complemented by such democratic practices as sortation, referenda and elections, consultation and deliberation, as well as the freedom of speech* (p.75). At the end of the chapter, the authors argue that *democracy is necessary to save political meritocracy in China (p.95).*

The relationship between states is analysed in the third chapter. The main requirement for harmonised hierarchical relations is presented as "the need for reciprocity". The authors firstly examine the chronological order in ancient China and India. Then they arrive at the conclusion that includes *the global order consists of a hierarchy between different states, with some states having more de facto power than others* (p.108). Bell and Wang make their claim that the current world order may be established on the principle of "one world, two hierarchical

systems" and support this claim in the next chapter.

As a substantial part of the book, the third chapter includes the most assertive idea of the book. Authors argue that a desirable model for modern inter-state relations can be established basing on the China-led traditional hierarchical relations called as tianxia.

> *"On this modernised account of tianxia, China is the centre of East Asia by virtue of its dominant economic status and increasing ability to project military power, and it has both extra powers and extra responsibilities in the East Asian region"* (p.136).

Except for suggesting the idea of reformulating the tianxia model for the current world order, the authors assert that the United States must recognise the Chinese superiority in the East Asian region.

> *"If the United States genuinely wants to avoid war in the East Asian region, it should try to accommodate and make concessions to China's desire to establish a regional hierarchy with itself at the head of the table"* (p.139).

> *"In short, the most viable path toward global peace in the region involves a bipolar world with the United States and China as heads of two regional hierarchies of states. Both China and the US recognise each other's leadership in their respective regions, and they work together to solve common global problems such as climate change"* (p. 140).

The last two chapters examine the ideal form of human behaviours against animals and machines. Through these last two chapters, machines and animals are handled with a

utilitarian approach that advises human superiority.

Within the context presented above, *Just Hierarchy Why Social Hierarchies Matter in China and the Rest of the World* has great importance to those who try to understand the social and traditional values of Asian nations. As the authors also mention in the book, Confucian originated social values still maintain to affect moral and political approaches of the Asian nations. Therefore, those who realise that Eurocentric world order and social values are not enough to understand Asian nations motivation have to apply for this book.

Even though the book aims to contribute to be understood of the primary motivation behind the social values of Asian nations, the authors present a Sino-centric approach. They even impose Chinese superiority for the Asian region and clearly tell their ideas to *originate from China*, and they *write for China* (p.25). However, what the good thing is that they encourage the audience to read the book with a critical eye and open to critics on their arguments.

Even most of the arguments seem strange for those who belong to different cultural traditions from the Confucian ethics. The authors support their argument by referring to ancient philosophers such as Aristotle, Mencius, Vatsyayana, and Kant. Unfortunately, the comparative historical approach does not present a persuasive explanation in terms of the argument. Precisely because of that, the direct approach of the book should be identified as eclectic, which includes modern and traditional, progressive, and conservative approaches rather than "progressive conservative".

In a few words, Bell and Wang's Just Hierarchy is a remarkable contribution to the newly emerging world order, which necessitates expanding the mutual understanding and moving away from Eurocentric socio-cultural prejudices. Under the light of explanations above, Just Hierarchy is a reference book for those who

try to understand the Asian way of thought, especially for those studying political science, sociology and international affairs.

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BOOK REVIEW

Sean R. Roberts

The War on the Uyghurs: China's Internal Campaign against a Muslim Minority

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020, ISBN: 978-0-691-20218-1, 328 pp., $29.95.)

The War on the Uyghurs is the first book published by Sean R. Roberts, a cultural anthropologist with some 30 years' experience of studying the ethnolinguistic group which has recently become the focus of international media and political attention due to the Chinese communist regime's ongoing effort to establish an unprecedented high-tech police state in their homeland, known officially as Xinjiang. The author's main argument is that this latest stage of Beijing's attempts to attach the whole region to China proper for good amounts to a "cultural genocide," which finalises a several centuries old aim to colonise it and has been particularly aided by the US-led Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) since the beginning of this century. The thesis that GWOT has legitimised state repression against consciously dehumanised alleged "terrorists," especially Muslim ones, across much of the world and particularly in countries that are mostly at odds with the US, is not novel. Roberts, however, provides a meticulous, convincing, and genuinely frightening account of how this unfolded in the Uyghur homeland, defiantly called "Eastern Turkistan" by many of those who are critical of Beijing's radical actions there.

The book unravels this process in a rough chronological order throughout six well-thought-out analytical chapters with the logical focus on the post-2001 Chinese policies towards the "Uyghur homeland" that coincided with GWOT. The case study is embedded within a strong and fitting theoretical framework focusing on Foucauldian biopolitics directed against alleged terrorists who are dehumanised through a "presumption of guilt." As is befitting of a serious social scientist, Roberts pays close attention to critical and contextualised usage of his key concepts. The case study thus provides the narrative of how the Uyghur homeland has been transformed from a "frontier colony" to a "settler colony" as the alleged terrorist threat there increasingly became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The latter process has been exemplified by the evolution of Uyghur resistance from the phantom "terrorist" Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) to a real organization – the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), which itself rapidly developed from a video production company with a militant wing in Afghanistan to a serious fighting and settlement force in Syria. By the author's own recognition, it is precisely this analysis of Uyghur militant groups that represents the book's most original research. However, the meticulous account of political violence within the Uyghur homeland up to its peak in 2014–15 also merits such evaluation.

The analysis convincingly reveals that, contrary to China's allegations, these two developments were largely separate, except for the fact that intensifying repression within the Uyghur homeland has forced many of its indigenous inhabitants to flee abroad, with some joining the TIP as a result. Crucially, it was the global "conterterrorism industrial complex" led by the US and composed of politicians, diplomats, security operatives, and scholars that greatly contributed to this

self-fulfilling prophecy and thus also to the legitimisation of both the "People's War on Terror" and the subsequent cultural genocide unleashed on the Uyghur homeland by China's current leadership of Xi Jinping. The Xinjiang panopticon nowadays is characterised by huge and multi-dimensional systems of *de facto* incarceration for the most "suspicious" indigenous Muslims and omnipresent high-tech surveillance. Roberts' book, however, places part of the blame for the rise of this Orwellian, quintessentially biopolitical police state, on the outside world, particularly its developed Western and Muslim-majority components, both of which have contributed to or at least enabled this collective tragedy and thus far have not done enough to halt it.

The author's two most contentious propositions of conceptual nature – namely, that the vast majority of the actual instances of Uyghur violent resistance to Chinese rule cannot even be defined as truly terrorist, and that Beijing's post-2017 actions against them amount to a cultural genocide aimed at erasing and replacing the Uyghur identity itself by "breaking their roots" – are both supported by plenty of evidence. As this review is being written, the one-party state continues to alter the Uyghur homeland's physical and human "terrain" in its own image. One can safely speculate that the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and China's resultant isolationism would only contribute to this sinister process.

In the meantime, Roberts offers valuable thoughts regarding the implications of his findings on what comes next for the Uyghur homeland and the world at large. The book's conclusion deals with three critical questions about this tragedy's future trajectory in a remarkably humanitarian way. Answering the first one – what may be the future of the cultural genocide itself – the author believes that there is little that can fully stop and retract it, short of complete overhaul of the leadership in Beijing. The wider implications of the Uyghur tragedy for the future of GWOT derive from the fact that it is only a prime example of using allegations of terrorism to justify and pursue other interests across the world, leading Roberts to call for the adoption of an internationally recognized and objective definition of "terrorism" to prevent atrocities in "forever wars" waged against it. Third, in order to prevent the Uyghur crisis from getting any worse, the author suggests putting significant pressure on China that would come from the grassroots and targeting it economically.

According to Roberts, the ongoing war on the Uyghurs is actually about more than the next global superpower, as it is merely symptomatic of a "post-privacy," "post-rights," and "post-diversity" world that gradually came into being after the declaration of GWOT. This timely, thought-provoking, and significant book should thus be of utmost interest to any reader who wants to live in the rules-based international order, however imperfect it may often seem to be. As someone who was lucky enough to visit the Uyghur homeland just before the "people's war" unleashed not upon terror but against this proud, hospitable, and unique community, I can only agree with and fully support the author's conclusions and recommendations.

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BOOK REVIEW

Adam Mestyan

Arab Patriotism: The Ideology and Culture of Power in Late Ottoman Egypt

The book, *Arab Patriotism*, written by Adam Mestyan reflects on what the Ottoman context of Egypt means for its nationalism. Throughout the nineteenth century the governance of the Egyptian province was in the hands of one Turkish-speaking family. They were neither local Egyptians nor people sent from the imperial elite. Mestyan noted that, Patriotism or national pride is the feeling of love, devotion, and sense of attachment to a homeland or the country and alliance with other citizens who share the same sentiment to create a feeling of oneness among the people. In this regards, Arab patriotism is a nationalist ideology that asserts the Arabs are a nation and promotes the unity of Arab people, celebrating the glories of Arab civilization, the language and literature of the Arabs, and calling for rejuvenation and political union in the Arab world. Its central premise is that the peoples of the Arab world, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean, constitute one nation bound together by common ethnicity, language, culture, history, identity, geography and politics. One of the primary goals of Arab nationalism is the end of Western influence in the Arab world, seen as a "nemesis" of Arab strength, and the removal of those Arab governments considered to be dependent upon Western power. It rose to prominence with the weakening and defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century and declined after the defeat of the Arab armies in the Six-Day War. From this point of view, Mestyan's book provides significant analyses for the beginning of Arab Patriotism in the Ottoman Egypt.

Mestyan emphasizes that the situation in Egypt under the Ottoman rule was different from direct European colonialism. When Mestyan mentions British occupation in the region he states that 'Egypt is not India', he reveals his view on British occupation in India. (2020: 10)

Mestyan notes that no Ottoman sultans had visited the province of Egypt in the three centuries since its conquest by Sultan Selim I in 1517. However, Sultan Abdulaziz travelled by train from Alexandria to Cairo, where he observed factories and visited the museum of Egyptology. (2020: 19)

When Mestyan emphasizes the Ottoman imperial patriotism in the middle of the nineteenth century, he mentions *Osmanlılık,* referring to Ottoman citizenship, however *Osmanlılık* was not necessarily about a citizenship. Ottoman patriotism was derived from consciously being Ottoman as *Osmanlılık,* however it was not really related to Ottoman citizenship, because attachment to Ottoman Empire was more than citisznship. Ottomanism was a concept which was developed prior to the 1876-1878 First Constitutional Era of the Ottoman Empire. Mestyan states that, its proponents believed that it could create the social cohesion needed to keep nationalism from tearing the empire apart. It is because the major precursors to Ottomanism were the Reformation Edict of 1856 promised full equality under the law regardless of religion, and the Ottoman

Nationality Law of 1869, which created a common Ottoman citizenship irrespective of religious or ethnic affiliation.

According to Mestyan, Abbas Hilmi in early 1850s, distinguished between Ottoman Imperial interests and Egyptian dynastic ones. The governor himself used to expression in Turkish "what comes first for an Egyptian is Egypt" can be explained through the notion of the Arab patriotism. (2020: 38) Indeed, the patriotic idea in Ottoman Turkish and in other Ottoman languages gained momentum in the late 1840s and it was during the Crimean War that it appeared as a forceful imperial territorial ideology.(2020:55)

Mestyan's use of some of the Ottoman-Turkish terms like zevat, ferik shows the writer's familiarity with Turkish literature. (2020: 55)

It is also important to note that he highlights the Italian Opera as Sultan Abdulmecid's choice in Istanbul in the 1850s. It also became popular in the Egyptian Khedivate. (2020:112) According to Mestyan the elite Ottomans adopted European public aesthetics in Khedivial Cairo and Khedive Ismail ordered the buildings from European architects and brought in Italian entertainment in order to modernize Egypt. (2020:112) He noted that it seemed to unite these intellectuals was an unspoken but shared believed that educated Arabic 'al arabiyya al Fusha' should become the language of Khedivate. (2020:126) Indeed, native speakers of Arabic generally do not distinguish between Modern Standard Arabic and Classical Arabic as separate languages. They refer to both as *al-'Arabīyah al-Fuṣḥā*, meaning "the eloquent Arabic". Today they consider the two forms to be two registers of one language in Egypt.

In 1876, new political figures appeared in Egypt. The anti-British Persian thinker Jamal al Din Al Afghani, living on a government pension in Cairo, found useful allies in Ottomans Syrians to fight European Imperialism. (2020:112) His plea for Islamic

renewal through solidarity never lost its relevance as a powerful symbol linking the past with hopes for the future. The image of Afghani as the indefatigable fighter against Western imperialism who helped make the Muslim world aware of its distinct identity remains equally as suggestive in Northern Africa. According to Mestyan, Ahmed Mukhtar arrived in Cairo in 1885 as a remarkable Ottoman Imperial High Commissioner man who was a friend of Jamal al Din Al Afghani. A warrior and general of the Ottoman army, Ahmed Mukhtar fought the Russian army in 1877-1878. The presence of an Ottoman war hero aroused pro-Ottoman sentiments in British-occupied Cairo. Ahmed Mukhtar faithfully upheld the Ottoman colors in Cairo, despite having only symbolic means, secrets agents and his own bodily presence to express Ottoman sovereignty. (2020: 286)

The history of Egypt under the British started from 1882, when it was occupied by British forces during the Anglo-Egyptian War, until 1956 after the Suez Crisis, when the last British forces withdrew in accordance with the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954. Undoubtedly, in 1882, Islamic and Arabic Nationalist opposition to European influence and settlement in the Middle East led to growing tension amongst notable natives, especially in Egypt which then as now was the most powerful, populous, and influential of Arab countries. The most dangerous opposition during this period came from the Egyptian army, which saw the reorientation of economic development away from their control as a threat to their privileges. During British occupation and later control, immigrants from less stable parts of the region including Greeks, Jews, and Armenians, began to flow into Egypt. In the aftermath of World War I, the large British Imperial Army in Egypt which was the centre of operations against the Ottoman Empire was quickly reduced with demobilization and restructuring of garrisons. Free of the large British military presence, the incipient German backed revolutionary movements were able to more effectively launch their operations. This part could be emphasized

more in the book in terms of the British action against *Osmanlilik* in Egypt. However, despite that Metsyen's book provides remarkable analyses to understand late Ottoman Egypt in history.

Briefly, a wholly original exploration of Egypt in the context of the Ottoman Empire, Arab Patriotism sheds light on the evolving sense of political belonging in the Arab world. The book, Arab nationalism provides important analyses and historical data for sociologists, historians, and political scientists. It is a well-researched study however could be more interesting with Ottoman archival sources.

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BOOK REVIEW

Adeeb Khalid

Central Asia: A New History from the Imperial Conquests to the Present

The book opens with a captivating overview of the ancient inhabitants of the region. This quick introduction articulates an idea that some nomadic tribes became settled, resulting in the formation of the first city-states in the region. The author extends this overview, drawing parallels with and connecting it to ancient times. This background that covers several centuries provides the reader with a sense of geographic areas that the book focuses on (later, this territory is identified by the author as Eastern and Western Turkestan). In addition to it, these first chapters intrigue a reader with the magnificence of the first local civilizations, the signs of which could still be noticed in the streets of the fabulous Central Asian cities such as Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand that remind an imaginative reader of the famous "Thousand and One Night".

The book expands the geographic understanding of the region further by using some maps that identify the location of the city-states mentioned before and the nomads who lived around them. Unfortunately, the illustrative value of the maps is not very high, and they do not help to have a precise understanding of the territory and the population in focus. The vagueness of the maps can be easily explained by nomadism that was quite widespread in the region that the city-states claimed control of. Nomadism does not recognize borders and implies population growth and decline due to natural (and often undocumented reasons) in addition to migration, conflation, and deflation. Nevertheless, more detailed maps with some demographic details would be beneficial for the readership.

The introductory overview includes the great Mongolian conquests of the 13th-15th centuries. They had a long-lasting effect on the local population and culture of the population in Central Asia. Besides conquering the huge territories, Genghis-khan and his descendants formed the local elites, they connected different parts of the world and defined the way Central Asians lived up until the Russian Empire started advancing and conquering the Western Turkestan (today's Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) in the 19th centuries. The might of China and its interest in Eastern Turkestan (today's Xinjiang province) was another determining factor that the author considers profoundly starting the actual history exploration of the region with the mid of the 18th century and the Han-Uyghur relations. Even though the importance of the British Empire in the region is without a doubt at that time, too, the book only tangentially mentions it. The reason for it is that neither Afghanistan nor Iran is included in the analysis. The author omits Mongolia, too, justifying his choices by research rationale at the very beginning of the book. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the importance of these countries, which encourages a curious reader to explore further individually.

The modern period of the region starts with the Soviet era. The national policies of

Bolsheviks and, especially Josef Stalin, were the foundation of what the former Soviet Central Asian republics and the nations are today. The simultaneous processes were going on in China that always had a significant presence in Xinjiang. Such presence was gradually growing until it turned into full control of the region. This was accompanied by the attempts of integration up until recently, when, according to the author, China decided that the Uyghurs were "a lost cause". The author presents the efforts of both empires in integrating Central Asian nations in a comparative way (p. 368-370). The book spots the weak and strong parts of the imperial policies of the Soviet Union and China precisely. These policies could often be defined as genocidal, even though in some strange ways they also could be considered as the ones that produced some positive effects.

One more captivating and significant topic that the book considers is collective identity. The author analyses it from different perspectives. His exploration includes not only remarkable and fateful events such as armed uprisings, famines, interethnic clashes, historical heritage but also literature and mythology. Influential authors such as Abdurauf Fitrat, Chokan Valikhanov, and later Chingiz Aitmatov contributed immensely to the construction of the local ethnic and national collective identities (p. 203, 245). So made the Great Patriotic War that started with the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union in 1941. The author rightly noticed that this war turned Central Asians into Soviet citizens (p. 306), and this happened despite all the negative experiences (e.g. famine) that the Soviets brought to the population of the region.

The book gives many more invaluable insights into what was going on in Central Asia during the Soviet times and how the situation was developing in China's Xinjiang. It talks in detail about the production of cotton, which became a significant and defining part of the local industry; the catastrophe of the Aral Sea, which is directly related to cotton production; the nuclear and

space programs that the region hosted; the creation of the Communist elite and the efforts to increase people's literacy. The book describes the development of the Sino-Uyghur relations, which perfectly presents the roots of the current political and social disaster in Xinjiang. An attentive reader could also get the idea of how the territory three times bigger than Spain became a host of the biggest concentration camp today.

The last chapters of the book describe the post-Soviet and the most recent developments in Eastern and Western Turkestan. They introduce Turkey as the new player in the region and provide a comparative analysis of the local political elite in the five post-Soviet republics. The current wave of terrorism and the war against it, the Islamization of the region, and reconfiguration of economic ties update a reader with the latest political developments that will play their role in the future of Central Asia.

In general, the book by Adeeb Khalid, "Central Asia. A New History from the Imperial Conquest to the Present", is one of the newest and comprehensive studies on the region. It is a very broad and, at the same time, concise introduction to Central Asian history. It serves the introductory purpose perfectly for various audiences. Students of different disciplines, new to the region and experienced scholars, or just curious readers would find all the essential (even if brief) events of Central Asian history in this book. The book can serve as a perfect guide for those who would like to conduct a more profound exploration of the political, social, cultural, and economic aspects that impacted the region and its formation.

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BOOK REVIEW

Michael Cotey Morgan

The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War

A world without war is the decisive goal of humankind, but only in a hypothetical state. Starting from the groundwork that the best peace is war, the great powers are in perpetual competition and confrontation, with the precise purpose of winning and dominating. In this regard, the Cold War era illustrates, probably the best, the aspirations and the struggle of the great powers to become the hegemon of the international political system.

The Cold War was the name given to the period between the end of the Second World War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union; it was a geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and, moreover, an ideological confrontation for global influence and leadership. Even though there was no military clash between these two superpowers, the permanent risk of a nuclear war asks for round table negotiation.

Hence, the Helsinki Accords are an essential feature, not only for the mentioned period but also for the history of the international relations discipline. Due to these reasons, this book aims to provide the inside story regarding this crucial assembly. The author succeeded in presenting the facts and personalities in an effortless manner for the reader.

Although the amount of information is considerable, the structure of the book is approachable as divided into seven chapters along with an epilogue. After a brief introduction, in which Morgan describes the grounds in writing this book and the general frame of it, the reader is subtly introduced to the reality of those rough times. Moreover, the author manages to reflect the image of that international system, one of the divided worlds in terms of ideology and economic approach, not to mention that Europe of two: East and West, into so called *crises of legitimacy* (chapter 1).

Back then, both United States and USSR faced internal problems in promoting their vision of the world; these two *superpowers* lacked the unity of the systems that they had established and the author, based on the facts, concludes that "the superpowers now sought to understand each other, cooperate across the Iron Curtain and reach agreement on the rules that would govern their relations and their conduct in the world" (p.23).

Another significant moment that Morgan neared is the crucial year of 1969 (chapter 2). In that year, an entirely new class of Cold War leaders assumed power: Richard Nixon in the United States, Georges Pompidou in France, and Willy Brandt in West Germany, as well as Leonid Brezhnev, who seized the entire Soviet power. This chapter carefully analyzes the political activities of those who have made possible the negotiations and the signing documents of the *Final Act*.

The third and fourth chapters cope with the talks for the assembly to take place designed in Multilateral Preparatory Talks (MPT). "The preparatory talks opened in an atmosphere of optimism and unease" (p. 111), stated Morgan, who describes the entire process of negotiations and the art of compromise. The reader will find out that consensus in international politics is tough to accomplish. The Helsinki Accords are such an example. The ideological divergences, also within the Eastern and Western blocks, along with the political contradictions, illustrated the difficulty of reconciliation between those thirty-five signatory states.

The last part of the book is established around the catchphrase: *the East needed the West more than the West needed the East* (p. 145). Indeed, there were several disagreements among the actors involved on this security accord but, it is hard to specify which part of the world needed these accords the most. It is crucial that every government, in the end, finally understood that times are changing, the world is under constant transformation, and every citizen should have a minimum of freedom guaranteed, together with economic access to basics needs.

These were critical points on the agenda, especially for those closed societies where for decades the term *freedom* was ineffable; of course, the Helsinki Accords did not change everything, and it could not do this but, it was a massive victory for those who believed in change and rapprochement. These features are successfully put forward by Morgan in such a way that the reader will have the feeling of being part of the history.

From one point of view, the most valuable aspect of this research is given by the author approach to what is known as the European continent. In the international relations field, the terms Western Europe and Eastern Europe have often been used. However, it should be noted that these regions (especially the Eastern one) have never been a geographical concept in itself, is considered only a geopolitical and (or) ideological notion. Even if, following the collapse of the Soviet

Empire, the Eastern region was divided (following the enlargement of the European Union and the North Atlantic Alliance) into Central and Eastern Europe, Morgan research concerns Europe as a whole and not how we are tempted to believe that there are two or more Europes.

Consequently, this book is not just a chronicle of the events. It stands for an iconic book of an event that changed the path of the Cold War. It serves as an imperative for anyone interested in contemporary history as well as foreign policy experts. The Helsinki moment illustrates that there is still reason in international politics, which the political world, today, requires for such an accord.

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BOOK REVIEW

Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Democratic Federalism: The Economics, Politics, and Law of Federal Governance

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020, ISBN: 9780691202129, 448 pp., $45.00 hb.)

In presenting an interdisciplinary approach to Democratic Federalism, Robert Inman and Daniel Rubinfeld examine different models of federalism and compare their relative effectiveness as regards economic efficiency, fostering citizen participation, and protecting individual liberties. There is a detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of federalism for citizens, as well as the development of federal governance in the United States and its evolution in the European Union and South Africa's transition from apartheid to a multiracial democracy. Democratic Federalism offers new insight into recent history and, critically, into the future of democracy.

The main question that the book purports to answer is how effective federal democracy is in terms of providing the best outcomes for economic benefits, citizen participation and representation, including the least represented minorities. The authors argue that federal democracy can attain these goals with a well-functional national legislature and locally elected representatives. The book comprises three parts: (I) The Institutions of Democratic Federalism; (II) Encouraging the Federal Conversation; (III) On Becoming Federal.

Part I deals with the forms of Federalism and safeguards of Democratic Federalism. Inman and Rubinfeld, in Chapter 2, discuss Economic Federalism, and based on their empirical analysis agree that Tiebout's six-condition economy model has merit. However, they suggest that if the expectation is to provide large-scale public goods, expenditures, or spillovers, then Tiebouts's model is not sufficient, central government is required. Local governments are ideal for supplying effective local services under Economic Federalism. However, democratic participation and representation might suffer, and the protection of rights, predominantly of minorities, becomes very questionable. In Chapter 3, the authors analyze Cooperative Federalism through voluntary alliances (Coasian Alliances) such as the WTO, the Paris Agreement, the WHO, and NATO. However, Inman and Rubinfeld suggest that "Alliances do work when both preference revelation and enforcement are possible" (p.91). Chapter 4 assesses Democratic Federalism and compares its outcomes with economic and cooperative federal governance. As Economic Federalism and Cooperative Federalism fail to provide fair outcomes and guarantee personal rights for everyone and, Democratic Federalism as an alternative to both as it offers economic and political functions through state/ district/ province representatives, and it is identified as "the centrepiece of Democratic Federalism" (p.100). Lastly, Chapter 5 analyses the safeguards of Democratic Federalism. That includes a national legislature, a senate, a president, a supreme court, and competitive political parties (p.140).

In Part II, Inman and Rubinfeld, in Chapter 6, introduce the Federalism Impact Statement, or FIST. The authors suggest that the seven-step "FIST sets the ground rules for

a dialogue about a proposed policy's implications for federal governance" (p.189). The impact of a proposed federal law or executive order is evaluated against the metrics of economic efficiency, citizen participation, and individual liberties and rights. The FIST summary enables deliberative discussions within Democratic Federalism's institutions that focus on finding a balance between efficiency, participation, and rights to decide whether or not to implement a policy (p.200). Chapter 7 discusses how the government uses fiscal policies of debt, taxes and spending to provide public goods and services in a federal public economy, since the authors explain that the primary role of democracies, regardless of whether they are unitary or federal, is to distribute natural resources to their citizens.

In the last chapter, Chapter 8, Inman and Rubinfeld assess the assignment of regulatory responsibilities in federal unions. Whilst some regulations are not negotiable such as fundamental/ universal individual rights, some issues or responsibilities are shared between national and local governments. When the six-step conditions of Tiebout are met, "race to the top" will not require national regulation. However, any violations, which means "a race to the bottom", will lead to "national regulation" (p.275).

Lastly, Part III includes two significant case studies concerning fundamental changes in government in the last 50 years: in the European Union and South Africa. Inman and Rubinfeld make an assessment in Chapter 9 of the form of governance of the EU, which they define as "Cooperative Federalism" under the Maastricht Treaty (p.305). Van den Bergh (2016) suggests that "the biggest mistake of the drafters of the Maastricht Treaty was their belief that the introduction of the Euro would speed up the process of political unification" (p. 956). Inman and Rubinfeld, however, argue that open markets, free trade, and market competition have effectively impacted on citizens despite fiscal inefficiencies in budgets. Whilst the protection of individual

rights has improved under the EU, citizen participation has been one of the main concerns since citizens are not directly involved in the decision-making process.

In Chapter 10, Inman and Rubinfeld assess the transition of South Africa from an apartheid regime to a new democratic regime that they define as "closely approximating Democratic Confederalism", with regard to its institutional structure as outlined in the Interim Constitution on November 18, 1993 (p.342). The latest approved constitution in 1996 structures federal institutions, including nine provincial governments, local governments and parliaments. The authors emphasize the country's challenges; however, they suggest that Democratic Federalism explains the transition to democracy. Consequently, both majority and elite residents have enjoyed economic advantages well beyond what might have been available under apartheid.

The book offers a comprehensive discussion of economic, cooperative and democratic federalism and an insightful view of the value of functional federal institutions for providing local goods and services, active political participation, and individual rights. Since federal systems are created for different reasons and achieve different purposes in various parts of the world, their structures may also be fundamentally distinct (Stepan, 1999). The authors also draw attention to multiple cases of federal states and their positive and negative consequences, such as new federal states, South Africa and Brazil. They also highlight former federal states that resulted in ethnic conflicts, including Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. In this book, although federal governance in multinational states has been questioned from multiple aspects, for a more critical assessment, the historical perspective would be helpful, especially in understanding colonialism and external influence on the nation or state-building processes. In fact, as in Iraq, the purpose and reasons for transitioning to a federal system may differ even for each constituent group. The differences in Kurds' historical background

and demands and other groups (Sunni and Shiite Muslims) in the new Iraqi governance system require a unique approach since the Kurds have historical ties to the region/ or defined homeland and have struggled for self-determination more than a century.

In this regard, the history-territory relationship is considered significant in protecting ethnic and indigenous rights. However, this issue is not adequately addressed as part of the debates over the federal system. At the same time, the authors suggest that one of the pillars of Democratic Federalism is to "ensure suffrage and personal freedoms for all inhabitants of the nation" (p. 169); Indigenous peoples' rights do not appear to be included in the guarantees promised in federal government systems. They are still fighting for their fundamental rights in many countries (Corntassel, 2008; Hamilton, 2019), especially in Canada, the USA, and Brazil. This emphasis also contradicts Dahl's definition of democracy, which means that the government constantly responds to the preferences of its citizens (Dahl, 1971). The book also discusses this dilemma.

As Democratic Federalism is suggested the best system for representation and political participation, the authors also point out that one of the main weaknesses is that "Democratic Federalism only succeeds for all citizens when citizens are represented within the legislature", which extra legislative institutions are required to address (p.138). Overall, the book, Democratic Federalism, offers a valuable and well-researched analysis of Federalism by highlighting several case studies worldwide, especially those from countries with emerging democracies. It is highly recommended for those interested in understanding the economic, legal, and political facets of democratic governance that ensures equal access to goods and services safeguards minorities' rights, and allows them to participate in democratic processes.

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