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Thinking through the Event:
Alain Badiou versus Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri

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KEYWORDS	ABSTRACT
Event, Cantorian Set Theory, Multitude, Everyday Politics, Capitalist Sovereignty	*This article offers how the concept of the event is approached by two opposing post-Marxist thinkers - Alain Badiou, Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri. Since the beginning of the modern era, many events, which could be significant or not, have occurred, such as the French Revolution, the Paris Commune, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Zapatista movements, the Arab Spring, anti-globalisation movements, indigenous movements, agricultural movements and the contemporary global protests that have emerged in many parts of the world over the past few decades. They all have affected world politics in some ways. Hence, there are many ways to think about these events or conceptualise these events in distinctive ways. This article compares the approaches of Badiou, who has still been known for his commitment to Maoism, and Hardt & Negri, who established a postmodern relationship between biopolitics, capitalism and empire. The paper emphasises that although both Badiou and Hard & Negri believe that events bring up new possibilities, the event rarely occurs throughout history for the former. For the latter, global capitalism gives rise to the events. The paper stands with Hardt and Negri's formulation as their perceptions enable us to perceive the novelties, potentialities, and creativeness of social uprisings that have become prevalent in the contemporary world.*

Introduction

This article offers how the concept of the event is approached by two opposing post-Marxist thinkers - Alain Badiou, Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri. Since the beginning of the modern era, many events, which could be significant or not, have occurred, such as the French Revolution, the Paris Commune, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Zapatista movements, the Arab Spring, anti-globalisation movements, indigenous movements, agricultural movements and the contemporary global protests that have emerged in many parts of the world over the past few decades. They all have affected world politics in some ways. Hence, there are many ways to think about or conceptualise these events in distinctive ways. Many thinkers (e.g. Derrida, 2002; Gilles, 1990; Heidegger, 1999) have been interested in the conceptualisation of events for a long time. Among them, Badiou and Hardt & Negri perceived the event as a revelation, but their perceptions differed in many ways. This article compares the approaches of Badiou, who has still been known for his commitment to Maoism, and

Hardt & Negri, who established a postmodern relationship between biopolitics, capitalism and empire.

French philosopher, Alain Badiou's work is highly ambitious and easily recognisable because it diverges significantly from the dominant traditions that have emerged since the Second World War. It might be said that Badiou offers a political thought against Marx because Badiou's political philosophy rejects any dialectical relation between the social-economic and the political (Lotz, 2021). Yet, his perspective stands against the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions; instead, he advocates a neo-Platonist position. In addition, his perspective has been strongly affected by the science of mathematics, which is central to his ontology. His work is an attempt to bring together "a new understanding of mathematics; a not exactly-Marxist relationship between philosophy and radical politics; a not-exactly Heideggerian vision of the relationship between philosophy and poetry; and finally a new dialogue with psychoanalysis and the question of love" (Badiou & Critchley, 2007, p. 358). It can be said that his sharp focus on the concept of the event constitutes a new insight into the philosophy (Dag, 2017, p.29). His unrelenting focus on the idea of "the event" offers new insights for philosophy and is based on a foundation of Cantorian set theory, which allows every situation of being to be infinite.

In contradistinction to this, American literary scholar Michael Hardt and Italian militant philosopher Antonio Negri, as post-Marxist scholars, constitute their philosophy through criticism of traditional Marxism. Yet, Negri and Hardt's position can be associated with the effort to present a modern interpretation of Marxist thought. They attempt to seek the relationship between Marxist social theory and political philosophy. In light of this, they believe that political philosophy can only be described concerning a theory of subjectivity and labour informed by current global capitalism trends (Lotz, 2021). In general, they were inspired by a broad range of philosophers such as Spinoza, Althusser, Deleuze and Foucault, as well as utilised more interdisciplinary works. The core of their work can be summed up in the saying, "the multitude against Empire". They see mass movements (the multitude) as standing in opposition to a new form of global sovereignty (Hardt & Negri, 2000). As part of their analysis, they see the concept of "the event" as crucial. In particular, they regard the works of Deleuze and Foucault as necessary in terms of their conceptualising of "the event". In particular, the vitalist ontology of Deleuze and the biopolitics of Foucault are considered central to accurately conceptualising "the event". Ultimately, what is crucial in terms of "the event" for them is that "being is made in the event." (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 63).

This article seeks to examine the differences and similarities between Badiou and Hardt & Negri's emphases on events, especially with regard to their perspective on the role of politics. The article offers different ways to think the event is perceived. The paper is organised into two sections. In the first section, both perspectives on conceptualising "the event" will be presented separately. In the second, their approaches to political events will be compared and contrasted. Finally, some alternative approaches to conceptualising politics will be evaluated after summarising the main arguments. It is challenging to reach thoughts on the event because the event in Badiou's understanding arises from determining whether things are counted or not by the state. On the other hand, the foundation of Hardt & Negri's event focuses on globalisation or a new form of capitalist sovereignty. The paper ends by discussing how everyday politics is grasped by both authors and stands with Hardt & Negri's conceptualisation of the event.

Alain Badiou's Perspective on the Event

Alain Badiou's concept of the event is distinctive and sophisticated. He develops his approach to events, particularly in his influential work *Being and Event* (Badiou, 2007). Badiou specifies his complex ontology according to mathematics; for him, mathematics is ontology. According to Badiou, "the operation of mathematics is itself the discourse of ontology, the description of being-as-being

or pure multiplicity of itself." (Hallward, 1998, p. 90). In this sense, it can be said that his position on mathematics is closer to Plato's position. More specifically, his mathematical ontology is based on Cantorian set theory and algebra. Badiou states, "the ontological decision concerning infinity can then simply be phrased as an infinite natural multiplicity exists." (Badiou, 2007, p. 48). Or stated another way, the set theory does not deal with wholes and parts but rather it "enables us to think [of] being as "inconsistent multiplicity" without reducing it to any transcendental unity which somehow lies beyond multiplicity" (Bassett, 2008, p. 897).

Perhaps it is necessary to begin with, the concept of the "situation" before fully considering the "event". Badiou refers to a situation as a synonym for a "set". Accordingly, a situation can be defined "as the presenting or "counting-out" of elements that belong to a given set" (Hallward, 2008, p. 101). The situation can only submit consistent elements. This means a situation results from the operation (counting or ordering procedure). According to the criteria of a situation, the "void" or "empty set" appears within the limits of the situation. The void is a universally included set; every possible set consists of the void itself and is the foundation of all possible construction. However, the void does not belong not just to any setting but also to the void itself. It is literally an empty or null set; it has no elements. For example, if the situation of capitalism is considered, while profits and property are counted in a situation, proletarian humanity is not calculated in it, and so proletarian humanity is the void or in an empty set (Crockett, 2013; Hallward, 2008). According to Badiou, there will be a fully deployed situation, which he refers to as a multiplicity, stabilised and loaned coherence based on a founding element that does not belong to the plurality. Badiou understands that an event can only occur when something is removed from the equilibrium of a fully deployed state (Smith & Doel, 2011).

What emerged here is an "excess" of subset according to the generation of ordinals. In a finite set with *n* elements, there are always subsets, which have an infinite number of elements. "That is to say that no multiple is in a position to make one of everything that is included… Inclusion is in irremediable excess over belonging" (Hallward, 2008, p. 102). From Badiou's point of view, the state of the situation, what Badiou calls the "meta-structure of a situation", controls this excess and designates the subsets of a set. The state is thus one organisation involved with ordering the parts of the set. Put another way; the state "ensures that the potential anarchic organisation of social combinations remains structured in such a way as to preserve the governing interests of the situation." (Hallward, 1998, p. 92). In this regard, the state prevents the void from being revealed across all situations. For instance, in the capitalist situation, the proletariat remains unrepresented. The state controls the proletariat's power from being revealed, so the question of the state appears to be the central point in Badiou's conception of the "event".

For Badiou, the event is " "supernumerary" in a wholly "numerical" ontological scale." for that, "it is a substanceless, perfectly transient fragment of pure chance which allows for the assertion of a truth to come." (Hallward, 1998, pp. 94–95). This means that events are not predictable from within the situation; it is "self-founding", and every single stage of the progression of the process is led by itself. This insight sheds light on Badiou's understanding that the event does not possess "objectivity" since it has actors inside the action. Events occur at "eventasites", which are not a part of the situation. An evential site is "totally singular: it is presented, but none of its elements is presented." (Badiou, 2007, p. 507). However, an eventual site is not the same as a void. Indeed, it is at the edge of the void, and also it is an odd multiple. An eventual site is a place wherein "something new and decisive can happen, and as such, it 'concentrates the historicity of the situation'. It opens the way to a pure beginning and the inauguration of a 'new time'" (Bassett, 2008, p. 898).

One of the best examples Badiou provides of an event is the French Revolution. According to him, while the French Revolution is an event which is neither presented in the situation nor can it be seen as belonging to its situation, the eventual site is thus eighteenth-century France. This might seem

contradictory; how can the event happen without belonging to a situation and not being present in the situation? However, Badiou explained that the state prohibits events; thus, the French Revolution was "an empty phrase used by its participants and enemies alike, with no real referent" (Pluth, 2010, p. 64). In short, according to Badiou, the event "belongs to that-which-is-not-being-qua-being." (2007, p. 189). In other words, according to Badiou (2014, p. 62), "an event is linked to the notion of the undecidable." In the absence of undecidability within a situation, there would be no event, only a monotonous repetition of the same.

Hardt & Negri's Approach to the Event

Hardt & Negri do not conceptualise the event explicitly as Badiou has done. Their philosophy on events appears step by step throughout their works. In *Empire* (2000), *Multitude* (2005) and *Commonwealth* (2009), they develop their core philosophy based on a contemporary vision of Marxist thought.

In *Empire*, Hardt & Negri argue that, in our time, the era of the nation-state has ended because global capitalism globally destroys all national boundaries. The contemporary economic, cultural and legal transformations experienced across the world cannot be explained by colonialism and imperialism, but rather there is a new form of sovereignty, namely "Empire". Empire is a "new form of sovereignty", which is "now emerging and it includes as its primary elements, or nodes, the dominant nation-states along with supranational institutions, major capitalist corporations, and other powers". (Hardt & Negri, 2005, p. vii). Thus, they use the term Empire to highlight the existence of a present universal order as opposed to nation-specific colonialism or imperialism. In conceptualising Empire in this way, no centre can be identified. Instead, it has a universal order which approves neither boundaries nor limits (Hardt & Negri, 2000).

Turning to the concept of the multitude, they maintain that there are two faces of globalisation. On the one hand, Empire spreads globally through networks and establishes a hierarchy through new control mechanisms and constant conflicts. However, globalisation also produces new kinds of solidarities and common networks which allow a variety of people who would otherwise be separate to act and communicate together. In other words, this aspect of globalisation can be said to be enabling us to discover the common. However, for Hardt & Negri (2005), the multitude cannot be defined as the people or the working class. The multitude cannot also be reduced to a single identity or a unity. Indeed, the multitude can be said to consist of unlimited internal differences. It involves not just culture, race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality differences but also lifestyles, worldviews and differences in desire. Thus, the multitude is a multiplicity of distinct differences. Traditionally the working class has been used as a stand-in for all waged workers; however, the multitude in Hardt & Negri's concept refers to all varieties of social production. In this sense, the multitude is a much broader term (Hardt & Negri, 2005) than traditional class-based concepts.

Considering their understanding of the event, Hardt & Negri do not theorise events similarly to Badiou. Some clues towards their knowledge of the event appeared in their first book, *Empire* (Hardt & Negri, 2000), but these were not sufficiently developed arguments. Their only real reference to events is when they describe them as erupting within the order of the imperial system in the chapter on "Alternatives within Empire". However, their arguments and events' conceptualisation was expanded dramatically in both *Multitude* and *Commonwealth*.

At the end of *Multitude*, their main argument concerning events appears by addressing the question, "When does the moment of ruptures come?" (Hardt & Negri, 2005, p. 357). They argued that "[r]evolutionary politics must grasp... the moment of rupture or *clinamen* that can create [a] new world. Grant politics always seek this moment, creating... a new constitutive temporality... inaugurating a new future" (ibid, p. 357). Moreover, they elaborate that "this long season of violence

and contradictions... the extraordinary accumulations of grievances and reform proposals must at some point be transformed by a strong event, a radical insurrectional demand" (ibid, p. 358). As these quotes indicate for Hardt & Negri, the event must not just bring new possibilities but also must be rebellious.

They continue their argument in *Commonwealth*. In the book's first chapter, they turn to Foucault to discuss biopolitics[1] as an event. They argue that as biopolitics has the potential of the event, it disrupts the normative system. Moreover, such effects do not emerge from the outside but rather it comes from the inside. "[I]t ruptures the continuity of history and existing order.... as ruptures... as innovation, which emerges, so to speak, from the inside...[It] is the source of innovation and also the criterion of truth" (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 57). It is important to note that by borrowing the concepts of biopolitics from Foucault, it seems that their theory of the event has been altered from that proposed in *Empire* and *Multitude.* Accordingly, the event, in their terms, does not just entail forward momentum but also has the power to create a new world. In other words, events give meaning to history by demonstrating the truth of the eternal (Grant, 2010). At this point, we can discern a profound difference between Badiou and Hardt & Negri. Although both Badiou and Hardt & Negri's thoughts can be found in the concept of communism or the pursuit of compelling visions of a postcapitalist world (Lotz, 2021), for the latter event can be found anytime and anywhere in the world.

Events: Rare or Often?

Having considered Badiou and Hardt & Negri's concepts of the event individually, this paper will now compare and contrast these theories and identify their similarities and differences. The conceptualising of events has played an essential point in the thought of many continental philosophers, especially in how they relate to the creation of new opportunities in politics.

As mentioned, Badiou's conceptualisation of events is based mainly on mathematical ontology (Cantorian set theory). In his account, the event happens at the edge of the void; consequently, there is always an excess of subsets. For Badiou, historical situations are unnecessary for events to happen. In *Being and Event,* he states that the evental site "is only ever a *condition of being* for the event," and "there is no event save relative to a historical situation, even if a historical situation does not *necessarily* produce events." (Badiou, 2007, p. 179). Thus, the event requires an interpretative intervention, which gives meaning to the event. Such intervention makes a truth (fidelity), which is then considered universal.

Hardt & Negri's political event concept is very different from Badiou's in many respects. They agree with Badiou that the event must be intense but also look at it from an entirely different perspective. For Hardt & Negri, the intense event occurs from the inside and does not enter from the outside (i.e. emerging from the void of the situation). Hence, they are critical of Badiou's theory of the event as, according to them, it lacks consideration of the relations between freedom and power. They state that a "retrospective approach to the event, in fact, does not give us the rationality of insurrectional activity, which must strive within the historical process to create revolutionary event" (Hardt & Negri, 2009, pp. 60–61). In comparison, Hardt & Negri's event concept bears a stronger resemblance to the Foucauldian or Delezuian event. For example, Deleuze & Guattari (1994, p. 110), in their work, *What is Philosophy*, states that "what History grasps of the event is its effectuation in states of

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[1] In the works of Foucault, biopolitics refers to an alternative production of subjectivity. It addresses "living man" "to a multiplicity of men . . . to the extent that they form . . . a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic" of life. (Foucault & Ewald, 2003, pp. 242–243). In their work, Hardt & Negri give a positive meaning to Foucault's biopolitics. According to them, biopolitics refers to a new era of capitalist production.

affairs or lived experience, but the event in its becoming, in its specific consistency, in its self-positing concept, escapes History".

However, Bensaïd (2004), in his work, criticises Badiou's concept of the event as being miraculous or pseudoreligious because there is not sufficient consideration of reason in Badiou's review of an event. Bensaid asserts, "this is politics made tantamount to an act of levitation, reduced to a series of unconditioned events and 'sequences' whose exhaustion or end remain forever mysterious." (Bensaïd, 2004, p. 98). Considering the causal reasons involved with the event, Slavoj Zizek (2008) proclaims, "It's much easier to imagine the end of all life on earth [e.g. through climate change, nuclear war or wayward asteroids] than a much more modest, radical change in capitalism." (as cited in Frassinelli, 2011, p. 111). Similarly, Bassett (2008) argues that the distinct separation of events and situation is the main problem with Badiou's conception of an event. He suggests that "[w]e may accumulate knowledge of the facts of a situation, but such an analysis is [not] discovered from any genuine truth process. The event is an excess, emerging from the void, and beyond the grasp of causal analysis however detailed and painstaking" (K. Bassett, 2008, p. 902). In this sense, Hardt & Negri's notion, based on Deleuze and Foucault's concept, appears more plausible than Badiou's as Hardt & Negri (2009) recognise that a retrospective approach, which is the central point for Badiou, is limiting in that it causes one to lose sight of the productivity of the event.

As Calcagno (2007) explains that for Badiou's event, three conditions need to be met for it to be considered political. First of all, there must be a collectivity in the material of the event. Secondly, such collectivity must influence contemporary politics and the situation's character. Lastly, the only possibility that political events can emerge is if there is a relationship between the event and the state. For Badiou, it seems that if these three conditions are met, then an event must have a universality of effect. Hence, the effects produced are not restricted just to their time but also have effects in the present.

Consequently, Badiou considers true political events to be rare. In Badiou's account, typical examples of events are the French Revolution, the Paris Commune (1871), the Russian Revolution, the Chinese Cultural Revolution and the 1968 Paris event (Newman, 2011) and Arab Spring (Badiou, 2012). He classified the modes of politics according to history based on such events. Consequently, in his classification system, there are four modes of politics: the revolutionary mode (the French Revolution, 1792-94), the classist mode (1848-1871), the Bolshevik mode (1902-1917) and the dialectical mode (the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 1928-58). All these events, according to Badiou, sidestepped the traditional party-state model of political organisation and produced egalitarian, independent, and radically democratic forms of politics (Newman, 2011). In other words, such events can be considered a critique of political representation.

Hardt & Negri's concept of the event is no such classification system. For them, events are a creation of the multitude, expressing its desire and needs against the Empire. Hence in contrast to the rarity of Badiou's event, they maintain that events are frequently occurring. In *Empire,* they provided many examples of such events, including the Tiananmen Square events (1989), the Intifada against the state of Israel, the May 1992 revolt (Los Angeles), the Zapatista rebellion, the massive strikes in Paris (1995) and so on. All of these events are considered to be biopolitical in nature.

Moreover, they display a lack of communication between them as they have neither a common language nor the same enemy. As a result of this incommunicability, they cannot move horizontally; instead, "they are forced instead to leap vertically and touch immediately on the global level" (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 55). In doing so, "they all directly attack the global order of Empire and seek a real alternative." (ibid, p. 56-57). Thus, in *Commonwealth*, Hardt & Negri argue that "capitalist production [itself]... is becoming biopolitical" (p. 131) as the composition of the labour force has transformed. This transformation produces not only new capital but also new social relations, and

these represent new mechanisms of exploitation and capitalist control. At the same time, the multitude exercises its power in the metropolis through the use of revolts and as such, Hart and Negri focus on the role of the metropolis as a site for uprisings. They describe that "all contemporary metropolises are pathologies in the sense that their hierarchies and divisions corrupt the common and block beneficial encounters through institutionalised racism, segregations of rich and poor and various other structures of exclusion and subordination." (ibid, p. 257). Such inequality is hard to disguise, and due to the constant exploitation occurring in the metropolis, rebellions are fermented. However, Hart and Negri explain that revolts occur not just as a result of hierarchy and exploitation but also due to "the growth of networks of cooperation and communication, the increased intensity of the common and encounters among singularities. This is where the multitude is finding its home." (ibid, p. 260).

In summary, Badiou and Heart and Negri have diametrically opposed positions regarding the frequency of events. Davis (2006) highlights that it is the first time the urban population has exceeded the rural population. Hence, in the contemporary world, cities are growing in unpredictable ways due to globalisation which is pushing people out of the countryside and into the cities. Agreeing with this observation, Hardt & Negri (2009) point out that significant inequalities among contemporary metropolises are a fundamental issue of our era. Consequently, reducing events to the rarity that Badiou suggests little help in understanding contemporary urban conflicts, and it also seems to prohibit the taking of progressive decisions. Thus with Badiou's concept of the event, it appears that it offers no means through which to grasp the rapidly changing condition of our lives.

Conversely, Hardt & Negri have been criticised for their attempts to generalise all events worldwide. For example, Zizek (2009) indicates that Hardt & Negri's account of the multitude rules itself, which he regards as unlikely and unnecessary:

> "The problem with HN is that they are *too* Marxist, taking over the underlying Marxist scheme of historical progress... [T]hey rehabilitate the old Marxist notion of the tension between productive forces and the relations of production: capitalism already generates the 'germs of the future new forms of life', it incessantly produces the new 'common', so that, in revolutionary explosion, this New should just be liberated from the old social form." (Zizek, 2009, p. 266).

Badiou has responded directly to Hardt & Negri's work, arguing that there is no theory of the event in their work. Thus, during an interview, Badiou (2008) asserts, "There is always in Negri the conviction that the strength of capitalism is also the creativity of the multitude. Two faces of the same phenomenon: the oppressive face and, on the other side, the emancipatory, in something like a unity...There is no necessity of an event in Negri because there is something structural in the movement of emancipation." (Badiou, 2008a, n.p.). To some extent, Badiou's criticism seems justified; however, his position may not take account of the development in their thinking evident in the *Commonwealth*.

It is clear that both positions have different perceptions of the event. Moreover, while the concept of an event is crucial for Badiou, Hardt & Negri appear more interested in the revolutionary possibilities that events offer regarding their biopolitical production.

Conclusion

This paper contends that producing theories relating to the event is a crucial task because it assists us in developing a thorough understanding of the world, especially in the realms of politics and history. However, this short comparative examination has shown dramatic differences in theories and conceptualisations of the event evident in the work of Badiou and Hardt & Negri. However, some

similarities are evident in their emphasis on the importance of the event. For instance, both groups of scholars recognise that the event involves rupture and thus brings new possibilities to the world and they also both advocate that the nature of such ruptures is strong.

However, their perspective on the importance of the historical situation is one of the most important differences between their approaches. While for Badiou, the event is unpredictable within the existing situation and thus, the historical position does not have any importance to any event to take place, Hardt & Negri argue that history is essential because it reveals events that occur from the inside. Moreover, as discussed, Badiou's event concept has been criticised because it offers no consideration of the "pre-evental" situation. Neglecting this aspect means that his event emerges as a kind of miracle, which has been identified as a weakness in his argument. On the other hand, although Hardt & Negri's event offers more opportunities, their project can also be criticised as utopian as Zizek (2009) makes this point, contending that even though their ideas provide insight into the logic of contemporary capitalism, their perspective on the political juncture is utopian.

In a sense, however, this is inevitable as the kind of politics they promote focuses on creating a new world. Thus, Hardt & Negri advocate mass movements; in this sense, their political position simply reflects their Marxist ideology. According to them, the multitude is capable of running counter to our desires for democracy, freedom and singularity. Indeed, if contemporary global social movements are carefully analysed, such a multitude can be seen in each movement (see also Castells, 2015; Harvey, 2018; Merrifield, 2012, 2013, 2014). Regardless of race, ethnicity, age, and class, in many global movements, different identities assemble to show their common frustration and anger against the "undemocratic system of globalisation" (Merrifield, 2014, p. VIII). For example, inspiring one another, protesters took to the streets in the 2010s in cities as diverse as Tunis, Cairo, Benghazi, Madrid, Athens, New York, Ferguson, Baltimore, London, Istanbul and Seol. The indigenous movement in Spain and the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States were inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt (Akay, 2021; Calhoun, 2013; Merrifield, 2014). Consequently, Hardt & Negri's multitude of concepts enables us to grasp the everyday politics of our cities faces.

Nevertheless, Hardt & Negri suggest that the Commonwealth must be ended, and a list of demands presented to be presented to restore or reinvent a new political conception of the world. We "must demand the support of life against misery… that governments must provide everyone with the basic means of life"; we "must demand equality against hierarchy, allowing everyone to become capable of participating in the constitution of society, collective self-rule, and constructive interaction with others" and we "must demand open access to the common against the barriers of private property." (Hardt & Negri, 2009, pp. 380–381). Although such demands might be vital in the modern world, they do not compass any original thinking. Frassinelli (2011, p. 128), for instance, sees a telling assumption in their perspective; "who is the 'we' who should make their content a concentre terrain of struggle and force them upon governments which are both unable to provide such things as basic means for 'everyone' and… reluctant to get rid of 'the barriers of private property.'"

Alternatively, Badiou's politics can represent a form of neo- or post-anarchism (Bassett & Dewsbury, 2012). Badiou thinks the Party-State cannot solve the problems of the 20th or 21st centuries. This is because we are now at a "distance from the state," which he calls "politics without party" (Calcagno, 2007; Crockett, 2013; Lotz, 2021). What he means by distance from the state is that we currently lack the necessities to enter into an organisation that the state does not define. However, it should be noted that for Badiou, the state includes the government, the media and those who make economic decisions. Thus, he declares, "when you allow the political process to be dominated by the state you've already lost the game because you've abdicated in advance your own political independence." (Badiou, 2008b, p. 651). What he offers as an alternative is that " if we are to propose a new articulation between destruction and subtraction, we have to develop a new type of negation or critique, one that differs from the dialectical model of class struggle in its historical signification"

(ibid, p. 654). However, despite such forceful pronouncements, he has not yet gone further and suggested how such articulation should appear. Hence, his notion of politics seems idealised and abstract, which led to rarefied political events and hard to take place (Newman, 2011). The rise of the anti-globalisation movements, indigenous rights movements, agricultural movements, black lives matter movements and other types of movements, thus, are dismissed as irrelevant by Badiou's abstract event formulation. In this regard, Hardt & Negri's philosophy enables us to perceive the novelties, potentialities, and creativeness of social uprisings that have become prevalent in the contemporary world. Such a conceptualisation also allows us to appreciate everyday forms of emancipatory politics, which Badiou fails to address.

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Return and Recuperation Strategies on Returnees to Nigeria: The Libya Episode

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KEYWORDS	ABSTRACT
Reintegration, Strategy, Libya, Nigeria, Return, Government *Received 06 April 2022* *Revised 24 May 2022* *Accepted 10 June 2022*	*The paper examined the strategies put in place by the governmental agencies for the reintegration of returnees. Primary and secondary data were utilized for the study. Preliminary data were collected through the administration of questionnaires and interviews. The study population (10,369) comprised the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA, 34), National Agency against Trafficking in Persons and other related crime (NAPTIP, 108), International Organisation for Migration (IOM, 34), Nigeria in Diaspora Commission (NiDCOM, 15) and Nigeria returnees (10,180) from Libya. The sample for the study was made up of 399 respondents. The distribution is as follows: NEMA (17), NAPTIP (54), IOM (16), NiDCOM (15), and returnees (297). Secondary data will be obtained from decision extracts of the agencies on matters relating to the subject matter, conciliation meetings, and internet sources. Data collected were analyzed using frequency, distribution, percentage, and Chi-square. The study showed the effect of strategies put in place by governmental agencies, which have enhanced the economic development of the returnees; reduced irregular or illegal migration to Europe through the Libya route; returnees' psychological rehabilitation of returnees in Nigeria. Furthermore, the Chi-square analysis showed that the x^2_{cal} (9.2) is greater than x^2_{tab} (5.99); hence, the rejection of the null hypothesis and it founds a significant relationship between government agencies and the returnees' reintegration. The study concluded that governmental agencies' strategies have an effect on the reintegration of the returnees.*

Introduction

The purpose of reintegration of the returnees is entrenched in the immediate environment, community, and family. Similarly, the realignment of the returnees through the introduction of strategies is hinged on factors responsible for migration. These conditions are often known as pull-push factors which necessitate reintegration strategies for the returned migrants. As a result of these factors, threats and violence on the returnees, assess to economic opportunities; community

structures; relationships and family relations, availability of health care system; psychosocial treatment; education; housing; cultural; and language backing, reintegration strategies are classified into three categories. By extension, the reintegration of returnees requires huge investment, resources, and data (Musalo, Frydman, Cernadas, 2015; Knoll, Veron & Mayer, 2021; Kusari, 2021; Lietaert & Kuschminder, 2021; Apeloko, D. O. and O. O. Ayeni, 2012)

It is the responsibility of government agencies to oversee the returnees' reintegration process, which is overseen by the resources and data at their disposal, as well as the investment allocated for it. The agencies, on the other hand, are both globally and locally created on cooperation, coordination, and collaboration through partnering in both incentives and policy frameworks in the reintegration of returnees in the country of origin. Having developed the synergy for the returned migrants, efforts are combined between international and local response agencies. The agencies include the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Nigeria in Diaspora Commission (NiDCOM), and the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (NAPTIP). The functions of these agencies converged on the design, establishment, and execution of the framework for the re-establishment of returned migrants towards economic, social, and psychosocial strategies.

Black, Arrisson, Lee, Marshall & William (2004); Strand, Boers, Idzerda, Kirwan, Kvien, Tugwell & Dougados (2011) and Koser & Kuschminder (2015) also buttress factors responsible for migrant returnees as conditions in the host country (returnees' policies, inability to acclimatized and integrated into the destination country, living states and others) and conditions in home country (fundamental human rights, safety, social and economy, personal belongings such as shelter, employment opportunities, and personal relationship). Thus, individual factors influencing the decision to return to the country of origin are structural, individual, policy frameworks and returned migrants' readiness. However, as a result of the effect of irregular on the returnees, this study raises a research question on what are the effects of reintegration strategies on the returnees from Libya in Nigeria?, It is on this premise that this paper assesses the effect of reintegration strategies on the returnees from Libya, providing answer to the study question via the paper objective.

Problematising the Returnees Reintegration

Transition to Libya, according to IOM in 2019, as cited in Boyd-Mcmillan & DeMarinis, (2020) and Rever (2020) opine that physical brutality (shoving, slapping, grabbing, forced twisting of the migrant's body, ingestion forcefully of hard substances, pushing, inflicting injuries with weapons, choking and biting, as well as burning); sexual – incest, testing of virginity, forceful sterilization, pregnancy and abortion, exposure to pornography, sexual harassment, anal or vaginal rape, genital mutilation of females, child/early or forced marriage, sexual exploitation through trafficking; psychological (harassment at workplace, insults, and humiliations, restrictions and isolation to communication, control with coercion, and threat of violence); and economic deprivation characterize migrants experiences in the course of migrating to Europe through Libya. As a result of the foregoing, repatriation comes to display owing to the traumatic experience of migrants in Libya. These experiences and others have continued to attract attention globally and locally, as this suggest, IOM (2019); Oxford (2020) and El Ghamari (2016) recent survey indicates that over 181,000 departures of immigrants arrive in Libya, while 193, 581 have been internally displaced in Libya with various degrees of violence not devoid of physical, sexual, psychological and economic violence which has always been at the fore of migrants' repatriation process.

However, existing studies on reintegration (Kuschminder, 2017), Lietaert (2019) argues that the real culprit is not migrant repatriation or return to Nigeria; rather, it's reintegration agencies and their ability or lack thereof to fulfil their responsibilities in making reintegration programmes

successful in the country of origin. Even though government agencies and strategies are in place to assist returning citizens, the difficulties militating in the reintegration procedures seem unrelated to the lack of adequate reintegration programmes for the returnees particularly in the country of birth. Instead, it appears that the difficulties they face in reintegration are due to other factors which are often identified as push-pull factors indicated in both country of origin and destination countries. On this basis, the current state of Nigeria on the returning citizens finds it difficult to reintegrate into the society they had left behind. Peradventure, these challenges persist in spite of the programme put in by government for the recuperation of returnees, the returned migrant from the destination country to their home countries may engage in criminal behaviour, such as robbery and drug use, or even commit suicide as a result of the pressure to find work in an already overcrowded labour market in the host country, perhaps the programmes fail to achieve defined purpose. In a related development, (Mercier et a., 2016) posits that if they fail to live up to their family and society's expectations, returnees face stigma and discrimination especially from their respective families. In addition, returned citizens may develop an inferiority complex as a result of returning to their home countries, which could have a significant impact on their lives.

Although in light of the aforementioned clearly shows the effect of absence, lack or inappropriate implementation of reintegration strategies in Nigeria, it gives the impression of huge benefits derived from the records of recuperation of returnees through economic, social and psychosocial strategies. Significantly, socio-cultural, economic and psychosocial factors have an impact on a returnees' ability to reintegrate back into their home country. On this account, mental maps, bankruptcies and behavioural patterns of those who relocate generally are impacted by cultural adaptations for international assignees in the home country. For some people, returning to their pre-assignment behaviour can be difficult, because their behaviour dynamism has occurred significantly while on an international duty for the recuperation of the returned migrants in home country. While in addition, migrant who relocate abroad also lose contact with their "social network of colleagues and supervisors within the domestic organization, reintegration processes cover the missing gap between the migrants and the labour market." As they return, many tasks await their return, including reconnecting with old friends and learning how to use the most up-to-date technological advances, and they return home because of the loneliness and anxiety that they experience while living abroad. The procedure of reintegration procedures on the returnees, this study raises a research question on what are the effects of reintegration strategies on the returnees from Libya in Nigeria? It is on this premise that this paper assesses the effect of reintegration strategies on the returnees from Libya, providing answer to the study question via the paper objective.

Assessment of Reintegration Programs

Schulhofer and Sambanis (2010) and Jawaid (2017) emphasise that returnees who are given assistance in their efforts to reintegrate economically into society have a greater chance of succeeding in establishing themselves as economically independent once they have returned home. Because it is common for returnees to be unable to make a wage that allows them to support themselves in their home countries, many of the programmes that are designed to assist returnees in readjusting back into society include provisions for economic readjustment. This type of assistance can be of great use to returnees who are in need of skills or resources in order to (re)establish adequate and sustainable income generation for themselves and their families. However, economic reintegration assistance may also take the form of collective or community-based assistance, and the various levels of assistance may not necessarily be mutually exclusive from one another. This section provides an overview of the various forms of individual economic assistance. For instance, returnees can receive individual assistance with particular needs such as high levels of non-productive debt (Van Hear, 2004), and they can also receive assistance within the context of a collective project to set up an activity that will provide them with a source of

income that will be sustainable over the long term. Both kinds of assistance can be given out at the same time if necessary.

Returnees who are physically able to find work have the option, as part of the process of economic reintegration, of participating in the local labour market as self-employed business owners, co-owners of collective businesses (such as cooperatives), or wage or salaried workers. These options are available to returnees who are physically able to find work, such as training or educational support (vocational training, skills' development, finance and budgeting counselling) (Wilson, 2012); Job placement (apprenticeship/on-the-job training, paid internships) (El, 1991; Porto & Parson, 2002); and Job placement (apprenticeship/on-the-job training, paid internships), and Job placement (apprenticeship/on-the-job training, paid internships). These are all examples of individual economic reintegration assistance that could be provided to returnees to assist them in gaining access to the opportunities that were described earlier in this paragraph. When developing strategies for economic reintegration, it is important to take into account the specific requirements and capabilities of the returning individual, as well as the local labour market, the social environment, and the resources that are currently available.

In order to access social services, many people who have returned home, require some degree of assistance, either immediately upon arrival or subsequently in the process of reintegration (Arowolo, 2000). An important part of social reintegration support for individuals returning to their home country in that country is to make it easier to access and make referrals to a wide range of public infrastructure services such as affordable housing and educational opportunities. Reintegration services are tailored to the specific needs of each individual returnee by the organisation in charge of reintegration or its partners. When it comes to helping returnees find a place to live, case managers and service organisations oftentimes rely on word-of-mouth or other informal connections. Despite their importance, these connections are extremely fragile. Staff turnover makes them vulnerable to being compromised because they necessitate intimate knowledge of the local community. Returnees in this context have difficulty securing a place to live because of the need to pay rental deposits, security deposits, and to show proof of a steady job. Moreover, returnees with large families, those with disabilities, or those who are single parents may face discrimination in certain settings. A returnee's best bet is to work with a case manager to find a housing situation that is both ideal for them and one that can be maintained over the long term. It's critical to consider the following aspects when selecting an appropriate place to stay: What is the returnee's preference in terms of proximity to their family members and the community in which they were raised? Additionally, sustainable housing requires foresight into possible future changes. Returning to a more stable housing situation after building capital, social networks and a new home can have both positive and negative effects on an individual's life. People who move back to their home country may have difficulty finding housing at first. Carr (2014) argued that it could be due to a lack of money and/or if the home is damaged by bad weather, for example. To improve housing sustainability during reintegration, returnees should be assessed for possible housing issues, prepared for these issues, and then followed up.

The primary goal of individual psychosocial assistance to assist returning migrants' psychological well-being and ability to re-establish social networks (Williamson and Robinson, 2006; Silove, Ventevogel and Rees, 2017). Moreover, individual psychosocial assistance is most commonly provided through counselling, but clinical referrals should be considered in certain circumstances. Even if a returnee does not have clinical needs for psychosocial counselling, it is critical for long-term integration to have a healthy social life, networks, and contacts. Many shifts occur in a person's mental and emotional state as they embark on a journey across the ocean. Migrants undergo a transformational process after fleeing their home country, one that takes into account the reasons they left, their journey, the welcome they receive in their new country, and their ability to adapt and reintegrate. Traumatic experiences can influence a person's re-entry into society,

culture (including gender norms), and behaviour in both old and new environments. It doesn't matter if they're big or small, positive or negative, conscious or not. Doyle and Peterson (2005) previously contend that migration can be disruptive, even if it occurs in an organic way, if it is a result of a difficult choice or if the return is forced upon migrants, especially if they have little choice but to return to their home country. The reintegration of returnees can be made easier if these aspects are recognised and taken into account when providing assistance.

All of these factors play a role in returnees' overall well-being in their psychosocial life. A sense of failure and loss, a negative self-perception, and other deep negative psychological reactions may accompany the difficulties of re-establishing ties to family and friends, difficulties creating an income, and the uncertainty of facing a new life in a country that has changed during their absence (or that returnees perceive very differently after their migratory experience) (or that returnees perceive very differently after their migratory experience). It is essential to pay attention to the psychosocial aspects of reintegration and the psychological, social, and cultural challenges they present in order to help migrants achieve long-term integration. Personal psychosocial support is an important component of successful reintegration. As a result of toxic stress, deep anxieties, and social stigma, many people are unable to participate in or take advantage of livelihood opportunities. When it comes to ensuring the well-being of members of the community, this is especially important. This state of mind makes it difficult to make decisions about the future at all (Kuschminder, 2017; Kandilige and Adiku, 2020). For example, there are few cases of reintegration assistance, although it was carried out on Italian returnees.

Recuperation results associated with geographical context

Number of reintegration cases Regions of Origin	Part I	Part II	Part III	Part IV	Part V
Asia	11	21	42	44	108
Europe and Community of Independent States (CIS)	13	21	40	19	33
Latin America	18	33	112	162	265
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA)	84	30	55	21	53
Sub-Saharan Africa	48	34	70	50	111
Total reintegration cases	*174*	*139*	*319*	*296*	*570*

Source: Adapted from IOM AVR Framework, 2015.

Examination of Forced Return and North Africa Experiences

Baser, Mehmet and Fatimah (2018) enumerate causes of deportation, though scholarly structured into the pattern, remote and immediate reactions. The acknowledgement of root causes enumerated are; i) exposure of refugees or asylum to timeless detention officially internal to the government or non-state actors, in this circumstance, the militia directives, ii) forceful detainment of migrant, subsequently subjecting to graven conditions with little or no food, servitude, torture, forced labour and other dehumanizing experiences, iii) automatic detention of migrant on the sea without trial, iii) non-legal presence of legal and administrative processes on immigration detention, iv) insensitivity of the government to the plights and vulnerability of migrant (ill-treatment, i.e. human trafficking and rape), and v) broker of deals with Libyan Government and militias to control migrant in-spite of severe and abuse of human rights. In supporting the enumeration of GDP, the above contributions are valid for their progress.

Repatriation of migrants to home countries is no doubt the resultant effect of immigrant actions as well as inactions that spike the anger of the host countries. But an upheaval of remote and immediate menace violently nurtured from accumulated grievances invested as a result of

feedback or consequences of actions. In that circumstance, reviewed by Sönmez (2020), and Fishman-Duker (2019), Douglas Murray (2017), contribute to the issues from several accounts in the book titled "Strange Death of Europe." In that contribution to the aforementioned, sexual assaults were increasing, and some of these include; German women in years respectively (20, 55, 21, 17, 21, 25) raped by asylum seekers in Germany in which, most of them are Africans and middle east asylum seekers (30, 30, 25, 21, 28) years old respectively. Although, many of these rape cases made it to judicial trials, while some never made it to the judicial parlance.

Ullah (2014) and Al Jazeera (2013b) in this report reveal another official cause of the deportation of Africans from the land of Israel. In part, the sudden legislation against the foreigners in Israel to detain any migrants under the new regime dispensation spurs Africans' mass movement. Contrary to the opinion of Guardian and Al Jazeera contributions, self-defacements, hatred, being short-changed, and inferiority complex could be a violent action against the Africans and infuriates a hostile environment. Al Jazeera (2014) and Long (2013) report that over two million migrants were repatriated owing to sudden legislation against the immigrants. Hence, breaking down the sanity of the host environment.

Migrants and refugees in North Africa are open to dreadful violations of the rights of human persons. The horrendous actions on human rights violations have continued to thrive as a result of state institutions that are weakened by persistent years of political division and conflict (AI, 2017 cited in Macintyre, 2020). Recently, the upheavals in North Africa, as reports revealed, for example, the extant studies on Libya remain scanty, however, it may be a meaningful action of Gaddafi's restricted administration against disclosure of migrants' identity in Libya. Academicians, researchers, scholars, and other affiliated research groups were restricted from researching migration and related issues. That is, issues concerning unilateral arrest, detention, and other anti-humanity activities raised tension on encryption on exposing Libya through research programmes (Hamood, 2008).

Notwithstanding, borders on research in North Africa do not stop other states' activities from conducting findings on what, why, and how migrants are flowing from the West Africa region, most especially Nigeria in that circumstance. However, Adepoju (2002), de Haas (2008), and Raineri (2019) opine that the level of migration and its consequences can be logically raised from the experiences of returned migrants through holistic research on the returnees. In other words, some have criticise the notion separately from being in tandem to some factors, which are not familiar, particularly attributed to each region vis-à-vis the development of the home country. Ultimately, Libya government activities on various transactions occurring in the country contributes to the psychological trauma experienced by the migrants.

In an attempt to control the internal governance in the host countries, anti-government protesters consequently became wide in revolts in rejecting the ideology of Colonel Mummah Al-Gaddafi's for example, the promotion of the sub-Saharan combined foreign treaties popularized Libya as receiving state for migrants coupled with the nearness of Libya to Europe (Loescher, 2014 and Bob-Miller and Bob-Miller, 2013). Likewise, the urge to control internal governance by the Libyans did not just commence in a short while but consequently brewed from both remote and immediate causes. The remote reason, on the other hand, as mentioned in (Bredeloup & Pliez, 2011), is a perceived sense of injustice, widespread corruption, tyranny, and several years of marginalization politically. In another study Bob-Miller (2012) & de Haas (2007a; 2007b) also contribute that the root cause of repatriation can also be linked to the heavy inclusion of foreign nationals into key positions in Libya, thereby subjecting the citizens to menial jobs. Although, the plausibility of having all these as remote causes could be accepted. But be that as it may, individual, group and economic downturns cannot be set aside to determine the major causes of the repatriation of Nigerians from Libya.

Kuschminder (2014) reveals the causes of repatriation and deportation of foreigners in North Africa to countries of birth as suggested by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees through the vulnerability of environmental porosity. This, on the other hand, UNHCR report, found that harsh conditions of the environment, the prevalence of criminal schemes and lack of the rule of law, precarious mobility and lack of medical assistance and other basics (food, water, and clothing) necessitate the sanctity of readjustment strategies on returnees. Categorically, this in turn, impact positively on home country socio-economic environment returnees' economic capacity is enhanced. Despite those causes of repatriation of foreigners in Nigeria, it is no doubt that the illegal detainment of migrants, maltreatment along the transit route such as being subject to a beating, whipping, robbing, forced labour, sexual molestation, and exploitation characterized the host country as it appears in Libya in that circumstance.

The present dispensation of instability in Libya, South Africa, and Angola, among others, have seriously deteriorated foreigners' capacity to grow and develop in the destination countries. According to UNHCR (2014) report, the threat of armed violence, xenophobic actions, and outright discrimination against foreigners, especially the Nigerians who are "known as Hustlers", are being victimized to leaving the destination countries. In that spirit, by inception, the mandate of the agency for the reintegration of returnees in Nigeria, for instance, prepares the ground for migrant returnees from various host countries and enunciates the readiness of NCFRMI, NEMA, NAPTIP, and NiDCOM. They have saddled the primary roles of readjusting the returned migrant into the country of origin purportedly. On the contrary, it also alludes to the dehumanization of foreigners in the host country. Libya especially is not in tandem with the signatory of the 1951 Conventions. This enabled it, to some extent, the ordeal of irrational activities against humanity in the host country.

Arising from the previous text, the remote cause of repatriation and deportation of migrants from Libya pass-off from the distance from the signatory to 1951 treaties. The non-alignment of Libya perhaps snowballs gradually some implications and consequences of sanctions on any particular erring member can affect those actions as well as inactions of the global body to an extent restrain the countries from infringing on the human rights of host and home country citizens. For example, in Italy, Povoledo (2013) opines those human rights violations are characterized and likewise criticized by international organizations, which also represent the roots of Africans (Nigerians, Ethiopians, Somalis, and Sudanese) repatriations in Italy. Alluding to the above statements, (de Haas & Sigona, 2012) posits that another salient reason that can be responsible for the deportation of foreign nationals from the host countries is also hinged on the increasing rate of influx of undocumented migrants from the host countries, which subsequently engaged in low-skilled job and extremely informal such as construction sites, a sales representative in retails outlets, agricultural circuit. Opinions of the writers vary due to individuals' reasoning and logical capacity presentations. Dumont and Spielvogel (2008a; 2008b), in contesting the above fact, same reasons for leaving the country of birth can also be accounted for leaving the destination country. That every county has its own beliefs, culture, traditions, and government, of which some of these causes are a general phenomenon. Causes, either remote or immediate, can be general. These are landslides, and flooding could be an available signal for migration.

Away from the individual perspective, the argument also spurs from the theory of Abraham Maslow on Motivation theory. However, Maslow's theory postulated six hierarchies of satisfaction which we can summon the leverage on some of those things that fuelled the crisis of exploitation, maltreatment, dehumanization, extortion, human trafficking, sex trade, and smuggling of migrants for economic pursuit (Anyanwu, Omolewa, Adeyeri, Okanlawon, Siddiqui, 1995). In the same vein, in an attempt to source for the basic needs, which are relative in persons and insatiable. However, individual interest depends on time, age, level, position, status, and achievement that dictates the scourge for aggressive steps to confront their setbacks. In another development, Cerase (1974)

enumerates four key factors as determinants of returning the migrant in Italy: prejudice, selfish interest rather than common interest (this can be described as voluntary return), incapacitation due to old age, and innovative mind.

In contrast to the summations of Cerase (1974), the listed determinant for migrant returnees can be expelled by countering his reaction to his opinion based on the following ways include the racial life that is expended by the host country, the high tax rate on the accumulated wealth, stringent migration policy, among others other could be responsible for returnees to his or her country of birth. In the same vein, Dumont and Spielvogel's (2008) findings classified Cerase's perception of migrant return to their home country as i) inability to acclimatize or synchronize easily into the destination country, ii) comparison of host and home country aftermath of departure from the country of origin, iii) premeditated decision on the tendency to savings, and iv) employment opportunities in the home after-acquired self-development at the host country. Although, the findings of Dumont & Spielvogel (2008) do not hold in every contingency as returning of migrants is dynamic in deciding what factors may be responsible for repatriation vis-à-vis the consequent of rehabilitation and reintegration of returnees from host counties.

Klinthall (2006) and Escobar et al., (2006) argue that another factor that is imperative, which causes the uprising of migrants' return decision back to the home country. However, the opinion of Klinthall and Shorthand invalidate the findings of Dumont and Spielvogel, which asserts that the paradigm of returnees to their home country can also be stemmed from the residency state of the migrant in the destination countries. In that study, it is, however, affirmed that decision of migrant to return is in connection with migrant's economy and residence rights permanently, limitless residence rights of migrant's ecomigrant's) migrant's economy and provisional rights to stay, migrants under provisional safety or welfare reasons. In this context, the decision of migrants to return to their home country largely, to an extent, depends on their right to stay provisionally or permanently.

The host country, on the other hand, may be to blame for a sudden shift in a migrant's status. To put it another way, the new government's stricter immigration policies could have an impact on this. People who moved to New Zealand or Canada in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s to establish a business or to reunite with family may be more likely to leave the host country after five years than those who migrated for other reasons, such as education or training. In contrast to Klinthall and Escobar et al. (2006) and Cerase (1974), who in their studies posit that returned migrants depend on economic residency achieved over time and changes in government migration policy, Koser and Kuschminder (2015) present their study against this backdrop. Koser and Kuschminder, on the other hand, categorised the factors that influence migrants' voluntary and involuntary return home. According to the categorization, individual aspects like gender, social relations, and age, as well as policy involvements in the context of reintegration processes as incentives or sanctions in home and destination countries, are considered. Trafficking in Persons (National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking). Returned migrants' decisions to return to their home countries are largely based on "returnees' "preparedness," according to Cassarino (2004). He believes that readiness and disposition are influenced by the two nuclei fundamentals. Environmental factors, on the other hand, often preclude the ability to put together both concrete and in-concrete economic vices, making it difficult to return home voluntarily.

According to another study, traffickers and their militias operating in North Africa — particularly Libya — have contributed to the repatriation and deportation of Nigerian migrants to their home country, even though this may be occurring in countries all over Sub-Saharan Africa. Jordan and Prendella, 2019 confirmed that child trafficking and smuggling are major focus areas for those involved in trafficking, but the study includes all forms of deportation or repatriation, no matter how old or how young the individual is. Approximately 679,897 migrants have been identified in

North Africa (primarily in the Cairo, Tripoli, Tunisia, and Morocco region) as of June 2018, including 54,392 children, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). About 4,574 of the migrants are said to be in detention centres, which means that 33 percent of the children involved in the conversation are travelling alone.

It is also possible to point to the death of Muammar Gaddafi in late 2011 as another reason for Libyans returning home. It is because of this and other factors that foreigners are subjected to sex attacks in Libya, where there is a political vacuum and dangerous activities. It's no surprise that the international community and Islamist factions are battling for control of Libya. In addition, there is the battle for economic supremacy. However, the hardships of the Mediterranean Sea contribute to migrants returning from their long journeys. As an example, it will take about 1000 kilometres, 1200 kilometres and 1400 kilometres to get to Tripoli, Tunisia and Morocco from Nigeria (Wikipedia). Migrants are at risk during this time of transition for various forms of abuse and hardship, including sexual molestations like rape and rape, beatings, theft, malnutrition, and illegal detention without charge or trial for extended periods of time. The findings of Bernd and Alenxandra (2018) show that Africans, particularly those from the sub-Saharan region, face difficulties in obtaining an official document to remain in Germany.

Reintegration Assessment and Performance on Returnees

Whenever a reintegration programme is implemented, its effects can be seen by the participants. The migrant returnees' human development has benefited from this as well. Moreover, the program's expansion into the general public. As a matter of fact, there is no point in monitoring and evaluating certain work if there are no policies, plans, or programmes to monitor. Every milestone of migrant reintegration must be met in order to have an impact on the long-term reintegration process. Families and communities are also affected by returning citizens, as is the government. The occurrence of returning migrants is a cyclical process. Tradition, if not ritual, promotes global trends and patterns of integration through repetition. Aside from that, global reintegration trends could alter the way people think about migration. Readjustment concerns also include a wide range of actors, including those who have been abroad for a long time, those who have incentives and a strategy for living abroad, and those who have a sense of legitimacy as a migrant. One of the most important aspects of the reintegration pattern is that it allows vulnerable groups who have no intention of returning to their home countries to develop to their full potential. This is the view of several scholars, such as Cassarino (2015), Farell, Mahon and McDonagh (2012), Stark (1996) and Apeloko (2021).

The vulnerable group, on the other hand, is a response to inequitable distribution and allocation of resources to the governed, rather than a reflection of labour withdrawal from the country of origin. However, this category of vulnerable dispersals includes a variety of scholars, including students, skilled labour, and semi-skilled personnel, as mentioned previously in the literature (Glaser and Habers, 1974; Kuschminder, 2014; Thorn and Lauritz, 2006; McLaughan and Salt, 2002; Lowell and Findlay, 2001; Vertovec, 2002; Cervantes and Guellec, 2002; and Wickramasekara, 2003). Furthermore, trafficking in persons of individuals from home country and smuggling of migrants having been shown with recent development of unequal allocation of the commonwealth, the return of refugees after a plethora of confrontations from the destination countries' citizens, government, and militias, particularly in Libya, have indicated as a deceptive tool which is adopted by "Ogas and Madams" as usually referred to by migrants (Cassarino 2008; Iredale et al., 2001; McCormick and Wahba 2003).

Consequently, migration patterns can be classified into the aforementioned categories in the context of this study. Illegal routes to Europe are possible for other groups through both legal and illegal channels. Both TIP and Smuggling of Migrants can be tentatively categorised as two distinct

groups (SOM). There should not be sufficient justification for the achievement of migrants' development goals in migration politics and processes and patterns if returnees can be reintegrated into society regardless of their route of transit. Another study found that because of their destination, TIP and SOM are frequently returned to their countries of origin. In most cases, the incapacitated group in TIP represents modern slavery. This is child labour and the abuse that goes along with it. SOM, on the other hand, refers to the migrant known as an illegal, unregistered, or undocumented migrant.

Tripartite benefits accrue to the returnees from host countries to their home countries when they are reintegrated. Individuals (migrants), their home countries (of origin), and their final destination countries will all benefit from the interconnected nature of reintegration as the specified agencies work together to achieve the goals and objectives of global government. From the findings of Mohapatra and Ratha (2011), it can be inferred that a reintegration system is beneficial to both primary and secondary stakeholders. In contrast, (Dumont & Spielvogel, 2008) argues that the reintegration of returnees into the environment may have a superficial impact on the home country because of the nature and scope of reannexing the returnees into the environment. Mohapatra and Ratha (2011), along with the earlier work of Dumont and Spielvogel (2008), both challenge the conventional wisdom about how objective these scholars are. Alternatively, the contributions of these researchers can be compared in terms of the specificity with which they assist those who have been trafficked, smuggled, or who have overstayed their visas in the country illegally. An effective enabling environment, especially for those with an abject mind, can be created from the bowels of this review's findings. Corroboration for this study comes from various categories of people who indicate that they intend to move from their home country to the state where they intend to settle. On the other hand, migration is built on the basis of security, economic pursuit and political upheaval.

According to the research conducted by Molenaar and El Kamouni-Janssen (2017), the necessity of Assistance Voluntary Reintegration (AVR) occurs within the confines of a network of smuggling humans into various locations. This, on the other hand, focuses not just on international transiting but also on trafficking within countries, child labour, and the smuggling of people from one location to another. In addition, he confirms that all of these wills were carried out within the framework of irregular dynamics of interaction with national government, regional or state government, as well as changes in local political and economic systems. Molenaar and El Kamouni-Janssen support the idea that the reintegration programme effect has the potential to reduce illegal and unauthorised migration. In a different turn of events, the effect might take on an individualistic character in this sense. In this way, some people may exhibit the effects either on the social level, while others may display the effect on the psychosocial, and still others may be on the economic sagacity achieved during the period in which the AVR was incubating.

In a similar vein, the statutory functions of agencies involved in the readjustment of migrants into their country of birth will be able to provide some insight into the effects of the reintegration programme. Enforcement and reinforcement of strategies on returning citizens by the relevant agencies In Nigeria, for example, the NCFRMI, NEMA, NAPTIP, NiDCOM, and IOM are charged with the responsibility of managing, controlling, and developing the migrant population (which includes asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDP), refugees, stateless persons (SP), and returnees). In the first place, the effect of the reintegration process can be further strengthened by proper monitoring of returnees who have been fragmented, strict adherence to training and workshops, surveillance of migrants with a full participatory development programme, and so on. On the basis of this, returnee adaptations and self-acclimatization in the process make the strategies' impact worse.

According to yet another finding, the term "adjustment to the reintegration process" can be used interchangeably with "reintegration" when referring to this particular aspect. Penkel (2016) places a strong emphasis on the need for an adjustment programme that is improved for both expatriates and repatriates. Due to the fact that the effect of reintegration can only be measured on the migrant themselves, the study has the effect of narrowing the view specifically of reintegration strategies. In other words, the problems that arise from the deportation and repatriation of migrants have their roots in the country that is hosting them. In the past, (Hammer, Hart, and Rogan, 1998) proposed the idea that an individual's expectation is polarised in both positive and negative resolution before and after a return. As a result of this contribution, Penkel is able to express the effect of reintegration both as a precursor to and a consequence of the return of migrants to the country in which they were born (2016). In order to provide further clarification regarding the effect of reintegration, as stated by (Penkel, 2002; Hammer, Hart, and Rogan, 1998), the reintegration effect is qualitative in terms of migrant projections to release themselves so that they can be reincorporated into the primary environment. Consequently, the effects of reintegration on returnees are significantly impacted, tentatively, on trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants by ensuring that the following measures are put in the proper channel before these impacts can be probably measured. The salient needs of returnees involve the following parameters:

1. Counselling psychosocially to return migrants at all stages

2. Embassy help in the country of birth to determine they possess undeniable help such as documents and return flight travel tickets;

3. Access to legal help,

4. Discovery of skills and training

5. Welcoming, information on education for the children, housing, employment decency.

6. Means of livelihood guaranteed at the country of birth - skills, development of entrepreneurship, and start-ups for the returned.

Data Analysis

Assessing the effect of reintegration strategies on the returnees by governmental agencies

Government agencies in Nigeria are responsible for assessing the reintegration of returnees. Accordingly, the quantitative data gathered from the respondents were analysed, interpreted, and tabled in table Aa in terms of frequency, percentage, mean, and standard deviation. It was also decided to use the four-point Likert scale in order to get more specific information from the survey participants. Table Aa provides an explanation of what the median range of respondents' assertions means.

146 (50.6 per cent) of respondents agreed with the assertion; 110 (38.1 per cent) of respondents strongly agreed and corroborated the assertion; 21 (7.4 per cent) of respondents disagreed with the variable; and 11 (3.9 per cent) of respondents strongly disagreed with the assertion, as shown by the distribution of the variable in Table 4.3a. According to most respondents, reintegration strategies have resulted in increased economic empowerment for returnees in Nigeria (X = 3.23).

There were 181 (62.8 per cent) who agreed with the assertion that there had been a reduction in illegal and irregular migration to Europe via the Libyan route among Nigerian returnees; 55 (19.2 per cent) strongly agreed; 47 (16.4 per cent) disagreed; and only 5 (1.7 per cent) strongly agreed with the variable. (X = 2.99) was the average value of this claim. According to this data, reintegration processes appear to have reduced illegal or irregular migration to Europe via the Libyan route among returnees.

In support of the third claim, 124 (43.6 per cent) of respondents agreed with the variable; 110 (38.5 per cent) of respondents strongly agreed with the variable; 32 (7.6 per cent) of respondents disagreed with the variable; and 19 (6.6 per cent) of respondents strongly agreed confirmed the claim's truth. This was reaffirmed by 110 (38.5 per cent) of respondents who strongly agreed with the variable. Analysis of the data showed that reintegration procedures with a mean of (X = 3. returnees' psychological rehabilitation.

A total of 10 (3.5%) of the respondents agreed with the assertion; 10 (3.5%) strongly agreed; 155 (53.8%) of the respondents disagreed with the variable; and 113 (39.2%) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the variable in Nigeria, according to table 4.4a. Similarly, a total of 113 (39.2%) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the variable. The returnees' social reintegration strategies (housing, health, education, and mental health) were confirmed by this variable, which had a mean value of (X = 1.76).

Furthermore, 101 (35.1 per cent) of the respondents agreed with the assertion; 155 (53.8 per cent) of the respondents strongly agreed with the assertion; 22 (7.6 per cent) of the respondents disagreed with the variable; and 10 (3.5 per cent) of the respondents strongly disagreed with the variable. An average of (X = 3.39) was found to indicate that the returnees were involved in social reintegration strategies, such as housing, health and education. In addition, the table below shows how the mean rating and scale are interpreted.

TABLE Aa: Assess the effect of the reintegration strategies on the returnees

S/N	Governmental agency's reintegration strategies (variables)	Responses	Frequency	Percentage	Mean	Decision
1	Increased economic conditions of the returnees	Strongly Agree	110	38.1		High Extent
		Agree	146	50.6		
		Disagree	21	7.4		
		Strongly Disagree	11	3.9		High Extent
		Total	**288**	**100**	3.23	
2	Reduce irregular or illegal migration to Europe through the Libya route	Strongly Agree	55	19.2		
		Agree	181	62.8		
		Disagree	47	16.4		
		Strongly Disagree	5	1.7		
		Total	**288**	**100**	2.99	

3	Improved returnees' psychological rehabilitation in Nigeria	Strongly Agree				High Extent
		Agree	110	38.7		
		Disagree	124	43.6		
		Strongly Disagree	32	11.1		
		Total	19	6.6		
			288	**100**		
					3.11	
4	It protects the returnees from harassment and right-related humiliations	Strongly Agree				Very High Extent
		Agree	155	53.8		
		Disagree	101	35.1		
		Strongly Disagree	22	7.6		
		Total	10	3.5		
			288	**100**		
					3.39	
5	To ease or facilitates access to housing, health and educational services	Strongly Agree				Low Extent
		Agree	10	3.5		
		Disagree	10	3.5		
		Strongly Disagree	155	53.8		
			113	39.2		
		Total	**288**	**100**		
					1.76	

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Table Ab: Mean Rating Interpretation (Returnees Perspective)

Scale	Mean Rating	Remarks	Interpretation
4	$3.26 - 4.00$	Strongly Agree	Very High Extent
3	$2.51 - 3.25$	Agree	High Extent
2	$1.76 - 2.5$	Disagree	Low Extent
1	$1.00 - 1.75$	Strongly Disagree	Very Low Extent

Source: Field Survey, 2022

Test of Hypothesis

Chi-square is the statistical method used to analyse the data. The study's level of significance is set at 5%. (i.e., 0.05). We reject the Ho and accept the Hi if the x^2 calculation is greater than the x^2 table, and we accept the Ho and reject the Hi if the x^2 calculation is less than the x^2 table.

H₀: there is no positive effect between governmental agencies' strategies and the reintegration of returnees in the study area

Hᵢ: there is a positive effect between governmental strategies and the reintegration of returnees in the study area

Using chi-square to test Hypothesis 1

Chi-Square (X^2) calculated is given as

$$\sum \left[\frac{(o_i - e_i)^2}{e_i} \right]$$

Where o_i is the observed frequency and e_i is the expected frequency

Ac Table: Chi-square table for Hypothesis Testing

RESPONSES	OBSERVED FREQUENCY (o_i)	EXPECTED FREQUENCY (e_i)	$(o_i - e_i)^2$	$\frac{(o_i - e_i)^2}{e_i}$
Strongly Agree/Agree	40.8	33.3	56.3	1.7
Undecided	19.1	33.3	201.6	6.1
Strongly Disagree/Disagree	40.1	33.3	46.2	1.4
Total	100.0	100		9.2

Source: Statistically generated from Table Ac

Calculated = 9.2 Degree of freedom = 3 − 1 = 2 at 5% significance level = 5.99, therefore, we reject H_0 and accept its alternative. It was determined that the calculated 9.2 is greater than the tabulated (5.99) and thus, the null hypothesis is rejected because the p-value (0.03) is less than the 0.05 significant level. Thus, the study found a strong correlation between the strategies of government agencies and the reintegration of returnees. The study concluded that governmental agencies' strategies have an effect on the reintegration of the returnees.

Conclusion

Reintegration strategies implemented by the government and their impact on the returnees were examined with this study objective assertion. According to the survey, suggest that majority of respondents agreed with the assertion that returning citizens' reintegration strategies boosted their economic development. Daniel (2018) argument corroborates the findings of this study that economic strategies for reintegrating returnees in Nigeria improve their entrepreneurship skills, and the results of this study corroborate that claim. Using a sufficient sample size, the study was able to cover all levels of government agency staff, from the highest levels of management down to the lowest levels of junior staff. In the same vein, this study's findings support government agencies' efforts to reduce irregular or illegal migration to Europe via the Libyan route to Europe. To validate this further, 47.1 per cent of those polled agreed with the statement above, and 40.7% strongly agreed, while the remaining respondents disagreed availability of returnees' reintegration strategies for the returned migrants in Nigeria.

As a result of the outcome of this study, there was a decrease in the amount of irregular migration caused by remigration from Nigeria transiting via dangerous route. Amidst this, the reintegration strategy, with particular reference to guardian and counselling strategies, returnees' psychological and mental state is improved. Psychosocial reintegration strategies, according to 33.7 per cent of respondents, improve the mental health of returnees, while 54.1 per cent of respondents strongly agreed that this was the case. In addition, 25.2% of respondents disagreed; 27.3% of respondents strongly agreed that reintegration strategies do not engage the returnees in social reintegration methods (housing, health, education, and psychological). Having considers the various approaches to the reintegration of returnees in Nigeria, the effect of economic, social and psychosocial strategies on the returnees were identified in rehabilitated the returnees, realigning the returned migrant into their primary environment in the home country, empowered and re-equipping the

returnees towards self-actualisation. Hence, according to the findings of the study, the strategies implemented by governmental agencies do have an impact on the returnees' ability to successfully reintegrate into society.

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Politico Legal Dynamics of Seaborne Piracy in the Pelagic Waters of South East Asia

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ABSTRACT

Geopolitical location places the seaborne piracy infested pelagic waters of South East Asia (SEA) astride a very different façade of international relations and maritime legal regime of the littoral states disturbing the commercial route and the energy lifelines. The littoral states of the SEA are the immediate stake holders who have a primary role to play in addressing the challenges arising out of this seaborne menace. The present study specifically includes three littoral states of the SEA as representative references, for examination against the backdrop of UNCLOS regime and they are Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. The present work offers a comparative analysis of anti-piracy legal regime of the above selected maritime states who are also the ASEAN states. They all belong to the group of high-income and middle-income developing economies, as categorised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). These nation states have maritime, economic and strategic interests in the oceans and seas adjacent to them. Another striking commonality is that, most of them are poised to industrialise their economies, can be observed from the relatively high-average annual growth rate in the industrial sectors vis-a-vis the agricultural sectors of their respective economies, since the 1990s. Hitherto, the issues raised are, what are the stake holds of the concerned states? Is the prevailing legal regime adequate enough to maintain the maritime stake holds? Are the littoral states triggered to 'use of force' law by post-9/11 developments related? It also addresses how regional and national actors are functioning differently within the scope of a discourse of international law and agencies like UN, ASEAN, etc.

This paper investigates the existing national mechanism of three littoral states i.e., Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand, to combat sea-borne piracy in the maritime South East Asia (SEA). Historically, all these states have encountered the politico-economic changes of the Indo-Pacific region in the face of European colonisation, imperialism, and cold-war and post-cold developments of the new world order and effects of globalisation. The root cause of such a mal-development of maritime piracy in the SEA is the socio-economic lacuna created by the severity of under-development in some states vs the impact of development and developing patterns in the maritime states flanking the pelagic waters of SEA. The littorals have continuously worked to eliminate this menace through their anti-piracy national maritime deterrence and domestic laws under the aegis of the UNCLOS-SUA Convention, and IMO-IMB Protocol. Their efforts seemed successful as

occurrences of sea-borne piracy was going down in 2019. But the Covid 19 pandemic prompted this menace to rise again.

Concerned Littorals of Pelagic SEA

To begin with, littorals of maritime SEA always sought regional power centres for assistance in maintaining maritime order, addressing the problem of piracy and coping with natural disasters. International pressure has been exerted on these states, in particular, on Indonesia and Malaysia, because piracy was thought to originate from these two countries (Chew, 2007). Malaysia and Indonesia were reluctant to acknowledge that they had problems with piracy in their waters. Chew has noted that countries with enhanced maritime capabilities like the United States, India, South Africa, and Australia can help by not only cooperating amongst themselves but also by taking other littoral states on board as part of multilateral efforts towards the maintenance of maritime order in the Indian Ocean (2007:11). A joint anti-piracy, anti-narco-terrorism patrolling of the Indian Ocean had been agreed to in principle between Singapore, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, to which India was also invited (Gupta, 2004). This effort began in 2000, when piracy attacks peaked in the Malacca Straits and increased even more following the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent conclusions drawn about the possible insecurity of the maritime domain. At this time, both Japan and the United States indicated a desire to participate in enhancing security in the waterway (Chew, 2007: 7). However, it was not until 2004 that real steps were taken toward securing the maritime southeast. The problem has led Japan to call for combined action by Asian coastguards and regional governments now recognize the need to cooperate. However, sovereignty disputes and China's opposition to any Japanese involvement in security operations beyond its shores may hinder their efforts (Strategic Comments, 2014). Later, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore have signed an accord to implement anti-piracy patrols in the Malacca Straits, where India was again invited to join at a meeting held in July 2004. – The agreement reached between the Malaysian, Indonesian and Singaporean navies on the conduct of joint anti-piracy patrols in the Malacca Straits with much on-demand aid from India, is a good instance of progress in increasing maritime cooperation (The Strait Times, 29 June 2004).

Furthermore, these states have endeavoured to maintain peace and sustained security through organisations like SAARC, ASEAN, the NAM, and ZOPFAN (Braun, 1983). The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) comprising of 10 member states and 17 partner states, offers the principal forum for the security discourse and develops cooperative measures. Though on the security level these states appear to have strong but diverse objectives, however, cooperation concerning counter-terrorism and maritime piracy has improved considerably since 9/11 and the Bali bombings of October 2002. Therefore, maritime security cooperation is high on the agenda of these SEA states and security cooperation within the ARF has certainly been enhanced (Majumdar, 2015). Whereas the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) offers a defence relationship based on a series of bilateral agreements between the UK, New Zealand, Australia, Malaysia and Singapore dating back to 1971. An Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) for Malaysia and Singapore is based in Malaysia with aircraft and personnel from all five countries being rotated (Bing, 2015).

However, addressing piracy in maritime SEA is complicated. It puts the interests of the user states of regional Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)—such as Japan, the United States and China — against the interests of the coastal states like Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore. Further complicating the matter is that neither user states nor coastal states are united in their preferred approach to the problem. Nevertheless, the national responses of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand to the maritime piracy issue in SEA has contributed to the decline in the frequency, severity, and cost of pirate attacks from their peak in the last few years of the twentieth century. – Therefore, what are the stake holds of these concerned states of pelagic SEA? It is

pertinent to evaluate the UNCLOS counter maritime piracy regime vis-à-vis politico-legal status of the afore-mentioned states under the UNCLOS.

Malaysia and UNCLOS

Malaysia is an UNCLOS signatory state who ratified it in its national maritime law. Since 1996, Malaysian national maritime regime addresses the rights of ships and nations in international and territorial waters, covering such diverse topics as economic zones, underwater cables, collisions of ships, and the navigation of submarines (Bing, 2015). Malaysia has accepted UNCLOS recognition of national sovereignty extending up to 12 nautical miles beyond its land territory to encompass its "*territorial sea*" which includes the pelagic waters, Straits of Malacca and the Gulf of Thailand (Article 100 to 106). As a general rule, ships from all nations may pass through its territorial sea continuously and expeditiously, provided they do not enter a port facility of Malaysia's internal waters without permission, immune by right to "*innocent passage*" and provided the passage is not "*prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the Coastal state.*" (UNCLOS, Article 107 to 110). Following this international maritime regime, Malaysia is entitled to seize a pirate ship or a ship that has been captured by pirates and may arrest the pirates and seize their property. A "*pirate ship*" is defined as any ship, intended by the person controlling the ship, to be used in an act of piracy. The seizure must be carried out by a warship or military aircraft, or by a marked ship or aircraft in government service (UNCLOS, Article 100 to 103). A warship must have reasonable grounds for suspecting a ship is engaged in piracy before boarding that ship. The Malaysian courts may decide how to punish the pirates and how to dispose of their property, subject to the rights of innocent third parties. If a ship is flying a national flag of some country and is seized without adequate cause, the nation of the flagged ship is entitled to pursue the offending nation for damages (UNCLOS, Article 106, 107 and 110). It is note-worthy that the Federal Constitution of Malaysia contains no provision that automatically adopts international law and conventions as the law of Malaysia (HG.org). Malaysian Federal maritime law combines modern legislation, centuries-old Malay doctrines, international treaties, private contracts, and more into a single set of interdependent legal rules. Accordingly, rules or conventions of international law, including the prohibition of piracy in UNCLOS, do not automatically become part of Malaysia's domestic law unless the Malaysian government took action to adopt those laws (HG.org).

Indonesia and UNCLOS

On the other hand, Indonesia is the largest archipelago in the world, with at least 14,000 islands, nearly eight million square kilometres of sea area, and the second-longest coastline in the world is situated at one of the most important maritime crossroads in the Indo-Pacific region. Located between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Indonesia provides a central conduit for global shipping via the Malacca Straits and is also home to several other key maritime transit points, such as the Makassar, Sunda, and Lombok Straits. Its geographical situation has exposed Indonesia to a wide range of maritime security challenges like unreported smuggling, illegal fishing, unregulated piracy, illegal immigration, and vulnerability to maritime terrorism, risking its national security interests and commercial shipping, and maritime tourism (Morris and Paoli, 2018: 18). Understanding the country's geopolitical position Government of Indonesia has reflected in its maritime strategic thinking, putting regulatory, administrative, legal, and material instruments into place to better manage and govern its vast maritime space. However, Indonesia has been unable to develop effective port infrastructure to aid its coastal development and its ranking remains well below many other countries in Asia in terms of port infrastructure quality. Thus, long-term sustained action plans, sustainable resource management etc. have always remained a key challenge for Indonesian maritime policymakers (Fenton and Chapsos, 2018).

Following UNCLOS, to which Indonesia is a signatory since 1994, apart from an obvious act of war, military exercises, and acts of espionage, prejudicial acts include offloading cargo in violation of customs laws, fishing, survey and research activities, and acts that cause serious pollution, acts of piracy are reasonably deemed prejudicial to a nation's good order (HG.org). Nations have the sovereign authority to police and enforce violations of UNCLOS within their territorial seas and straits. For that reason, international law permits a nation to police piracy within its territorial waters, regardless of the nationality of the pirates or the ownership of the vessel under piracy attack. Indonesia has ratified UNCLOS in 2000 and re-conceptualised its identity as a maritime nation whose livelihood both derives from and depends upon the sea, which is evident from President Joko Widodo's Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) in 2014 and Sea Policy proposals (Morris and Paoli, 2018: 17).

Acts of piracy on the high seas are primarily addressed where member states are required "*to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any state.*" (UNCLOS, Article 110). The '*high seas*', define all parts of the sea that are not part of a nation's internal or territorial waters, or the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state, or parts of the sea that fall within an exclusive economic zone, and they are open to all ships of all nations, including landlocked nations. Ships flying any nation's flag are entitled to sail the high seas. Freedom of the high seas, however, is reserved for peaceful purposes (UNCLOS, Article 105, 106, 107 and 110). Hitherto, maritime piracy is well defined under UNCLOS, it does not set out a legal regime for prosecuting pirates, nor does it give guidance on sentencing, or even require states to enact a piracy law (HG.org). This means that it is the prosecuting state's right and responsibility to determine the laws and sentences that apply in cases of piracy brought before its courts. Indonesia does not have a National Anti-Piracy Law, and as a result, pirates prosecuted in Indonesian courts are charged under specific sections of the Criminal Code instead (HG.org).

Thailand and UNCLOS

On the contrary, Thailand has a coastline of 3,219 km, more than 250 islands, and over 4,000 km of inland waterways, a thriving maritime market, that meets most preconditions for maritime piracy threats. Though the Thai maritime sector is relatively small compared to other SEA countries the existing business opportunities, interesting coastal tourism development and multiple strategically located ports and a comparatively good port infrastructure and efficiency make its pelagic waterways an attractive playground for maritime piracy (Thailand Factsheet Maritime Sector, 2018). It is interesting to note that national anti-maritime piracy programmes were seen to be working in Thailand since 1987 (The Journal of Commerce online). During the Cold War period Close to 800,000 people from neighbouring countries fled their homes being affected by the Vietnam War and the consequent fear of totalitarian regime formation and moved into the Thai refugee camps. It is in their narratives where we find their tales of escape which were often coloured by a common thread of horror at sea - brutality at the hands of pirates and smugglers who infest the waters of the Gulf of Thailand. Though Thailand ratified UNCLOS in 2011, it has had its own set of domestic maritime laws combating maritime piracy since 2001.

A Comparative Analysis of Counter-Piracy Maritime Exercises of the Concerned Littorals

Now the question arises that is the prevailing UNCLOS regime adequate enough to maintain the maritime stake holds of the above-mentioned states? Therefore, a comparative observation of the national counter maritime piracy exercises of Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand ancillary to UNCLOS has been done.

Counter Piracy Maritime Exercises of Malaysia

Piracy is not a specific offence under Malaysian law, although the legislature has considered enacting an anti-piracy law (Bhar, HG.org). Pirates must, therefore, be charged with violating some other substantive criminal provision, such as gang-robbery. If an act is illegal under the Laws of Malaysia, a Malaysian citizen or permanent resident who commits that act on the high seas, or any person who commits that act on the high seas on a ship that is registered in Malaysia, can be punished for that crime by a Malaysian court. (Bhar, HG.org) observes that this extension of "*extraterritorial jurisdiction*" to the high seas permits Malaysian authorities to prosecute pirates who attack a Malaysian ship and commit acts, such as robbery or gang-robbery that would be crimes if committed within the borders of Malaysia. Jurisdiction to try such offences is conferred on the Malaysian Federal High Court by the Courts of Judicature Act 1964, as amended. That Act also gives the Malaysian Federal High Court jurisdiction to try offences committed "*by any person on the high seas where the offence is piracy by the law of nations*." (Courts of Judicature Act, 1964). The latter provision embodies the concept of "*universal jurisdiction*" and appears to confer jurisdiction to try violations of UNCLOS (Articles 100 to 107 and 110). It is not clear, however, whether conduct prohibited by UNCLOS can be tried if it is not specifically criminalized by Malaysian law, given the distinction between the 'triability' of an offence and jurisdiction to try the offence (Courts of Judicature Act, 1964). And finally, the Malaysian Federal High Court has jurisdiction to try offences against the state or any offence certified by the Attorney General to affect the security of Malaysia when such offences are committed on the high seas by a citizen or permanent resident of Malaysia or onboard a ship registered in Malaysia. That provision of the law provided the jurisdictional foundation for a recent piracy prosecution (Courts of Judicature Act, 1964).

The Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA) the Government policy research institute set up in 1993 has so far taken a comprehensive approach in dealing with national, regional and global maritime matters affecting Malaysia and have so far successfully contributed towards a meaningful, comprehensive and cogent national maritime policy for Malaysia (MIMA Website). MIMA's research wing The Centre for Ocean Law and Policy (OLAP)**,** aspires to be Malaysia's national centre of excellence for research in ocean law and policy issues and aims to provide timely and relevant advice and policy options as well as to identify key areas of interest for Malaysia's multi-disciplinary realm of Ocean and maritime law that encompass UNCLOS and IMO and other related international law, as well as maritime and admiralty law. So far OLAP has undertaken the role of promoting awareness in ocean law and maritime legal aspects to appropriate stakeholders and the public, by conducting seminars, training workshops and conferences, quite effectively (MIMA Website).

Counter Piracy Maritime Exercises of Indonesia

Conversely, rooted in the history and experiences of the military and the state itself, Indonesian maritime strategic culture has so far shaped the perceived roles and responsibilities of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Laut (TNIAL), the most capable maritime security agency of Indonesia. Albeit institutional, doctrinal reform and weapons modernisation, the navy appears to be reluctant to relinquish its long-standing law enforcement and internal security roles resulting in overlap of roles and responsibilities among the various maritime security agencies and civil-military relations in Indonesia (Arif and Kurniawan, 2017: 77).

Indonesian maritime domain has ensured positive regulatory developments in the domain of illegal Unreported Unregulated (IUU) fishing; a ban on transhipments; a ban on the use of unsustainable fishing gear; the strengthening of auditing and licensing practices; the development of a more rigorous legal framework that has contributed to improving the governance of the fishery business.

(Morris and Paoli, 2018: 28). Hence, maritime security is a vital part of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) policy. It articulates,

> First, if maritime piracy and armed attacks against ships cannot be anticipated by Indonesia's coast guard and navy, it would potentially cause harm to the development of the maritime industry and service sectors of not only Indonesia but all the littorals of maritime SEA.

> Second, vulnerability to maritime piracy may threaten the image of Indonesia as a maritime nation.

Furthermore, in 2014, President Joko Widodo declared his vision of GMF to transform Indonesia into a global maritime power. Underlying this vision is a renewed realisation of Indonesian geostrategic importance and the changing strategic environment (Morris and Paoli, 2018: 21). While non-traditional, trans-national maritime security threats such as piracy, armed robbery and other sea-borne crimes like illegal smuggling and trafficking continue to threaten Indonesian maritime jurisdictions, more traditional, conventional military threats are re-emerging as major powers like China, United States, Australia and India continue to stretch their areas of strategic interests. GMF stands in contrast with the previous Indonesian foreign policy and maritime doctrine as it seems to be more outward-looking and even assertive in pursuing its strategic interests, seeking to build the country's maritime defence capabilities, enabling it to play an active role in the Indo-Pacific region, re-establishing Indonesia's decades-old ethos of 'green water' navy finally into fruition (24).

On the international level, apart from UNCLOS, Indonesia has become a party to several maritime treaties that have enhanced its standing in maritime law protocols, such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the International Labour Organization Maritime Labour Convention (ILO-MLC). Five Indonesian ports have passed the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), set under the IMO, on minimum security arrangements for international ports and government agencies (Dinarto, 2016, Fenton and Chapsos, 2018). Finally, the concept of 'sharing' regulatory and operational approaches among regional states to combat shared maritime security issues may now be regarded among policymakers in Indonesia as the most viable solution to combat maritime piracy addressing regional maritime security challenges (Dinarto, 2016). Indonesia must strengthen maritime security cooperation through active diplomacy. According to its capacity as a middle-power country, Dinarto (2016) observed, Indonesia maximized its bargaining position at least in particular fields of interest. Indonesia is so far actively strengthening its maritime security cooperation through bilateral, trilateral and multilateral channels as a preventative measure.

Counter Piracy Maritime Exercises of Thailand

However, in case of Thailand, we find a robust and elaborate national maritime regime, at work, much before the UNCLOS has been incepted.

Thai Vessels Act, B.E. 2481 (1938) defines (Ministry of Transport, Thailand) "*trading in Thai waters*" reserves domestic coastal shipping i.e., transportation of cargo between two points in Thai waters, for registered Thai vessels. Section 7 of the same regulation stipulates that only registered Thai vessels with at least seventy per cent of Thai equity for domestic shipping with hundred per cent Thai national crew onboard and registered Thai vessels with at least fifty-one of Thai equity for international shipping can do "*trading in Thai waters*" whereas Section 47 stipulates that foreign-registered vessels can be allowed to do "*trading in Thai waters*" if (1) international agreements or treaties signed by Thailand agreed to do so, and (2) it is proved that certain type of

Thai vessels is not sufficient and will adversely affect the country's economy. This is to be approved by the Minister of Transport case by case for a period of one.

Furthermore, Thailand's anti-piracy law Bhumibol Adulyadej Rex Act on Prevention and Suppression of Piracy, B.E. 2534 (1991) reads "*all of the Laws, by /law and regulations in so far as they deal with matters provided herein or are contrary hereto or inconsistent herewith shall be replaced by this Act.*" According to the Section 1 of this act, "*The Acts of Piracy*" means any act of

(a) Seizing or taking control over any ships by force or threats to endanger the ships or doing any act of violence or threatening to do any act or violence against any person or board the ship.

(b) destroying the ship or causing damage to a ship or by any other means which is likely to cause danger to that ship.

(c) detaining or confining the other person on by any other means whatever, depriving such person of the liberty of a person. Or,

(d) robbery or gang-robbery which is committed on the high seas, or within the exclusive economic zone of any state by a person on board a private ship or a private aircraft against another ship or against a person or property or boarded such ships and for private ends of the offender.

"*Private ship or Private aircraft*" includes warship, Government Ship or Government Aircraft whose crew has mutinied or taken control over such ship or aircraft or seized or taken control by any person (Section 1, Bhumibol Adulyadej Rex, B.E. 2534).

"*Preliminary investigation and inquiry*" mean search for facts and evidence, the collection of evidence, or other proceedings conducted by the naval official according to the provisions of this Act in connection with the act of piracy to assert the fact or the particulars of the offence or establish the guilt or securing the delivery of the offender to the inquiry official (Section 2, Bhumibol Adulyadej Rex, B.E. 2534).

Following Section 5 of the said Act, the naval officials shall have the power to perform necessary measures and the preliminary investigation and inquiry of the naval official become an integral part of the inquiry official under the Criminal Procedure Court (Section 5, Bhumibol Adulyadej Rex, B.E. 2534).

If the Naval Official shall have a reasonable ground to suspect that it will commit or has committed an act of piracy (Section 6, Bhumibol Adulyadej Rex, B.E. 2534); by sending boat or aircraft under his command to the suspected ship, to verify the right to fly the flag and if there is any reasonable ground, the search can be conducted following Section 6 and the suspected can be detained following Section 7, 8, 9 of the said Act and following Section 10 and 11, the offences and the accused shall be tried and adjudicated by the Criminal Court of Bangkok Military Court, depending on the venue of the act, be it coastal water or territorial water or high seas (Section 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, Bhumibol Adulyadej Rex, B.E. 2534).

Furthermore, Thai anti-piracy act offers different punishments to the offenders depending on the gravity of the offence.

Section 15: Any person who commits the act of piracy by seizing or taking control of a ship, by doing any violence, threatening to do any act of violence to cause damage to a ship or by doing any

act against any person on board such ship shall be punished with imprisonment of five to ten years and a fine of fifty thousand to a hundred thousand Baht.

Section 16: Any person who commits the act of piracy by destroying a ship shall be punished with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment of one to twenty years.

Section 17: Any person who commits the act of piracy by causing damage to a ship which is likely to cause endanger to any person shall be punished with imprisonment of six months to seven years and a fine of five thousand to seventy thousand Baht.

Section 18: Any person who commits the act of piracy by causing damage to a ship or by any other means whatever which likely to cause damage to such ships shall be punished with imprisonment of six months to five years or a fine not exceeding fifty thousand Baht or both.

Section 19: Any person who commits the act of piracy by detaining or confining the other person or by any other means whatever depriving such person of the liberty of five to ten years and fine of fifty thousand t a hundred thousand Baht.

Section 20: Any person who commits the act of piracy by robbers or gang-robbers shall be punished with imprisonment of ten to 20 years and a fine of a hundred thousand to two hundred thousand Baht.

- It is interesting to note that to halt maritime theft, attacks, smuggling and abductions, the U.N. High Commission on Refugees had supported the Thailand Government's anti-piracy program, where the Thai marine and provincial land police are being schooled in law enforcement methods aimed at combating maritime piracy and other sea-borne crimes (Thailand Factsheet Maritime Sector, 2018). As a co-sponsor of the program, the United States spend about $7 million in maritime and coast-guard training and has installed a U.S. Coast Guard unit in Puget Sound. Lt. Cmdr. Mark Jorgenson, commander of the Pacific area training team informed the media that "*the Thais are being trained in maritime law enforcement strategies including boardings, search-and-rescue missions and first aid.*" (Geographic Research Study, 1984: No. 6). Lt. Cmdr. Steve Kraus, refugee officer at the U.S. embassy in Bangkok, said in a report to the U.S. Coast Guard that he believed that the anti-piracy program would be working. He claimed the number of assaults on refugee boats has been cut from 3.2 attacks on a boat in 1981 to 1.2 attacks a boat in 1986 (Geographic Research Study, 1984: No. 6).

Still, Tung Thanh Nguyen, the coordinator of the Southeast Asian Refugee Coalition in Seattle, believes that Piracy and other acts against coastal communities and illegal immigrants overpopulating the coastal refugee camps are difficult to deter. "*Programs such as the one operated by the Thai government will do little*" ... as ... "*these anti-piracy programs do not begin to touch the surface in finding solutions to the problem of victimization.*" (Silk Legal website). Mr Tung stressed due to poverty, it is not rare, he said, "*for the coastal communities to be fishermen by day and pirates or smugglers by night.*" Furthermore, through major investments in infrastructure and the development of the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC), a strategically located economic zone, Thailand becomes the maritime gateway to Asia. Positive and stable economic forecasts for the Southeast Asian region, combined with Thailand's ambitious plans, have created interesting business opportunities for Dutch enterprises in the maritime sector.

Politico-Legal Dynamics of the Concerned Littorals Regarding Piracy

Thus, we can see, that the politico-legal dynamics of seaborne piracy in the pelagic waters of SEA is varied and incongruous. Are these states triggered to 'use of force' law by post-9/11 developments related to the instruments addressing the issue of seaborne piracy? The national approaches to a multi-layered response of the players and stake-holders therefore, would define the role of the global communities involved.

Malaysian Initiatives:

Acts of piracy that occur within Malaysian waters are policed by the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), established in 2004 (MMEA Website). The Malaysian Maritime Zone includes Malaysia's internal waters, its territorial sea, its continental shelf, its exclusive economic zone, and the Malaysian fisheries zone. The MMEA is charged with maintaining law and order, protecting peace, safety and security, preventing and detecting crime, apprehending and prosecuting criminals, and collecting security intelligence within the Malaysian Maritime Zone and specifically charged with preventing and suppressing piracy and is empowered to stop, enter, board, inspect, and detain any vessel and to arrest its occupants if it has reason to believe an offence has been committed. Prosecution of a person MMEA arrests requires the consent of the public prosecutor (MMEA Website). However, The MMEA is required to respect the right of innocent passage established by UNCLOS. Since acts of piracy generally involve the commission of some other crime that is expressly defined by Malaysia's criminal code, those substantive offences can be tried in Malaysian courts if they are committed in Malaysia's maritime zone or if they are committed on the high seas by Malaysian citizens or on a ship registered in Malaysia. Given the present state of Malaysian law, doubt about the power to prosecute pirates in Malaysian courts only arises when an act of piracy affects Malaysians on the high seas but is not committed by Malaysians and does not occur on a ship that is registered in Malaysia (HG.org).

Moreover, there are occurrences where Malaysian maritime anti-piracy law came in conflict with that of UNCLOS-IMO protocol (Zubir, 2012. For example, in February 2011, Malaysian prosecutors charged seven Somali pirates captured by Malaysian naval forces in the Gulf of Aden, who were accused of shooting at naval personnel who had apprehended a hijacked chemical tanker, seized by the pirates, owned by a Japanese firm but operated by a Malaysian company. Prosecutors argued that the court had jurisdiction because the pirates threatened the security of Malaysian citizens. Zubir (2012) observes that the argument did not satisfy international jurisdictional statutes, given that the ship was not registered in Malaysia. The defence moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the crime occurred in international waters, beyond the territorial jurisdiction of Malaysia. Malaysian Federal Court denied that motion. The pirates eventually entered into a plea agreement and entered guilty pleas to reduced charges of discharging a firearm with the intent to avoid arrest, a crime that is not subject to the death penalty. They were each sentenced to a term of incarceration. Since the defendants entered guilty pleas, the jurisdictional issue was never tested on appeal to the International Court of Justice, under the universal maritime regime (Zubir, 2012).

Indonesian Initiatives:

In 2014, the Indonesian government established Badan Keamanan Laut i.e., Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA) reorganising previous Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Laut i.e., Indonesian Maritime Security Coordinating Agency (BAKORKAMLA) with an idea to develop a single entity that leads the maritime law enforcement operations and synergise the activities of the various other maritime security stakeholders coherently (Arif and Kurniawan, 2017: 78). Apart from that, at present, in addition to the TNI-AL, there are the Marine Police, the Transport Ministry's Sea and Coast Guard Unit (Kesatuan Penjaga Laut dan Pantai), Customs, the Fisheries

Surveillance Unit, the Foreign Ministry, the Attorney General's Office, the Interior Ministry, the Defence Ministry, the Ministry of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, the National Intelligence Board and the General Headquarters of the Indonesian Armed Forces – all responsible for law enforcement and maritime safety and security (Morris and Paoli, 2018: 31). In early 2015, the TNI-AL Western Fleet, which oversees maritime security in the western part of the country including the Malacca Straits, Singapore Straits and other pelagic waters of SEA, established a Quick Reaction Team (QRT) to provide a better response to illegal activities in the area. The operations carried out by the Quick Reaction Team have successfully arrested several vessels operating illegally in the Indonesian waters (Arif and Kurniawan, 2017: 80).

Following the establishment of BAKAMLA in 2014, under the Indonesian Law No. 32/2014 and PERPRES No. 178/2014 to synergise law enforcement across the various Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE) agencies, SATGAS 115 Presidential Task Force was also established in 2015 under PERPRES No. 115 to combat fisheries crimes (SATGAS Website). Administered under the KKP portfolio, SATGAS 115 seeks to strengthen administrative and legal sanctions against illegal fishing in Indonesian waters, thus far revoking 291 licenses, suspending 261 licenses and issuing 48 warning letters so far (SATGAS Website). Whereas BAKAMLA is now coordinating the assets and personnel from other MLE agencies and naval counterparts in a joint task force arrangement to monitor, detain, inspect and work with the proper legal authorities to prosecute violations of Indonesian maritime law (Fenton and Chapsos, 2018). Despite constraints, both SATGAS 115 and BAKAMLA have leveraged increased regulatory and legal powers to combat maritime security threats (SATGAS Website).

Indonesia's maritime sector also gained a boost since 2016 when the coordinating minister for Maritime Affairs Luhut Binsar Panjaitan agreed to cooperate with Japan, establishing the strategic bilateral Indonesia-Japan Maritime Forum (IJMF). The two countries agreed to collaborate in the field of maritime security, maritime economy, maritime infrastructure, as well as maritime education and training (The Jakarta Post). Seeking strategic cooperation in the maritime and industrial sectors, Japan would not only contribute to the development of the fish markets in Natuna Besar and the energy sector in East Natuna but also would be constructing a strategic port in Sabang, and work with the Indonesian Maritime Security Board to work on smuggling issues. Though the agreement appears to neglect the growing transnational maritime threat in SEA i.e., maritime piracy, incidents of which have mostly occurred in Indonesian waters, particularly in the shipping lanes from the Malacca Straits to the Singapore Straits and it signifies strategic bilateral security cooperation between Indonesia and Japan in term of sea-borne smuggling prevention (Dinarto, 2016).

Thailand's Initiatives

2014 onwards Thai Government has made their maritime objective clear that do not want outside influence in their internal policies in terms of the refugees and illegal immigrants, who actively participate in maritime piracy, narco-terrorism and other sea-borne crimes (Thailand Factsheet Maritime Sector, 2018). The Port Authority of Thailand (PAT) is responsible for the development and management of Thailand's major deep-sea ports (Ministry of Transport, Thailand). In recent years, the PAT has started to transform its ports into green ports per the IMO standards (Thailand Factsheet Maritime Sector, 2018). Laem Chabang Port, the largest in Thailand, the 4th largest in ASEAN, and the 22nd in the world (2015), is located in the EEC and handles 54% of Thailand's total imports and export. Chiang Saen port is located on the bank of the Mekong River close to the border with Myanmar and Laos. It functions as a mid-point depot for shipments from south China to Laem Chabang. Chiang Khong port, north of Thailand, serves small ships from Laos and is less important for Thailand's economy (Thailand Factsheet Maritime Sector, 2018). These ports are strategically crucial to Thailand's maritime security and economy. Hence PAT continuosly invests

in modernizing ICT and reporting systems, creating a one-stop-shop service centre, and increasing these ports' capacity.

Conclusion: Towards A Multi-Lateral Interdependent Approach

Since the rise of Islamic terrorism in the SEA, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand shifted more focus to coordinated maritime patrols and collaborative maritime goals. Indonesia has warned the international community about the Abu Sayyaf militant operatives and that if this issue could not be addressed immediately and holistically, the problem could reach levels seen off Somalia in the Gulf of Aden. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said "*We will undertake coordinated patrols in the maritime areas of our common concern*" (CNA, 9 May 2017). At least one-seventh of the Thai Anti-Piracy operation zone overlaps jurisdictional claims of Cambodia, Vietnam and Malaysia, encouraging a tendency toward cautious enforcement efforts in these 'grey' areas. In accord with Malaysia, however, Thailand has claimed Criminal jurisdiction in part of their joint development zone. Thailand thus could extend its anti-piracy activities into an approximately 2,800 – square kilometres area where there is a high incidence of pirate attacks. In 2014 Thai and Vietnam agreed to promote coastal shipping and patrolling along the eastern region of Thailand to the south of Vietnam by utilizing small and medium-sized ports. Cambodia was invited to join this maritime exercise as the coastal route also passes through its southern region with some potential coastal ports infested by pirates. The Tripartite Task Force (TTF) on Thailand-Cambodia-Vietnam (TCV) Coastal Shipping was established in 2015 (Ministry of Transport, Thailand). Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines have agreed on such joint patrols in 2016 (The Maritime Executive, 16 May 2016). Joint maritime patrols in Sulu and Celebes seas involve ships from the three national navies i.e., of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines coordinating together and crossing into each other's territorial waters (The Maritime Executive, 16 May 2016). The US has extended its naval expertise and has given about $200 million in communications and surveillance equipment to the three countries' joint maritime forces over the past decade (CNA, 9 May 2017). Expanding maritime security cooperation, joint defence production, counter-terrorism strategy and boosting trade and investment was the major focus of Thai Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha's visit to India in July 2018 (Economic Times, 12 July 2018).

Henceforth, how regional and national actors are functioning differently within the scope of a international law and agencies like UN, ASEAN etc, have been surveyed. It has been found that maritime states of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand have developed their maritime policies keeping piracy deterrence in mind. However, most attacks in the SEA take place within the territorial waters of the littoral states, the correct term to use for the crime is '*armed robbery,*' not piracy (IMB Annual Report, 2019), like robbery of sea-vessels, hijacking of vessels, kidnap-for-ransom attacks, port corruption and other petty crimes. Consequent multilateral and bilateral cooperative efforts under the aegis of regional counter-piracy maritime regime addressed the transnational problem of piracy quite effectively. But state-by-state approach, instead of an interdependent approach leads to discrepancies in the sentences handed down to the pirates in the pelagic waters of SEA. It also jeopardises the diplomatic relations among neighbouring littorals with conflicting interest. Hitherto, accepting all the odds – Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand – have channeled their efforts with an interdependent approach, on rewarding a robust counter-piracy maritime regime in the pelagic SEA.

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Geopolitical Struggle between Russia and Turkey: The Intersection of Ukraine and Syrian Crises

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ABSTRACT

As a new but uncertain international system has been operating for decades that can be regarded as a transition from unipolarity to something resembling multipolarity. Therefore, established and possible future great powers have been determining their foreign policies according to their future projections of the regional conflicts. This paper investigates Turkey and Russia's stances in the Syrian and Ukrainian Crises. It might sound odd that Russia and Turkey are comparable in a struggle for the sphere of influence that intercepts each other. However, their good bilateral relations and different, even conflictual, approaches to regional and international issues provide a suitable ground to claim that a new international system is about to emerge. It will continue until the positions of established and newly emerged great powers are embedded. In practice, Russia's stance in the Ukrainian crisis and Turkey's stance in the Syrian crisis represent ontological threads to the vision of their own countries. However, they can still work together at a certain level because of third-party involvement in the issues.

Introduction: The Dynamism of International Order

The world states prepared themselves for new conditions and struggled to find the most suitable place for themselves in the emerging international system. Once almost a half-century world system collapsed and the US appeared victorious in the cold war, the rest of the world looked for alternatives. In this sense, the last decade of the 20th century was spent trying to find balance in the post-Cold war world system. The post-Cold War era, which resulted in the victory of the Western bloc under the leadership of the USA, paved the way for all components of the West to dominate world politics and began to be the determinant of all national and international politics throughout the 1990s. Therefore, the way national and international conflicts are being dealt with has been taken as a basis for how and according to what national and international problems would be resolved. Being one of the two poles of the Cold War era, the West represented a liberal/capitalist and free market-based, politically liberal-democratic, culturally secular and multicultural, and socially open and participatory structure. Therefore, the world's post-cold war approach to potential problems was built on these ideas and values.

In this context, it was thought that the preservation of these values and putting them into practice in other countries were better serving their and intervened states' national interests. The integration of Germany in all the mentioned areas can be considered a result of this idea. To put it more clearly, by giving up its structural features, East Germany, which had a socialist and closed economic, social, cultural and political system, united with West Germany, which has a liberal and open economic, social, cultural and political system. The practices of the idea of victory were not limited to the unification of Germany but also played an active role in the First Gulf War, Kosovo, Bosnia and Rwanda crises in the last decade of the 20th century. In solving these international conflicts, the American and Western European states, which intervened with the vision of a unipolar world, had a say in the resolution method of the issues and the final political, economic and social structures to be established. This situation has been evaluated as one of the signs of the transition from bipolarity to a unipolar system in which the global balance of power, which was thought to have been achieved in the post-Cold War period, was led by the United States (Layne, 1993).

The methods and tools used by the West in every intervention during the 1990s have become a source of legitimacy for the international system based on national interests or expectations. The most striking of these methods is to create a peace-keeping force and operate under international organisations' umbrella (Neack, 1995). During this period, the United Nations and its relevant units (development aid, peace-keeping, disarmament, etc.) laid the groundwork for both legitimacy and multilateralism in the interventions of the First Gulf War, Rwanda, Kosovo and Bosnia (Tallberg et al., 2018). The most influential international intervention discourse created in the same period is the concept of humanitarian intervention. This concept, which will mean a violation of the sovereign rights of states over their lands, has made the right to intervene in state administrations possible with international institutions based on human and humanitarian values (Weiss, 2016).

The turning point of the 21st century in terms of international politics is the September 11 terrorist attack. The policy developed by the USA against this terrorist attack was explained with the concept of preventive intervention, and the then US President George Bush gave the clues of a harsh and interventionist foreign policy against terrorism with the statement that you are either with us or against us (Ikenberry, 2004). Afterwards, the Iraq and Afghanistan interventions brought along the discussions of a unipolar world order dominated by military power. Although the military success of the American interventions was quickly announced, the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan in the post-intervention years failed to solve the economic, political and social problems (Bailey and Immerman, 2015). At the same time, the idea that the USA's military, political and social interventions, which have begun to be seen as a global police force in the unipolar world, are not economically and politically sustainable has been discussed. The lack of economic and political support for unilateral international politics by other countries, especially the representatives of the Western bloc, has made these discussions meaningful in terms of global politics (Fettweis, 2017).

Another global issue that started in the 1990s and continued to increase its effectiveness in world politics has been revolutions or social movements (Tüfekçi and Dağ, 2022). The efforts of the countries in the Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union (Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle East) to establish their own political and economic system after the Cold War continued on the prevailing ideas mentioned above. In other words, third-world countries, which took positions as satellite states during the Cold War period, started to experience their own cold wars within their national borders. Therefore, since the union of East Germany with the West, all countries of the world have witnessed political, economic and social struggles within themselves about where and how to position themselves (Sarotte, 2014; Öniş, 1995).

Post-Soviet newly established countries, Latin American, African, Middle Eastern and Far East countries experience this transformation as internal turmoil, revolutions, civil war, coups or social movements. The national movements in question form the basis for the interventions of great superpowers in line with their national interests or values. The conceptual framework that provides the legitimacy of these interventions is based on reasons such as the humanitarian intervention that emerged after the cold war, replacing dictatorships or autocracies with democratic regimes, punishing those who support terrorism and states that create instability at the global and regional level (Verhoeven, 2009). The inhumane treatment of Serbs against Bosnian Muslims has revealed the concept of humanitarian intervention, mass killings in Rwanda paved the way for the international community to intervene to prevent massacres based on human rights. In Latin America and the Middle East, each military intervention was opened to change the regimes of the dictators or the countries that support terrorism, and the methods of punishing the national governments with economic and political sanctions came to the fore. Supporting civil and military opposition to socialist dictators in Latin America has also added variety to the intervention methods of international politics.

In the process of rebuilding the international system after the Cold War, the unipolarity experiment was put into practice by the USA. Before the unipolar international system becomes well established, there is still a global dynamic that showed the transition to multipolarity in the 21st century. It may be premature to argue that a multipolar global system has become instituted, and its tendencies, norms, and rules have settled. However, when looking at the sides of every international problem, the existence of regional and great powers operating at the regional and international level, which increases their resistance against a unipolar system, is now an indisputable fact of international relations (Itzkowitz Shifrinson, 2020). While the USA is still the world's most significant power and its policies towards international conflicts are of great importance, regional or great powers oppose the policies of the West or Russian Federation at the regional level. States that refused to be satellite states (as in the cold war) began to act in their own interests. The power politics that continues under these conditions has been conducted not as a direct opposition to each other but as having a different approach to international conflicts from the United States (Tudoroiu, 2015).

The Arab Spring and its subsequent political and military developments are essential examples of 21st-century power politics. More specifically, the Syrian Crisis, for which no military and political solution has yet been found, continues to exist as a field of struggle for regional and great powers who want to design world politics in line with their interests. On the other hand, the Ukraine Crisis can be seen as an area where an active struggle between the Western and Eastern blocs took place after the Cold War period. The crucial sides of these two crises can be listed as the USA, European Union, Russia, China, Turkey and other Eurasian and Arab countries. Turkey and Russia, the significant actors in both crises, considered them an existential threat to national security. While the Syrian Crisis represents a challenge that may lead to the recognition of its great power or regional power status for Turkey (Demirtas-Bagdonas, 2014: 140), the Ukraine Crisis is seen as an area where its cross-border policy-making power is tested. Considering its active role, the Syrian Crisis represents Russia's struggle to re-exist outside the Soviet sphere of influence. At the same time, the Ukraine Crisis expresses the most critical point of the contraction of the Soviet-influenced sphere. While both countries are trying to determine and implement international policies in line with their interests, it is seen that they have both different and resemble policies. The same issue is valid for comparing other great powers (USA, European Union and China) in terms of defining international problems and their resolution policies. This study will try to reveal the geopolitical importance of these two crises for Russia and Turkey by focusing on how Russia and Turkey approached the Syria and Ukraine Crises.

The article will continue with a section revealing the reasons and scope of the Syrian and Ukraine Crises. Later, how Russia and Turkey approached these crises and what they base their approach on will be discussed regarding their domestic and foreign policies. It will be completed with the conclusion section, which includes a general evaluation.

Syria and Ukraine Crises

Although a state's political and social turmoil is considered the country's internal problems, this situation makes the state in question open to the interventions of regional or great powers. Global powers, which have good relations with the current regime or administration of that state, develop policies to protect the relationship between them by providing political and, if necessary, military support to not lose their sphere of influence on the relevant state. At the same time, global or regional powers that are disturbed by the regime or administration of that state also support alternative political or military groups, mainly oppositional groups. Therefore, with a state that does not have a settled political structure, they become open to the intervention of other powers due to the political movements they experience within themselves. In opening the door for such an intervention, only the opposition groups against the regime or the administration openly demand foreign powers' political and military support to come to power. The correlation between the demands of the sub-national groups that want to come to power and the increase in the number of regional or great powers that want to gain influence over the national group makes solving the conflicts more challenging. On the other hand, unsolved problems transform into protracted conflicts and cause national, regional and international instability. To put it more clearly, the conflictual policies developed to protect the interests of opposition groups and regional/great powers at the national level bring along intransigence.

Syrian Case

The social mobilisation known as the Arab Spring broke out due to the popular revolt against the dictators and authoritarian regimes in power for many years. When these social movements turned into square movements and spread all over the Arab countries, they caused the establishment of a new administration with the resignation of the political power or the departure of the heads of state (Alhousseiny and Atar, 2021). When the way to establish a new system was opened, opposition segments united against a single dictator or regime, leading to further instability due to differences among themselves. It is because regional and global actors have provided support to one of the fractions of opposing groups per ideational or strategic interests. As it can be understood from here, the group that will establish the new administrations after the social movements, that is, which group will come to power, has a significant effect on the continuity of the problem.

In the case of Syria, the repression regime that started with Hafez Assad's seizure of the Baath Party leadership with a coup intensified discomfort in the country. The implementation of the Alevi sect as a condition for official cadres was met with backlash by the Sunni majority, and an ethnic opposition group was formed against Arab nationalism with the rejection of the Kurdish identity. Even though the differences among the opposing Arab Sunnis and ethnic Kurds, their common enemy, the regime, caused them to meet on the common ground of the opposition cumulatively (Lund, 2019). Particularly, during the periods when Bashar Assad and the Baath Regime weakened against the opposition armed groups, the disagreements within the opposition were seen as a sign of new conflicts in the post-Assad period. As seen from the practice, the power struggle between the religious references and the opposition armed organisations led to a terrorist organisation such as ISIS flourishing and controlling a significant part of Syria for a while.

On the other hand, the Syrian extensions of the KDP and PKK tried to gain space by entering into a political and armed struggle as an intra-Kurdish conflict. The struggle between the two central

opposition veins interrupted the political and armed conflict against Hafez Assad. It caused the Baath regime led by Assad to recover and maintain its power. The popular uprising that started in 2011 continues with a state of deadlock in which three different groups are active. These are the Assad regime that controls the area around Damascus and Southern Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces, which is based on the PYD/YPG (PKK's Syrian branch) in Northern Syria, and the Free Syrian Army, which seeks to maintain its presence in a limited area of North-West Syria (Lund, 2019). Russia and Iran support the first of these three groups, which try to protect their areas of dominance, American and European countries support the second one, and Turkey and Qatar support the last.

Ukrainian Case

Ukraine, which gained its independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union, was caught between Russia and Europe. The most general and vital reason for the Ukraine crisis is the domestic struggle over what will be the main ideas that will shape the future of the country (Cengiz, 2020). On the one hand, it has brought about sharp polarisations between those who want close cooperation with Russia and, on the other hand, the political views that advocate political, cultural, social and economic integration with the West. Ukraine, which has geostrategic importance in transferring Russia's and Central Asian energy resources to Europe, is crucial for Russia and European states. Therefore, both sides make the Ukrainian administration closer to them as a national-interest issue. In the last years of the 20th century, the efforts of Eastern European countries to integrate with Western European countries became effective in Ukraine in the 21st century. With the orange revolution in 2004, people filled the streets, and the 2004 presidential election between pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko and pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych ceased to be an ordinary election and resulted in a social movement known as the Orange revolution. The streets were filled with demonstrators protesting the election results when pro-Moscow Yanukovych was declared the winner of the election, which took place on November 21, 2004, according to the uncertain outcomes of the National Election Commission. After harsh criticism of internal and external interference in the elections, the Supreme Court of Ukraine decided to renew the elections. Then, pro-Western Yushchenko won the presidential election held on December 26 2004 (Kuzio, 2005). In short, Ukraine is politically caught between a pro-Moscow and Russian-speaking social and political bloc and a pro-Western Ukrainian nationalist bloc (Arel, 2018).

At the same time, similar to the conditions in Syria, the conflicts among the blocs increased political instability. Especially the crisis of management style between pro-Western Yushchenko and Tymoshenko prevented Ukraine from developing a solid domestic and foreign policy in the post-Orange Revolution period. The social ambience created by the orange revolution lost its strength with the failure to form a pro-Western coalition government. The personal hostilities of critical political figures within the same group caused political disagreement (Labbare, 2010: 39). On the other hand, the fact that some pro-Moscow political groups are pro-Russian enough to undermine Ukraine's independence and the Russian oligarchs' strength in Ukraine's politics and the economy still exist as a factor that fuels the power struggle between the supporters of Moscow. Under these conditions, just like in the Syrian crisis, the great powers had no difficulty finding local groups they would support financially, politically and militarily, in line with their interests.

At the end of 2013 and in 2014, the Ukrainian administration's unwillingness under Yanukovych's leadership to sign the European Association Agreement was evaluated by the pro-Western groups as the decline of democratic reforms and the increase in the political power of the pro-Moscow. However, this political transformation was achieved when the square movements turned into armed conflict. As a result of the armed conflicts between the pro-Western and pro-Russian groups, Russia annexed Crimea, and at the same time, a unilateral declaration of autonomy was made in areas where the Russian population and influence were dominant (Donetsk and Lugansk).

Under these circumstances, the Ukrainian government continues to follow a pro-Western policy, Russia does not give up on the annexation of Crimea, and the EU and America impose sanctions on Russia for its annexation of Crimea. On the other hand, Turkey does not recognise Russia's annexation of Crimea (Rüma and Çelikpala, 2019:75) and continues to develop good relations with the Ukrainian government.

Ontological Approaches of Turkey and Russia towards the Syrian and Ukrainian Crisis

For Turkey and Russia, the Syria and Ukraine crises are essential in increasing their regional activities as they respectively lie by their adjacent borders. They clearly intend to become a regional or great power through their foreign policies. It is possible to see these intentions in their approaches to the Syria and Ukraine crises, respectively. The geography where these crises are experienced has a crucial role in their geopolitical visions. Although Turkey and Russia are on different sides in both crises, they do not hesitate to expand their cooperation areas. Despite Turkey's anti-Assad and Baath Party statements, Russia does not give up its cooperation with Turkey in the Syria Crisis.

On the other hand, despite the fact that Turkey did not recognise the annexation of Crimea and stated in its foreign policy discourses that it was against international law, Russia continues its economic, political and military relations with Turkey. This situation is explained by the concept of "compartmentalisation" in the literature (Tüfekçi, 2017a; Rüma and Çelikpala, 2019). Although there was a short-term interruption experience after Syria shot down the Turkish plane, and then Turkey shot down the Russian warplane, it can be claimed that Turkish-Russian relations continue despite all the differences (Kınık and Tüfekçi, 2018).

For a better understanding of the situation, it is necessary to explain the roles of both countries in regional and global politics and why they continue to act together in certain areas despite the conflicts between these roles. To start with Russia's regional and global vision, it claims that it defined the Soviet-era borders as its sphere of influence and that it has a privileged position in these areas. If the states in the sphere of influence cannot prevent their desire to integrate with the West, Russia's military intervention would be possible in the so-claimed soviet hinterland.

The willingness of the Eastern European countries, which gained their independence after the USSR, for membership in the European Union and NATO, caused them to integrate into Western Europe's political, cultural and economic structures one by one. In this process, Russia, the heir of the Soviet Union, watched the developments from afar because it did not have enough power (Larrabee, 2010). Russia, which recovered under the leadership of Vladimir Putin after the 2000s, showed that it would not allow countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and Belarus to leave their sphere of influence. The closeness of Georgia and Ukraine to the EU and NATO was again perceived as a threat to Russia. In particular, the possible NATO memberships of Ukraine and Georgia have been evaluated as the containment of Russia (Larrabee, 2010: 36). The threat perception on this issue caused Russia to use the option of military intervention when it realised that it could not control the governments of the relevant countries. Therefore, Russia intervened in Georgia, controlled South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and tried to prevent the presence of other great powers, especially America, in the geography it saw as its sphere of influence by making bilateral and multilateral agreements with the post-Soviet Central Asian countries. In this context, the article by Malyarenko and Wolff provides an essential perspective on Russia's approach to the Ukraine crisis. They explained that the ultimate goal of Russia's Ukraine policy is to ensure that a pro-Russian and stable government remains in power. If this is not possible, if the emergence of a pro-Western Ukraine is inevitable, they claim that Russia is trying to destabilise this country to prevent its continuous integration with the West (Malyarenko and Wolff, 2018).

Russia's policy towards Ukraine, in particular, and its perspective on the post-Soviet countries that gained their independence, in general, are considered an integral part of its field of activity for Russia. It thinks that the increase in the population of other great powers in the geography harms their national interests and status as a great power in the international system. In this respect, it is trying to establish a monopoly on the extraction of energy resources in Central Asia and their distribution to the world markets. On the other hand, it does not remain silent about the political developments in the region by opposing the shaping of the political structures of these countries according to the West, interfering in the elections from the outside, establishing political and military pressure, and gathering the opposition groups around itself. Russia developed policies according to its national interests and great power status in post-Soviet countries and prevented international intervention by using its veto right as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and controlled the activities of the United States and other European countries. Thus, it can prevent resolution suggestions that will increase tensions.

Ukraine is of vital importance for the Russian hinterland. The fact that Ukraine, which will be regarded as the last stronghold connecting to the European mainland, has a pro-Western administration will mean Russia's closure to its post-Soviet borders. At the same time, Russia's location on the energy supply route to Europe has geostrategic importance in terms of the continuity of Russia's regional and global energy policies. On the other hand, its military and strategic importance for the Black Sea navy located on the Crimean Peninsula of Russia is too important to be ignored (Terterov, Van Pool and Nagornyy, 2010: 192). Russia cannot be expected to give up on such geostrategic importance. In particular, it cannot be expected to consider the conflicts in the Caucasus, Belarus, Syria, and Libya outside Russia's national interests. Still, it can be argued that the Ukraine problem is of much greater importance in the context of the historical power struggle between Western Europe and Russia.

It is seen that the international great power status of the Soviets outweighs it. As in Ukraine, it does not have the characteristics of being a buffer zone between the EU and Russia, being on the route of energy lines (Terterov, Van Pool and Nagornyy, 2010: 195) or hosting the most critical Navy fleet. However, it would be more accurate to consider the Soviets as the last satellite state in the Middle East during the cold war period (Blank, 2018). Even if the Russian naval base in the Syrian port of Tarsus is considered an indicator of Russia's international power, the Russian navy in Crimea is more important in protecting the Russian mainland. In this context, it is necessary to read Russia's Syria policy to confirm its status as a major power and thus have a say in international issues. Russia's Syria policy has an important function not only in terms of increasing its sphere of influence but also in narrowing the sphere of influence of other great powers (Tudoroiu, 2015; Lund, 2019). However, with respect to Syria, it cannot be compared with the policy of blocking Western influence in Ukraine in terms of importance due to Ukraine's proximity to the Russian borders.

On the other hand, Turkey was considered the eastern border of the Western bloc during the cold war and had a position expected to comply with the world and regional policies of the American and European states. After the 2000s, it is possible to talk about that Turkey sought to establish ties with all the countries in its region and to be a determinant in regional politics based on its historical heritage (Terterov, Van Pool, & Nagornyy, 2010: 197; Tufekci, 2017b). In other words, from being the policy implementer of the West in the region, Turkey has entered into a struggle to become a policy-making country in the region and the world. With the discourse and policies of zero problems with neighbours (Aras and Fidan, 2009), Win-Win, Turkey has sought to increase its effectiveness in the regions such as the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East, and Persian Gulf (Aras and Karakaya Polat, 2008:507) and North Africa (D'Alema, 2017). It tries to deepen its economic and political relations with each of the regions mentioned above by using its historical, religious and ethnic ties and the concept of civilisation in the broadest sense (Dağ, 2016). Turkey, which

redefines itself in a comprehensive framework, has also redefined its foreign policy from the idea of a country surrounded by enemies to one full of potential good relations on all four sides. Turkey has tried to have a say in its own geography by playing the role of a mediator in all the aforementioned surrounding regions and has made progress in becoming an influential power, although it cannot be claimed to be entirely successful (Taşpınar, 2012).

Trying to revive its historical and cultural heritage, which forms the basis and existential ground of its new foreign policy, Turkey tries to expand its sphere of influence by using its ethnic identity in the Caucasus, its religious identity in the Balkans, the interaction of Muslim democracy in the Arab world and the Ottoman heritage in North Africa. The fact that it tried to persuade Bashar Assad to democratic reforms in the Syrian crisis is due to its Ottoman heritage, religious and historical ties, and the feature of being a Muslim democracy. The protests turned into armed resistance when the reform demands were not met, and the Baath administration opened fire on the demonstrators. Turkey, which directly opposed the Assad administration, wanted to gain influence over Syria after Assad by supporting all opposition groups. Due to the support given to the opposition and the belief that the Assad regime would collapse in a short time, Turkey has implemented an open-door policy for the oppressed Syrian people and has evaluated this policy as a historical responsibility. Thus, the problem of irregular migrants has become a significant problem for Turkey. The fact that Syria has a long border with Turkey and that Syria was seen as Turkey's gateway to the Arab world before the crisis has made the Syrian crisis very important in Turkey's foreign policy. The establishment of a de-facto administration in Northern Syria by the PYD/YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organisation, which it has been fighting within its borders for years, has been a factor that increased the vital importance of the Syrian crisis (Dag, 2018; Rüma and Çelikpala, 2019: 77; D'Alema, 2017). The PKK's exploitation of the power vacuum in Syria and the safe coordination of its terrorist attacks against Turkey have deeply affected Turkey's approach to the Syrian crisis.

Another point that makes the Syrian crisis ontologically important in Turkish foreign policy is that Turkey's effort to have a say in international problems as a regional and global actor is considered an application area. In other words, the Syrian crisis is a test board for whether the policies of being active rather than passive have an equivalent in the field and whether they have the power to implement these discourses in a sustainable way. It has tried to exist in all political and military manoeuvres for the solution or non-solution of the Syrian crisis, to protect its own national interests, and not to stay out of regional re-designing.

Turkey's perspective on the Ukraine crisis, although not as vital as the Syrian crisis, is based on the doctrines of protecting the rights of the Crimean Turks and defending Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Providing political support to social movements and revolutions in Ukraine, Turkey wants to increase its effectiveness in the Black Sea by entering into military cooperation with Ukraine. The basis of this foreign policy is the historical ties with the Crimean Khanate dating back to the Ottoman period and the discourses of having a common ethnic identity (Terterov, Van Pool and Nagornyy, 2010: 199).

Foreign Policy Convergence and Cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the Syrian and Ukraine Crisis

The Arab Spring and the revolutions in the countries that gained their independence after the Soviet Union provided the political and social ground for the people and possible opposition groups living under the dictator regimes that were destroyed one by one. As in all revolutions, the content of the demands gives clues to the administration's economic, social and political structure that will be established after the revolutions. In the 21st century, the dominant global ideas of concepts such as human rights, freedom, a free market economy, and democracy were either supported by almost

all opposition groups or studies were carried out to implement different versions. In this context, Turkey, which presented an example with its Muslim, democrat and EU candidate country identities, was shown as a model country and displayed a stance in harmony with Western values. On the other hand, the fact that Russia is seen as the representative of values such as oppressive, authoritarian and socialist democracy is shown as an example by groups that want to maintain their current power, not by the opponents. Therefore, the new regional dynamics provided an excellent opportunity for Turkey to increase its influence, and for Russia, it offered a chance to regain its influence in the Soviet period. While Turkey stood on the side of the people who rebelled by using Western values in both the Syrian and Ukraine crises, Russia took the side of the dominant oppressive regimes.

The ontological strategies that Turkey and Russia follow in foreign policy intersect and even conflict with each other in all geographies they are struggling (Tufekci, 2017a). They are confronted by supporting rival groups in almost all international problems, including Central Asia, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Black Sea region (Babali, 2010). At the same time, it is seen that they have agreed on common working areas in energy, bilateral economic relations and even political solution channels (Astana Process). Within the framework of the article's main argument, while the Ukraine crisis is of vital importance for Russia, the Syrian crisis is at a more secondary level. The Syrian crisis is crucial for Turkey, while the Ukraine crisis is secondary. If attention is paid, both countries consider it vitally important for their national interests to be active in their own environment and region. Although they see each other as rivals, the main reason they can carry out joint activities is that the American and Western European countries, which they see as rivals in great power politics, want to prevent their activities in the region.

However, when the Arab Spring turned into the Arab winter, with the failure to establish new administrations after the revolutions and the struggle for power of different political groups, a new field of struggle for regional and global powers emerged. Despite the support of the European states and the United States to the opposition, the fact that they could not be sure of the power alternatives for Syria after Assad prevented them from directly intervening in the Syrian crisis. Russia, on the other hand, considered excluding itself and ignoring the sovereignty of a country under the name of humanitarian intervention as contrary to its own interests and its status as a great power, as in the case of Libya, and therefore did not approach Assad's removal from the administration despite criticising the Syrian regime (Deyermond, 2016; Ruma and Celikpala, 2019: 68). Especially as in the examples of Egypt and Libya, Russia and Turkey were dissatisfied with being excluded from the newly formed Middle East balance.

Conclusion

How can it be explained that Russia and Turkey are at opposite poles in two international conflicts that are of vital importance to each other and that they have good relations in general? The answer to this question is based on the international system. While Turkey and Russia continue to struggle among themselves in many geographies where their spheres of influence intersect, they continue to engage in political and military dialogue to expand their range of action against other great powers, rather than directly clashing with each other because of the discomfort they feel in the current global power system. Both countries are trying to revitalise their historical activities and spheres of influence and to have a say and take a share in solving all the problems remaining in the hinterland of these areas. To this end, it would be reasonable to claim they resist a unipolar world system.

Russia and Turkey's approach to the Ukraine and Syria crises, respectively, has revealed the conflicts that are essential for their national interests. While the conflict of the leading foreign policy approaches of both countries may cause them to be in a great struggle, including the situation of armed conflict, they cannot give up on working together to prevent other regional and

global powers from getting involved in the issues that are of vital importance to them in the multipolar world system. In the Ukraine and Syria Crisis, where the USA, the EU and China are in a struggle for their sphere of influence, Russia and Turkey will continue to struggle with each other and with other international great powers to be compelling actors and to be among the decision-makers for a possible resolution. While this situation has the potential to perpetuate the deadlock, it also reveals the potential to find a permanent solution to all international problems, including the Ukraine and Syria crisis, through multilateral agreements.

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Arab Spring in Syria and the Rest

I. William Zartman, PhD

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Itimar Rabinovich & Carmit Valensi, *Syrian Requiem: The Civil War and its Aftermath,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021, ISBN: 9780691193311, 288 pp., £25.00 / $29.95)

Noah Feldman, *The Arab Winter: A Tragedy*, (Princeton: Princeton Press University, 2021, ISBN: 9780691194929, 216 pp., $22.95 / £18.99)

It's a sad day for scholarly judgments on Middle East events, particularly Arab seasons. Analyses are back again to conclude that irresponsible autocracy is the synonym for Arab governance after acting as bearish and bullish as the current stock market. Decades of evidence-based research came to the repeated conclusion that "democracy" couldn't be spelt in Arabic, and even Islamic attempts at governing were vulnerable to secular autocrats. A number of accounts have pointed out how clayey the giants' feet were, but all concluded that they were encased in the heavy military boots. When in fact, counter-indications broke the surface and toppled the giants right and left, we all admitted how wrong we were and wondered why. But then things rapidly returned to normal, and a decade later, not one Arab Spring government remained.

It is sad indeed because, as democrats ourselves and basic optimists, scholars and the watching world rose to cheer the young people and then the middle class that rose against the autocrats, sharing the hope that The People would finally have their say and could not be repressed forever. We even hoped that our Western democracies would come to support the popular liberation movements so that interests and values could coincide in support of new Arab democracies. It all crashed. What went wrong, how wrong did it go, and why?

Two scholarly authorities with practical experience face these questions, one addressing several cases in the whole area and the other taking on a single case. Noah Feldman seeks to make sense of the events beyond the individual states' scorecard and does an admirable job, for I, too, believe that the Spring was remarkable and significant (Zartman, 2015). His argument is that The People took charge of events, producing profound consequences for the region. If one can take issue with the development of his argument, it is not because the argument is thin and weak but because it is thick and conceptually based, inviting an encounter with some of its concepts and their application. This is no simple account of historical agency but a personal grappling with the political agency running through events.

The most notable aspect was that The People acted, where the habit of events past was that they were only acted upon. That was the reason for the widespread cheering from the outside world, and

it is certain to have lasting effects beyond the immediate repressive action of governments in Syria, Egypt, Algeria and even Tunisia. The universal cry of "freedom, dignity, jobs, bread, justice" did not include "democracy", only the outputs of a properly functioning political system, but they cannot be trashed by the street sweepers. People acting, Feldman discusses later, means intentional acting or agency to determine the outcome of political events, and it can be broken down into historical actions that can be observed and dated and political agency that can be felt in trends of events (pp. 30-34).

The second notable and perhaps more debatable consequence has been the dissolution of pan-Arab nationalism. To point out The People acted is also, as Feldman emphasizes, to indicate that external actors played a minor role, whereas Middle East history to this point involved significant and determinate action from without. Although the initial Spring was an impressive example of an imitation effect across the Arab—and only Arab—world, it brought out separate national political patterns and identities and also the ethnic mixture that each state contained. While undeniable, this is an analyst's effect, neither absent in the past nor assured for the future.

The third effect has been the demonstrated inability of political Islam to exercise governing power effectively. Its attempts to seize power out of the rubble of the state produced by the uprising showed its own ineptitude. Ennahda and the Brotherhood were striking examples of national failure in Tunisia and Egypt for different reasons, but the Islamic State that tried to drag the *intifada* back into the dark--not Golden--ages has brutally failed at governing for the whole Muslim world.

The theme of People's action also carries the exclusion of two frequently evoked mantras that Feldman points out after the initial presentation. First, the notion that the army is The People, either acting as a legitimizing control over the regime or as an extension of The People from whom its troops came (a point not developed) is simply factually inaccurate. Second, the notion that an authoritarian regime rests on a social (political?) contract of "bread for silence" is analytically false; the regime assumed the relation (or at least its second element), but it was their principle, never a contract, and the absence of the first part frequently placed it in the slogans of the *intifada*.

On the basis of these ideas, Feldman turns to his cases with a careful analysis based on research and reasoning and firsthand experience in the countries of the Spring. He begins with Egypt, where he seems to have trouble with his argument. Undeniably, The People acted in Midan al-Tahrir. It may be true that the army was the one that told Hosni Mubarak to resign, against the advice of the US, for example, but he only had to look at the window to see the real force behind that message. The army, too, saw that force and had its own reasons for job protection to back The People's message. It seems clear, as Feldman notes that neither The People nor the army had any notion of what should happen next except those elections were needed. When Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood was the result of poor electoral participation, two unexpected events followed: his adoption of a winner-takes-all spoils system and his appointment of Gen. Abdelfatah al-Sisi as army head. The two institutional forces, the Brotherhood and the Army, played a game of political seesaw for two years until, fearing that Morsi was gaining the upper position, it sacked him. This action, Feldman claims, was also a case of The People acting, but for all his careful argument, that seems a shaky judgment to hold. True, there was another huge round of demonstrations, but did The People act "in ways that determine the outcome" (p 31)? "Egypt faces a revolutionary process that interacts and mingles with a process of reform, and both are surrounded by military coup…based on street support of some segments of society facing a strong spreading and continuous process of opposition." (El Raggal and Ezzat, 2015). Out of this jumble of agency, Feldman concludes (or posits) that the "people acted as agents of their own political future by overthrowing the [Morsi] regime…[and] effectively inviting the return of the very [military] regime they had overthrown two and a half years before." (p. 31). One can also conclude

that the People were so engrossed in their new practice of protest that they never noticed, as the Army was the one that acted.

Curiously, Feldman turns to Tunisia at the end, where most commentators put it at the beginning as a model. Its story seems straightforward as an example of The People's agency, a comparative model for the rest as well as the initiator of the Spring wave. Feldman notes this with a detailed appreciation of the ways in which The People acted. Many aspects made Tunisia an unexceptional Arab state, historically its own nation, but it produced an exceptional experience. Tunisia did have a strong civil society, and its version of the Muslim Brotherhood—the Ennahda movement, then party--was led by an experienced intellectual, Rachid Ghannouchi, who pressed his party into accepting a coalition—all the opposite of Morsi.

The *intifada* (uprising) itself was a remarkable and spontaneous rolling coalition of unemployed, labor (not unions initially), middle class and party leaders with no plans except the removal of the regime and a list of grievances. Two figures dominated the crowd: Ghannouchi and an aged leftover from the early independence regime, Beji Qaid Essebsi, a secular leader who insisted that the uprising was against the autocratic regime, not against the state. When the adamantly secular and moderately religious forces deadlocked over the writing of a constitution in 2014, the civil society stepped in the form of a Quartet of professional organizations. A model compromise constitution was passed, but the undercurrent of political agency that pitted religious against secular directions gradually tore the system—and the two leaders—into vicious infighting of position politics to the neglect of the original slogan of the needs that caused the uprising.

Feldman's analysis is shown by events that closed the story after his book was published to be more accurate than he could claim (Mohsen-Finan, 2021). The acting People "went to the streets seeking jobs and social justice…. What they got was constitutional democracy with elected politicians. Yet liberal democracy does not have any magic solution for facilitating economic development…[but] remains vulnerable to future threats and challenges…based on the regime's failure to resolve deep-seated economic and social problems" (p. 131-132). In 2021, as in the previous decade, a deux ex machina stepped in, not as a responsible coalition of civil society to break the irresponsible deadlock, but instead a presidential coup by newly elected Kais es-Saied, a civilian version of as-Sisi (with army backing) who removed the institutions of democracy but had no plans for development himself. Feldman foresaw the trend, although he is overly laudatory of a Tunisian sense of political responsibility.

The People acted in a series of elections since the uprising, and they elected es-Saied, a newcomer professor with a populist message but they were soon alienated by what they got as the parliament, which they also elected, was suspended (and some members arrested) and replaced by government by executive fiat. Feldman's analysis of the historical actions up to this point is insightful and prescient, but should periodic elections be also counted as a political agency? That would seem to routinize the concept out of significance. In any case, in Tunisia, as in Egypt, The People's agency has become a thing of the past, making for an Arab Winter.

Feldman then turns to Syria, certainly the nadir of the Arab Winter and The People's agency. In Syria, The People acted too, as in Egypt and Tunisia, but Syria is a different country. Whereas the other two nations were rather homogeneous and geographically contiguous internally, the Syrian nation is ethnically heterogeneous, geographically scattered and religiously riven, and the course of the People's action reflected these divisions. Initially an amorphous mass as in the other two countries, it soon fell apart as rival organizations seized upon the disparities to find a source for their followers and their troops. Tunisia and Egypt never reached the organization stage but remained as socio-political rhizomes, connected by social media and essentially leaderless; the Syrian uprising sought organization, formed armies, and produced a number of competing leaders.

The People was cut into pieces by its composition in Syria, but the regime capitalized on the situation. The regime could not have played on the fragmentation of the Tunisian or Egyptian people because there was none of significance, but in Syria, the regime was a religious minority selling protection to other minorities and marginalization to other regions. The army abandoned the regime in the other two countries, but it immediately entered into the conflict in Syria, backing the regime viciously. It was the military response that turned the *intifada* into a civil war.

A third characteristic that distinguished Syria from the other two uprisings, after The People's heterogeneity and the regime's military response, was foreign involvement. Feldman, who has written a good deal about American foreign policy, reaches back to the US invasion of Iraq to begin his causal trail. Once again, he focuses on political agency—he drops the theme's name in favour of the moral question—rather than a blow-by-blow account of complex events since 2003. In introducing instability on the back of democracy in Iraq, the invasion released a number of forces in the region and a corresponding instability in US policy in the region. When the uprising occurred, the US sympathized, and Secretary Hilary Clinton fostered the only national Syrian resistance organization—albeit on paper—that existed (which Feldman omits but Rabinovich and Valensi pick up). But when Clinton and other ranking figures urged President Barak Obama to offer direct support to the resistance, and when Obama drew a clear red line against Asad's use of chemical weapons, he pulled back to the paper on that one too, and Asad continued his use of sodium and other chemicals. "US policy was to strengthen the forces threatening the regime enough to keep them in the fight while refusing to take definite steps that would make them win." (p. 90).

Russia had no such inhibitions in its support for Asad, which Feldman barely mentions alongside his ample, if warranted, castigation of the US. Russia entered early, politically in 2012 and then in 2015 with airplanes, and then with troops, and it saved Asad from a mutually hurting stalemate and a chance at negotiation, if not collapse (was it in Asad's nature to do so). Again, the invasion against The People's action separated Syria from Tunisia's and Egypt's experience, and it was the mirror image of Libya's experience, where Western countries intervened by air in the overthrow of the regime of Moammar Qadhafi. Elsewhere in the Arab Spring, Feldman's condition holds strongly, in that the people acted on their own but in Syria, Russia's direct involvement, the forerunner of its interventions along its borders, saved Asad from The People he claimed to defend (while massacring). While there is no guarantee—and perhaps even an assurance of the opposite-- that any replacement of Asad by the resistance would have produced a government that could overcome The People's heterogeneity positively, it was Russia's decisive action rather than America's piddling inaction that exacerbated Syria's civil war. Whether that war is over, as Feldman intimates (p. 98), the People are back under the cruel mallet of Asad and Russia is behind the throne.

The fourth characteristic of the Syrian uprising is the very different role of political Islam, to which Feldman devotes a separate chapter. For all their mistakes in the arena of parliamentary democracy, Ennahda and the Brotherhood were non-violent political players in a competitive electoral and legislative scene; Ennahda goes by the label of moderate Islam dedicated to coalition politics (despite its banning), reaffirmed in a number of crucial meetings under Ghannouchi, and the Brotherhood, although falling to a more radical wing in a meeting in 2008, was a seasoned election and legislative player (despite its banning). The Islamic State, originally limited to Iraq and the Levant (ISIS or *da'esh*), was a non-democratic revolutionary-reformist utopian community based on a Sunni Salafi-jihadi doctrine (why Feldman adds the "-reformist" I don't know when "revolutionary" takes it all in); I would add "violent" for emphasis although that too should be understood under "revolutionary." As indicated, it is specifically outside the parameters of the other state's experience: it did not represent action by The People but by a dedicated subversive core group, and it was and is still a transnational movement, although operating within geographic

sections, as its original name indicated. IS was formed by Sunni refugees from Iraq when the Shi'a government took over as a result of the American-imposed democratization, and it found fertile ground in the vacuum created by the Syrian civil war (and by the Iraqi government). As a result, it is brought into relief by two other analytical parameters. It was the result of international intervention and was eradicated territorially as a state also by the international intervention (although it remains as a transnational subversive movement). And it was the ultimate attempt by political Islam to create a state of its own, untrammelled by Western democratic ideas and by modern Muslim interpretations, and, at the end, abandoned by the God on whose behalf it claimed to act.

It is in Syria that Feldman meets Rabinovich and Valensi, handling the same challenge of combining historical agency or narrative and political agency or themes and mentalities. This the authors do by opening with a pre-*intifada* background and an uprising and civil war account rather than with a statement of analytical concepts, followed by chapters analysing the domestic, regional and international scene. The first chapters are a historian's history, reporting the course of events that led to an ever-inward-centre evolution of the regime from Hafiz al-Asad to his son Bashar in 2000, whose" family ran Syria as a family business" and whose entrenched and corrupt elite was constantly checked for loyalty. When the uprising occurred (sparked by government torture of some kids, not self-immolation as in Tunisia or a commemoration protest in Egypt), the regime responded with brutality; subsequent token measures of loosening were overshadowed by military harshness. As the protests spread, they avoided the two largest cities but picked up in other towns and villages, where Local Coordinating Committees provide some organization—but remained uncoordinated nationally—and later took up local governance.

Across the country, the uprising began to take on its notable characteristics of militarization, sectarianization, Islamization, regionalization and internationalization. After a year and a half of uprising, the UN declared the *intifada* a civil war in mid-2012. Hezbollah out of Lebanon captured the key city of Qusayr from the Syrian resistance less than a year later and toward the end of 2013, *da'esh* had its first military success and went on the capture Raqqah in eastern Syria and declare itself the *khalifa*, a territorial state. The same year, Obama pulled back from his redline on military involvement, hiding behind Asad's joining the Chemical Weapons Ban, with his sodium fingers crossed behind his back, and thus "paved the way for Russian military intervention." (p. 91). In 2017, along with Iran and Turkey, Russia sidelined the UN mediators' Geneva-centred efforts to bring the civil war under control by launching a competing process from Astana that made paper progress amid much diplomatic busyness and Russian bombing for emphasis. The chapter carefully weaves the diplomatic and military efforts to expand Asad's control over his country.

Rabinovich and Valensi then turn to levels of the conflict—domestic, regional and international, while a further chapter, added at the end of the book, updates on the period 2019-2020. While a quarter of the Syrian territory remains under the control of the US-supported Kurdish forces, the northern border strip is occupied by Turkey to keep the Kurds out, and a province around Idlib remains occupied by Turkish and Islamic forces, life continues as normal under Asad and the Russians in 60 per cent of the country. "With a set of formal structures wrapped around a core of family, clans, and confidents...in a 'transactional state' in which profiteers, warlords and individuals...take advantage of the war..." (p. 197). The chapters provide a thorough portrayal of Syrian society and the civil war's effect on it, or rather its role in the civil war—the 'Alawi regime in its privileges and militias, the Sunni majority and the other minorities in their protection and security, even the tribes in their fractious autonomy. On the opposition side, effective action has been shattered by the same division seen in Tunisia between secularists and Islamists, the latter further driven by sectarian and tactical doctrine, plus the same division that plagued Iraq after the invasion between the exiled and domestic leadership pretenders and another division between Turkish-supported and US-supported Kurds. The kaleidoscopic twists of the Islamic opposition,

culminating in the hydra-headed *khalif* (califate) of the IS that then shattered into tentacles throughout the Muslim east and Africa, are well portrayed. The opposition never got over it until all that was left was the Idlib pocket and border strip under Turkish protection and the eastern Kurds under American assistance. The Rabinovich-Valensi account is particularly knowledgeable and detailed in its closing sections to the chapter on life in various areas under civil war, including its crushing and dividing cultural impact on society.

The civil war in the midst of the collapse of the international system of established norms and relations sucked two distinct levels of external actors into the black hole of the domestic power vacuum, which Rabinovich and Valensi treat encyclopaedically in separate chapters. While separate treatment of each country allows for a thorough focus on them one by one, the account loses the chance to place the two levels in a larger context of their own. There has always been an Arab Cold War, as Malcolm Kerr pointed out in 1965, but conditions half a century later are different. In the current System of World Disorder, vacuums attract interference from both levels because of intrinsic interest no longer inhibited by external restraint and because of competitive interest in intervening peremptorily before the rival gets in. US restraint gave the go-ahead to Russia, as noted; Iran's interest in encircling Israel and Turkey's interest in retrieving old Ottoman territories and prestige are explored in the book. Others had a negative interest: both the Syrian Sunnis and Israel shared the view that it was better to humour the regime because it was preferable to the Islamic dangers taking over. Iran is deeply invested in Syria to protect its investment in Hezbollah (and vice versa) and to make sure Saudi and its Western allies were not camped next door but above by a visceral hatred of Israel (p. 123). However, as time has gone on, changes in Syrian military leadership have brought pro-Russians to replace Iran-leaning generals.

Turkey's contradictory interests in the area have produced contradictory relations. The two countries mended fences (literally) when Bashar came to power, but the Spring uprising drove them apart. Turkey also felt it cooperated with IS, riding on the tiger's back, and it channelled recruits and even supplies to the khilafa and cooperated with Islamist factions in the Idlib pocket. But Turkey abhors the US-supported Kurdish militia in eastern Syria, and after having been chastised for downing a Russian plane, Turkey made up with Russian activity in Syria and joined Russia in sponsoring the Astana process. Turkey, a NATO member despite appearances, has more live conflicts of interest with the US and with Russia and acts accordingly. Israel's policy toward the Syrian vacuum and others' efforts to fill it is, above all, determined by the Iranian threat, specifically embodied by Hezbollah but more broadly by Iranian arms and personnel on the border. This has led to important efforts at reconciliation with Russia, not markedly successful, and attempts to keep its balance faced with wobbling American policy. In an unstable neighbourhood, Israel is on its own, keeping a nimble policy of sharp defences and mild rapprochements to protect its clear interests.

The Arab states are less nimble; after an ostracism of Syria from the Arab League and a thereby-condemned attempt to mediate in the early days of the uprising, they remain dominated by their own Sunni-Shi'a schism and their attitude toward the Arab Spring's challenge to sitting regimes but drawn in by the attraction of the black hole. Sifting through these contradictions, Saudi Arabia, along with its allies in the Gulf, was an early supporter of the uprising and had its own Salafi resistance group and negotiating initiative but rebuffed, it turned its attention elsewhere and let things be. Qatar has taken a more active role, with its own stronger resistance group, egged on by its own conflict with Saudi. Iraq has pursued a policy dictated by its animosity to Saudi, its affinity to Iran, and its conflict with ISIS rather than by any clear interest of its own. Lebanon's, Jordan's and Egypt's positions in the chinks of these relations are also discussed briefly in the chapter. It would have been interesting to have a summary at the end of the chapter, situating this level of interested parties, each dancing to a different time, within the context of a bumpy floor.

Another chapter addresses the higher level of international relations. The best characterization of this level is Secretary Clinton's "wicked problem", referring in technical terms to a conflict that engages internal and external players with conventional and non-conventional arms following diverse and crisscrossing interests in several salient and more non-salient solutions, a bird nest of agencies and actions. US policy toward Syria has been grounded in ambivalence, not just between interests and actions but between action and inaction. When the *intifada* broke out, Clinton observed that "Syria is not Libya," but Russia's fear that it might be and trigger Western intervention triggered its own intervention instead. Rabinovich and Valensi are as clear and detailed about the internal conflicts within the Obama administration as they were in the previous chapter about intra-Syrian disputes. The Trump administration fares no better in its record and in Rabinovic and Valensi's eyes, although the turns of events it encountered made it even more difficult to pin down an already torn policy. There was some coherence under Secretary Rex Tillerson, but he was soon replaced. By the time the administration had settled down, Asad had pulled Russia into its bed, used the chemical weapons it had foresworn, continued to host the IS hydra despite its loss of a territorial base, launched military campaigns that ruptured US-Russian agreed ceasefires, and gradually moved back into acceptance from the Arab neighbours. Predictably, Rabinovich and Valensu address a brief and approving mention of Trump's support of Israeli policy. They also note that Europe—notably Britain and France—occupy a marginal position alongside the US in the Syria conflict, materially and diplomatically supporting resistance, which is gradually losing. Rabinovich and Valensi succinctly dismiss the Western decision not to provide reconstruction aid as long as Asad is in charge as losing a potential opportunity, but the whole troublesome topic is not examined (p. 193).

As for Russia, everything was the reverse of the US position. Russia had no interest in supporting the uprisings against authoritarian rulers, on the contrary; it had an important political relation and a naval base to maintain; and an interest in keeping the US and the West and the jihadis out. When things went bad in 2015, Russia stepped in to save the regime that had run out of breath. Russia's enhanced presence in Syria called for enhanced relations from other Arab states and so further enhanced Russia's presence in the area. Russia's Astana initiative pulled in formal cooperation with NATO, Turkey, who had just contracted for a Russian air-defence system, and Iran; in the Geneva process, Russia and Syria skillfully hid behind each other ("I would but he won't").   The zigzag process of escalating Russia's presence in the area centred on Syria and radiated into the region.

Yet at the end (if there is an end), Russia emerged with a dominant position and hence a key responsibility but was still unable to pull off a solution to the conflict. Unfortunately, the great unrecognized agent, fatigue, are likely to creep in leaving Russia holding the bag and all that is therein, as the region accepts its presence as the man who came to dinner. Rabinovich and Valensi hint at this outcome without being able to identify any possible source of a catharsis (that Feldman evokes) that could cleanse the region of its habits and exacerbations. That was the aim of the Arab Spring, but by focusing on its engagingly broad and basic demands, it left tough organization and effective agency to the resilient targets of its efforts. Perhaps the greatest, ironic tragedy of all is the descent of the last remaining hopeful case in Tunisia into the depth of authoritarian takeover, the second presidential coup in its history, welcomed by its fatigued, disillusioned People, at least for a while.

The hopeless hope and unproduced promise of Feldman's Arab Winter and Rabinovich's and Valensi's Arab Turmoil rest like a good taste after a bad meal. These two books are well done, with some holes, by careful commentators. One reads like an informed intelligence brief, the other a disquisition that engages the intelligence. One is primarily a historical narrative, the other an interpretation of political agency. If you want to know in detail about the collection of events and actors in and about one country, read Rabinovich and Valensi; if you want to ponder a thoughtful

search for a theme running through one event in three (of four) countries (depending on what you consider the *khilafa*), read Feldman. They're both good, in their way; why should you have to choose?

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BOOK REVIEW

Adam Goodman

The Deportation Machine. America's Long History of Expelling Immigrants

The Deportation Machine is an analysis and discussion of the deportation regime developed in the United States of America (USA) in the nineteenth century. As Goodman explains, the book "reveals how public officials have assembled well-oiled deportation machines, propelled by bureaucratic self-interest as well as the concerns of local communities and private firms. It is a book about how authorities have used the machine's three expulsion mechanisms – formal deportation, voluntary departure, and self-deportation to exert tremendous control over people's lives by determining who can enter the country and regulating who the state allows to remain" (p.2). The book also discusses "how undocumented immigrants and their allies have endured, adapted, and resisted, taking to the streets and the courts to demand their constitutional rights and challenge what they have considered being unjust laws and inhumane treatment" (p.2). For Goodman, expulsion is a strategy adopted by the communities and states to affirm "control over populations that fall within their borders" (p.2).

The book comprises six chapters and an epilogue that mainly focuses on Trump's presidency, and there is a note on sources and language and acknowledgement. The book is based on the research conducted by Goodman over a decade in twenty archives in the USA and Mexico, interviews with deportees, activists, lawyers, union organisers and immigrant officials. These sources, along with US and Mexican newspapers and periodicals,

have been used to depict and provide a deep and detailed historical analysis of the deportation regime in the USA.

In chapter one, Goodman traces the origins of the deportation machine in the anti-Chinese sentiments developed in the nineteenth century, especially on the West Coast and related to the growing presence of cheap Chinese labour between 1850 and 1870. Chinese migrants were considered a threat to the nation. This anti-Chinese sentiment was then ruled in 1882 with the Chinese Exclusion Act "barring the immigration of Chinese labourers for ten years and establishing grounds to deport" (p.13) those Chinese migrants residing unlawfully in the USA.

In chapter two, Goodman focuses on voluntary departure and anti-immigrant campaigns in the twentieth century. This chapter is a detailed discussion of the deportation during the Great Depression in the 1930s and Operation Wetback in the 1950s. Goodman focuses on Mexican migrants, who, after the Chinese migrants, were those who had been the target of the laws and further restrictions on migrant communities. As the author pointed out, it is unclear how many Mexican migrants were deported during the Great Depression. Still, it marked a strong collaboration between the different stakeholders, such as the local, state, and federal officials who "contributed to the repatriation of as many as half a million Mexicans and Mexican Americans between 1929 and 1939" (p. 46). Operation Wetback, which started in 1954, aimed at regulating

"the flow of Mexican agricultural labourers by reducing the number of unauthorised migrants and increasing the number of braceros" (pp. 52-53). This operation started after the Bracero Program in 1942, which led many Mexican migrants to work temporarily in the agricultural sector in the USA. The Operation Wetback represented an opportunity for the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) "to boost its reputation, build morale among its officers, and solidify its place within the federal bureaucracy" (p. 71).

Chapter three offers an insight of the public-private relationships in managing the deportation of migrants. As Goodman states, "examining the physical process of deportation offers important insights into both the history of the immigrant experience and immigration policy" (p. 73). The rationale behind this chapter is to clearly illustrate that deportation was a business for the public as well as for the private operators and that their relationships "have also decisively shaped enforcement practices, with devastating consequences for migrants" (p. 74). In the chapter, Goodman provides a very meaningful discussion of how migrants' deportation and the process itself were mainly based on the idea that punishment and profits were much more important than the migrants' well-being.

In chapter four, Goodman highlights the contours of what he calls the age of mass expulsion. Between 1965 and 1985, thirteen million deportations were carried out by the INS and mostly targeted Mexican migrants. The author emphasises the crisis, the pressures, and contradictions of the migration system, and he "argues that the nation's ongoing demand for cheap migrant labour and the INS's increasing dependence on voluntary departures and immigration raids between 1965 and 1985 normalised the deportation machine both at the border and in the interior making the possibility of deportation an everyday reality for many, if not most, undocumented immigrants" (p. 109). Because of these constant raids especially against Mexican migrants, they

decided to take "to the streets and the courts in increasing numbers, where they demanded civil and human rights for all and insisted on ethnic Mexican's belonging" (p. 133).

Chapter five is a detailed discussion of activism and resistance in the streets and in courts against deportation. By focusing on the resistance to deportation during the age of mass expulsion, Goodman "argues that the tireless efforts of immigrants and activists helped to build solidarity and empower the undocumented community, in turn limiting the effectiveness of voluntary departures, INS raids, and fear campaigns meant to scare people into the shadows or out of the country altogether. They challenged the basic idea that being undocumented automatically implied deportability. And through their resistance, they helped determine the civil rights of noncitizens, while also defending immigrants' dignity and redefining belonging in ways that transcended legal status and citizenship" (p. 135).

Chapter six is a detailed discussion of deportation and incarceration in the era of militarised borders. Goodman argues that the "criminalisation of migrants. The growth of immigration detention and concurrent militarisation of the border meant that deportation represented a more permanent separation than ever before. Immigrant activists, advocates and allies employed an array of protest strategies in response" (p. 168). This chapter focuses on how deportation has become one of the main features of migration policy in the USA, both under the Republican and Democratic presidencies.

Goodman's book is outstanding research on how the deportation regime developed in the USA. His book sheds light on how migrants' deportation originated from prejudices of a few and propagated quickly to the entire society. Migrants represented a threat to a socio-economic system that was consolidating, and, for this reason, they were perceived as an obstacle to the full economic and social development of American society.

In conclusion, the book represents an important source of information on the deportation that occurred in the USA since the nineteenth century. It is not only a very informative, useful, and relevant book for those scholars interested in understanding migration in its historical, political, economic, and social implications but also a book for those who are interested in understanding the deportation process and how it works. The book is a discussion that offers an insight into the evolution of American society.

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BOOK REVIEW

Rachel McCleary and Robert J Barro

The Wealth of Religions: The Political Economy of Believing and Belonging

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019, ISBN: 9780691217109, 216 pp., $21.95 / £18.99)

The Wealth of Religions is a comprehensive effort to analyze how religion matters in social sciences, specifically economics. The book focuses on the relation between religion and political economy by treating this relation as a two-way interaction, how religion affects economic growth, and how economic outcomes affect religiousness. The book is a thought-provoking piece on how to think about religion in social sciences.

The book is organized into two sections. The book's first section lays the ground for the relationship between religiousness and economic growth. The book's second section involves chapters on various themes, including state religions, religious clubs, and the Catholic Church's saint-making practices.

In the first chapter entitled "Religion: It's a Market", the authors explain the economics of religion. They apply a supply and demand perspective to religion in which the individual is deciding the costs and benefits of participating in a particular religion. This is linked to the book's title, *the Wealth of Religions*, which pays homage to Adam Smith's famous work considered the first on modern economics, *the Wealth of Nations*. In *the Wealth of Nations*, Adam Smith holds that the absence of a state monopoly on religion can lead to a market of religions. In this market, there is a plurality of religions; hence, there is competition among different religions. Individuals are more likely to choose the religion that will give them greater joy and greater religious participation. The

authors also treat religion as another area to apply economic rules of supply and demand.

The second chapter answers the question of what explains religiousness in a society. There is a discussion of secularization theory, arguing that economic progress leads to a decline in religiosity. Analyzing international data on religiosity and socio-economic conditions, the authors agree with the secularization theory that higher economic development leads to decreases in religiosity. Yet, they highlight that secularization is "a slow and gradual process" (p. 29), and one should focus on the mechanisms between economic development and religiosity, such as education and urbanization (p. 30). Although urbanization means lower levels of religiosity, higher levels of education do not mean lower levels of religiosity. In fact, conversion rates rise when education levels increase. The authors emphasize that secularization is not a universal phenomenon and deserves context-specific analysis.

The third chapter examines the effects of religion on state, society, and economics. The authors survey the ideas of Protestant Reformation's key figures: Martin Luther, John Calvin, and John Wesley. Then, they assess the Weberian argument of Protestantism's promotion of work ethic and thrift, which Weber believes facilitated the capitalist production, and find that believing in religion has positive influences on economic growth. Yet, they show that if there is more participation in religion, there is less

economic growth. Therefore, the authors make a distinction between believing and belonging and partially support Weber's thesis on Protestant ethics.

The following chapter examines Islam's effect on economic growth. The authors question if Islam produces the same effects as Protestantism on economics. They argue that it does not and survey its causes in Islamic legal history, from strict inheritance laws to restrictions on credits and insurance and non-development of corporate law structure. However, this analysis is not as detailed as the Protestantism study and needs improvement. Also, there are references to research on Islamic pilgrimage and fasting. The pilgrimage experience appears to make Muslims more tolerant toward women's place in society and education. The research on Muslim fasting in the holy month of Ramadan demonstrated that when the fasting hour increases according to the country's latitude, economic growth lowers. Yet, people feel spiritual satisfaction for participating in Ramadan, and it improves their overall wellbeing.

In the second section of the book, the fifth chapter answers why some countries have state religions whereas others do not. Although the percentage of countries having a state religion has decreased from the 1900s to the 2000s, there are still countries that have state religions, and the level of economic development does not explain why, since both richer Western countries and poorer African and Latin American countries have state religions. "The share of the adhering population belonging to the main religion" explains state religions, but it does not apply everywhere (p. 112). Historical conditions are critical in this analysis, as Turkey is an essential outlier by lacking a state religion, although its probability of having a state religion is high. The size of the country is also essential, rather than larger or smaller countries, moderate-sized countries are more likely to have a state religion.

The following chapter on religious clubs and terrorist organizations rests on "the club model" that explains why some groups employ extreme behaviours: to promote homogeneity and commitment among members. The authors argue that this eliminates free riders from joining the club. Although it is a theory of social organization, the authors believe that this theory could tell us about religious and ideological groups' motivations, including violence. The next chapter is on "the Catholic Church's competitive response to Protestantism" (p. 138) by promoting saint-making. The authors write that saint making has a strategic purpose to "raise collective identity through participation in rituals" (p. 141) through the representation of saints from regions other than Western Europe, such as Latin America, Eastern Europe, and North America. Saint-making is part of Catholicism's competition with both Protestantism and secularization by making Catholicism more appealing.

The Wealth of Religions' main contributions are locating religion as an object of study in social sciences by focusing on its relation with economic growth and being in dialogue with mainstream theories of society, specifically secularization theory. Although the book's title honours Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations,* Max Weber is the classical figure that keeps appearing in the text with his hypotheses on Protestant ethics and secularization. Weber's ideas on Protestant ethics and capitalism remain significant throughout the book since the authors question if religion affects economics. For instance, the authors discuss the economic and social processes of Islam in a chapter dedicated to Islam and economic growth to test the Weberian argument of religion's effect on the economy. Weber reappears with challenges posed by secularization to the Catholic Church in another chapter, where countries get richer, religiosity declines.

The book has a comprehensive selection of introductory materials on religion that will be useful for people from various academic levels. The authors' analysis of the Catholic Church's saint-making practices since the Middle Ages uses a valuable source that is hard to come by elsewhere. Their

methodological rigour throughout the book remains impressive. The book may not satisfy readers from disciplines other than economics since it sometimes lacks in-detail sociological and political analyses; however, this is hardly a weakness considering the broad historical and international data used in the book and the authors' attempts to diversify the religious arena by incorporating Islam and Buddhism in the analysis. *The Wealth of Religions* will be an intriguing read for those who question Adam Smith and Max Weber's perspectives on religion and political economy in today's world.

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BOOK REVIEW

Joseph Masco

The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020, ISBN: 9780691202174, pp. 456, Price: $27.95 / £22.00)

The nuclear weapons programme is one of our time's most talked about yet misunderstood technological endeavours. While historians have studied the early years of the Manhattan project in-depth, the secrecy surrounding nuclear weapons has ensured that the nature of the technology decision-making and work methods involved in the modern US nuclear weapons programme (from the 1960s to the present) has remained unclear. Fortunately, a few gutsy ethnographers have made the effort to investigate nuclear weapons work during the last decade or two. They have had to deal with the difficulty of researching a group that insists on, and may legally enforce, secrecy in many of its core activities.

The Nuclear Borderlands delves into the social ramifications of America's most influential technology project of the twentieth century: the atomic bomb. The first anthropological study of the long-term repercussions of the Manhattan Project for the people who live in and around Los Alamos, New Mexico, where the first atomic bomb, as well as the bulk of warheads in the current US nuclear arsenal, was designed, is presented by Joseph Masco in his book "The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico." Masco looks at how various groups (weapons scientists at Los Alamos National Laboratory, nearby Pueblo Indian Nations and Nuevomexicano communities, and anti-nuclear activists engaged with the US nuclear weapons projected in the post-Cold War period) mobilising to debate and redefine what

constitutes "national security." Masco contends in a ground breaking ethnographic research that the United States' preoccupation with possible nuclear catastrophe during the Cold War overshadowed the more considerable impact of the nuclear complex on American culture. He argues that the atomic bomb is more than simply the motor of American technoscientific modernity; it has also spawned a new cognitive orientation toward daily life, prompting cross-cultural experiences of "nuclear uncanny," as Masco puts it. The book presents fresh theoretical views on the genesis and logic of US national security culture by revealing how the bomb has transformed conceptions of time, nature, race, and citizenship. The Nuclear Borderlands evaluates the nuclear security state's efforts to recreate itself in a post-Cold War world, exposing the nuclear logic that underpins the twenty-first century US war on terrorism.

From the 1963 Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty to the 1992 Underground Test Moratorium, international treaties and US nuclear policy have primarily determined the experimental regimes available to experts on nuclear weapons (p.43). When the Manhattan Project landed on the Pajarito Plateau in 1943, it was supposed to be a one-time US incursion into northern New Mexico, a required military operation that would cease when the war ended. Few could have predicted that the advent of the military atomic era, followed by the Cold War, would result in a permanent technoscientific presence on the plateau,

making the plutonium economy a permanent aspect of life along the Rio Grande's northern reaches (p.99). However, the threat of espionage has long loomed over the US nuclear complex. Some of these ghosts at Los Alamos have names Klaus Fuchs and Theodore Hall, for example, while others, like the third Soviet agent alleged to have worked at Los Alamos during the Manhattan Project, remain unidentified (p.263). However, with the end of the Cold War, espionage, like the US nuclear weapons, seemed to fade in the American consciousness, psychically banished as a quaint relic of a (nuclear) period presumed passed. The firestorms of spring 2000 could not have come from a more unexpected place after more than five decades concentrated on a certain sort of catastrophe in Los Alamos. On May 4, the U.S. Forest Service lost control of a plan to burn underbrush at Bandelier National Monument to minimise the danger of forest fire. Winds gusting to over sixty miles per hour overtook the "controlled" area during the next week (p.289). With the formal turn of the United States to a counterterrorism state after September 11, 2001, the post-Cold War period came to an end. After the terrorist attacks on September 11, Americans who thought the end of the Cold War had fundamentally changed their relationship with the bomb were proven wrong. A complete accounting of the Manhattan project, as this book has argued, is a more difficult matter that must consider not just technoscience but also the cumulative social, environmental, and political impacts of radioactive nation-building. The bomb, most crucially, has created a split between national and state security discussions (p.336).

Starting with the first two chapters, the modified version commences a delicate balancing act by demonstrating the complicated relationships among localised, regional, and worldwide nuclear weapons crises. He presents an intriguing viewpoint on the realities of regular activities for the inhabitants of northern New Mexico in this and future chapters. Masco's multidisciplinary framework enables him to interact with many intersecting narratives of

ethnicity, power, and colonialism involving nuclear weapons, which are still largely unknown throughout American Analyses. Masco dives into the knowledge and perspectives of First Nations communities, Nuevomexicanos, and environmentalist NGO activists in his third, fourth, and fifth chapters. Even if some of those groups regard Los Alamos as a colonialist entity, Masco skilfully clarifies the various opposing interpretations and perceptions of nuclear weapons inside and between such communities. Numerous residents' examples of environmental NGOs as Anglo intruders threaten the region's survival, even though they have campaigned for such disclosure of crucial data about nuclear activities and pollutants in northern New Mexico. Masco's work is well known for its straightforward portrayal of these difficulties. His concluding chapter on Los Alamos' nuclear confidentiality, endemic racism, and genetically mutated ecological systems establishes the importance of the previous chapters whereas offering a disheartening evaluation of the existing challenges confronting the people of New Mexico and the rest of the world that are living with the hazardous inheritance of the Manhattan Project.

The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico, by Joseph Masco, is the most recent addition to the anthropological literature on nuclear weapons work and its cultural significance. The declared objective of Masco is to "defetishize" nuclear weapons. His method is to drastically raise the ethnographic stakes by looking at not only the work of weapons designers but also the connections between a weapons design facility and its surrounding communities and, more broadly, the significance of the nuclear weapons business in American society. Masco's broad method allows him to pose new questions regarding nuclear weapons' cultural relevance, but it isn't totally successful: it yields crucial discoveries, but some ethnographic detail is lost in the scope of his study, and certain linkages aren't thoroughly explored.

The book's main audience consists of professional academics, analysts, and policymakers, and it should also reach beyond specialists to university students and the general public. As the book explains enough relevant historical, technical, and theoretical background and is surely well presented, an educated student can quickly grasp and benefit from the important points in one read. Academics, politicians, and the general public have benefited greatly from these studies, which have made elements of the cultural background of nuclear weapons manufacturing available. They have increased the opportunities for public debate and democratic decision-making on nuclear weapons.

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BOOK REVIEW

John G. Matsusaka

Let the People Rule: How Direct Democracy Can Meet the Populist Challenge

Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020, ISBN: 9780691199726, 312 pp., $29.95 / £25.00)

Matsusaka sets out on a very ambitious task – he seeks to find a political corrective to the crisis of democratic representation that is currently plaguing the United States (and many other countries), culminating in the rise to power of populist figures. Broadly speaking, his antidote to the current lack of confidence in national political institutions is to transfer power and voice back to the citizenry. In short, the solution to poor democracy is more democracy of and by the people. Depending on who the audience of this book may be, I think the reader may take different aspects for their own purposes.

Strength of this book is the culling of arguments and evidence that Matsusaka employs that spans the whole gamut of social science fields. The reader will be exposed to political history, economic, sociological, and political science arguments for why citizens should have their voices amplified. Amidst the inefficiencies and inadequacies of the bloated "administrative state" (p. 5) to solve complex 21st century problems, Matsusaka stakes out the position that power should be reassigned from faceless technocrats on alphabetized DC streets to the denizens on Main Street. The book is organized into four sections: the first lays out the "democratic drift" that has transpired over the last few decades and how representative institutions in the US have failed the citizenry; the second provides a comprehensive descriptive account of direct democracy practices in US history and around the world and also refutes the notion that direct democracy is somehow un-American or politically destabilizing; the

third posits potential reforms and ideas on how to implement popular referendums drawing on historical cases while reviewing their potential shortcomings; and, the fourth wraps up the author's argument with scope conditions and best practices of direct democracy.

The book offers various things for various types of readers and will be easily accessible to the general public, political practitioners, and academics. Its general appeal, however, may contribute to some of its weaknesses, discussed below. Viewed through an academic lens, the book suffers from four weaknesses. First, scrutinizing the methodological and empirical merit of the book leaves the reader wanting more. The author's argument would be bolstered with more convincing evidence for the book's most important claim—that national referendums in the United States would yield a democratic panacea for low levels of trust in government. Apart from a few mentions of Pew or Gallup public opinion polls (and a discussion on p. 165-6), there was not much empirical support that citizen participation in referendums increases trust in government. At one stage, Matsusaka discusses this practice's regularity at the local and state level and puts forth a higher level of trust in local and state governments. However, there is no discussion of a rich political science literature that has investigated this phenomenon through statistical modelling of survey data, panel data, and even survey experiments. The author champions the countries of Italy and Ireland as success stories of direct democracy

practices. However, both of these countries routinely score well below the European average on trust indices of political institutions. Further, the countries scoring much higher on these annual surveys (e.g. Finland and Sweden) tend to have significantly fewer referendums than the cases highlighted by Matsusaka as model cases.

Second, and connected to the above, the author's selection and presentation of evidence seem to suffer from a selection bias. As a comparative politics scholar, I appreciated the chapter discussing global direct democracy practices. However, the chapter seemed rushed and offered few details about interesting cases (e.g. Taiwan, Uruguay, the Philippines) that could yield informative lessons for the United States. In the quick overview of Latin America, the author could have discussed some of the more problematic cases of Venezuela and Ecuador, two poster children that would have allowed the author to caution against some of the worst excesses that may result from executives using referendums as governing mechanisms, especially in extremely polarized contexts similar to the US. Much scholarly work has illustrated the politicized nature of referendums in both countries and how power-hungry presidents manipulated these institutions to circumvent checks and balances, all in the name of the popular will. What were billed as citizen participatory mechanisms in constitutional reforms actually ended in constitutional coups, resulting in disastrous democratic recessions. South America also offers alternative institutions that the author could have also considered—namely citizen participation in direct governance in Brazil, ranging from health councils to participatory budgeting committees.

Third, although populism is in the title and used to set out the intellectual roadmap of this book, there is actually very little about the phenomenon. The term is briefly mentioned and loosely applied to cases across Europe. I struggled to see the broader connection of the proposed cure of citizen referendums to solve populism's causes, especially given that the author acknowledged that "populism springs from different sources in each country" (p. 80). Fourth, the book also tends to offer a monolithic treatment of those who lack trust in government. A generation of political science research has illustrated the many different micro-level factors (e.g. age, education, income, gender, partisanship, race) that strongly condition citizens' levels of trust in government. Treating an entire population as behaving and responding to stimuli in a rather uniform fashion seems a bit simplistic. Lastly, as highlighted above, other mechanisms of citizen participation we see around the world have been shown to enhance citizens' trust and even improve the outcomes of government performance, making a case that the real solution to a lack of representation is to democratize certain institutions. This alternative, perhaps superior to national citizen referendums, would satisfy a major shortcoming pointed out by the author of his own recommendation, a "reliance on government officials to implement is unavoidable" (p. 64).

Although there may be shortcomings from an academic perspective, the book offers quite a lot for other audiences, namely political activists and practitioners. Those dedicated to improving public institutions' legitimacy and concerned by the current demise of the public's trust in representative and governing institutions will take a lot from this book. Matsusaka offers clearly articulated policy solutions and political mechanisms by which to regain the citizenry's trust. It should be taken seriously by those currently in public office and wanting to better serve their constituents.

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BOOK REVIEW

Catherine E. De Vries and Sara B. Hobolt

Political Entrepreneurs: The Rise of Challenger Parties in Europe

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020, ISBN: 9780691194752, 336 pp., $32.00 / £25.00)

According to academics, after a decade of crisis, European politics have suffered unfathomable metamorphoses, performing in the collapse of formerly-stable Western European political institutions. It's egregious that no one can entirely predict how this would affect European politics, but the reality of developing new political players cannot be overlooked. Their entrance into the political arena has piqued the curiosity of scholars, who have been fascinated by attempts to interpret the reasons for their presence.

The book is a topical and significant book that delves into a timely and vital issue. Catherine de Vries and Sara Hobolt are two of Europe's most influential specialists on party competitiveness. While many studies have looked at the emergence of these 'rival parties' across Europe, one of the book's most essential benefactions is the notion that the rise of political beginners is only one side of the coin. Indeed, the authors argue that to comprehend this expansion fully, we must also consider the life of parties that were influential in the first three decades following World War II. Despite fast political bouleversement, some of these parties are still important at the moment. The book deepens understanding of once developments in European politics while furnishing a fruitful frame for unborn exploration in the field by drawing attention to the remarkable adaptability of similar dominant parties, which generally prompts far lower exploration trouble than the astonishing success of political entrepreneurs. Political Entrepreneurs is structured into four

corridors and nine chapters that address all aspects of rival party political conduct. While concentrated on Western Europe, the authors take advantage of the quantum of accessible data, counting on expert, by-election, and fiat data to probe what inspires similar parties to challenge the established powers.

The first part of the book examines the notion of political de-alignment and identifies it as the primary problem defying the political diapason. The authors describe de-alignment as the interplay of political outliers and mainstream parties. As a result, De Vries and Hobolt produce a dominance and invention proposition of political metamorphosis. The authors' interest in political request transitions originates from comparing the requests of artificial businesses and political parties. De Vries and Hobolt apply a swell proposition to twentieth-century Western Europe to better understand the rival parties' nonfictional background. The result is a much larger frame for assaying Western European politics. The first swell begins in the early twentieth century with the emergence of popular social parties. The alternate swell is associated with the rise of green parties in the 1970s, while the third swell begins after the 1980s and is related to the rise of populist radical right groups.

The rival party approach relies heavily on the invention. According to the authors, there are two types of inventions: political invention and rhetorical invention. While the rhetorical invention is associated with anti-establishment speech, the political invention

is appertained to as an issue of entrepreneurship. By combining these two factors, insurgent parties can successfully challenge the dominance of established parties and convert political request power. Authors distinguish between exogenous and endogenous sources of request power when agitating the generality of request power in politics. Exogenous (external) sources include electoral morals, while endogenous (internal) sources include pronounced convergence, the rallying of chops, and avoidance of problems.

The second section of the book concentrates on party domination and dominance techniques proposed by the endogenous sources in the book's first section. The authors outline the elements that considerably hamper competitor parties' electoral success. They claim that candidates cannot acquire electoral support under systems with high polarisation. The authors disregard the traditional generality of party cooperation and concentrate instead on the extent to which pickers can switch between current parties. Their hypothesis is predicated on the notion that the farther pickers switch between current parties, the lower their attachment to them. De Vries and Hobolt also extend their exploration to dominance styles. They characterize unique convergence as parties moving to the centre of the political spectrum to attract a larger number of pickers. One analogous system is related to Anthony Down's rational choice proposition and Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all party proposition. The capability of dominant parties to dominate the political program and thus avoid unpleasant issues is related to issue avoidance. The marshalling of authority is the ultimate domination fashion by which the established parties distinguish themselves from contenders.

The third part of the book focuses on invention and, in particular, its political confines previously appertained to as problem entrepreneurship. Using business circumlocutions, De Vries and Hobolt show how certain enterprises can lead to earnings or losses for the parties that accept or disregard them. The authors give three case

studies from Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands that help us understand the value of problem entrepreneurship. They look at political developments in Western Europe since the 1970s and show how these relate to the emergence of new-postmaterialist-enterprises in the political program, analogous to environmental issues and nuclear disarmament. The authors argue that political parties engage in win-lose behaviour because of the issue of entrepreneurship.

Parties organize their agendas based on the link between political revenues and the overall costs of their business. This sort of activity directly affects their political request standing. The book's last section, titled "Transformation," addresses the changes that competing parties bring to the electoral arena. In this section, De Vries and Hobolt describe what they foresee based on their proposal, focusing on what they term namer appeal or the favourable response of pickers to competing parties' creative endeavour. The book's last empirical chapter examines the issue of political request fragmentation and its influence on the political scene. The authors examine the birth and election wins of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany and the challenges in establishing governments in Belgium and the Netherlands to demonstrate how opposition parties may influence political life and even play a significant role in government formation. The book closes not with a conclusion but with a chapter on "future scripts."

The writers provide three scenarios for the future of the political request. Using three case studies from the Netherlands, Greece, and Spain, the authors identify fragmentation, relief, and reinvention as the three most plausible outcomes. The authors define fragmentation as the spread of power in the political request, leading to political instability as farther parties crop. Relegation describes the creative ways rival parties use to depose established parties. Ultimately, reinvention is about a party's capability to adapt to an ever-changing and delicate electoral environment. However, if successful, dominant parties can repel the

trouble posed by rivals. The authors demonstrate that the presently dominant parties pay significantly lower attention to contentious "new politics" motifs than opposing parties, which presents an interesting argument. Will the substantially 'adaptive' systems accepted by political entrepreneurs in recent decades continue to be a kind of electoral success once they're active in government and become a major party themselves? In doing so, the book creates the frame for instigative, partial-baked examinations.

The Rise of Challenger Parties in Europe is a precious resource for academics and experimenters interested in European party contests and electoral gravidity. The book's original and new theoretical frame of party dominance and invention not only extends our understanding of the rise of contending parties across Europe but also enriches the literature on relative politics more astronomically. De Vries and Hobolt present several clear and accessible analyses that exfoliate sapience on the nature and origins of patterns of political stability and change in ultramodern Western European party systems. Their work is an excellent addition to studies of European party competitiveness and will serve as a reference point for any unborn conversations on the issue.

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BOOK REVIEW

Noah Feldman

The Arab Winter: A Tragedy

After the fall of Tunisia and the regime of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the so-called "Arab Spring" reached Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria. The regimes of Ben Ali, Gaddafi, and the regimes of Hosni Mubarak and Ali Abdullah Saleh fell, while the Syrian revolution turned into a multilateral war. At the same time, the name of the Arab spring raises controversy due to the violence that accompanied the revolutions and their disappointing results.

In "The Arab Winter," Noam Feldman emphasized that the Arab Spring in the Middle East fell short of achieving the majority of its higher aspirations. The Arab spring, unfortunately, deteriorated many people's lives and turned into a tragedy called "Winter." The author aims to provide intellectual readers, decision-makers, and researchers with an in-depth political interpretation and analysis of the Arab spring and its outcomes.

The main three outcomes that shaped the current phase in the Middle East are the new political experience, Arab nationalism, and political Islam. Collective action was newly introduced into the region, which shaped the people acting on "their own." The massive spillover of the Arab spring did not hide the reality that Arab nationalism has been fragmented. Dealing with the protests and people separately by the authorities led to the closing of borders, among other factors, motivating the appearance of identity issues. As a result, the Arab spring fed the divisions in some countries like Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt, but with a different means of control by categorizing the population. Feldman also observed that political Islam had been fundamentally transformed after the events. The collapse of brotherhood governments and movements is an end to democratically oriented political Islam as it used to be.

To analyze and discuss the three outcomes mentioned above, "The Arab Winter" examines different pivotal events of the Arab Spring: Egypt's revolt and military takeover, Syria's civil war, the Islamic State's "ISIS caliphate," and Tunisian difficulties in the process of democracy. After demonstrating the regional commonalities and differences in protesters' demands, Feldman highlighted the states' experiences and introduced them as separate cases to show a specific outcome. For instance, Tunisia represents liberal political Islam while Egypt shows the institutional one. However, after the rise of ISIS, Syria has become "a rejectionist form of political Islam."

Feldman argued that the Arab spring's heroic story had been transformed into uncertainty and something darker. "The Arab Spring promised to end dictatorship and bring self-government to people across the Middle East." Except in Tunisia, the revolution that started with so much hope has turned into a dictatorship, civil war, extremism, or all three.

On the other hand, Feldman contends that the Arab Spring was not a complete failure or even destiny. A brave and painful sequence of

events took place in the Middle East for the first time in modern history when Arab people started working together to pursue freedom. Moreover, Noam claimed that the decision to change governments and regimes in the Middle East this time came from within. It is no secret that the conditions influencing politics, the economy, and other institutional affairs historically were shaped by colonialism and superpowers. Therefore, the history of the region used to be shaped by outsiders, according to the author.

Feldman wanted to be optimistic about the Arab spring, so he believed that even though these events did not result in constitutional democracy or even a more comfortable life for the majority of those affected, this did not mean that the effort had been useless. However, the political activities that took place in the Middle East during the Arab spring had and still have a considerable impact. He also believes that "failure is always a possible outcome of attempting self-determination" and that such efforts may be significant in the future.

Evaluating the Arab spring cannot be done without referring to the characteristics and demands of the people themselves during the period of so-called "revolution." An immediate investigation can show that people's lives became worse than before after what happened. Therefore, if democracy and freedom lead to well-being, this is not the case in the Middle East so far, especially in countries like Egypt and Tunisia, where people are still suffering today or worse than before.

However, seven years was not enough time to judge an experience based on the shadow of change after a long period of colonialism and dictatorship in the region. The changes are not visible when we target the political leadership and ignore the deep state. For instance, Feldman did not focus on the deep state's role in the Middle East and how this state still controls the political scene. What happened in the Arab spring countries cannot be well explained and comprehended in terms of the deep state's transformation and

movement. Therefore, the outcomes of the Arab spring are not direct results of the people's protests and demands, as, in fact, it is a political will and a continuity of the deep state when the dictators are just interfaced actors.

The same thing goes for the evaluation of political Islam and Arab nationalism. Arab nationalism has had critical issues and controversies for a long time in the region, even before the Arab spring. Therefore, the rise of politics based on Islamic views itself was an answer to the failure of Arab nationalism. On the other hand, so-called political Islam has continuously fed from the religiosity of societies and is not the same in all countries. As a result, it cannot be ended as society is a power source for this type of politics. Also, Feldman depended a lot on the facts shown and introduced by the media. However, what the media portrays always depends on and serves different agendas and ideological points of view.

Feldman's analyses also ignore the fact that many outsiders interfered and assisted in turning the balance of power in one direction, mostly against people's will. For instance, the Syrian regime called on Russia and Iran to help control the Syrian people, but it ended with a massive war and casualties.

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