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A Future Projection of Post-Covid-19 in Japan: Universal Values and International Cooperation

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Yukio Sakurai

Independent Researcher, yukio1887@gmail.com

KEYWORDS	ABSTRACT
COVID-19 Pandemic, Universal Values, Ageing Population, International Cooperation	<i>This essay aims to clarify the most popular impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and examine a future projection of Post-COVID-19 in Japan. This is based on interdisciplinary studies, particularly the literature survey on global governance in English and Japanese. Japan has consistently lived after WWII under the principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Given the challenges caused by the pandemic, it is unpredictable how much conflict between multiple powers will hinder national security and economic globalization. The following five actions should be executed: Japan should participate in international research activities to envision a future society, Japan should adopt a unique future concept to address ageing populations and social security reform in their international cooperation, a review of neoliberalism, construction of a society that can respond to societal risks, and political leadership and freedom of speech to deal with serious social risks should be championed.</i>
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Introduction

It is believed that viral infections, including tuberculosis, have been overcome in developed countries and are regarded as issues affecting developing countries. SARS and MERS had little impact, and even the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on lives was as small as the usual annual damage of influenza in Japan. In fact, the excess mortality of Japan in 2020 was reported as 'minus15,000,' including an effect of the COVID-19 pandemic impacts (Bando, 2021).

The trend in Japan, however, changed in August 2021 due to the spread of the delta strain (Kurita, Sugawara, and Ohkusa, 2022), and the excess mortality of Japan in 2021 was reported as 'plus 12,293,' including an effect of the COVID-19 pandemic impacts (NIID Japan, 2022a). Since then, the epidemic of the new corona infection has been confirmed several times, and now (January 2023) Japan is hit by the double infection risk of the 8th wave of the omicron corona and the influenza epidemic (NIID Japan, 2022b).

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought an unprecedented crisis to every country/area. The government of Japan has been addressing this issue for years and has found a solution through vaccination. Yet, an uncertain situation remains in east Asian countries, including China. In contrast, the UK and European countries lifted all the restrictions related to COVID-19. This creates a considerable gap in COVID-19 policies between countries/areas. Currently, moves to

mutate COVID-19 into a highly infectious virus and to carry out repeated vaccination are simultaneously progressing, and the battle between the two still continues in some countries while accidents caused by vaccination appear.

The COVID-19 pandemic has emerged as a global issue. Why did it so happen? It is supposed that the COVID-19 pandemic attacked the weakest areas of the contemporary world. The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic have extended to general policies, including politics, the economy, employment, education, and people's lifestyle (Sakurai, 2021). Given these challenges, what is a projection of post-COVID-19 in Japan? This is the research question that this essay intends to answer. Some views responding to this question appear (i.e., Burrows and Engelke, 2020; Yuval, 2020; NIRA, 2020; Schwab, 2020; CFR, 2021; Roubík et al., 2022; Ciravegna and Michailova, 2022). This essay is based on interdisciplinary studies, particularly the literature survey on global governance and adult protection in English and Japanese. The scope of consideration is not limited to the national health policy but also general policies. The discussion is basically focused on Japan, but some of the discussion would presumably find global application.

Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic

The COVID-19 pandemic is examined to understand its most popular impacts. In Japan, first, a lack of national leadership was revealed. The failure to promptly produce effective countermeasures against the COVID-19 pandemic was no different in other countries, but the national leaders could not communicate effectively to the people in their own words in the event of a national crisis. A perception gap between the national leaders and the people might have been happening. This gap raises the frustration of the people that a person who is not qualified to be a leader oversees national affairs. Even if politicians were not capable of that much, Japan was assumed to have talented bureaucrats and academic experts.

However, with the national crisis caused by the pandemic, national bureaucrats who rely on precedent and execute their duties under the law have become confused without clear guidance from politicians of the ruling parties. Behind it, there was a change in the personnel system for national bureaucrats during the second Shinzo Abe Administration. The cabinet of Japan has collectively administered executive personnel affairs of each ministry and agency through the Cabinet Personnel Management Agency since 2014. With this system, each ministry/agency is under the control of the Cabinet, and the Prime Minister can behave like a President (Toda, 2015). Academic experts in the field of public health can analyze and explain issues pertaining to their specific research areas, but it was also revealed that they lack the ability to think about the relationship between public health and state management. The national bureaucrats and academic experts turned out to be less reliable in coping with a crisis than thought.

Second, information from the mass media lacks a good balance. The mass media has reported the risk of the COVID-19 pandemic like the pandemic was a flood, thereby instilling fear in the public; the information lacked scientific data-based analysis, and they could not project the medium to long-term impacts. As a result, the public, especially elderly people and people with disabilities, who continued to watch the mass media reports on TV and/or in newspapers, seemed to be atrophied and suffered more psychological consequences than the actual harm caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (Murakami, 2021).

In contrast, those who were sceptical about the media coverage suspended watching the TV and/or reading newspapers, and consequently, mass media alienation, particularly among young people, rapidly increased. A web research survey in September 2020 in Japan shows that "video" is the top media for teens and their 20s, and "TV" is the top media for people in their 30s to 60s. About 30 per

cent of teens and 20s do not trust mass media (Yamaji, 2020). This leads to a gap in perception between generations on the COVID-19 pandemic issue.

Third, tremendous peer pressure is seen in society. Peer pressure is “the strong influence of a group, especially a group of children, on members of that group to behave as everyone else does” (Cambridge Online Dictionary, 2022). Peer pressure is so strong in Japan, and it is considered a national character. Various factors are assumed to constitute a phenomenon of peer pressure, such as historical reasons (i.e., the mentality of agricultural society), primary educational effects (i.e., moral education on collectivism), and a local practice not to make things transparent (i.e., part of Japanese philosophy), and none of them is the overwhelming reason.

Peer pressure contributes towards ensuring discipline even in natural disasters, such as earthquakes and tsunamis. But everyone, including a child, the elderly, and a person with a disability, is forced to comply with the regulations or guidelines shared among people in daily life, such as washing hands, wearing nose masks, social distancing, leaving windows open for proper ventilation, and keeping silent in a closed public space. Those who break the regulations or guidelines, intentionally or unintentionally, tend to be heavily criticized, not necessarily by the authority, but by other people, even when breaking the guidelines are not deemed illegal.

Japan has no state of an emergency clause in its constitution. The Government of Japan can only declare a state of emergency by law in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, which is not enforced on people like a lockdown but requests people to observe the regulations or guidelines by relevant voluntary restrictions or by order, due to amendments to the law in February 2021, under the local governor’s supervision in the relevant jurisdictions (Ida, 2020); The Kyodo news poll survey (March to April 2021) showed that 57 per cent of Japanese people agree to amend its constitution to incorporate state of the emergency clause, but it has not materialized.

A reason why peer pressure happens is presumably due to the practice that individual responsibility is questioned if his or her behaviour negatively affects society (Kokami and Sato, 2020). Anonymous posts in social networking systems (SNS) are further amplifying the pressure with words of slander and humiliation. Activities of the so-called “Pandemic Police,” a self-appointed enforcer of business closure and stay-at-home requests during the pandemic, were frequently seen before the Government of Japan declared a state of emergency by law. After the declaration, restrictions were requested by law, and the activities of the Pandemic Police disappeared. This is because “the standards for self-restraint that serve as rules are ambiguous, and many people do not follow requests, leaving them without confidence in justice”, according to the comments of an expert, Hajime Ohta (Jiji Press, 2021).

Fourth, the COVID-19 pandemic has had a serious impact on all industries. Along with the rapid slump in demands, the working environment for clerical workers changed drastically with a switch to the online work-from-home method. Whilst there are some industries that obtained excessive incomes due to the malfunction of certain manufacturing goods and their global logistic chains. Universities closed their gates and stopped all activities at the initial stage and then shifted to online lectures. It was understood that research institutes, such as universities, which were originally believed to respond to national crises from a scientific standpoint, ran for self-defence in the event of an emergency, did not carry out any conspicuous activities at the initial months but rather closed their doors. These activities were instructed by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan.

In the global community, first, diplomatic relations between nations have deteriorated, increasing the threat of potential conflicts. In particular, the deterioration of the–China relationship is remarkable (Nye JS Jr, 2020). From the US and its allies’ perspectives, China’s “unilateral attempts

to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas and any acts of intimidation” is the chief focus (MOFA, 2021). However, China has a different view (MFAC, 2021). It seems that “conflicts of powers, interests, and even values” (Kosaka, 2017: 21) are happening between the two nations. The conflicts may lead to divisions of the global community into two or more. Despite the need for the global community, which is composed of the United Nations (UN), to point in some direction to issues that cannot be addressed by a single nation, it has not been possible to respond effectively to potential conflicts between nations (UN, 2022). Then, the Russia-Ukraine military conflict happened in such a situation that the global community could not maintain the tie for international cooperation, but a division between the two nations ended (ECFR, 2022).

Second, it was suspected that international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), are under the influence of a certain country. The “WHO-convened global study of origins of SARS-CoV-2: China Part” was published in February 2021. Less enough clarification has been made in the report, and further studies are needed (WHO, 2021). This shows how difficult it is for such international institutions to maintain neutrality in the global community. In fact, four heads of the UN affiliate organizations (i.e., FAO, ICAO, ITU, and UNIDO) were from a certain country. Whilst international cooperation was needed to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, effective international cooperation could not be practised, at least during the initial stage.

Third, the role of SNS expanded rapidly, and in some cases, untrue information was spread, intentionally or unintentionally. The move by major SNS providers to unilaterally delete users’ remarks that are not in the national interest and its policy has become apparent. For example, some Japanese YouTubers mention that it happens on YouTube, and thus, they carefully pay attention to their topics and expressions not to touch upon the administrator’s alerts. This clearly demonstrates that the position of the international SNS speech theatre is not always neutral nor safe but is under threat to the freedom of speech by major SNS providers as commercial companies.

Fourth, the alienation of vulnerable people has become prevalent. Due to the suspension of economic activities, many have become unemployed worldwide, and the number of people who are in financial difficulty has increased. In fact, in the 2020 ILO-OECD paper, it was addressed that it is “important to start on the task of building back better to address the deep-rooted labour market fragilities and structural inequalities that the pandemic has exposed” (ILO-OECD, 2020: 3). Elderly care facilities have become a potential spot for COVID-19 clusters and suffer from a severe shortage of social workers (Kohn, 2020, 2021). Older residents have been isolated without contact with relatives and friends due to the strict in-house operational rules. People living in closed facilities, such as prisoners, people with severe intellectual disabilities, and people with severe dementia, were placed in a similar situation.

Future Condition Settings

To consider the research question, it is necessary that certain conditions are set for the future. First, a society with an ageing population is expected worldwide. Population composition is the result of past accumulation and is the most convincing future composition. There were 702.9 million persons aged 65 years or over in the world in 2019, and the number of elderly persons is projected to be 1,548.9 million in 2050 (UN, 2019: 5). Globally, the share of the population aged 65 years or over will increase from 9 per cent in 2019 to 16 per cent by 2050 (UN, 2019: 1). The ageing of the population is a global phenomenon except for Africa (ibid.), and it is predicted to continue in the future. In particular, the ageing of the population in Europe and East Asia is expected to have a profound effect on the medical, aged care and social security policies of each country. It is important to establish social protection programs that can be sustained over the long term to prevent poverty, reduce inequality and promote social inclusion among elderly people.

Second, a society in which the role of artificial intelligence (AI) is increasing with progress in information technology (IT) is expected. It is a society in which IT will be used for automatic driving technology in automobiles, analysis of big data, management of personal information, social surveillance and military devices, and so on. It is expected that developed countries will shift from post-industrial societies to AI societies in the 2030s. For example, the Cabinet Office of Japan shows the project “Society 5.0” (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2021) to bring about a human-centred society by utilizing AI. This society also includes the risk of surveillance society and cyber-attack and needs effective safeguards to avoid excessive surveillance by the government and commercial companies to restrict human rights.

Third, a possible increase in depersonalization is expected. Depersonalization is “a psychopathological syndrome characterized by loss of identity and feelings of unreality and strangeness about one's own behaviour” (Merriam-Webster, 2022). Due to conflicts of interest between generations arising from the declining birthrate and ageing of the population in developed countries and loss of employment opportunities, particularly for young workers in part because of society's dependence on IT and AI, social ties will be gradually weakened, and suspicions will be widespread, making it difficult for people to establish trust and interdependence in communities. Eventually, depersonalization is expected to occur, as Karl Marx predicted (Grimmes and Simmons, 1970).

Fourth, the conflict of universal values between countries is expected. In the uncertain domestic and international situation, the important thing in imagining the future is to ‘return to the basics.’ It is a reconfirmation of the basic principles of society and a clarification of the social norms. Japan has consistently lived after WWII under the principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and peace. These universal values were reconfirmed at the Japan-US Summit Meeting in Washington on April 16, 2021 (MOFA, 2021). All of these are believed to be universal values and do not change at all, even with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

But it is true that all countries do not always accept the above values (Eto, 2017; Green, 2021). For this reason, Japan may suffer from contradictory double standards of values, namely, the relations with countries that share universal values and relations with countries that do not. Behind this is the progress of economic globalization, where business is carried out across borders. Whether this economic globalization will block the relationships between countries that share universal values and those that do not in the future depends on future developments (Naganuma, 2020).

If these relations were to be blocked, commercial transactions and finance for exchanging goods, services, and money would be confined to a certain area, and free trade and financial transactions in the world would not be possible. Even if clear blocking is avoided, according to the relevant sharing of universal values, potential conflicts between multiple powers can lead to divisions in the world. It is unpredictable how much conflict between multiple powers will hinder national security and economic globalization, and this is a serious key point. This movement may lead to a shortage of important basic commodities, such as energy resources, food materials, rare metals, and water.

A Future Projection of Post-COVID-19: Five Actions

Based on the above-mentioned impacts and settings, a future projection of post-COVID-19 is examined. First, Japan's participation in international co-research activities that envision a future society is vital. It is well known that before the end of World War II, the political leaders held summit meetings to create a new post-war world order. A well-known meeting was that the three heads of state of the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union met at Yalta in Crimea and concluded the Yalta Agreement in February 1945. Although the COVID-19 pandemic is not a war between nations,

it will need to be treated in such a manner in view of its large-scale multifaceted impact. Therefore, it is necessary to envision a world order after the COVID-19 pandemic must have been overcome.

In the process of this concept-making, it is desirable that a voluntary gathering of thought leaders is held. There can be various avenues, such as G7 and G20 meetings led by the major political leaders, the UN, international symposiums with individual participation of opinion leaders, and study group meetings among international research institutes. It is thus essential to adopt a policy such that there will always be Japanese representatives at each event. To support this research activity on domestic and foreign relations, a special task force, such as a future vision team, in the Cabinet Office of Japan will be important. It seems essential to adopt the leadership of Japan that are clear enough to the Japanese people and the global community.

Second, it is important for Japan to contribute a unique future concept to the global community. This is to ensure Japan's national identity in the international community and to encourage national security in a broad sense through the contribution. Issues common to all countries/areas in the world include the ageing of the population and social security reform. Ageing of the population is one of the most serious issues facing Japan at present, but it is conceivable that Japan, which constitutes the world's most aged society, will take advantage of this and produce countermeasures. The proportion of Japan's population aged 65 and over was 29.1 per cent in September 2022. It is expected to rise to 38.4 per cent by 2065. Thus, Japan has become a super-aged society, and the population is even ageing further (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2020).

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic experience, it has become clear that elderly people are the most vulnerable, and the ageing of the population is a serious issue in national governance. Japan should take leadership in international cooperation to cope with the ageing population, based on the policy experience between 1945 and 2022 regarding the welfare and social security system (JICA, 2014), under the concept of 'human security.' Human security is an approach to assist member states in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people (UN, 2012).

Such soft and smart power (Nye JS Jr, 2013) contributions would be acknowledged by countries/areas that may share or may not share universal values. This is distinct from the realm of military defence and is not related to potential national conflicts. This project does not require a huge budget but requires a clear national consensus to use a reasonable budget with skilful human resources and practical knowledge. The Government of Japan's stance on human security is shown by the speech (MOFA, 2006). Some researchers address that "the Japanese approach, as a medium- to long-term strategy, accentuates a wider variety of human security issues and the deeper causes of human insecurity" (Bosold and Werthes, 2005).

Responding to the ageing of the population leads to the stability of the domestic civilian sector, which is an important factor in national governance. In fact, in the domestic civilian sector, every country/area is worried about how to deal with the ageing of its population. The international cooperation project can be called the "Japan Program for the Well-being of the Ageing Populations (JPWAP)," which comprises four parts, namely, (1) Cooperation in Legislation and Policy-making, (2) Cooperation in Healthcare and Aged Care for the Elderly, (3) Cooperation in Community Business Activities for the Elderly, and (4) Cooperation in Elderly Education in Schools and Communities.

This project is a comprehensive package of the four main training programs for the well-being of the aged populations that are related to various academic areas, such as law, public policy, medicine, nursing, social welfare, gerontology, bioethics, psychology, education, business management and community management. By devising online training and establishing relay

training centres in the ASEAN countries, such as Singapore, and the Middle East and North African countries, such as Turkey (Istanbul), it will be possible to expand international cooperation based on these regional training centres as hubs (Sakurai, 2018).

This project comprises two categories, namely, (a) lecture programs for legislation and policy-making and (b) training practice programs for relevant practices. The former response to the several research questions; (i) what kinds of welfare and social security system have been developed in the process from the post-war reconstruction period to the present day of a super-aged society, (ii) what success and failure of the welfare and social security system were experienced, and what lessons Japan learnt from the policy history, and (iii) what legislation and policy-making will be necessary according to the relevant country/area. The lecture programs cover a wide range of welfare and social security system reforms and can be used as a reference for each country's countermeasures.

The latter comprises various training practice programs by practitioners for the well-being of the ageing populations to cover the welfare and social security practices, including the adult guardianship system, supported decision-making, and elder abuse prevention measures. Adult guardianship systems support decision-making, and elder abuse prevention measures by law are less developed or even not legislated in developing countries/areas. As the population ages and the number of elderly people with dementia increases, these law systems and practices will be important to cope with the ageing of the population. For this project, empowering Japanese practitioners who can communicate in English, such as policy administrators, lawyers, medical doctors, nurses, social workers, schoolteachers, not-for-profit organization (NPO) staff, businesspersons, etc., engaged in ministries, universities, research institutes, medical care/nursing care, schools, NPOs, commercial corporations etc. can be promoted. It is worthwhile to create employment for Japanese people, particularly women and retired elderly people with practical experience, for domestic research and international cooperation to continue long-term activities (Sakurai, 2019).

Third, a review of neoliberalism and its policy is important, which seeks to rely more on the functioning of the market (Schwab, 2020). Neoliberalism is believed to promote more efficient business by the privatization of public sector businesses (i.e., mail, public transportation, healthcare, international airport, port management, etc.). Since the 1980s, Japan has carried out privatization, especially if the move would possibly lead to effective business operations in the concerned sector. Certainly, there are some sectors, such as the national railway sector, which have become successful due to their privatization. The Japanese National Railways (JNR) was divided into six regional passenger railway companies and one freight railway company and privatized. These private companies were launched on April 1, 1987.

However, considering that there are businesses that are familiar with the competition for goods and services and businesses that are not, and there are businesses that need to be operated in every environment. It is also necessary to maintain certain levels of public involvement so that such businesses can continue to thrive even in the event of an emergency. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the need for public involvement in medical and public health fields has become clear.

In addition, it is known that aged care facilities are basically private businesses with a long-term care (aged care) insurance system, and it is extremely difficult to secure care workers when some of them eventually leave to avoid the risk of infection. Therefore, it is important to maintain a certain number of state-run aged care facilities and/or civil servant care workers in aged care from the viewpoint of securing aged care services (Yuki, 2021). This arrangement will guarantee civil servant care workers to keep their employment long-term. Particularly, most aged care workers who visit

elderly homes in Japan are, on average, elderly people aged 60 and over and must be regarded as essential workers (Yuki, 2020). To deal with risks, such as the infectious disease outbreak and natural disasters that may inevitably occur in the future, it is necessary to incorporate some areas of business into the government policy by changing the philosophy of neoliberalism as a general direction.

Fourth, the reconstruction of a society that can respond to multiple societal risks, including infectious disease outbreaks and natural disaster risks, is important. The COVID-19 pandemic is not just a transient event; it had the effect of visibly revealing existing social issues in a short period of time. It is necessary to make effective use of these unique opportunities and prevent society from withstanding all possible risks. This is eligible with the participation of a wide range of fields. Consideration is required on how to tackle the natural disaster case, including earthquakes, in the pandemic situation. An integrated policy is required for managing natural disasters during the pandemic (Ashraf, 2021), which is particularly emphasized in Japan, having a high risk of earthquakes. It is recommended to incorporate the response to risks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, into primary and secondary school education curricula as a risk learning program and to scientifically research the risk of responses to infectious diseases in higher education and research institutions.

One important in education is the concept of “dignity of risk”, which suggests “the principle of allowing an individual the dignity by affording to risk-taking, with subsequent enhancement of personal growth and quality of life” (Ibrahim and Davis, 2013: 189). Not only safeguarding the risk but also challenging the risk is important within reasonable allowance. It will also be important to encourage commercial corporations and NPOs in civil society to participate in risk management and enact legislation to support their participation.

Fifth, it is important that there is political leadership and freedom of speech to deal with the risk of the COVID-19 pandemic and other risks. In Japan, politicians are often a group of people who ascend office through hereditary succession, but some are ex-bureaucrats, representatives of labour unions or some industry groups, celebrities (in entertainment, sports, etc.), and ex. local parliament members. Hereditary succession is a system that places the highest priority on blood ties and does not necessarily emphasize the abilities of politicians.

Regardless of political beliefs, it may be necessary for talented people with political competence to create a policy system for people like them to become politicians. It is currently unlikely that a talented person will want to become a politician, especially with the instability of the profession where if they lose an election and remove the parliamentary badge, they will become just like every other person. Some measures should be established to encourage talented young people to become politicians. For example, an executive course to foster political leaders with business experience is worthwhile establishing in graduate schools, specializing in knowledge on national security, national budget, public policy, digitalization and so on.

Ensuring that there is freedom of speech that allows people to freely express their thoughts even when they are not politicians is extremely important in the operation of democracy. This is particularly true in a society where everyone can express their thoughts using SNS.

Conclusion

Based on the above-mentioned impacts and settings, a future projection of post-COVID-19 is examined. The following five actions should be executed to ensure a better post-COVID-19 future: (1) Japan should participate in international research activities to envision a future society, (2) it is necessary for Japan to adopt a unique future concept to address declining birth rates, ageing

populations, and social security reform and thus to contribute to, (3) a review of neoliberalism, which seeks to rely more on the functioning of the market, (4) construction of a society that can respond to societal risks, including the risk of the COVID-19 pandemic, and (5) political leadership and freedom of speech to deal with the risk of the COVID-19 pandemic and other risks should be championed.

Particularly for action (2) above, an idea of the “Japan Program for the Well-being of the Ageing Populations” is proposed, which will establish steady international cooperation under the concept of “human security.” This concept of human security can overcome the potential conflicts regarding the universal values to contribute to any country that may suffer from an ageing population. It is believed that the spirit of solidarity can be embodied through international cooperation on the common issue of an ageing population in each country.

The future is created by the people, especially younger people, who will lead the next generation. It is important to keep a good balance between generations in society, although the voices of the elderly tend to become bigger as the population ages. In order to achieve it, it would be an idea for younger people to vote in the election, at 18 now but at 16 in the future. Some European countries consider this idea in part because of a good balance of voting population between generations. Although the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a major social challenge, it will present a unique opportunity for leading discussions to activate that future, including a voting age system.

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Russia's Ukraine Revanchism: Dugin, Neo-Eurasianism, and the Emerging World Order

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Mohammad Ali Zafar

Research Scholar and Student of International Relations at the National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad, Pakistan,
alizafar100y@yahoo.com

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ABSTRACT

The Ukrainian conflict has paved the way to re-examine the geopolitical implications of Russian Neo-Eurasianism, which has challenged the Liberal International Order. The implications of such a development will have global implications for Russia. Indications of Putin's renewed mission, infused by re-strategising the Russian position in Eurasia coupled with cultural exceptionalism based on messianic identity, are observable in recognition of Donbas and Luhansk as separate territories and the invasion of Ukraine. The conflict has allowed the US to lead as an Atlanticist player and regain its slipping position in the international system. Therefore, following exploratory research methodology, the paper examines Dugin's geopolitical model based on neo-Eurasianism. The paper concludes that the model will observe major setbacks in the post-Ukrainian conflict order as the proposed alliances by Dugin's model with Moscow, Tokyo, and Tehran face several challenges. Consequently, the invasion has pushed Atlanticist pre-eminence back on track across Eurasia.

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Introduction

After the start of the Russian invasion, Anatoly Antonov, Russian Ambassador to the US, stated, "We are talking about changing the world order that was created by the United States and by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries after the dissolution of the Soviet Union" (Colarossi, 2022). Such assertions are not new; they find their relevance with philosopher Alexander Dugin's belief in the rise of multiple poles of modernity. Therefore, paving the way to link the practical relevance of the Eurasianist agenda and Russia's geopolitical gamble.

The Russian special operations in Ukraine have raised the ante for the re-imagining of Alexander Dugin's work, who said that war between Russia and Ukraine "is inevitable" (Ikenberry, 2018). He further exhorts that "*Russian-Western Relations Are Just Beginning; the West Must Take Us Seriously Now, Engage in Real Dialogue*" (Memri TV, 2022). His conceptualisation of Russian geopolitics has observed practical relevance in the shape of Vladimir Putin's recent actions to recognise the Donbas and Luhansk regions. The action has been inspired by the Russian understanding of Russian history, cultural exceptionalism, and the Eurasian perspective (Euro News, 2022). It highlights what Dugin believes: that there should be an end to political modernity

for which Eurasian powers must challenge the Liberal International Order, turning towards no one's order or a multipolar world.

The crisis resulted in multiple repercussions for its overall geopolitical ambitions, especially when a shift was observed in US's European allies, France, Germany, and the UK, who were looking to follow an independent foreign policy amid the conflict, thereby favouring US security-centric interests in Europe (Ikenberry, 2018). At first, NATO seemed somewhat obsolete in its recognition as a security alliance. However, the recent actions of Putin's pragmatic Eurasianist agenda have posed questions about the future of Russian geopolitics and the re-emergence of NATO's importance for Europe.

It is believed that Alexander Dugin's neo-Eurasian ideology is not the official policy of the Kremlin, but Putin's actions up till the Ukraine crisis provided evidence of Dugin's neo-Eurasianism in play in Europe and elsewhere. Nonetheless, political gestures and speech acts were already prevalent, and as Brickey LeQuire (2014) argues in his paper, *Putin and the West: The Politics of Eurasianism*, how Dugin's geopolitical theory "reportedly became the political creed of high officials in the current government."

Broadly speaking, the Russo-Ukrainian crisis has raised geopolitical challenges for Russia, which is why Dugin's geopolitical model, inspired by Mackinder's Heartland theory and Haushofer's Lebensraum, required a holistic reassessment of how Russia's actions are in line with Neo-Eurasianism and Dugin's geopolitics. To analyse this, there exist questions such as: what is Neo-Eurasianism, and what is the relevance of Ukraine in Neo-Eurasianism? How have Atlanticist powers, the US and its allies, responded to the recent invasion? How will Dugin's overstretched geopolitical model observe real geopolitical shocks amid the Ukrainian conflict?

Following the exploratory research methodology, the paper aims to argue how Russia's invasion of Ukraine is in line with neo-Eurasianism ideology and how the Russian geopolitical gamble will further strain the prospects of Russia's global treatment as a global power. Such actions will allow the US to further restrict Russia's regional assertions by reconfirming its position in the aforementioned regions. To simplify this, the paper is divided into three parts. The first part will conceptualise the concept of Neo-Eurasianism and its relevance to cultural exceptionalism, geopolitics, regional Eurasianist platforms, and Ukraine. The second part will analyse Dugin's geopolitical model to see the proposed alliance with Tehran, Berlin, and Tokyo. Also, this part will discuss how the Russo-Ukraine war was long coming. The third part will analyse the response from the west and the future of the proposed alliance by Dugin before concluding the paper.

Neo-Eurasianism: Cultural Exceptionalism, Geopolitics and Ukraine

Embracing its civilisational exceptionalism, Russia's vision has robust geopolitical ambitions following the Neo-Eurasianism ideology. The concept of Eurasianism gained its prominence in the 1920s with the work of P. Savitsky, N. Trubetzky, and G. Vernadsky to conceptualise the westernisation that caused Tsarist Russia's collapse. Later in the 1960s, Lev Gumilev rejected western-oriented Russian history (Clover, 2016), but his work remained focused till the Soviet era, after which Alexander Dugin, Alexander Panarin, and Alexander Prokhanov, with neo-Eurasianism ideology, contextualised the post-cold war period as 'Russia should not imitate the west'. They believe in an organised multi-ethnic Russian society based on the principles of civilisational coexistence and reject liberal universalism (Arbatova, 2019: 8). Such views find acclaim in the words of Putin for the support of his nationalist historical obsessions.

Neo-Eurasianism and Russia's Cultural Exceptionalism

Neo-Eurasianists view Russia as a unique civilisation with its own values and political system. Even Putin regards Russia as a "*civilisational state*" (Putin, 2013), which, as per Dugin, has an "*intrinsic right to evolve according to its own logic*" because there is no fixed pattern for human progress and development (Dugin, 2015: 18). This view challenges Fukuyama's lack of an alternative approach and Huntington's "conflict-laden" understanding of the bifurcation between western and non-western civilisations (Mouzakitis, 2017).

The cultural exceptionalism view views Russia as the messianic 'third way' (Klump, 2009). This is a sheered rejection of forked explanations proposed by the west by presenting a blurred explanation of Russia's European and Asian history. However, Dugin argues that Russian civilisation was established by several factors, which included Slavic-Aryan culture, orthodox traditions, and Turkic nomadism (Mouzakitis, 2017). By this, the aim is to allow Russia to hold onto an "inner cultural core" that has shaped its broader geopolitical imperatives (Shlapentokh, 2017).

Moreover, it is the civilisation that acts as the major political driver on an international scale. This classification, as per Dugin, is based on civilisational geopolitics, which has been shaped by the geopolitical rivalry between major land and sea powers with distinct hostile ambitions and cultural obsessions. In Russia, a land power is regarded as a Tellurocracy, whereas sea powers, the United States and the United Kingdom, are classified as "Atlanticist" Thalassocracies. (Melin, 2017).

The recent developments in Ukraine and Russia's geopolitical revivalism under Putin's presidency are aimed at the rejuvenation of Russian civilisation and the resurgence of Russian culture. This is where neo-Eurasianism provides context to understand Russian resurgence and the Ukraine crisis under a cultural perspective that has influenced nationalistically inspired foreign policy—disregarding Ukraine's sovereignty.

Neo-Eurasianism and Geopolitics

The all-present hostility between land and sea power, as described by Mackinder, has inspired Russian foreign policy and Dugin's geopolitics. Dugin's geopolitical design for a 'Eurasian Empire' is clearly influenced by Karl Haushofer's "New Eurasian Order," which proposed that Russian and German civilisations must collaborate to equalise sea power's influence from the world islands (Dugin, 1997: 30). Haushofer's theorisation was based on genocidal politics grounded on racial lines called as Lebensraum. It did inspire Dugin's Raumsinn, the Russian version of Lebensraum. However, Dugin's geopolitical determinism, based on Raumsinn, is established on geographical principles rather than racial lines. Dugin argues that it was indeed the Lebensraum that failed Germany because Hitler tried to make Europe German rather than European. This is where Dugin proposes that Russia must refrain from building a Russian empire but rather establish a Eurasian empire. This view is observable in the Russian civilisational discourse, as hurled by Putin in an article on the historical unity between Russians and Ukrainians (Putin, 2021).

Neo-Eurasianism and Ukraine

The Neo-Eurasian perspective on Ukraine is fused with their historical view of Ukraine's non-existence as a state (Dugin, 1997: 228), for which they fuelled ethnic and social tensions in Eastern Ukraine by supporting pro-Russian separatist movements. Traces of such disenfranchisement from within Ukraine against pro-western governments were observable even before the Crimean annexation. The actual preparatory period for the invasion started from 2005 onwards with the rise of the National Bolshevik Party, an extreme right party co-led by Dugin himself (Mathyl, 2002). The manifestation of the party is clear; they do not accept the existing borders of Russia.

Following this, Dugin, in his book *The Foundations of Geopolitics*, asserts that Ukraine as a state "has no geopolitical meaning" and "poses a huge danger to the whole of Eurasia" (Dugin, 1997: 254-228). For him, the solution to the Ukrainian problem is simply the division of the state into several zones based on geopolitical and ethnocultural realities. The four ethnocultural zones include Western Ukraine, Little Russia, the right bank of the Dnieper River (Central Ukraine), and Crimea (Dugin, 1997: 255).

The first region, Western Ukraine, includes Transcarpathia, Volhynia, and Galicia; it is aloof to Russian culture, so it is not included in the Eurasian heartland and must be kept alien to the other ethnocultural regions of Ukraine. Western Ukraine is part of Middle Europe (Mitteleuropa), which includes Germany, Italy, and most of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire's territories (Dugin, 2002: 256). The second region, "Little Russia," includes the territories to the east of the Dnieper River. This region is dominated by the orthodox Russian population, which is closely aligned with Russian history, culture, ethnography, and religion. As Dugin proposed, it is not important that the Eurasian empire must incorporate all the proposed areas into its dominance, but at least even if, for instance, Little Russia remains autonomous, it must remain "in an unconditional and solid union with Moscow". The third region, "Central Ukraine," is ethnically dominated by ethnic Russians from "Little Russia." Therefore, similar to Little Russia, Central Ukraine belongs to the Eurasian Heartland. Crimea must remain under "Moscow's direct strategic control." However, it should be granted maximum autonomy, keeping its socio-economic interests with Ukraine under consideration (Dugin, 1997: 256).

Eurasianism and restructuring of regional institutions for Eurasian integration

Several important institutions were formulated as part of Russian *Ostpolitik* to build economic and security alliances against Atlanticist powers and their allies. The first major institution formulated to keep the lost Russian states under Moscow's leadership was the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Through this institution, Moscow aims to keep its near-abroad states away from the influence of NATO or the EU. In securing Moscow's interests, it supports Dugin's claim that the post-soviet territories need to remain under Moscow's influence based on their shared cultural and historical relevance with Russia. Through this, Russia will be able to emerge as Eurasian Pole in the proposed multipolar world.

The second major institution is the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which is aimed at building a supra-national union that includes the CIS states. The EEU is to compete with the EU over economic trade with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, which is in line with the Eurasian agenda. Russia intends to use the EEU to foster interdependence among Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, and Armenia, thereby limiting Atlanticist influence in Eurasia. Following this, Putin aims to add China, India, Pakistan, Iran and other CIS members into the EEU, thus forging a greater emergent integration platform for the Eurasianist project (Mahjar and Ripa, 2016).

The third major institution is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); it is a hard-security-focused organisation that aims to be Russia's counterpart to NATO, especially in Central Asia, by promoting strategic understanding. This is traceable to their joint defence cooperation through military drills and the development of "Rapid Reaction Forces" in 2009.

Lastly, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which acts as a political-security-centred organisation, provides a joint working platform for Central and South Asian states. However, rising Chinese investment has posed new challenges for Russia in determining how to counter it while keeping it a Russian-centric regional institution. The future of these institutions is dependent not only on how Moscow responds to China's growing role in the SCO.

Dugin's Geopolitical Model

Alexander Dugin's geopolitical model presents the world as a multipolar geopolitical setup in which Russia is the leading Eurasian power in the multipolar world (Ingram, 2021). His assertion for a pluralistic version aims to represent the diverse civilisational coexistence of multiple pillars of modernity against the monopoly of western civilisation's monotonic liberal order (Melin, 2017: 18). This setup nullifies the traditional idea of a nation-state and replaces it with an "integrated civilisational structure" representing great spaces (Dugin, 2014: 19-20). And it is the "geo-economic belts" that keep unity within the "Great Spaces".

Figure 1: Map of Multipolar World



Figure 1 represents the division of the world into four geographical zones. The Euro-African zone, for example, is subdivided into European, Arab-Islamic, and Trans-Saharan Great Spaces. The Pacific-Far East zone includes the Chinese, Japanese, and New Pacific Large Spaces. Finally, the focus of the research in the Pan-Eurasian zone embodies Russian-Eurasian, Islamic Continental, and Hindu Large Spaces. The Anglo-American Zone includes three great spaces, i.e., North, Central, and South American Large Spaces. Within this setting, Russia will make a few geopolitical settlements by forming three major alliances against Atlanticist Sea Powers from the Anglo-American Zone. The alliance formation will be based on a commonality of interest, which is hostility toward Atlanticist powers; Dugin's proposed alliances for Moscow are with Berlin, Tokyo, and Tehran.

Moscow-Berlin Alliance

The overly ambitious model proposed returning the Kaliningrad Oblast (Easter Prussia) to Germany, along with the majority of protestant and catholic states, with the exception of 'unstable' Finland (Dugin, 1997: 155). On the other hand, as part of the Russian south, the Russian-Eurasia sphere must rule Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia, which are "north of the Balkan Peninsula from Serbia to Bulgaria" (Dugin, 1997: 224). Furthermore, with the exception of Estonia and Ukraine (except its western parts), all former Soviet Union states in Europe must enter into the Russian-Eurasian sphere, like Belarus.

The Moscow-Berlin alliance has been shaped by Russia's interest in German technology for Russian resources. Both sides have observed a convergence of broader socio-economic interests, a reduction in Berlin's defence spending in NATO, and their shared political views on

Georgia and Ukraine that have been shaped by German nationalism. Both sides have a history of settlements in the shape of the Treaty of Rapallo (1922), the Hitler-Stalin Pact of 1939 and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939) that introduced a mutual understanding of spheres of influence between the two sides. At the same time, there are concerns about the Alternative for Germany (AfD), a far-right nationalist party which is gaining prominence in Germany and is viewed as a pro-Russian party. If such factors are capitalised on in the long run by Russia, it can use German support to reject Atlanticist influence in the region.

Additionally, there exists an increasing irritant between Washington and Berlin based on Berlin's lack of attention towards an increase in defence spending under NATO's charter, the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, and Washington's withdrawal of 1/3rd of its troops (Hjelmgaard, 2020). Also, rising Chinese and Russian investment was pushing transcontinental relations with the Atlanticist powers to the point of 'no return' before the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict (Ellyatt, 2020).

Moscow-Tokyo Alliance

To form an intimidating arrangement against the US in East Asia, Moscow should offer the disputed Kuril Islands to Japan as per the model (Dugin, 1997: 163). The Kuril Islands were of increasing significance to the Japanese imperial power in the 1930s. If the Kremlin gives back Kurils Island, taken from Japan during WW2, it could restore the Japanese "new order" in the Pacific region. Nonetheless, Russia was in talks to negotiate with Japan over its claim on four islands in the Kuril chain, but after Japan's recent action to support US-backed sanctions, the Kremlin has abandoned peace talks with Tokyo.

Japan is aiming towards an independent security policy by increasing its defence spending by 15% since 2012 (Foster, 2020). The idea is that Japan must transform into a normal country by relocating Article 9 of the constitution. Such a security policy orientation has raised the ante in Washington vis-à-vis Tokyo's desire to move towards nuclear capability over the rising Chinese threat; this has been hinted at by former US diplomat Brzezinski. He believes that the uncertainty surrounding US security assurances to Japan may compel Japan to seek a geopolitical settlement with Russia (Seligman and Gramer, 2019) while developing a nuclear capability to deter Chinese threats (Brzezinski, 2012: 159).

Moscow-Tehran Alliance

The alliance with Tehran is central in the Russian-Eurasian sphere against Atlanticist powers as both share a principle of "common enemy" towards the US (Dugin, 1997: 164). Other than the access to warm water in Russia, Dugin argues that both sides have mutual recognition of traditional coexistence in a civilisational context (Dugin, 1997: 158). The presence of an anti-Atlanticist strategy infused with anti-American resentment in the Muslim world is capitalised on by Dugin (Dugin, 1997: 164). He recognises the general view of America towards Islamic associations in Eurasia as a favourable scenario for the Moscow-Tehran alliance. Such an alliance will allow Russia to break the hostile NATO-led 'Anaconda Ring', for which the US must be driven out of the Persian Gulf (Dugin, 1997: 60-166).

The US maximum pressure policy against Tehran has allowed Putin's Russia to bolster its ties with Iran. Mutual dependence and shared resentment of the US provided a foundation for the two sides to expand their cooperation against the Atlanticists. Despite the irritant over Syria, Tehran has other reasons to forge long-term ties with Moscow, especially the need to find an alternative to western sanctions and isolation from the international sphere. Iran's recent 400-billion-dollar deal with China and the death of IRGC General Suleimani have convinced Tehran

that they have to accommodate Russia and China by forging strategic partnerships in Eurasian countries, particularly the Middle East.

As per Dugin, Russia needs to build stronger ties with Iran to break the hostile NATO-led 'Anaconda Ring', for which the US must be driven out of the Persian Gulf, which is perceptible from the impediments between the US and Saudi Arabia. In his most recent remark, the Saudi crown prince said, "Simply, I do not care," when asked about Biden's misunderstandings of him (Chmaytelli, 2022). Their concern over Khashoggi's murder has increased Riyadh's resentment towards the US; such questioning helps in warming Saudi-Russia ties (Gardner, 2019). Therefore, irrespective of the Saudi-Iran rivalry, the two sides have been acting in favour of Russia.

A Long War Was Coming for Ukraine

Scholars argue that since the annexation of Crimea, the possibility of war between Russia and Ukraine has been observable. However, such assertions represent a submissive understanding of the history of Ukraine with Russia. There was a pattern in how the neo-Eurasianist agenda was in play that set the arrangement for each event that led to Putin's decision to start "special operations" in 2022. There are four explanations for the rise of the event from a historical point of view. First, as has been discussed in the previous section on how Russia views Ukraine as an unnatural state, it should be under the Kremlin's sphere of influence.

The second explanation is NATO's recalcitrant posture towards the threat faced by Ukraine. It is observable from the 2008 Georgian crisis when Germany's chancellor Angela Merkel, France's President Nicolas Sarkozy and the United Kingdom's Prime Minister Gordon Brown refused to offer NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine at the 20th NATO summit held in Bucharest. Even now, when NATO members meet, they don't want any hasty decision to accept Ukraine's membership, thus highlighting Europe's attitude towards Ukraine's security. Although the Ukraine crisis is not new yet, the French President believes that they can't afford to accept Ukraine's acceptance into NATO at such short notice. For these realities, Tim Marshall (2015), in his book, *The Prisoner of Geography*, states that "*Thank goodness Ukraine isn't in NATO, or we would have to act.*" However, the time was running out for Russia "to disrupt the annexation of Ukraine by the Atlanticist Empire". Therefore, it had to take a shot before Ukraine's urge to join NATO would be accepted by the West (Dugin, 2012: 234). The word "annexation" here meant the entrance of Ukraine into NATO.

The invasion of Ukraine shows that Russia has waited a long time for Germany and France to give her time, what Dugin calls a "grace period" by disallowing Ukraine's membership into NATO; nevertheless, time was running out for Dugin, as he asserts in his book, *The Fourth Political Theory*, "the battle for Crimea and Eastern Ukraine awaits us" (Dugin, 2012: 236-37). Therefore, the recent invasion was a long time coming, which is divisible from Dugin's neo-Eurasianist network inside Ukraine, Putin's hawking actions against Crimea in 2014, and his feisty speeches against Ukraine's membership in NATO. All of these proclamations show that the dismantling of Ukraine and the entrance of at least Eastern Ukraine under Moscow's direct control remains the immediate goal.

The third explanation is based on Russia's efforts to galvanise support from factions inside Ukraine. The Orange Revolution against Viktor Yanukovich, pro-Russian prime minister, in 2004 (Wilson, 2005) allowed Russia to take actions against Ukraine's pro-western leadership and the need to keep its home in order based on its increased fear of a western-sponsored colour revolution inside Russia. They sanctioned several pro-regime youth movements, such as "Rossiia molodaia"

(Young Russia), "Molodaia gvardiia" (Young Guard), "Nashi" (Ours), and some others. This underlined the involvement of the Neo-Eurasianist agenda within Ukraine since 2005.

The youth movements that were banned included *Evraziiskii soiuz molodezhi* (ESM, Eurasian Youth Union). The ESM was headed by Pavel Zarifullin and Valerii Korovin, who was the national Bolshevik youth wing of Dugin's international Eurasian movement. There is still unclear evidence over who formed ESM, but scholars such as Anton Shekhovtsov (2014), a political scientist, argue that the movement received presidential grants from Russia after the Orange Revolution, which shows the involvement of Moscow's leadership (Shekhovtsov, 2016).

Moreover, the ESM collaborated with far-right parties in Ukraine, such as the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU) and the Russian bloc. The progressive socialist party was at that time headed by Natalya Vitrenko and Dmytro Korchyns'kyi, who were members of the highest council of Dugin's MED. The presence of ESM in Ukraine made it clear that they do not accept Ukraine's entrance into the EU's sphere of influence. Based on this, the major political goal at first was to break Crimea away from Ukraine and then break Ukraine into regions so as to allow Moscow to occupy the niches.

The Neo-Eurasianist movement, which was almost dead in 2007-8 because of the measures taken by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) against ESM, re-emerged with the 2014 Russian-Ukrainian war (Podrobnosti, 2008). But irrespective of the fact that some of the ESM members flew to Russia and some remained as minorities in the movement, the covert support continued for pro-Russian organisations. For instance, the movement collaborated with PSPU's Vitrenko, whom Dugin called "a charismatic politician" (Trusevich, 2008). She is the same leader who wanted to build a political union between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus and was against reconciliation with the EU in general.

Other organisations, including the Donetsk Republic (DR), worked with ESM on the Eurasianist project. They, in 2006, made a move to hold a referendum for the independence of the Donetsk republic. However, the referendum never took place. Later, DR went underground when criminal cases were raised in Ukraine, yet it declared Donetsk's independence in 2009 (Ostrov, 2009). Later, after the rise of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko, DR again resumed its activities in 2012 and continued with its opposition to Yanukovich, who had pro-western rhetoric. These developments were followed by a period in 2012 when Ukraine was debating whether to sign an Association Agreement with the EU or to forge relations with the Russian-based Eurasian Customs Unions (ECU). For this, DR and ECU collaborated; they even took part in a meeting called "The Future of Donbas" in Luhansk (Bredikhin, 2012). The meeting chose interstate integration as the next step toward the Eurasian union.

The establishment of the embassy of the Donetsk Republic in Russia (2012) and the hosting of several conferences for the Eurasian project are some of the pertaining elements that were prevalent as part of subversive tactics before the actual invasion of Crimea in 2014. Thereby pushing separatists in the South East of Ukraine to start extensive violent mobilisations against anti-Russian authorities in Ukraine.

The recent development where Russia claims that they want to de-Nazify Ukraine is not different from Dugin's view that Atlanticist powers are the ones that brought Nazis to power in Ukraine. For a long time, Putin waited to start the invasion of Ukraine when the West kept pushing Moscow's redlines on Ukrainian issues. Thus, Putin, to gain political legitimacy at home and to support Russia's strategic culture of expansion, had to take this decision against what Dugin terms as the "Nazi Junta" of Ukraine.

Altogether, Dugin's ideological assumptions were converted into practice by the annexation of Crimea and then the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. So, the signs of war were observable for a long time, considering the role of ESM and pro-Russian separatist organisations in Ukraine. The ethnic plates were targeted by these factions, leading towards a strategic success for Russia by using the *Gibridnaya Voyna*, a Russian hybrid war strategy, to "erode the socio-cultural cohesion of the adversary's population" (Schadlow, 2015).

Atlanticist response

To encircle Russia, the US, along with other European powers, has praised a strategy that includes an inclusive approach majorly comprised of economic sanctions and the supply of arms to Ukraine. The strategy based on economic coercion and arms support aims to coerce Russia into accepting western diktat and demonstrating US leadership to withhold the Liberal International Order.

Economic sanctions

The economic sanctions that the West has imposed on Russia have been unprecedented in their speed, scale, and scope. The US, UK, EU members, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan, have increased their bets against Russian aggression by imposing various embargoes against Russia (Keay, 2022).

Based on the economy's future outlook, Western-backed sanctions will halt new investments in Russia for a long time. Therefore, \$630bn (£470bn) worth of Russian foreign currency reserves is also frozen, therefore plummeting the Russian ruble, consequently increasing inflation in Russia (Liang, 2022). Several state-owned enterprises, Alfa Bank, Sberbank, government officials, and dual-use goods for military and civilian purposes are also sanctioned by the UK, US, and EU (Gov.UK, 2019). But the need was to introduce further strict sanctions that would be more effective than those imposed on Iran, North Korea, and Russia after 2014.

The major setback was the removal of Russian banks from the international financial messaging system SWIFT. This requires Moscow to find alternatives, which in her case are possible through the Russian-developed System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS) and China's Cross-Border Interbank Payment System as an (imperfect) alternative to SWIFT. Nevertheless, the alternatives might work in the long run, but for now, 70% of the Russian banking market is in trouble because of its removal from the SWIFT system.

Capitalising on the global sanctions against Russia, the numbers are in a daunting position (Financial Times, 2022). On 24 February, Equinor, the Norwegian energy group, started the process of divesting away from its ventures in Russia. That will cost \$25 billion in Russia. On 28 February, HSBC decided to relax its ties with Russian banks, including VTB, Russia's second-largest bank. RWE has also favoured not re-entering into contracts with Russian counterparties for non-energy supplies (Reuters, 2022). Baker Hughes (Reuters, 2022) and Weatherford (PR Newswire, 2022), which provide oilfield services, have halted any new investment in their ongoing operations in the Russian oil market (Funakoshi, Lawson and Deka, 2022).

Moreover, AB Volvo, Nokia, Apple, Daimler Truck, General Motors, BMW, Ford Motor Co, Canada Goose, Mercedes-Benz, Volkswagen, Airbus, Toyota, etc. (Klayman, 2022). have all suspended their businesses in and with Russia. These might not be viewed as affecting the Russian economy in the long run. However, as per the public choice theory, the impact on people's daily lives matters a lot when calculating the impact of sanctions. To this, Reid Whitten says, "No way of shielding Russian people from the effects of sanctions" (Keay, 2022). The outpouring of automobiles, electronics, and related foreign investment in Russia will undoubtedly spark public outrage and

galvanise support in favour of liberal, anti-Putin, and anti-autocratic factions against the government's actions, especially when the situation implies a possible Iron Curtain 2.0 for Russian citizens.

Therefore, the impact of these sanctions on the Russian market, the Russian oil and gas sector, and the Russian retail sector will have exuberant ramifications. The crippling position of rubble cannot support a Russian invasion for long, considering the Atlanticist economic response. As Napoleon said, "armies march on their bellies", and if the economy is in peril, the armies cannot be offered much in the long run to continue their belligerent actions against an adversary that is economically, diplomatically, and militarily supported by the world's strongest economies.

The nature of sanctions this time is strict *vis a vis* the one imposed in 2014. The smart and targeted nature of the 2014 sanctions was predominantly symbolic; Park and Choi (2020) and Biersteker and Hudáková (2021) argue that the failure rate of those sanctions was high for several reasons. In recent cases, the EU has capitalised on the need to place stronger embargos against transport equipment, intermediate products, capital goods, etc. These sanctions have raised the ante for the Central Bank of Russia to utilise its \$127 billion in gold reserves left in Russian and renminbi reserves worth \$70 billion. This is why Putin has asked the EU and the US to return their payments in rubles in order to support the economy. The central bank, within just 8 days, from 24 February to 02 March, loaned 4.4 trillion rubles to banks so that the financial system would be able to maintain its stability (Aleksashenko, 2022).

The US has banned all Russian oil and gas imports, and its Atlanticist ally, the UK, remains committed to decreasing its dependence on Russian oil, eventually phasing out its dependence by the end of 2022 (Aljazeera, 2022). The major challenge for the US remains how it will provide alternative energy supplies to the EU, which is already dependent on Russian oil. As a result, Russia has been monitoring the impact of price fluctuations on the EU since December to see if the EU will be able to withstand the shocks of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Farid Zakariya (2022), a political commentator, believes that the EU is not far away from entering into a period of recession if oil prices are not controlled, which remains to be the case as Russia is stopping oil exports to Poland and Bulgaria and has asked EU members to pay their dues to Russia in rubles.

Overall, the US has requested Gulf states to increase their oil production to counter the increased challenges faced by the EU, which gets a quarter of its oil and 40% of its gas from Russia. Irrespective of the exhortation from the EU that they will switch to alternative energy supplies "before 2030", the source of alternatives is the Gulf States. This means that the Biden administration must reclaim the Saudi crown prince, Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) because relations between Washington and Riyadh have been strained since the Jamal Khashoggi incident. Trump's departure not only strained relations but also allowed Riyadh and its Gulf allies to look for other options, such as Beijing. The same Beijing that bought a major chunk of the Gulf's oil during the COVID-19 crisis when the US was fighting at home with COVID-19. Therefore, Saudi Arabia and Qatar's oil remain the crucial factors for Washington based on mounting pressure from the EU for alternative options because the US cannot support the EU's energy needs for long. Thus, if the US is able to win over its Middle Eastern counterparts, then there exists a strong opportunity for the Atlanticist powers to offset Russia's oil monopoly over the EU.

Military

To support such an ambitious geopolitical adventure, Dugin might just have oversimplified the military potential of the West against Russia. The fault in the Russian military's stars was observable from the time when several pictures of Russian military hardware baring open on Ukrainian soil were coming out of the war zone. Marck Cancia, a retired Marine Corps colonel who

has studied Russia's military buildup since the cold war, claims that "Russian strategy and tactics are failing in Ukraine" (Insider News, 2022). Hundreds of Russian tanks, SPCs, fighter aircraft, and airborne troops are all in play on Ukrainian soil. However, the images of abandoned vehicles, surrounding Russian troops, and shots down of Russian choppers by portable AA systems represent a miscalculated strategy from Putin's end.

In contrast, Ukraine has emerged as the one with the West's sympathy. Secretaries Blinken and Austin said to Zelenskyy that they vowed to "help them win" (Lee, 2022). The billion-dollar military hardware that has been reaching Ukraine represents a staunch response against Tellurocracy power by the Atlanticists. The states that have provided military hardware to Ukraine include Belgium, the Czech Republic, Canada, the US, the UK, Estonia, Germany, France, Latvia, Lithuania, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, the Netherlands, and the United States (Curtis and Mills, 2022).

The military support by the West was as expected. Therefore, the real question is: in the post-Ukrainian conflict, what will be the position of Eurasia? Will the grand chessboard see a shift in the positions of states such as Germany, which has been steadfast in its refusal to increase defence spending? What about the alliance that, Dugin proposed with Germany, Iran, and Japan? The answers to these will highlight that irrespective of the ambitious Eurasianist agenda, Dugin's geopolitical model will experience major setbacks.

Post-Ukrainian conflict geopolitics: Implications for Dugin's proposed alliances and Emerging World Order

German U-turn

For a long time, the Kremlin has been forging stronger ties with Berlin, which has attracted criticism from the US. Nevertheless, Germany has been a vital player in building the bridge between Russia and Europe. Even after the change in leadership with the departure of Angela Merkel, Berlin was unassured about changing its position against Russia, which means it was in line with the historical ties that Dugin proposed between Russia and Germany. Even at the very start of the conflict, Chancellor Olaf Scholz was reluctant to clarify Germany's position, highlighting Berlin's lack of concern to take the leadership position in addressing the crisis against Russian bellicosity (Aljazeera, 2022). It showed the inadequacy of Russian and Eastern European policies by Germany amid the Ukrainian crisis.

For years, Germany was not willing to stop the construction of Nord Stream 2, decrease its dependence on Russian oil or increase its defence spending as per NATO's charter, but it was all until the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis. Germany's guilt over the Nazi regime and the 20 million deaths in the USSR prevented them from increasing their defence spending, but with the heightened debate over the future of Europe's security and the improved standing of France vis a vis Germany in NATO, Berlin had to forge some policy changes.

Before the conflict, the stats show that 55% of Germany's need for gas was fulfilled by Russia raising questions about how Berlin's dependence on Russia (O'Donnell, 2022). To this, Scholz, in a session of the Bundestag, exhorted that the time has come for Germany to reduce its import dependency on Russia (France 24, 2022). The tables have turned. Many politicians, including German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier, have publicly admitted that "it was a mistake to use trade and energy to build a bridge with Moscow" and that the time has come for Germany to enter into a "new era for European security" where relations will be more about "containment and deterrence". Such exhortations have been supported by the new chancellor, Olaf Scholz, who, while arguing in the German parliament, used the term "Zeitenwende"—literally meaning a turning

point—to mark the rise of a new era for Germany (Abend and Bajekal, 2022). This means decreasing its dependence on Russian energy, increasing its defence spending and maintaining a stronger position via France in NATO to take the leadership seat in European security.

The ambitious Eurasianist agenda, as proposed by Dugin, finds one out of three proposed alliances, as per the model, in a dangled position. The Kremlin might be able to continue Nord Stream 2 in the future, but the tilt towards increased military spending, diplomatic re-positioning against Russia in favour of European security interests, and searching for alternative energy options—gulf states—has allowed Berlin to move further away from Russia (Bollfrass, 2022).

Japan

Japan is an important partner of the US, especially after the recently announced Indo-Pacific strategy. The shift in Japan's policy orientation since WWII has allowed her to move closer to the US sphere of influence, forming an essential East Asian alliance. Still, Japan has been aiming towards an independent foreign policy for the past few decades, which has been infused by its need to curtail the Chinese threat, for which it has shown its desire to build nuclear arsenals. On this, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, on Fuji Television, said that Japan should move forward towards a possible "nuclear sharing program" (Johnson, 2022). Such incitements of Tokyo to offset China were capitalised on by Russia when they entered into dialogue over the Chishima Islands, which Russia calls the Kuril Islands, but then Japan announced it would follow US-backed sanctions against Russia, and the talks ended.

Following western diktat, Japan has revoked the "most favoured nation" status of Russia (Bloomberg, 2022). The assets of several Russians were frozen, along with the prohibition of trade with several organisations. Tokyo has targeted Russian banks, banned imports of Russian coal, and banned exports of Russian-bound oil refinery equipment (Reuters, 2022). At the same time, it has tripled its loans to Ukraine, reaching \$300 million (Reuters, 2022). But there is a concern that since Japan depends on Russian coal for 13% of its power generation, this will lead to a rise in inflation in Japan. The fluctuation in the Japanese currency did raise eyebrows in the financial sector, but irrespective of these concerns, the public remained steadfast in its support for sanctions against Russia. The polls in April by Asahi Shimbun showed that 88% of the Japanese population supported sanctions against Russia (The Asahi Shimbun, 2022). This demonstrates that irrespective of certain domestic concerns, and the people remain supportive towards their government's foreign policy position in favour of the US-backed sanctions against Russia.

Dugin's proposed Moscow-Tokyo alliance was observing some hope when both were close to finalising the joint construction of the Kuril/ Chishima Islands before Russia's pugnacious actions in Ukraine. Other than this, Japan has had a more clear vision with the US over China, based on which the Ukrainian conflict has further unsettled Japan's deal with Russia over the disputed territories. Consequently, the global dynamics shaped by the Ukrainian conflict take away 2/3 of the proposed alliance as acclaimed by Dugin's geopolitical model.

Iran

The shared animosity between Russia and Iran against the US allows both sides to strengthen the natural strategic bonhomie (Shlapentokh, 2020). Irrespective of the US-backed sanctions against Russia, Iran has remained resistant to accepting any shared behaviour against Russia. This also supports her own offensive posture in the region, referred to as "forward defence" against US expansionism in its near abroad.

In Iran's case, Dugin's proposed alliance with Tehran remains nascent. Russia has been keen to invest in Iran and provide military hardware. Both recently concluded a deal in 2021 to mark their joint efforts in supporting Iran's interests with the JCPOA and at the UNSC. With this, Russia will provide advanced military hardware such as Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets and the S-400 missile defence system. In contrast, Iran provided Russia with a 20-year agreement in the same year, which makes Russian companies the largest shareholders in the Chalous gas field in Iran's Caspian Sea territory, but what good would such an alliance be considering the economic situation of Tehran and Moscow? (Watkins, 2021). On the geostrategic level, cooperation can lead to a joint response against Atlanticist powers, but considering the crippling position of Iran's economy, any overambitious roadmap will remain less productive against Washington, which has had a "maximum pressure" approach against Iran in the past.

So, despite the western response against Russia, Iran remains closer to the Russian ambit due to its hostility toward Washington as a result of its shaky position on P5+1, the assassination of IRGC General Qasem Suleimani, and the lynching of economic sanctions. This is why the US needs to shape its policy towards Iran to prevent it from fully entering into the Russian or Chinese circle, which is observable from its "look East" policy in the post-Rouhani period, as discussed by Ali Fathollah Nejad in his book, "Iran in an Emerging New World Order" (Nejad, 2021).

Even US allies like Germany, France, and the UK have been reluctant to support further sanctions on Iran. Moreover, they have been developing an alternative economic transition system as well to avoid US sanctions (Peel, 2019). Therefore, the US needs to finalise the P5+1 deal and integrate Iran's economy into the global market so that it can be driven away from the isolation that could be capitalised on by Russia. As Negar Mortazavi, an Iranian-American journalist and analyst, said, *"The president just has to make the decision, spend the political capital, take some public heat – which is what Obama did – and just do it"* (Harb, 2022). This will lead to the normalisation of relations with Iran, thus curtailing Eurasian influence, which will be a bigger threat to Russia than a "nuclear Iran". Nonetheless, this remains a possibility in the future, as the chances are currently scanty.

Conclusion

Despite the radical nature of Dugin's geopolitical model, which beliefs in dismantling parts of China and giving Turkey geopolitical shocks, it is an oversimplification of the existing realities. However, keeping geopolitical shortcomings aside, the prospects of an alliance with Germany, Japan, and Iran remain a possibility, and so will it be in the future. The nationalistically inspired foreign policy did show similarities to the Neo-Eurasianist vision for Ukraine, but in the end, the current Russian revanchism has raised multiple challenges for the Russian Eurasianist project.

The paper has capitalised on the concepts of cultural exceptionalism, neo-Eurasianism, and Russian geopolitical actions. The paper has analysed the real motive behind Russian actions in Ukraine and how the Neo-Eurasianist agenda has been in play in Ukraine since 2005, leading all the way to Putin's decision in 2022 to announce "special operations" in Ukraine. At the same time, the paper has analysed the Atlanticist response to the conflict and how the conflict has allowed the US to regain its influence in Europe, which was questioned by France and Germany based on their diminishing role in NATO. But the conflict allowed European states to recalibrate their security policies as well as heighten the discourse on what it means to be part of NATO vs non-NATO European states. Based on this, Sweden, Finland, and Ukraine have raised their voice for NATO membership. Therefore, despite multiple challenges for the EU on how to find alternatives to Russian energy supplies in Europe, they have been nudged by Russian aggression, which is one of its kind since the end of the II World War.

America's slipping grip, especially in Eastern Europe, never meant the rise of the Eurasian pole under Russian leadership or the emergence of China as the global hegemon: rather, it showed what it means for Europe to be part of the Liberal International Order and what it means to have the US's security, diplomatic, and economic support against a resurgent Russia.

Further, in the Persian Gulf, there are some irritants based on the animosity between the Biden administration and Saudi Arabia and Iran. To prevent further damage, the US needs to finalise Iran's nuclear deal because there will be several challenges for it in the future. Also, Trump's Abraham Accord efforts need not go down in veins. Therefore, the US needs to reset its relations with Saudi Arabia, a major oil swinger in the global oil market, to prevent Russia's oil monopoly and provide an alternative to the EU's oil demands. Based on this, Washington needs to open a new chapter with MBS, which is to remain the most relevant after Israel in American foreign policy in the Middle East.

In Southeast Asia, America has been forging stronger ties with regional partners, for which Japan has been acting as a close ally based on their shared animosity towards China. For the future, the US needs to ensure that regional partners need to be supported in such a manner as not to allow Russia and China to come closer, as that would pose stronger challenges for the Liberal International Order.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has jolted the Eurasian landmass. The actions have been infused with a historical understanding of Russian civilisation's exceptionalism that resonates with Dugin's Neo-Eurasianism, aimed to build a Eurasian empire. Irrespective of the view that Neo-Eurasianism is not the official ideology of Russia or that Dugin's view is not directly linked to Putin, for the past 25 years, his assertions have been what Russia has been doing. Dugin has been acting as Putin's ear and has had an important role in anti-Western discourse. Along with this, Dugin has had an integral part in the military studies of Russian officers. The idea of Neo-Eurasianism cannot be sidelined by the West because of the massive threat it poses to stability in Europe. In 2014, the Czech Security Information Service (2014) released a report stating that Russian actions in Europe aim to establish a structure "ideologically based on Dugin's expansionist Neo-Eurasianism." Therefore, neo-Eurasianism, with its anti-Atlanticist vision, cannot be dismissed.

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Orazio M. Gnerre

oraziognerre@gmail.com

KEYWORDS	ABSTRACT
<p>The people's Republic of China, Turkey, Asian Partnership, Diplomacy</p> <p>Received 25 July 2022 Revised 04 January 2023 Accepted 10 January 2023</p>	<p><i>The People's Republic of China is renowned as Turkey's most important import partner. The relations between these two countries have developed over time through complex diplomacy and have been consolidated thanks to an increasingly intense economic exchange favoured by the new trends of market globalisation. This speech intends to analyse the historical development of the relations between these two political-institutional entities, their role within the geometries of power in the Eurasian continent, the impact of the cultural elements that influence diplomacy between the two countries and the future of these relations about the great political transformations that history is undergoing.</i></p>

Introduction

When we talk about the Republic of Turkey and the People's Republic of China, we are undoubtedly talking about two of the main players in the politics of the great Eurasian continental mass. Both of these actors have their own interests, their own history, and their own differences, but the dialogue between these two entities is made necessary by the sharing of the same large geographical space, which is the Eurasian continental landmass. Obviously, China and Turkey are located in very different regional sectors, but recent developments in technologies for both human and commercial movement and connection have greatly shortened distances, and the infrastructure building projects of the People's Republic of China today involve the whole continental mass and the next seas. In a global reality such as that described by Parag Khanna in *Connectography* (2016), geographic proximity is not the most important element for links of any kind – in this case, interstate links. Specifically, between these two countries, there is a link of fundamental importance with respect to the pre-eminence (exercised in various regions) in the great Eurasian continental mass.

Ethnic subjectivities of great diplomatic importance for relations between the two countries, such as that of the Uighurs, also testify to their shared history, given that this group that lives in the territory of the multinational state of the People's Republic of China is Turkic. The Uyghurs, however, are only one of the various Turkish-speaking ethnic groups in China: this fact should testify to the deep ethnic and geographical ties that exist between the two countries. The Turkish and Chinese cultures are of profound relevance in the Eurasian continent, and their encounter far precedes contemporary geo-economic issues. Throughout history, relations between the Turkic peoples and China have always been very close, as demonstrated by extensive documentation (Golden, 1992).

In the recent history of China, with the formation of the new revolutionary government and the birth of the new state following the expulsion of foreign political entities and the victory of the communist side against Chang Kai Shek (Meisner, 2010), Turkey has repeatedly demonstrated that it understands the reasons of this Far Eastern country. This was due to the similar nature of the two countries, both resurrected thanks to modern national revolutions, and both were humiliated by Western powers, albeit in different ways.

This article intends to illustrate the current condition of international relations between Turkey and China through the lens of geopolitics and geoeconomics. Both of these disciplines are notoriously hybrid and consider a whole series of factors and levels, not only at a global level (an area in which we will use the “connectographic” reading extended to these two states, so distant and so close at the same time) but also at a disciplinary one. In this sense, what interests us most in this analysis is a historiographical reading of the separation of these two countries from Western influence and the beginning of a dialogue based on relatively similar historical-political elements. Besides that, the history of diplomacy between these two countries in contemporary times, as well as the beginning of economic and trade relations between them, will be used in this article. In addition to the economic exchange per se, the economic analysis also and above all, focuses on the large infrastructural construction projects and expansion of commercial networks on the Eurasian continent so as to explain the type of relationship that could unite these two countries in the long term, in addition than during the development of the aforementioned projects. The fundamental question that grips many analysts and that sees us interested in this article is also that of how much Turkey is willing to invest in building a future of solid interrelationships with China. Here the ambivalence of the geographical-territorial question returns, as the evaporation of the classic distance measurement system: China and Turkey are, as we have mentioned, both important countries on the Eurasian continental mass, which cannot fail to attract each other commercially and diplomatically according to their own gravitational power, that two countries that live in very different regions, with the cultural and geopolitical effects that follow. The equation is complex, and solving it is not easy, but adding elements and comparing them with the current state of affairs can certainly help.

From Humiliation to Cooperation

If Turkey, with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, had seen the West feast on its remains before the advent of Atatürk, China would have experienced years of political and economic subordination to European countries.

In describing this period of subordination, Chinese President Xi Jinping, on the centenary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, testified to the role of this political organisation and the previous nationalistic efforts of the Chinese people in liberating the country and its productive forces (Xi, 2021).

This type of submission imposed on the two countries – even if that of Turkey was, in particular, consequential to the First World War, having been the country feared in its past by the European powers (Motta, 1998) – has created, over time, a feeling of redemption that has transformed into the construction of a modern nation, more focused on the processes of political unification and competitiveness in international and economic terms. China, on the other hand, has also produced specific concepts on the development of international relations that must guarantee fair development for those countries that have been subdued and subordinated. The role of the “century of great humiliation” in the development of contemporary China's doctrine of international relations (Scott 2008: 3), a doctrine fundamentally imbued with anti-colonialism, should not be underestimated. This project has had different stages of development: from the idea of the development of the Third World of Maoist ancestry (Jiang, 2013) to that of a harmonic

internationalist order promoted by Hu Jintao (2005) and Xi Jinping (2015a, 2017). In this sense, China and its new political hierarchies immediately became interested in the role of Islam and Muslim countries in the world, understanding their potential in human, demographic and economic terms. All this was part, as mentioned, of a pan-Asian and Third World strategy, in which Turkey also had its role.

As Gillespie reminds us (2014: 12), Maoist politics was aimed at creating something like a "third force" at the international level, also producing new political-theoretical formulations within the communist camp (Meisner 2010) and giving life to the political currents of national-communism and third worldism (Gnerre, 2022: 109-110). Before the historical frictions with the Soviet Union, which took place with the conclusion of the experience of the Soviet presence in China under the government of Khrushchev (Gnerre, 2022: 109; Suyin, 1969: 91), China according to Gillespie (2014: 12) thus juggled between the great Eurasian socialist country and other nations which, despite an apparent difference on the ideological level with respect to the perspectives of international communism, had much more in common with its political history. By doing this, China would have opened a space of great importance in international politics, a space that wedged itself between the two blocs of the great global political challenge and went on to define a third area of belonging (Gillespie, 2014: 12). This then produced a new political reality which in turn was manifested by Mao with the theory of the Three Worlds (Mao, 1998: 454), and which influenced the Chinese view of the world thereafter (Gillespie, 2014: 12). This approach also assumed, in Mao's thought, the idea of non-hegemonic international equilibrium (Gnerre, La Grassa 2019: 52).

These ideas of cooperation between humiliated and subordinate countries matched harmoniously with those of resurgence that had developed in the Turkish cultural and political world. Specifically in those environments with a nationalistic imprint that advocated an Ottoman recovery through the tools of technical and economic modernisation. The aforementioned circles had opened their eyes to the international reality and had long ago identified possible great Asian allies for this process of the ascent of non-Western countries. Among these, of course, was China:

“All [those] authors [were] linked by their vigorous emphasis of the religious (Islam), ethnic (Turkishness) and historical (“Ottomanness”) dimensions of their own identity. On the other hand, the latter is, according to them, the reason why Turkey must turn its attention towards its immediate neighbours and do justice to its vocation as a regional power independent of the West. Although the authors differed fundamentally in their preference for specific neighbouring regions with which Turkey should intensify its relations, they were nonetheless united in their consistent rejection of their country’s unilateral alignment with the European Union. This dissociation from the EU thereby acquired a long-term, strategic character, while relations with the USA would and should be generated by tactical deliberation. In those years, [their] ideal partners were Japan and China, both of which [...] had been humiliated by the West” (Seufert, 2012: 13).

Özşahin, Donelli and Gasco have defined one of the links of great importance in the Sino-Titch relations such as revisionist stances towards western hegemony (Özşahin, Donelli and Gasco, 2022: 232). They add that “the relationship has deepened beyond material exchanges, and an additional factor that has facilitated the strengthening of ties is ideological” (Özşahin, Donelli and Gasco, 2022: 232).

While Sino-Turkish relations initially experienced difficulties due to Turkey's Atlantic framing, these problems dissolved towards the 1970s, thanks to Turkish political changes and the political leadership of Deng Xiaoping in China. In 1971, for example, Turkey promoted, together with 76 other nations, the cession of the United Nations seat to the People's Republic of China, which was notoriously formerly occupied by Taiwan.

In 1971, relations between revolutionary China and Turkey officially began, following the entry of the former into the United Nations Security Council (Akçay, 2017: 75). According to Akçay (2017: 75), the international relations between the two countries were not of great magnitude previously, and this was undoubtedly due to the economic-political profile of the far-eastern country, which, in the Maoist era, famously adopted a greater closure than the world market. It was the coup d'état of 12 September 1980 that gave way to a course of events that gave renewed life to relations between the two Asian countries, renewed life that took the form of a real revival of political-diplomatic relations, given that this event was perceived negatively by the European Economic Community which consequently moved away from Turkey, allowing the latter to approach an influential partner with which to build other forms of cooperation (Akçay, 2017: 75).

Thanks to Deng Xiaoping's reforms and China's greater economic openness, economic relations with Turkey have accelerated the already existing diplomatic ones and are of increasing importance (Akçay, 2017: 76).

The Economic Bridge

Although since ancient times, there were already trade agreements between the Chinese Empire and the Turkish states (Sandikli 2010: 226-227), despite ups and downs, relations between China and Turkey have evolved on various levels, of which the economic one is probably one of the most significant. This is because, as we have said, both countries represent realities that are establishing themselves on the global scene at rather fast growth rates, within a phenomenon that has allowed the creation of cooperation groups such as that of the BRICS (in which, however, Turkey does not figure).

Notoriously, one of the factors of great change in the world economic scenario about a decade after the Cold War – during which Turkey and China relied on different political fellowships (Yıldırım, 2020) – was the rise of the BRICs (Goldstein, 2011), then BRICS. These countries have shown a great ability to grow at an accelerated rate. This phenomenon, in which China plays an important role associated with a mutation of world balances (Parenti, 2009), has its own particular physiognomy (Li, 2014). It is precise with the end of the Cold War, indeed, and the international opening that has been achieved (which took place for step and not all at once) that the relations between China and Turkey have taken off, especially in the economic sector, which for a long time, one of the levels in which the greatest successes are recorded (Yıldırım, 2020): this type of connection predictably will tend to strengthen itself (Yıldırım, 2020) if the trend is confirmed by international political events and by the development of existing value chains and commercial lines.

Turkey, for now, external to the BRICS, has been for the latter a similar element in terms of growth to be taken into account (Farrar and Ariff, 2014: 149-158). As explained, therefore, Turkey entered this trend with what is called the real “economic boom” of the 2000s.

The economic rise of Turkey, to date one of the prominent players in the global market scenario, went hand in hand with the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Jarosiewicz, 2013: 1), making it difficult for observers distinguish between the political successes of the party in question and those of the national economy. Between 2002 and 2007, the Turkish economy grew at an annual rate of 7.2%, maintaining momentum quite well despite the 2008 global economic crisis (Jarosiewicz, 2013: 1) “after a slowdown in GDP growth to just 0.6% in 2008 and a subsequent recession (which saw a 4.6% contraction in GDP), the economy strongly rebounded, producing 8.8% growth in 2010 and 9.2% in 2011” (Jarosiewicz, 2013: 1).

This type of growth, despite the various perplexities and doubts frequently raised by analysts, is

proving to be a particularly continuous trend. According to data, the Turkish economy grew by 11% in 2021, after a period of necessary global contraction due to the Covid-19 pandemic (Erkoyun, 2022). Yet, Turkey was one of the few countries that, in 2020, in a period of the world health crisis, grew economically (Erkoyun, 2022).

Despite the fact that Turkey is not part of the BRICS, among Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, also President Erdogan also attended the BRICS meeting in 2018 (Ay, 2018), testifying to common interests that exist between these political entities. In doing so, Erdogan stressed the importance of this summit within South-South cooperation and overcoming trade competition, and how the BRICS countries made up 50% in 2017 over the previous decade (Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye, 2018).

In 2000 alone, Turkey's trade with the BRICS countries made up 3% of total exports and 11% of total imports. In 2013, following global geo-economic transformation trends, these figures rose to 8.4% and 23%, respectively (Dinçer, 2015: 3). Arslan Ayan's analysis (2019: 3-4) suggests that Turkey would benefit from joining the BRICS in terms of positioning in the world-system and international prestige. In economic terms, he argues that it would contribute substantially to the level of Turkish exports, making Turkey less dependent on Western countries, and finally, it would guarantee the possibility of developing technology (including military type) with other members. Therefore, greater cooperation between these political spheres could be very beneficial for Turkey, considering the economic interdependence that already exists. Other elements of great importance, in this case, are undoubtedly the greater opening of Turkey to the large markets of these economies and the possibility of receiving flows of financing from these countries (Başbay, 2018).

The level reached by the exchanges with the BRICS reconstitutes the international map of Turkey's interlocutor. Its export-import ratio with the BRICS countries was about 18% in 2020, changing the percentage trade relationship that Turkey has with the countries of the European Union (Kutlay and Öniş, 2021: 1098). As Kutlay and Öniş (2021: 1098) rightly point out, the long-term economic relationship between Turkey and European countries always remains of great weight, and Europe itself is still a commercial pole of interest. However, the increase in trade with the BRICS countries automatically leads to a reconsideration of this type of relationship, given and considered as the majority of the Turkish trade deficit in 2020 was towards the BRICS countries themselves.

All this, however, considers the overall picture of the BRICS countries, which should be disaggregated to better understand the terms in which Sino-Turkish economic relations are characterised. After 2016, various Chinese delegations were invited to China to help the country develop in the context of national security and also of the economy (Yang, 2019). In 2021, China became Turkey's second-largest trading partner. The bilateral trade volume corresponds to 35.9 billion dollars. Turkey exports many raw materials to China, including metals and other mineral elements. In addition to this, it also exports chemicals to the Far Eastern country. China exports raw materials to Turkey as well as machinery and various other finished products. According to data released directly by the Republic of Turkey on trade with China, Chinese investments in Turkey correspond to approximately \$ 4 billion and are primarily allocated to the sectors of energy, finance, infrastructure and so on (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs). This type of economic option for Turkey necessarily takes on political contours (Öniş and Yalikum, 2021), especially in the sphere of foreign policy (Ergenc, 2015).

From Infrastructures to Asian Partnership

Keeping in mind the issues related to building infrastructure networks on the Eurasian continent, China famously launched the Belt and Road Initiative project. With this project, China intends to

build an intercontinental commercial network that passes through the main hubs but also through peripheral sectors of Eurasia. This project combines pipelines, railways, ports and other infrastructure assets under the same planning (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Sweden, 2019). If fully implemented, this would plausibly produce various positive externalities for the Eurasian countries that would be connected to these large commercial spaces (Maliszewska and Van Der Mensbrugge, 2019). Many countries are at the forefront of welcoming Chinese investments in this program.

Among these, there is also Turkey, which values the project positively and wants to join it. President Erdogan himself participated in the Summit for the construction of the Belt and Road in Beijing in 2017. "Positioned in a key place for the Belt and Road" (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs), according to the Turkish government's own words, Turkey would like to complete the "Trans-Hazar Middle Corridor" of this important project with its contribution, uniting Asia to Europe. Specifically, the construction of roads and railways is expected in Turkey to connect Anatolia with Central Asia and China through Azerbaijan and Georgia (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

This role of the bridge envisaged for Turkey in this imposing Eurasian infrastructural construction traces in all respects the ambivalent nature of Turkish civilisation and geography, linked on the one hand to the great Asian tradition and on the other to the culture and history of Europe. A country that experiences this apparent contrast, similar to Turkey, is Russia, which over the centuries has had to face the heated debates between Westernists and supporters of the Asian heritage, opting, however, for the affirmation of its own specific civilisational culture (Leont'ev, 1987). This seems to be the same as Turkey's option in this sense, which arises within the framework of international relations with a marked awareness of the national interest but also of multilateral cooperation. The geographical position places Turkey in a place to have to dialogue with very different political entities, but whose harmonisation is necessary for the management of security and the promotion of continental development.

This role is evidently also recognised by the People's Republic of China, which frequently affirms the importance of state entities in the securitisation processes of the planetary geographic regions (Xi, 2017). The regionalisation process promoted by China is understood by its political guides as the necessary cooperation between states and governments to create a balance of prosperity and collaboration. In this sense, China has often reiterated the importance of cooperation over competition (Xi, 2015 a), especially in opposition to the phenomenon that geopolitical analysts have defined as the "Thucydides trap". There is no doubt that the role that Turkish subjectivity plays in Asia, on which this country leans, is substantial. In the thought of President Xi Jinping himself, all Asian countries must collaborate in the process of Asian reform that must not be called into question by the countries of the so-called "north of the world".

"Accounting for one-third of the world economy, Asia is one of the most dynamic regions with the most potential, and its global strategic importance has been rising. Over the past 70 years, Asian countries have gradually transcended their differences in ideology and social system. No longer cut off from each other, they are now open and inclusive, with suspicion and estrangement giving way to growing trust and appreciation. The interests of Asian countries have become intertwined, and a community of common destiny has increasingly taken shape."

The destiny of the Asian peoples is, according to Xi Jinping, connected by a whole series of needs and difficulties that the region is facing and will have to face, and only the recognition of the same culture and history within a space as vast as it is common will lead to greater security. This security clearly takes on different colours, within a perspective that is that of a development of international political and economic relations within the aforementioned regional space. Some of the aspects of

this security are economical and peaceful coexistence. Xi Jinping also asserts, to underline the importance of collaboration, that “it remains an uphill battle for Asian countries to grow the economy, improve people's livelihood and eliminate poverty” (Xi, 2015 b). This means that another of the historical needs to be taken care of by the Asian peoples is that of improving the collective well-being and social development of their countries, in a situation of the relatively recent establishment of the national autonomies of many of the states which are of great prominence in the Asian region. In fact, it was pointed out that, precisely in this sense, the Chinese interest in the Middle East and Turkey is growing (Özşahin, Donelli and Gasco, 2022: 220), precisely in relation to the condition of extra-westernity (with what it entails in historical terms and development processes) of these sectors. This integrates favourably with inter-Asian dialogue projects and finds an actor in Turkey with which to interface, which has great influence in these areas.

Within this macro-regional discourse, the role of Turkey is important for China. Turkey, on the other hand, has fully developed awareness of its necessary participation in Asian issues by joining the pan-Asian initiative called “Asia Anew”.

It is clear to everyone how the world is experiencing a moment of redefining the weight of the actors that make it up, especially from an economic and commercial point of view (Stuenkel, 2015). Within this phenomenon, in which the BRICS certainly play a key role (Stuenkel, 2015), there has been a major component of Asia in the last twenty years (Zhanaltay, 2021). This phenomenon of widespread economic growth in its Asian location is the result of the economic growth of India, Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, China and Japan (Zhanaltay, 2021). When Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu announced the Asia Anew project for cooperation with Asian countries without breaking or neglecting relations with Western ones, he clearly had in mind the economic rise of contemporary Asia, an element to which he added that of strengthening ties with ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which should be interpreted more from the point of view linked to the strengthening of the regional perspective, beyond simple bilateral relations (Zhanaltay, 2021). Despite the economic factors that guide (or at least induce) these choices, it is clear that the counterweight to this is the awakening of an Asian conscience in the Turkish actor. Zhanaltay comments on this type of choice as follows: “one of the main goals of this policy is to implement focused and applicable strategies that address regional dynamics in diplomatic approaches with different countries” (Zhanaltay, 2021); and adds that “at this point, Turkey, by signing the ASEAN Friendship and Cooperation Agreement in 2010, has taken an important step towards solidifying its relations at the institutional level” (Zhanaltay, 2021). If the purpose of this type of “sliding” towards the East is not oppositional towards the West (Zhanaltay, 2021), it rather represents a renewed Turkish vision towards some clear elements of its geopolitical nature, fuelled by historical-cultural awareness and by a certain sensibleness to the regional context in which it is inserted.

Of course, when we talk about processes of peaceful development and securing large regions, paradoxically, we cannot fail to speak of the sphere of national and collective defence. In this sense, China and Turkey have begun paths of rapprochement and collaboration within the Shanghai Organization for Cooperation. In this sense, Turkey has been a dialogue partner with the SCO, in which China's role is primary, since 2012 (Anadolu Agency, 2012). In 2016, President Erdogan referred to the possibility of definitively joining the group (Wang, 2016). All this while Turkey is also a member of NATO. This type of attention to both political and territorial horizons (China Daily 2016) derives directly from the geographical mediumship that characterises this country.

Conclusion

The role of China and Turkey, as we have said, is pre-eminent in the Eurasian continent, and both have specific interests and particular political and cultural traditions. Nonetheless, the processes of

integration and construction of international partnerships are a contrasted but still growing trend, despite the announcements and fears of major decoupling and forms of de-globalisation. Clearly, in these cases, the outcome of these processes must be analysed in the long term while always keeping an eye on the present and on the not-insignificant sphere of diplomacy.

Turkey, as we know it, has often been defined as a bridge between the European and Asian worlds. It is undoubtedly true that her civilisation is indebted to both of these historical-cultural spheres. Nonetheless, there is an important weight of the Asian tradition in its history, and this is certainly valid within a more solid process of structuring relations between Eastern countries. Obviously, this is part of a development path of multilateral relations and global economy that does not cover only the Asian space, and as we have seen, the role of the BRICS is not of little importance in this sense. However, relations between China and Turkey are moving along the lines of Asian security and development in a reform process that aims at relaxing international relations between the players in the area and cooperation. In these contexts, economics and politics can be treated on separate levels, but they will never be completely disjoint.

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Conceptual Analysis of Censorship in Kashmir Media

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Arshi Showkat

Research Scholar at Jamia Millia Islamia, arshieq@gmail.com

Rayan Naqash

Independent Journalist

KEYWORDS	ABSTRACT
<p>Media, News Reporting, Censorship, Indian Administered Kashmir, Self-censorship</p> <p>Received 18 April 2022 Revised 30 September 2022 Accepted 20 October 2022</p>	<p>Media in Indian-administered Kashmir has essentially navigated through structural barriers imposed by the state and cultural barriers of the society to negotiate its space. Analysing the trajectory of media proliferation and its functioning, a pattern of devolution from a comparatively independent media to what can be called governmentality of information to establish dominance and grant legitimacy to the state is discernible. This conceptual paper examines the patterns of state control over the media as reactionary and proactive measures. Reactive measures meaning measures taken directly in response to an immediate factor/event, like state oversight of media content, jamming of telecommunication networks, choking media houses of finances by denial of advertisement revenue, et al. The proactive measures include the use of legislative and executive power over the media with a long-term vision — to create perceptions and behaviours to legitimize state control. One such example is the media policy 2020 which aims to replace "negative" coverage of the government and saturate the papers with uniformly positive and identical content. Based on the assessment of recent incidents of censorship, this article argues that reactionary and proactive measures have together created an atmosphere of uncertainty and self-censorship gravely impacting the reporting of events in Indian-administered Kashmir.</p>

Conceptual Analysis of Censorship in Kashmir Media

“What does not exist in the media does not exist in the public mind, even if it could have a fragmented presence in individual minds. Therefore, a political message is necessarily a media message” (James Curran, 2010)

Jammu and Kashmir, the northernmost state of India has a long contested history. Sharing its border with Pakistan, the erstwhile state has been a breaking point between the two countries, with both countries claiming parts of it, in addition to China claiming a part as well. Hence, the governments of all three sides have made efforts throughout to maintain and increase control over their claimed parts. The international bodies have documented the human rights abuses on both sides- of Indian administered and Pakistan administered parts. With the increasing proliferation of

media, the documentation has gotten rigorous too. Simultaneously, the ways of control over the media have also evolved.

The last decade saw enormous growth in the number of newspapers published in Indian-administered Kashmir and at the same time, Indian-administered Kashmir has been referred to as “an open-air prison” (RSF, 2020; Pandow and Kanth, 2021). In describing the recent patterns of censorship in Indian administered Kashmir by the Indian State, Koul (2020) draws attention to Indian media’s silence over the human rights situation in Indian administered Kashmir but vocal condemnation of the same in Xinjiang in China. She writes what Xinjiang is to China, Indian administered Kashmir is to India.

Pandow and Kanth, (2021) call Indian media’s reporting of Indian-administered Kashmir an agenda to legitimize the Indian state’s claim over the region. This, along with frequent internet shutdowns and reporting of local media remains the only potential source of authentic information on day-to-day happenings. As Castels (2007) explains, media messages are important because the media is so influential. If something isn’t portrayed in the media, it doesn’t exist in the public. “Therefore, a political message is necessarily a media message” (Castels, 2007).

Pandow (2020) traces the threats and dangers faced by the Indian-administered Kashmir journalists post unilateral abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019 and notes that despite such dangers, many journalists risk their safety and continue to put the truth before their audience. However, the same optimism is not shared by valley-based journalists such as Gowhar Geelani who feels that the media persons in the valley have been compelled to become extensions of the state as opposed to being watchdogs for society and Shahna Butt who sees the future of journalism to be very bleak in the valley.

India, despite being a democracy, scholars have noted a gradual decline in freedom of expression over the last few decades. Nandy (2005) predicted censorship to have a bright future in India. He went to the extent of comparing censorship in dictatorships with democracies. The latter, he said, manufactured the need for censorship by making them believe that it was necessary for and in the interest of national security (Sirhan, 2021). The continued censorship of media by successive governments in India is described by Mehta and Kaye (2021) as India’s inability to forgo the colonial legacy.

The increasing reliance on advertisements has further restricted the reportage of news houses in India (Gupta, 2005). However, for Indian-administered Kashmir’s protracted conflict, the layers of control and “regulation” get multiplied because states try to increasingly control the discourse (Brooten, 2017) to avoid the challenge that accurate news reporting poses to the government narrative (Sirohi, 2020).

Indian administered Kashmir’s media institutions have had to navigate multiple layers of state control. They have been under pressure from outside forces, like the government, the military, and the militants. This also builds up internal pressure for self-censorship. The most obvious way is the laws that prohibit certain forms of expression. However, other ways are less visible but no less important. These include the financial pressures on media houses. The Government of India (GoI) has used internet shutdowns in J&K as part of a larger campaign to quell the region’s demand for more democratic autonomy. Internet shutdowns have become regular in J&K, one of the world’s most militarized zones, even if there is even the slightest prospect of disturbance and protest. However, techniques are changing as methods of controlling information have become more multifaceted, including direct attacks on journalists and journalistic freedoms.

In this article, the authors expand on the typologies of recent censorship practices in Indian-administered Kashmir to offer an overall view of how state control works through bureaucratic and policing institutions to produce media. The article argues that censorship practices involve the interaction of both formal and informal regulatory measures designed to ensure state control over the contested public sphere.

Censorship: Meaning and Trends

Broadly understood as the suppression of information that poses any threat to an authority-political or cultural (Mazzarella and Kaur, 2013; Evans and Selgelid, 2015; Sirhan, 2021) censorship is diametrically opposite to Freedom of expression, a fundamental human right. It is not merely a tool used by repressive regimes to restrict expression on religious, political, and moral grounds, but a way of maintaining power and control over social groups (King, Pan and Roberts, 2013). Sue Curry Jansen in her book *Censorship: The Knot that Binds Knowledge and Power* puts forth her definition as:

“It encompasses all socially structured proscriptions or prescriptions which inhibit or prohibit the dissemination of ideas, information, images, and other messages through a society’s channels of communication whether these obstructions are secured by political, economic, religious, or other systems of authority,” (Jansen, 1988).

She suggests that, as opposed to the more overt methods of communication and cultural control that criticism has a history of emphasizing, we examine the implicit mechanisms of censorship.

Censorship does not only stop something new from being said or created but it also alters the past histories in a way to suits the present, thereby denying the people their memory and heritage. Volf (2006) best explains the human rights perspective in this regard that if no one knows about the atrocities, it remains a secret. Both victims and perpetrators are misunderstood by others because they don’t know what happened. When a person is harmed or their rights violated, the victim suffers twice—first from the original deed and second from being disrespected by those who never knew what happened to them (Volf, 2006).

Foucault links the notion of power to discourse, describing how power is used to create and in effect, also conceal, the knowledge that can generate discourse. Although Foucault did not specifically mention media in his works on discourse, he emphasizes the complexity of power relations which shape discourse and produce knowledge and truth for the public (Foucault, 1980). In Foucault's writings, the ontology of censorship and its power connection are recurring themes. He dismantles the connection between restriction and censorship in *The History of Sexuality* from 1976, arguing that our impression of the connection between sexuality and repression is false. Foucault investigates how progressive institutions like Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon enforce discipline. The structure's design tenets serve as a road map for the development of self-censorship. The Panoptic society, which is portrayed in the architecture of this jail, replaces external punishment and monitoring with internal norms of conduct. When describing how these restrictions work, Foucault makes sure to emphasize that they are there to analyze, monitor, and rectify the "abnormal" (Freshwater, 2004).

Censorship, whether it takes the form of prior restraint or post-publication repression, believes that individuals are capable of developing dangerous notions in understandable formats, which the authority seeks to prevent. Althusser (2014) contends that despite their certain existence, these techniques are only a byproduct of a larger initiative to render such ideas really unthinkable rather than merely unpublishable. Gramsci (1975) examines this kind of governmental strategy by arguing that authoritarian control and fanaticism create a climate of mistrust towards events, incidents and

individuals that might even hint at separatism and violence and the alienation of due process by the state methodically tearing apart the social structures, leading to cycles of violence, unchecked power, impunity and violent resistance (Boga, 2020).

Despite the instincts, desires, and rights of people to be able to express themselves in any way they want, their ability to do so is tied to governments and markets that try to control human expressions in every form- artistic, journalistic, academic, protests, and so on. The history of censorship is long and dated. One of the earliest known forms of censorship occurred in ancient Egypt during the reign of Akhenaten (1351–1334 BC) who criminalized the making of images of several Gods to put an end to polytheism which was prevalent in Egypt in that period (Hollis, Hornung and Lorton, 2001).

As much as communication methods evolved over the years, censorship methods only evolved. Under Article 19 of UDHR and Resolution 59 of the UN General Assembly adopted in 1946, the United Nations has repeatedly been emphasizing the need for freedom of expression, of which, freedom of media has become a fundamental pillar. To celebrate the spirit of freedom of expression, the United Nations (UN) also marked Freedom of information as the theme of 2019, at the same time acknowledging the different ways governments harass and intimidate media in different countries to curtail freedom. Despite the recognition at international forums, several countries have been reluctant in introducing and following the positive obligations in providing such freedom to journalists and media houses.

The report on Press Freedom worldwide published in 2006 divided the countries into three categories based on the media freedom in these countries- Free, Partially Free, and Not Free. It ranked 73 of the 194 survey countries Free with respect to their media. India fell in the partially free category, along with Turkey, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, and 54 other countries and the remaining 66 were put in not a free category. The report describes the call for a “responsible press” as a justification by the state to impose censorship and emphasizes the need for free media, a precondition for accountability and rule of law.

Another report by the same organization- the Freedom House described media freedom globally as going into a downward spiral. Their specific findings on India noted that the government in the country was sending out all the signals to media houses to toe their line and also growing its army of propaganda disseminators.

Media from across the globe is known for its power to generate discourses through agenda-setting function and to equally divert attention from situations to control the narratives. Analysing the scope and reasons for censorship, the International Journalists attending the Salzburg Seminar Session 396 in 2002 contended that the threats press freedoms are historically political in nature (Mitchell, 2020). The same was echoed by the Media Freedom report 2020, stating that dynamic political scenarios exact and dictate the media ‘regulations’ in a country.

On the World Press Freedom index, India stood 142 out of the 180 countries, calling it one of the most dangerous countries for journalists. In 2019, it stood at 140. A decade back, India stood at 131, at least 10 ranks behind its current rank. The reports highlighted the particular challenges faced by journalists in Jammu and Indian-administered Kashmir including suspension of internet and communication lines, physical threats to journalists and media houses, and the visas of foreign journalists being turned down.

Self-Censorship

Recently, the Indian state has utilized extreme censorship, severe limits, severe intimidation, and violence against journalists to limit media access and reach in Indian-administered Kashmir. To muzzle the media, legislation like the UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act), charges brought against some journalists, raids, physical assaults, interrogations, travel restrictions, and other coercive techniques are used.

The new media landscape is significantly shaped by market pressures as well as the ideological influences of the forces in power. During such phases, it is but natural for the media outlets to change themselves suitably to the ongoing undercurrents. Media outlets or journalists decide not to say/write anything that may be of significance to the public, such as not to report a story about the government or express an opinion on new legislation, either because it is accurate or because it would add to a heated public discussion of the topic.

Although self-censorship is thought to be a choice action, it frequently results from pressure or fear of repercussions. Along with reinventing the effects of censorship, New Censorship Theory recasts its actors. Contrary to conventional notions of censorship, which place more emphasis on the reactions of influential institutions within the nation or its institutions, the New Censorship Theory sees censorship as a diffuse, pervasive phenomenon in which a variety of stakeholders, including personal and structural conditions, function as effective censors (Bunn, 2015).

The capacity of individuals to consume free media is hampered by coercion and influence on media to self-censor. Furthermore, this ends the democratic discussion. An open and democratic government relies on the willingness and capacity to get information, analyse issues, and then articulate and engage in discussion from people's perspectives. However, in an atmosphere where people are faced with pressures to self-censor, no such free flow of information is possible. This new approach to censorship is referred to as the "New Censorship Theory," according to Bunn (2015) since it extends the conventional notions of censorship to include self-censorship as a result of the exercise of more decentralized and indirect means of power. According to Bourdieu's (2018) reasoning, a state's use of direct coercion to censor content is an indication that it has failed to impose a widely accepted set of ideas on society. This makes self-censorship stealthier than censorship and more challenging to discern empirically.

The present study focuses its attention on the practices of censorship in Indian-administered Kashmir on local media as well as gradually controlling the stories in the national and international media about the region. The region is significant not only in terms of its geographical positioning but also relevant to the politics of the whole country. The political tides in Kashmir have a ripple effect on politics in India and Indian relations with its neighbours, hence the practice to control the narrative about this region holds significance. Given the violent political context of Indian-administered Kashmir, the measures by the state often bypass the standards of human rights and dignity. In the rest of the Indian states, the internet shutdowns have been attributed to be an immediate consequence of communal tensions and attempts to contain them. About 18 shutdowns were ordered nationwide in only the initial 4 months of 2021. There are a few indicators that the rising usage of shutdowns will decrease despite significant public outcries and lobbying initiatives. A sharp increase in blackouts in India cannot be viewed separately from either the wider democratic deterioration that the BJP has caused in the nation, or in particular from the party's divisive Hindutva agenda (Ruijgrok, 2022).

Brief History of Censorship in Indian-administered Kashmir

The press in Indian-administered Kashmir has historically faced varying degrees of censorship. In the Valley's recent political history, the autocratic Dogra rulers had imposed a blanket ban on all news media creating an information vacuum that was filled by newspapers smuggled into Indian-administered Kashmir from Lahore, then part of British India and a literary hub (Ahmad, 2018). The newspapers coming into Indian-administered Kashmir as such presented a polarized narrative that corresponded to the ethnic, political, and religious loyalties of the paper's owners. For instance, papers owned by Hindus were favourable to the Dogra rulers and overlooked the harsh lived realities of the Indian-administered Kashmiris, the majority of whom continue to be Muslims and whose plight was highlighted by Muslim paper owners (Chandel, 2021). It was towards the end of the Dogra rule that the last monarch Hari Singh finally conceded and allowed the first newspaper to be published out of the Valley, owned by an Indian-administered Kashmiri Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz. The Indian-administered Kashmiri Pandit community, which had access to and monopolized education and government jobs in the region, continued to also dominate the media for decades to come.

After the withdrawal of the British from South Asia and the emergence of India and Pakistan, the press in Indian-administered Kashmir witnessed a transition. As more newspapers began to be published from the Valley, the marginalized Muslims gave themselves a voice through these publications. Yet, there were levers of control over the media, from the use of patronage to the weaponization of the law against journalists. One of the first major instances of the use of the law against journalists came in 1986, when Ghulam Nabi Shaida, editor of the Urdu daily *Wadi Ki Aawaz*, was booked under the Public Safety Act for reproducing a controversial article against the Prophet Mohammad, published in the West Bengal press (Gura, 2021). The law was passed three years before his arrest, intended for use against timber smugglers. Four years later, the outbreak of the current ongoing insurgency led to both proliferation of media houses as well as the diversification of curbs against them.

Prominent journalist Yusuf Jameel notes successive governments in Indian-administered Kashmir have imposed indirect censorship by creating "circumstances in which it would become difficult and impossible for us to work" (Naqash, 2016). Jameel elaborated that the curbs came in the form of denial of journalists' access to the ground and government officials. Another journalist (based on an interview) said another aspect of the censorship was the government's ability to entice media houses into accepting favours – such as government accommodations on nominal rent, advertisement revenue, and miscellaneous subsidies and perks – as having thinned the line between self-censorship out of fear of losing those favours and direct censorship from the government. There have, however, still been instances of direct government censorship throughout the decades since 1990.

As violent political upheavals continue and approach described an increase in volume and scope, there is an increasing need for a more in-depth understanding of how the news media participates in conflicts and manages them on a global scale. These wars are highly asymmetric in terms of material and defence power as well as intangible assets or "soft power". Gaining territory is not as important as winning the "hearts and minds" of the people. Because a state is almost always militarily superior, non-state groups are more reliant on information warfare, which entails influencing attitudes and perceptions. The governments view independent media as a security threat and feel threatened by credible information. When this occurs, the media frequently mirrors the current power structure, providing the government with significant advantages over grassroots organizations and civil society. The news media are essential for the long-term prevention of violence because they are important self-regulatory components of a democratic society and trustworthy sources of information.

Censorship in the Present Day

A free press is vital to democratic governance. By informing the public, engaging in critical reporting, and guaranteeing accountability and transparency in governmental operations, journalists operate as agents of political change. However, the vital role of the media may be undermined when government censorship or commercial or corporate forces work against journalistic independence. State censorship is the use of repressive or outlawed actions by government organisations to prevent the dissemination of particular information to the general public. Governments have the power to restrict press freedoms through laws and regulations, or, in cases when material has already become public, they can use the legal system or criminal law to prosecute or otherwise penalise journalists or media organisations. Governments may impose restrictions on news coverage, choose what information the public receives, and so influence political discourse by setting up mass media infrastructure or providing financial support to media companies (Yesil, 2014).

Under the guise of "security," "integration," and "national interest," the propaganda apparatus in India that stifles opposition to the government and hegemonized perceptions for a national and international audience operates unchecked, strengthening support for militarized alternatives to political issues and feeding the growing "transnational military-industrial-corporate-state-media" complex to conceal the human toll the conflict has exacted on the local population (Boga, 2018). According to states, content on the Internet is regulated because open communication technology has some components that might be harmful or unlawful. Its potential use in terrorism and criminal behaviour is a source of worry. Those who are against the notion contend that politics is the primary motivation behind using Internet infrastructure to impose filters. The goal of censorship is to prevent international communication and the spread of ideas (Bailey and Craig, 2011).

The government's measures to censor the press as such can be broadly categorized into two categories: reactionary and proactive. Reactive or reactionary measures mean measures taken directly in response to an immediate factor/event, like state oversight of media content, jamming of telecommunication networks, choking media houses of finances by denial of advertisement revenue, et al. The proactive measures include the use of legislative and executive power over the media with a long-term vision – to create perceptions and behaviours to legitimize state control. The authors use the paradigm developed by Kalatil and Boas, (2003) to distinguish between reactive and proactive frameworks as forms of censorship. Reactive measures are rather straightforward, but their execution is difficult due to the information management functions that various legal or political authorities, cultural and educational institutions, and vigilante forces perform. Reactive measures seek to regulate media content and hence limit information flow. Although they are a development of the more traditional reactive regimes of control over audio-visual mass media, proactive measures are actions taken by the state to actively state promote the use of tools and services to create media content to marginalize the expression of objectionable or threatening content (as determined by the government). The main objective of the two measures is to construct the public sphere through practices of control and monitoring is to eventually confirm state dominance in the context of expanding knowledge-based economic developments tied to improvements in global communication systems. One such example is the Media Policy 2020 which aims to replace "negative" coverage of the government and saturate the papers with uniformly positive and identical content. The sections below describe these measures and their impact on the overall coverage of Indian-administered Kashmir in the media.

Reactive Measures

Reactive measures can be classified as reactionary measures taken by the local governments in response to events and incidents, during which a mass mobilization has occurred or where the government believes there is potential for mass mobilization, which has a direct bearing on the press in the immediate short term. The most common of such reactive measures is the suspension of internet and mobile telephony and the imposition of curfews and restrictions to prevent any law and order situation arising out of any incident such as an encounter, attack or killing of militants. In relatively fewer instances, the government has also resorted to more direct attacks on journalism by raiding printing presses (often multiple newspapers are printed at a single printing press) and confiscating printed copies of newspapers and banning selected newspapers. These reactionary measures aimed at short-term curbing of the freedom of the press were witnessed during the 2008, 2010, and 2016 mass uprisings in the Indian-administered Kashmir Valley. These measures are taken to block the immediate flow of information within the state as well as across the borders to prevent information about possible human rights violations to flow across the borders.

Communication Blockades

The impact of reactionary measures on the press is most evident from the 2019 government crackdown in Indian-administered Kashmir. In August 2019, as the Indian government feared a mass mobilization in response to its unilateral abrogation of Jammu and Indian administered Kashmir's residual autonomy, the suspension of all forms of communication initially and the continued restrictions on the internet — what was later called the world's longest shutdown of the internet in a democracy — clubbed with the authorities refusal of granting curfew passes to local journalists, thereby physically preventing journalists from gathering news from the grounded, led to an information vacuum. Journalists, including female reporters, from the city- of Srinagar, also reported manhandling of their equipment and assaults during attempts to cover certain incidents. Due to the information vacuum, only a few such incidents could come to the fore from outside the city limits. The restrictions were the harshest that journalists had witnessed since the eruption of the insurgency in the late 1980s.

The authorities in Indian-administered Kashmir resorted to a hybrid form of restriction on communications, allowing functionality to a select list of numbers but barring the majority of journalists despite requests made to the chief of police by the Indian-administered Kashmir Press Club. After being criticized for crippling journalists, the government's Directorate of Information and Public Relations (DIPR) set up an internet facility for journalists in a posh and fortified private hotel in Srinagar; there were, however, just eight internet connections for more than four hundred local journalists and several more flying in from New Delhi. There was also a single mobile phone for all the journalists to make calls after registering their numbers and the number they were calling in a registry maintained by the DIPR. Subsequently, the facility was shifted to the premises of the DIPR, nominally enhancing the number of internet connections. Even at these facilities, journalists had to struggle with slow internet bandwidth. The DIPR called it the "Media Facilitation Centre" but journalists viewed it as a "media concentration camp" and "internet's shrine" as described by a journalist— indicative of the widening trust deficit between the press and the government (Naqash, 2020b). The government was also cautious in creating filters between local and non-local, New Delhi-based journalists who flew into the valley. The latter were provided with unfettered access to government officials and areas on the ground.

The denial of the internet over prolonged periods coupled with restrictions on the movement led to a situation where journalists were not only unable to converse with sources over encrypted messaging applications but also found physical meetings difficult. Its overall impact was the slowing down of the flow of information.

Another drawback, one that directly impacted the information flow, was the inability of the journalists to reach out to the government itself for information on spontaneous events. In several instances it led to the absence of government versions on sensitive issues- a point of contention between the government and the press but with the former unwilling to acknowledge the onus. The only source of official information appeared in the form of daily press briefings where there was little scope for questioning the government officials — in effect making these events official monologues. The attempt was to weave a narrative of normalcy even as journalists encountered restrictions on the ground. For instance, on the day of Eid on August 11, 2019, the unprecedented restrictions on the ground were glossed over with the press briefing focusing on the number of locals stepping out of their homes to pray and complemented with visuals simultaneously released on the internet and circulated by the Indian national media.

The tacit approval and support of the corporate-run national media led to a sanitized narrative dominating the silence of the natives. Pamela Philipose writes in *Himal Magazine*: “In contrast to this chokehold on independently generated journalism in the Valley, was the free flow of information, generated by the corporatized media, which supported, celebrated, and eulogized the Modi government’s actions. This cynical complementarity of a shutdown of media content in J & K, and the exuberant proliferation of media content outside it, is nothing less than establishing the dominant, nationalist narrative at gunpoint” (Philipose, 2016).

Amid the total communication blackout, some Urdu television channels popular in Indian-administered Kashmir had added another ticker to their display to accommodate messages from Indian-administered Kashmiris outside the valley to their family members at home. An urgent petition filed by senior journalist and Indian administered Kashmir Times editor, Anuradha Bhasin on August 16, 2019, in the Supreme Court, challenging the ban on phone lines and the internet was not heard till January — ironically, months after the phone lines were restored. Beginning January 26, 2020, the administration restored slow-speed 2G internet to Indian-administered Kashmir, albeit blacklisting nearly all websites, including news and social media networks. Simultaneously, the J&K administration also criminalized the use of VPNs, which many at that time were using to bypass restrictions and threatened punishment under the draconian Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (Naqash, 2020a).

In J&K, the bulk of internet outages is declared as a preventative measure at times that might serve as catalysts for mass protest. Before public holidays, well-known militant trials, executions, or funerals (or the anniversaries thereof), which all point to potential opportunities for protest, the internet is regularly shut down. For the same reason, the government restricts internet use before, during, and following "encounters" between armed militants and security officers. To sum it together, internet shutdowns in the valley have served multiple purposes in favour of the ruling dispensation as noted below:

1. **Failure of locals to access information:** In absence of the internet, coupled with shutdowns and restrictions on the movement of locals, the local population is unable to keep up with the updates of happenings locally and hence an information vacuum is created leading to rumours about the happenings.
2. **Failure of journalists to access sources:** Along with an information vacuum, the journalists also face the challenge of accessing their sources which limits their ability to access multiple sources and verify the details. During most such shutdowns, the only accessible sources remain the official sources that would most often only present a narrative that resonates with the state.
3. **Controlled narrative construction:** Unlike the internet shutdowns in other parts of India, the internet shutdown in Indian-administered Kashmir is differential in nature. In 2019, the local journalists, those working with local media as well as national media, were

restricted in terms of access to the internet and mobility whereas the journalists from the mainland whose reporting aligned more with the sadist narrative were given access to the internet in a government-established facility. This way, the narrative that the erstwhile state had accepted the change to its autonomous status gathered strength. The Indian government asserts that the shutdowns are necessary to maintain calm, but several commentators contend that they stifle protests and cover up violations of human rights by security personnel.

Compared to the shutdowns in India, Indian-administered Kashmir has witnessed prolonged internet shutdowns with a greater frequency. The short and staggered internet shutdowns only manage to create a temporary information vacuum however this does not undermine the repressive character of such shutdowns. The internet blackouts imposed during the anti-CAA demonstrations provide a crystal-clear illustration of how they might be used to support crackdowns on dissent. There are many others. For instance, internet blackouts were implemented earlier this year amid a crackdown on nonviolent farmer demonstrations in both Haryana and Punjab. Internet shutdowns, which are more frequent in BJP-ruled areas, are typically a response to communal tensions and have become a normal and accepted response to societal discontent as a result of overuse. The data available through different research studies underlines the political aspects of internet shutdowns, despite the Indian government's claim that they are a response to a law-and-order issue brought on by online fake news and disinformation.

Withdrawal of advertisements

Indian-administered Kashmir is a landlocked Valley with a limited private sector and a relatively small advertising market. As such most newspapers are dependent on advertisement revenues from the government, a fact that the government is well aware of and has used to chastise and strong-arm the press into submission. One of the earliest instances of using the denial of advertisements as a form of punishment came in the aftermath of the 2010 protests in Indian administered Kashmir when major newspapers — which included Greater Indian administered Kashmir, Rising Indian administered Kashmir, and Indian administered Kashmir Times — were barred from receiving central government ads through the Directorate of Advertising and Visual Publicity (DAVP). After the 2016 protests, the Union Government again sought to institutionalize the method as the Ministry of Home Affairs, which has no jurisdiction over the functioning of the press or disbursing of advertisements, wrote to the state government to withhold advertisements to newspapers that were publishing “highly radicalized content glamorizing terrorists and anti-national elements” (Javaid, 2017).

The Hindustan Times further reproduced the content of the letter, that was sent to the state government and the Jammu and Indian administered Kashmir police: “...publishing of anti-national articles in the newspapers of the state should be strictly dealt with. Such newspapers should also not be given any patronage by way of advertisements by the state government. This may be circulated to all concerned for strict compliance.” The following year, several leading dailies of Indian-administered Kashmir were barred from receiving state government advertisements, a punishment that more or less continued till August 5, 2019, following which a new dynamic emerged. Now, newspapers were being punished for not carrying press notes or carrying any news item showing the government in poor light, direct interference with papers’ editorial discretion and reporting freedoms (Naqash, 2020c). Because there are so few firms and private businesses in the valley, newspapers in Kashmir are more vulnerable because they rely nearly solely on government ads to make money. “We rely on government marketing for support since there is no private sector. In a way, the government is our customer,” according to prominent journalist and Kashmir Images editor-in-chief Bashir Manzar (Aggarwal, 2018).

On the other hand, separatists have also sought to police the contents of newspapers at times, though its scale — after the militancy ebbed in the 2000s — is not comparable to the state actions. In August 2016, amid the uprising, the late Syed Ali Geelani chastised the press for not reproducing a poster in which the separatist Hurriyat demanded the resignation of unionist politicians as civilian killings by government forces during protests continued unabated. “Everyone agreed to publish it as a poster advertisement but none of them, except Indian, administered Kashmir Reader and Tameel Irshad an Urdu newspaper], dared to publish it,” Geelani had then said. He also sought to interfere with newspaper editorial, calling it a “moral obligation” and responsibility of the press to highlight separatist demands.

"Professional assignments aside, we have some more obligations as part of an oppressed nation, which is struggling for its basic rights. Everybody needs to own this movement and share their bit of responsibility honestly."

Proactive Measures

Apart from the reactive measures the state adopted to create an atmosphere of censorship in response to events in the valley, the state adopted measures that would lead to a long-term impact on the free flow of information through media. Such measures include drafting a media policy for media houses in Jammu and India administered by Kashmir that outlines how the media should report making the coverage favourable to the state. The constant discrediting of media and media persons

Media Policy

The state's overall vision to stymie the press is laid down in the media policy it imposed upon Jammu and Indian-administered Kashmir on May 15, 2020. The policy was rolled out during the Lieutenant Governor's rule, sans any elected representation — symbolic of New Delhi's growing appetite to choke the press. The policy lays down mechanisms to regulate not only the flow of advertisement to news organizations but the press itself; it also officiates the interference of security agencies with the press and seeks greater control over defining who can practice journalism and who can't. A cursory reading of the 53-page document reveals its fundamental aim to neuter the media space of critical coverage and fill the vacuum with positive stories about governance to “foster a genuinely positive image of the Government”. Its impact is already visible in a process that began much before the policy's official rollout: the sanitization of newspapers of all news reportage after the abrogation of J&K's semi-autonomy in August 2019. In a short period, Indian-administered Kashmir newspapers have also surrendered before the LG administration and ceded their print space for government PR — over and above advertisement space that the government buys (Naqash, 2020b). The document also highlights the state's contempt for both journalists as well as the public, deeming the former as incapable of creating news on “development” themes and the latter as not only unable to process it but considered unrequired to do so. “Ensuring that a message has a reasonable level of value for the recipient is paramount to gaining public attention and interest. While government operating procedures hold little value to the public, how those procedures affect the daily lives of people are very important to them. Therefore, information will be structured with the public impact as its basis. People should know about the execution of development projects, welfare measures, schemes, and new initiatives taken by the government for their welfare and how their lives are going to get impacted by the same,” one of the “guiding principles” of the policy states.

The policy was called Orwellian by the global press freedoms watchdog Reporters Without Borders (RSF). “Through this totally Orwellian regulation, the Jammu and Indian administered Kashmir administration becomes plaintiff against the free press, judge and executioner all in one,” the RSF

said, adding that it “will have the immediate effect of inducing a profound self-censorship that in practice amounts to prior censorship”. A most devastating fallout is the removal of all news archives from Indian-administered Kashmir’s newspapers (Hassan, 2021); in part also attributable to the lack of institution-building spirit among newspapers in the region. At the time of the policy’s rollout, India had fallen two places on the RAF’s 2020 World Press Freedom Index compared to the previous assessment and ranked 142 out of 180 nations — attributed “in part” to “the crackdown on press freedom in Indian administered Kashmir since last summer.” India’s rank on the index remains unchanged.

KPC Takeover

A new dimension to the state’s proactive measures was the dramatic closure of the Indian-administered Kashmir Press Club. On January 15, a dozen journalists — described as “disgruntled” by the larger journalist community in Indian-administered Kashmir — arrived at the press club in Srinagar and announced a “takeover” flouting all norms of the club, the last standing institution after the abrogation of J&Ks semi-autonomy which still held views largely independent of the government (Naqash, 2022). The group imposed themselves as the new, unelected management body and was widely condemned by Indian administered Kashmir based journalists as well as top journalist bodies in India who called it an “armed takeover” carried out as “police entered the premises without any due warrant or paperwork, and have, therefore, been brazenly complicit in this coup” (Ashiq, 2022). Even though the extent of the role of the state in the takeover is debatable, it has served the purpose of creating frictions in the journalist community, closure of the press club, and therewith denial of safe spaces for Indian-administered Kashmir journalists (Bukhtiyar, 2022).

Arrests, raids, and detentions

Kathju (2022) noted that summons, detentions, and arrests of journalists have become the new normal in Indian-administered Kashmir. The background checks for journalists have become rigorous involving different investigating agencies, primarily the police’s intelligence gathering division the CID. The background check, explains Kathju, involves scrutinizing their body of work and gathering personal details of individual journalists. Upon completion of such a check, the reports are sent to higher authorities, and accordingly, a call is taken on further action. In the first four months of 2022, the government arrested at least three journalists under the Public Safety Act. These include Sajad Gul in January, Fahad Shah in February, and Asif Sultan in April. In all three cases, the government has charged all three under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act. All three were granted bail by courts which led to their detention under the Public Safety Act (PSA) which empowers the state to detain the individuals for two years without any trial and at least three months before the detention can be challenged in the High Court, the only competent authority in PSA matters. The list of journalists booked by UAPA and PSA includes Masrat Zahra, Gowhar Geelani, Naseer Ganai, Haroon Lone, Kamran Yousuf, Qazi Shibli, and Suhail Dar.

Furthermore, the government has also barred international travel for journalists by denying renewal of or impounding their passports and putting those with valid passports on Lookout Circulars. In one of the earliest instances, journalist Gowhar Geelani was barred from travelling outside India in 2019. In 2021, Zahid Rafiq was barred from boarding an international flight to the United States where he was en route to teach at Cornell University. The list of journalists raided or summoned for questioning is even longer, a non-exhaustive list of which was compiled by Tantray (2022) for The Caravan. The list includes Naseer Ganai, Vikar Syed, Kamran Yousuf, Azhar Qadri, Mir Hilal, Basharat Masood, Peerzada Ashiq and many more. The homes of Qadri, Mir, and two others, Shah Abbas and Showkat Motta, have been raided and their digital equipment — including phones and computers of family members — was confiscated.

Conclusion

Indian administered Kashmir's media institutions have faced a constant struggle to stay relevant and maintain integrity while navigating state pressures. In April 2021, the Inspector General of Police India, Kashmir Vijay Kumar banned the live coverage of gunfights. The move would directly impact the transparency of such encounters from where reports of excesses are common. Kumar's diktat, however, was not condemned by the press community in Indian-administered Kashmir which lacks unity at this crucial juncture. The closure of the Indian-administered Kashmir Press Club after an attempted takeover by journalists close to the establishment. In a recent report on the state of media in Indian-administered Kashmir, the Press Council of India took note of the severe suppression of the press in the region. Worryingly, the committee quoted the Jammu and Indian administered Kashmir Lieutenant Governor Manoj Sinha has said that "many journalists were of 'anti-national' persuasion". The report further noted that the Governor, who reports directly to the Government of India, "conceded that when he was first appointed, he used to encourage open press conferences, but now had gone back to a 'selective engagement' with preferred journalists." The report also denied the complaints of intimidation of the press by select journalists and newspapers. Delegations meetings with the committee were arranged by the Directorate of Information and Public Relations of the Jammu and Indian administered Kashmir administration. These journalists were part of a larger group – styling itself as the Jammu and Indian administered Kashmir Press Corps – seen favourable to the government and later condemned the PCI report as "false" and "malicious".

Surveillance has been majorly strengthened in the last decade with at least five Indian-administered Kashmir journalists also featuring on the list of those spied upon using the Pegasus software. Also, as Kathju reported the Jammu and Indian-administered Kashmir police have also set up a social media cell wherein the public posts of journalists and others are minutely scrutinized by government sleuths as another parameter to categorize them as nationalist or anti-nationalist. The FCC report also quotes Indian administered Kashmir's police chief Vijay Kumar "had no hesitation in conceding that there exists a program to profile journalists working in the J&K region, "Our aim is to profile 80 per cent of Indian administered Kashmir, and we will do it for journalists too," he said.

As reported by NewsLaundry (11 April, 2022), the Jammu and Indian-administered Kashmir police have used social media posts as a tool to arrest journalists to give themselves the scope to deny that such arrests are indeed attacks on press freedoms. Apart from summons and raids, journalists have also raised concerns about being called by the Army and police officials in response to stories that are critical of the government in general or the forces in particular.

The media is facing the challenge of numerous types of censorship - direct or indirect, proactive and reactive – impeding their work but the most damaging is the act of self-censorship. Already, newspapers in Indian-administered Kashmir have failed to build themselves as institutions, engaging staff on an ad hoc basis without defined terms of employment in the form of contracts, flouting minimum wage norms, and wiping out their digital archives at regular intervals to name a few shortcomings.

All these factors act to prevent the knowledge and information from reaching the public that is considered offensive, harmful, and threatening by the state to its power and legitimacy – in its own words "national integrity and sovereignty of the state".

In more direct forms, censorship is visible in intimidation of journalists and media houses, withdrawal of advertisements, arrests, and other restrictions imposed on the media. The study further classifies such measures as reactive and proactive measures. Proactive measures take the

form of long-term structural and contextual changes like media which are slow to take shape but result in long-term damage to freedom of speech. While these may not appear to be of immediate consequence to the media as a whole, the proactive measures create an atmosphere of intimidation and fear where the nature of the coverage is gradually altered. One example of such measures is the perception of surveillance created over journalists. Giving journalists a sense of being watched by the state may not seem like an immediate threat to beginners who assume that surveillance is for senior journalists and that they would skip the radar but in the long run, the notion of being under surveillance works to create an atmosphere of constant fear and intimidation which in turn leads to some degree of self-censorship among the journalists. The frequent summoning of journalists in Indian-administered Kashmir creates a perception among one and all that they could be summoned next for their journalistic work, under the pretext of their social media posts. Moreover, the government has also frequently caused disinformation and rumour campaigns to throw journalists into disarray during crucial times such as in the aftermath of the abrogation of Jammu and Indian administered Kashmir's semi-autonomy.

The reactive measures taken in response to any major incident related to state security too have altered the nature of coverage in news media. The change in the content and terminologies used in local print media in the last decade is a subject that requires immediate analysis to trace the changes corresponding to changes in the politics of the state. Given the resource-stretched media organizations in Indian-administered Kashmir, they can control what their journalists write, and they in turn risk losing jobs in case of non-compliance. The stringent regulation is the present trend in media policy, which is challenging to account for in terms of conventional ideas. The lines separating state and private activity are becoming increasingly hazy, and self-censorship is occurring to lessen the ongoing danger of additional restrictions. The survival of these governance systems depends on institutions that uphold procedural fairness and public confidence.

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Rising Powers and the Politics of Peacebuilding: The Case of Brazil

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Iryna Tkachuk

Department of International Relations, Institute of Social Sciences, Karadeniz Technical University, e-mail: irena.tk@ukr.net

Ozgur Tufekci

Department of International Relations, Karadeniz Technical University, e-mail: ozgurtufekci@ktu.edu.tr

KEYWORDS	ABSTRACT
<p>Rising Powers, UN, Brazilian Foreign Policy, Peacekeeping Operations</p> <p>Received 9 August 2022 Revised 29 November 2022 Accepted 30 December 2022</p>	<p>During the last 25 years, Brazil has been providing an activist foreign policy not only in its own region but also in the world. The article highlights the peculiarities of Brazilian peacekeeping policy on President Lula's grand strategy during the term between 2003 and 2011 in line with its international and defence policy. In particular, the article mentions the main features of Brazilian peacebuilding, such as the reservation of humanitarian interventions, as the use of force leads to an increase in violence and instability. The participation of Brazil in peacekeeping operations is discussed, paying particular attention to its main characteristics and compliance with national interests, which are laid down in the country's grand strategy.</p>

Introduction

Participation of member countries in BRICS is considered a format of cooperation that enables them to consolidate their own regional leadership as opposed to the US-EU cooperation and to support their own national interests. In this sense, the security policy of the BRICS countries is an essential component of their collaboration. They implement this policy through the use of a forum to strengthen the international credibility of the group's countries as a framework for peace and stability. One of the aspects of cooperation is the participation of BRICS countries in the security discourse within the UN, where they are actively involved in solving security issues both at the regional and international levels. These countries declare their interest in the growing role of the United Nations; even the BRICS Summit documents always have provisions on the issue of reforming the UN, including the Security Council.

Brazil has always been a dominant country in South America, not just because of its territory and population but mostly because of the biggest economy in the region. Having this strong advantage, Brazil never tried to get the role of being a real leader. For a long time, its foreign policy was primarily focused on economic development and gaining autonomy in relation to the United States.

The years of military dictatorship contributed to the formation of a vast number of weak governments, which were usually not effective for the people. Brazil began to modernise after electing President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. He initiated significant changes in the economy of the region, which was continued by the next President, Louis Ignacio Lula da Silva. Consequently,

the foreign policy of Louis Ignacio Lula was characterised by the preservation of already selected priorities, strengthening independence in decision-making, first of all from the United States. Under the leadership of President Louis Ignacio Lula, the country has become a significant player. Consequently, with the growth of the Brazilian economy, the confidence of the country in international politics increased.

So can a country play a more critical role in the global context? Of course, the answer to this question is related to the level of the country's multilateral relations with other actors of international relations. States form their foreign policy from their material or ideal interests with which they build their interactions with other states and relevant actors in the global environment.

A grand strategy is a form of national planning to achieve a long-term goal. A grand strategy provides a national vision of the future and a precise plan for implementing this vision. In fact, this is a state course, which is formed on the basis of a clear definition of the national goal and the correct allocation of state resources for achieving the goal (Feaver, 2009). Historically, the need to formulate a grand strategy was due to the presence of an enemy. Thus, the aim of state politicians was to develop a coherent national strategy, combining military force, political leverage and economic power.

In the case of Brazil, after years of dictatorship in the country, state leaders have been chosen to strengthen Brazil as a significant global player. One of the ways to achieve this goal was the participation of Brazil in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations. The aim of this paper is to find an answer to the question, "How joining UN peacekeeping operations has influenced Brazil's grand strategy and helped Brazil to be a rising power?". Participation of Brazil in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN can prove (or refute) the possibility of a state transition from the status of a middle player to a global player. This paper examines the Brazilian motivation to participate in peace operations and its impact on international politics during the period of Louis Ignacio Lula's presidency (2003-2011). The first section will give us an understanding of the priorities in the Brazilian foreign and defence policies and how they relate to its peacekeeping policy. The following section will provide a quick historical overview of Brazilian participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), pointing to a unique Brazilian peacekeeping model and defining the interests of Brazilian participation in UNPKO. In the last part of this paper, we will make general conclusions and answer the research question.

Categorisation and Conceptualisation of the Rising Powers

With the beginning of the 21st century, the acceleration of globalisation and political developments has brought a comprehensive evolution process in the global economic arena. When we look at this transformation process, the financial crisis, which emerged in the USA in 2008 and had a profound effect on the world economy in a short time, became a vital breaking point that accelerated the transition to the new order (Dag and Tufekci, 2022). Two main trends have shaped the course of this transformation since the beginning of the crisis. First of all, it analyses that developed Western countries are experiencing a decline in their capacity to sustain economic growth and to reflect their power in the political and economic fields at the international level have gained popularity. Western economies, which could not achieve the desired growth after the crisis, have tended to lose their transformative powers and moral superiority in the international system (Dag and Tufekci, 2023). The weakening of liberal democracy in the West and the gradual increase of separatist and xenophobic movements throughout Europe are essential examples of the erosion of legitimacy.

Secondly, it managed to overcome the crisis with relatively minor damage; Countries that have started to make their weight felt more in the global economy by increasing their share in world production and which are called rising powers, have become the dynamo of the global economy

(Onis and Kutlay, 2011: 20). Therefore, it has become a trend to classify these countries, which are on the rise by making a rapid leap, attracting a large part of foreign direct investments, and whose capacity to influence the global economy is rapidly increasing, according to their actual GDP growth figures. In this context, classifications such as BRICS, MIKTA, MINT, MIST, PINE, Next 11, and CIVETS have started to be made. These countries, which are more active in their foreign policies and strong in their regions, also have the potential to be role models and demand more voice in international decision-making mechanisms in parallel with their increasing economic weight. In this context, how the rising powers will impact the course of the international system has turned into a new big question that is sought to be answered today (Onis and Kutlay, 2011: 20).

Although the concept of rising power has become a popular concept used by researchers and academics in recent years, it can be said that the theoretical literature on rising powers is insufficient and controversial. One of the significant shortcomings in this literature is conceptualising emerging powers by considering only their economic and military strengths. In other words, although there is no generally accepted definition of the concept, there is little consensus in the literature on which countries should be included in the status of the rising power, when and under what conditions they can be called rising powers, and when they are or will become great powers. However, the most obvious common point for the countries described as emerging powers is their high economic growth potential. In this context, it is accepted that these countries can reshape the global economic and political landscape of the 21st century (Hart and Jones, 2010: 65). On the other hand, they are defined as countries that strive to take on more influential roles in the system and change their power dynamics through international and regional organisations (Tank, 2012: 2-4).

In the article published in *International Affairs* magazine in 2006, Andrew Hurrell emphasised that the rising powers have four standard features. First, he stated that these countries, in addition to their growing economic power, have a relatively high military and political power capacity, a reasonable degree of internal consistency, and the ability to contribute to establishing a new global order. Secondly, underlining that the emerging powers want to play a more effective role in global issues, Hurrell stated that the relations and cooperation between these countries had deepened bilaterally and within regional and international institutions. Finally, he emphasised that a distinction can be made between the other Western "middle powers" and the majority of the rising powers. He stated that unlike Canada, Japan or many European countries, the emerging powers have never been fully integrated into the post-1945 international system with their sometimes opposing stance (Hurrell, 2006: 1-2).

Miller (2016: 217) characterised the emerging powers as the actors expected to be included in the category of great powers shortly and expressed the three characteristics of the emerging powers as follows: they try to increase. Secondly, they aim to globalise their national interests by assuming responsibilities in the international system through their allies and the organisations they are members of. Finally, emerging powers must provide internal acceptance and support that their role and status in the current system have changed.

Rising powers can influence the international order regionally or globally, primarily through the contribution of their material resources (usually the size of their economy, geography, population and military strength). What makes these countries important is that they have acquired enough power to change the direction of global politics and economy (Hurrell, 2006: 2). Emerging powers are often positioned differently from industrialised economies in the structural context. However, they can influence the international order -to a certain extent- with their material resources. However, not all emerging powers have achieved similar growth rates, particularly within the BRICS. Yet, in the financial and economic literature, the main argument for why these countries

are essential is based primarily on their "transparent economic size", not growth rate or opportunities for investor profits (Armijo, 2007: 12).

As another feature, emerging powers demand revisionist changes in the international order; because many are dissatisfied with the current world order. Their strategies in international politics are reformed and try to increase the bargaining power of the developing world within international multilateral organisations such as the WTO or the G20 (Bruera, 2015; 228). These countries are revisionists as they seek to integrate at least some of their fundamental aspects while trying to integrate into the global economic system (Nel and Mathew, 2010: 71).

Today's rising powers, which made rapid economic progress in the 2000s, differ significantly from their past examples. First, emerging modern powers continue to develop by combining and developing national economies as before and adding some regions and economies to their transnational production and investment networks. In addition, the security vulnerabilities associated with increasing transnational connections have enabled the rising powers to overcome their "governance borders" and to integrate into transnational functional governance networks (Hameiri and Jones, 2015: 80-81).

In summary, the most striking features of these countries are their high growth rates and the size of their market potential. On the other hand, the democratic experience of these countries is not sufficient, and high inflation rates have affected the economy. In addition, population growth rates are mostly higher in these countries than in other developed countries; they have younger and more dynamic populations.

In order to clarify the concept of rising power, a precise classification should be made by determining various criteria. First of all, it should be noted that while every rising power has the status of a developing country, not every developing country can be included in the rising power category. In this sense, O'Neill argues that the balance of power in the global economy is shifting towards developing countries and emphasises the Growth Environment Score (GES) analysis, which was created with five main and 13 sub-indicators to be used in the rising power classification. The main takeaway from this analysis is; strong growth can be achieved with a stable and open economy, healthy investment, high technology adoption rates, a healthy and well-educated workforce, and a safe and rules-based political environment (O'Neill et al., 2005: 3).

Table 1: Growth Environment Score (GES) Used in Rising Power Classification of Countries

Areas	Sub-indices
Macroeconomic Stability	Inflation
	Government Deficit
	External Debt
Macroeconomic Conditions	Investment Rates
	Openness of The Economy
Technological Capabilities	Penetration of PCs
	Phones
	Internet
Human Capital	Education
	Life Expectancy
Political Conditions	Political Stability
	Rule of Law
	Corruption

Source: O'Neill et al., 2005: 10.

Regarding the categorisation of the rising powers, there are several other methods. Yet again, not all of them provide a comprehensive approach to properly determine the power transition. That is why this paper will benefit from Tufekci's (2016, 103-104) power classification indicators, which is relatively much more detailed and useful for comprehending how rising powers rise. The classification consists of 7 main criteria, and the last heading is divided into 5 subcriteria.

Table 2: Power Classification Indicators

Economic Size	
Military Capability	
Democratic Development	
Demographic and Geographical Capacity	
Technological Capability	
Human Capital	
Soft Power	▪ <i>Foreign Aids</i>
	▪ <i>Diplomatic Missions</i>
	▪ <i>Mediation Initiatives</i>
	▪ <i>Acting in the Peacekeeping Operations</i>
	▪ <i>International Organizations Membership</i>

Source: Tufekci, 2016: 103-104.

Due to Brazil's economic strength, its hemispheric leadership, and its growing geostrategic role through multilateral international forums, it is assumed as a vital player in both regional and global politics across numerous dimensions. In this sense, while it is possible to examine the rise of Brazil from several perspectives, this article deals with how Brazil acted in the peacekeeping operations during the Lula era between 2003 and 2011 since the politics of peacebuilding is also one of the criteria to categorise the countries as it is put forward in table 2.

Peacekeeping Operations as a Part of Brazilian Foreign Policy

By the end of the 20th century, Brazil's foreign policy was based on four principles: protecting the territory, consolidating and strengthening the republic, preventing or resolving conflicts with its neighbours, and maintaining good relations with the United States. Consequently, Brazil's President, Lula da Silva, proclaimed a course in pursuing Brazil's leadership in politics and economics as part of a grand strategy which would help spread Latin-American values. To achieve that, Lula highlighted three diplomatic strategies: soft balancing, the creation of a coalition and the desire to position Brazil as the more united leader of South America (Brands, 2012).

Unlike the United States and Russia, Brazil became an economic state without becoming a military state. By applying the "soft power" principle in foreign policy, Brazil offers much more opportunities for developing and influencing international politics. We must admit that the most visible policy of "soft power" manifests itself in the participation of Brazil in various regional and international organisations. Consolidating its position as a generally recognised South American leader, one of the leading players in world politics, and a robust and persistent candidate as a member of the UN Security Council, Brazil actively uses the soft power potential in advancing integration processes and their approaches in various multilateral structures and regional associations. In order to consolidate its leadership in the region and achieve its global interests, Brazil is an active participant in the UN peacekeeping forces, directed financial resources for social

projects and trained its military forces. Brazil has a vital position in the peaceful resolution of conflicts, misunderstandings, and crises. It focuses on the relationship between preserving security and sustainable development of the world and is actively involved in the formation of a multipolar system in international relations and democratic world order. The participation of Brazil in the modernisation of the Security Council and readiness to increase its status on the international scene dictates the need for the state to formulate a clear position on critical issues of international cooperation (Kenkel, 2013).

A beneficial aspect of Brazil's foreign policy is participation in peacekeeping missions, in particular, in the successful United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), headed by Brazil since 2004, which has undoubtedly also consolidated the positive international image that has been blamed for Brazil. This operation opened the potential of Brazil's role in peacekeeping operations. The country provided the largest contingent of troops, and what is significant; the commander of the operation was always Brazilian. In addition, most of the contingent of peacekeepers consisted of military personnel and specialists from nine countries in Latin America. Brazilian peacekeepers promoted Haiti's transition to democracy and stability and helped rebuild its territory after the earthquake in January 2010 (UN news, 2011). The country is actively involved in peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions point to the importance of its membership as a permanent representative in the UN Security Council and is pursuing a stable course in addressing the problems of a peaceful atom in the territory of Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in regions subjected to Islamic extremism. In 2007, then Foreign Minister S. Amorim reaffirmed a new policy in the region and the world, saying: "We are aware that statements of Brazilian values and interests in the world are and will be of a global nature. Like it or not, Brazil is not a small country. It does not conduct and will never conduct the foreign policy of a small country" (Martinov, 2014).

The Foreign Minister of Brazil, A. Patriota, at the UN Security Council in 2011, stated that there is a tendency towards coercion, sanctions and hasty military intervention in the modern world, but preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping operations with the three elements should be an alternative to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The United Nations Peacekeeping Commission, along with respect for international law, can play an essential role in preventing a recurrence of conflict (Patriota, 2011).

Defence policy

Brazilian participation in the activities of international organisations and the desire to enhance its status in the international political arena dictates the need for Brazil to formulate a clear position on international cooperation issues. The National Defence policy was revised by the new leadership in 2005. It significantly differed from the strategy of the defence since 1995. In particular, the 2005 version identified the relationship between the national defence strategy and international peace support, multilateral institutions and peacekeeping operations.

It should be noted that the provision of peacekeeping operations has increased significantly with the adoption of consistent political documents. A separate heading for peacekeeping operations is devoted to the National Defence Strategy, as well as a leading role in the preparation of such missions. A significant step in the legal implementation of peacekeeping operations was the adoption in 2008 of a new "Doctrine of Military Defence", which also emphasises the importance of peaceful operations for the country's foreign policy purposes but notes that the Armed Forces can participate in peace operations in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations if they adhere to its fundamental principles (MoD, 2008).

According to the National Defence Policy (2005), the objectives of national defence are 1) contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security; and 2) their inclusion in the international decision-making process (Ekstrom and Miguel, 2012). Maintaining multilateral structures and vigorous participation in them is enshrined as the best way to realise the interests of Brazil at the international level. Brazil's interests are defined in terms of multilateral, pacifist, sovereign identity and peaceful operations subordinated to these interests.

The Brazilian National Security Strategy (2008) emphasises the country's desire to participate in peacekeeping operations. Brazil should increase its participation in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations or regional multilateral organisations, as it is in line with national interests and declared international commitments (MoD, 2008: 17).

Brazilian Peacekeeping Model

Brazil's engagement with the UN is an example of how the state is influential in the world arena and claims to be the same as the founding states of the Organization. Participation of Brazil in the UN became possible after the signing of the UN Charter by fifty states in 1945 in San Francisco. Since then, Brazil has been actively involved in the work of the United Nations organs and specialised agencies. It is worth noting, however, that at present, the country is not a member of the permanent members of the UN Security Council; Brazil is a candidate for membership as a permanent member with veto power. However, the Federal Republic of Brazil is actively pointing to permanent members of the UN Security Council in its desire to be on an equal footing with permanent member states and to obtain this status.

Since 1948 about 65 peacekeeping and security operations have been carried out, and Brazil has participated in 46 peacekeeping operations. For the first time, the country joined the United Nations peacekeeping operations in 1956, and since then has participated in peacekeeping missions continuously (Brigagão and Aguilar, 2009). However, it should be noted that despite the active peacekeeping activity, there was a problem at the institutional level between the institute of foreign policy and military structures, which increased the tension between diplomats and the military. For a long time, foreign policy was based on the principle of commitment to non-intervention policies. However, the country's armed forces positioned themselves ready for active peacekeeping operations.

In the recent years, the participation of Western states in UN peacekeeping operations has been reduced, and this gap has been actively filled by “rising” powers, in particular, the members of the BRICS and new players are increasingly taking the lead in these operations. At the time when Lula da Silva became President in 2003, Brazil participated in two UN operations, UNMOS (Angola) and UNMISSET (Timor-Leste). Between 2003 and 2011, the country participated in six of the eight UN missions during this period. Brazil participated in the mission on the Sinai Peninsula, was an observer during the civil wars in Africa and Latin America, and participated in Cyprus, the settlement of South-Asian conflicts (East Timor from Indonesia). The contingent of the country is part of peacekeeping forces in Africa: Liberia and Guinea-Bissau (formerly a Portuguese colony). In 2011, Brazilian experts and military experts participated in 7 UN peacekeeping operations in Western Sahara and Côte d'Ivoire (Борзова, 2011).

In 2003, Brazil prepared a report to the UN Security Council with specific recommendations on the sources of conflicts in Africa, ways to prevent and resolve these conflicts, and preparing the basis for lasting peace and economic growth after their permission. The report "On the causes of conflict and the promotion of lasting peace and sustainable development in Africa" was supposed to be the main document for addressing interrelated peace, security, and development issues.

Talking about Brazil's unique approach to peacekeeping operations, it's worth recalling the UN humanitarian intervention in Lebanon. This was a tremendous and unique cooperation, both for Brazil and for the UN, since the naval component of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon was instructed to ban Hezbollah's illicit circulation and, with the help of the Council's resolutions. Brazil has had a unique approach to Lebanon, as it was concerned about the increase in violence in that country and has repeatedly called for the protection of civilians and respect for international law. As a result of this operation, the special attitude of Brazilian peacekeeping contingent to the situation in Lebanon, close friendship and commitment were established between the states. Brazil has found a partner in this region.

Brazil has repeatedly criticised the concept of humanitarian intervention, which is used by the United States and other NATO countries. Thus, in the work of the UN Security Council, Brazil has been actively involved in the development of various concepts. One of them is the idea of "*Friends of Mediation*", which describes that the use of contingents should carry little violence to the local population. Moreover, during the period of the use of force, measures should be legitimate and limited to the objectives set out in the resolutions of the Security Council. Another accepted concept was "*Responsibility to protect*," which claimed that all responsibility should be exercised first and foremost through the use of diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means. And only if these means cannot achieve the desired result, the possibility of applying coercive measures can be considered (Hamman, 2012). Also, in addition to the already existing concept of responsibility to protect, Brazilian diplomats in 2011 developed the concept of "*Responsibility while protecting*", which reduces the risk of armed conflict and human casualties (Ekstrom and Miguel, 2012).

In addition, in Brazil, in the development of preventive diplomacy, the Centre for the Preparation of Peacekeepers was set up in Rio de Janeiro in 2005. Since then, a significant number of volunteers have been trained, and many have remained serving in military structures. The state uses their experience and skills not only outside the country but also internally to solve the problems of crime, especially in the poor parts of the country. Following the conflict in Uganda and Rwanda in the last decades of the last century, a protocol was signed that contains recommendations to the Security Council on the sources of conflicts in Africa. This was followed by a statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2012, "*Causes of Conflict and Promoting Sustainable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa*" (Oliver, 2012). This document was the first step in solving the interconnected concepts of peace, security, and development.


The Interests of Brazilian Participation in UNPKO

The involvement of states in peacekeeping activities is determined by various reasons and motivations. For some states, this is a way of realising the country's own unilateral interests since, in some cases; states view peacekeeping activities as contributing to increasing international prestige or the way they are incorporated into the UN decision-making process. For other states, the motives for participation are external: states may be pressured by allies to participate in a coalition or change their position in relation to a particular conflict context. One more reason for participation may be large financial compensation for peacekeeping activities. But the most important reason is that refusing to participate in this fundamental agenda will necessarily mean a loss of international political influence.

Participation of Brazil in a peacekeeping operation is undoubtedly a successful trend toward developing its own, Latin American form of peacekeeping as a counterpart to the liberal democratic north model that is now being promoted by the UN approach. Obviously, in the Latin American region, Brazil holds leadership positions on almost all issues, so that's why Brazil coordinates the

South American missions, which make up just over half of its membership. The participation of Brazilian blue helmets in peacekeeping missions is nothing but a way of establishing their positions not only in the region but also in the world, and it can also be used as a tool both for national interests and for the implementation of the commandments of Brazilian identity (Cavalcanti, 2013).

Figure 1: Number of Brazilian Military and Civilian Personnel Serving in Peacekeeping Missions Worldwide from 2001 to 2021



What are the goals of Brazil in participating in peacekeeping operations? Peaceful operations allow Brazil to achieve a certain set of goals. Indeed, at first glance, it seems that the main task is to promote foreign policy. However, in fact, participation in the Security Council is not limited to diplomatic objectives, as it includes a number of positive internal changes, such as the training and equipping of the Armed Forces, as well as providing the military with a new, prestigious mission closely linked to the image of the state abroad.

Talking about the external interests of the state, we can point to the following:

- improving relations with countries;
- promote Brazilian trade and investment;
- strengthening the peaceful resolution of conflicts and mediation;
- influencing the UN Security Council;
- creating national interests by involving in international cooperation.

The domestic interests of involving in peacekeeping operations:

- training of the Armed Forces;

- employed human resources;
- formation of a positive image of the army among the population.

Undoubtedly, the policy of official representatives of the state concerning its development is also important. So, if national leaders acknowledge that the interests of their states are linked to the continuation of the international status quo, they would maintain and protect the status quo. International organisations, especially the UN, are the leading actor in providing such support. That deduction is valid for Brazil, as well. During the years of Lula's presidency, he was chosen to engage in international cooperation with the participation of the state in various forums, negotiations, and associations as economic, political and security to achieve national interests.

Conclusion

Talking about Brazil's participation in UN peacekeeping operations, we need to emphasise once again the importance of the issue of international security. Definitely, the lack of security is one of the biggest problems in the modern world. Recognition of the struggle for power in relations between states imposes a peculiar pressure on international politics. Obviously, among all BRICS countries, only Brazil takes an active role in changing certain security policy provisions through existing international institutions and norms. Brazil is actively focusing on the relevance of multilateral actions based on cooperation agreements. Summing up the successes of Brazil, it should be pointed out that the period from 2003 to 2011 can be called the prosperity era of the state. President Luisa Ignacio Lula da Silva had started to implement the Brazilian grand strategy, which was based on the transition from unipolar to a multipolar order. The Brazilian economy dramatically improved, which in fact, contributed to the active involvement of the state in international processes, in particular, peacekeeping. During the eight years of the Lula presidency, the government developed a long-term national development strategy and reached an agreement with the United States, which for the first time, had to recognise the regional leadership of Brazil. One of the main objectives of this strategy was a solid international policy that would ensure the realisation of Brazilian interests. President Lula managed that by underlining three diplomatic strategies: soft balancing, the creation of a coalition and the desire to positioning Brazil as the leader of a more united South America. It should be emphasised here that peacekeeping was one way to achieve the realisation of the interests of the grand strategy. This strategy was successful since the profile of Brazil has risen significantly in the international arena, and this has also triggered tremendous internal changes in the country. For example, participation in peacekeeping operations contributed to the improvement of the armed forces, which, in addition to the accumulation of field experience, developed doctrine and training, actively contributing to the development of the state. Brazil firmly assumed its right to join the UN Security Council as a permanent member. Brazil initiated the creation of the South American Defence Council in 2008. The National Defence Strategy adopted in 2008 clearly defined the South Atlantic area as a zone of its "special responsibility" and set the task of building a military force comparable to the most modern armies in the world.

During this period, Brazil was one of the most active members of BRICS with participation in peacekeeping operations. In 2003, Brazil participated in two UN operations, UNMOS (Angola) and UNMISSET (Timor-Leste). Between 2003 and 2011, the country participated in six of the eight UN missions during this period. The well-formed policy of the President Lula da Silva has raised Brazil's profile in the world. In fact, thanks to Lula, the country managed to host the World Cup in 2014, as well as the summer Olympics in 2016, which was also a part of Lula's grand strategy.

However, it should be emphasised that the implementation of a grand strategy through engaging in world processes by one or another action does not guarantee the country's entry into the

international community as a global player, as it is a long process and requires stable development indicators. Brazil is an excellent example of this. After many years of dynamic economic development and good governance, now the country has suspended its activity in world politics. The biggest problem in Brazil is the lack of internal structures that would support its development. And that would suspend the big dream of being a rising power and changing its status from middle to a global actor in the international system for an indefinite period, as it has happened in the case of Brazil.

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BOOK REVIEW

Francis Fukuyama

Liberalism and its Discontents

Profile Books Ltd. London, 2022, ISBN: 978-1-80081-008-2, 145 pp., \$17 US

The wisdom of classic liberalism is in jeopardy, and the fissures in the faith of its ideologues are now manifest. The liberal doctrine, in its current form, has not only failed to address the socio-economic problems, but its radical emphasis on individualization has ended up aggravating their severity. Francis Fukuyama in his book *Liberalism and its Discontents* has underscored the need to undo the wrongs committed by or associated with classic liberalism and to reestablish the faith in liberalism's ability to build an inclusive, egalitarian, liberal society. The author has underscored the virtues of classic liberalism and its subsequent drift towards the neoliberal doctrine that, he believes, led to the undermining of the virtues of the former. Especially, liberalism's call for human emancipation overextended by the neoliberal theorist to the point of breaking has reared doubts about liberalism's ability to craft a balanced, cordial and spirited society.

Thematic approach has been applied to structure the book. The first four chapters are devoted to vital aspects of liberalism: premises of liberalism, its journey towards neoliberalism, importance of individual in classic liberalism and its misuse under neoliberalism. Chapter five to eight deals with topics such as: how liberalism turned against itself, how focus on rationality was overstretched, and what role does and can modern technology play in enhancing and undermining classic liberalism. The last three

chapters sketches the way forward to construct a liberal egalitarian society.

The plea for man's freedom, the author has opined, from the shackles of social compliance against his approval inspired him to spring out from the established social framework to weave a personal framework, but eventually, his quest for self-actualization got metamorphosed into a drive for self-care. Accordingly, consumer products advertised as care for one's body as well as soul replaced religion and philosophy as springs to sate man's spiritual longing. As Fukuyama has put it "The self-care and wellness movements are simply contemporary manifestations of Rousseau's vision of the "plenitude" of the inner self." The utter disregard and indifference towards everything except that which is concerned with one's self resulted in contagious societal and economic ills summited in the gratuitous inequalities and fragmented spiritless societies.

Fukuyama has discussed at length the criticisms branded against liberalism's assertion that a man, being a sovereign agent, should be allowed to chart his own course of actions and enter into social contracts of his own will. The author has chronicled historical circumstances that gave birth and proliferation of the liberal proposition "original position of a man" in the writings of liberal theorists such as Luther, Kant, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Rawls, and its subsequent criticism from critical theorists such as Marcuse and Mill. Critical theorists

maintain that in the real world, no “original position” exists as there is no choosing individual prior to that individual’s specific attributes such as race, gender, or sexual orientation; thus the “deontological” theory about human emancipation is flawed. Similarly, Marxists and Feminists vehemently disagree with the contention of free consent in the contract theory of workers and women. The disadvantaged position, they state, of these two groups barely allows for their consent to qualify as voluntary.

However, Fukuyama has defended liberal theory by underscoring that liberal doctrine is not flawed in essence. It was only the self-indulgence of neoliberal theorists that took the individualistic creed to its limits. While listing the truth as being that humans are both pro-social and selfishly individualistic and need to be accommodated in a broader understanding of liberalism, which can embrace and accommodate cultural diversities, rather than shunning liberalism and embracing brutal authoritarianism.

Similarly, the French Enlightenment’s glorification of reason’s capability to enter the domain of societal value systems has finally culminated in the “cognitive crisis”. The liberal enlightenment method of verification through empirical analysis, its ability to produce repeatable results and utter disregard for absolute authority are presented as the only valid way to objectify reality. However, critics such as Foucault and Edward Said have rejected the liberal proposition of “word neutrality”, as Foucault believes that discourses are created to reflect and implement the views of dominant groups. Furthermore, economists use complicated mathematical models, which are bereft of the ground realities of the marginalized sections of society, just to validate the tenets of market economics.

However, Fukuyama has stated that it is because of “intellectual capture” that economists and experts have reached a particular set of conclusions rather than because of their conscious biasedness or corruption. Furthermore, he cautions against

the consequences of Foucault’s power relation theory’s underlying assertion that every discourse hides its hidden agenda to dominate other groups; from this perspective, the author has opined, the rising calls from marginalized groups to be treated as equals would be interpreted by rightwing populists as a zero-sum power struggle and an attempt to get dethroned and overpowered; Moreover, the social divisions will be intensified through online platforms and Network Economics tilted towards sensationalism over careful vetting of information.

Fukuyama has also subscribed to the views of rightwing populists and leftwing radicals that there is an identity crisis in liberal societies as they consider themselves as citizens of the world rather than of a particular nation. Consequently, it has provided an opportunity to the rightwing populists and leftwing radicals to pitch identity-based alternatives to classically liberal societies. But Fukuyama has questioned the validity of both as realistic alternatives to replace the classic liberal system. While the author has claimed the rightwing populists’ would be a majoritarian model that would persecute minorities and other ethnic groups; the leftwing model’s everyday life would be overshadowed by concerns like gender, race, color, and ethnicity, and liberal ideals like color-blind meritocracy will take a backseat.

In conclusion, Fukuyama has suggested that to overcome the problem of common identity in a principle-based liberal society there is a need for a strong state to enforce those impartial principles. Hence, the state would provide a sense of community and bond within its territory. Besides, a liberal egalitarian society’s foundation would rest on the following principles: role of government in wealth distribution, social security, committed federalism, freedom of speech with appropriate limits, the primacy of individual rights over the rights of a group, and recognition that human autonomy is not unlimited.

However, it is surprising to see, despite author’s support for wealth redistribution,

that the words such as Keynes, Keynesian economics, and welfare economics are not mentioned even once in the whole book. Moreover, the author has associated every failure of liberal framework to neoliberal theorists and has defended classical liberalism from acquisitions but has not provided any realistic alternative except crafting a strong state. Though, the author has suggested that a strong state is inevitable to implement the liberal ideas, even by force, but the solidification of identity politics based on nationalism and patriotism can again plunge nations into ruthless competition and conflict with everyone and everything.

The book would be helpful for policymakers to reformulate and restructure public policies; to academicians and researchers to revisit and rethink about liberalism in modern era; more importantly, to general readers who desire to figure out why liberalism failed to live up to its ideals.

Ishfaq Ahmad Thaku

Doctorate in International Business, Aligarh
Muslim University, India.

Currently Teaching at Department of
Commerce, university of Kashmir, India.



www.cesran.org

Tower Court, Oakdale Road, York YO30 4XL, UK

BOOK REVIEW

Sharifullah Dorani

The Lone Leopard

S&M Publishing House, July 2022, ISBN: 978-1-7396069-0-9, 436 pp., £19.99/£10.99, hb.

In *The Lone Leopard* – a well-researched, historical fiction that took Dr Sharifullah Dorani “12 years” (Dorani, 2022: 430) to write – we follow Ahmad, a deeply religious young man, through school in Kabul, then as the Russians leave and the Mujahideen take over the family go to Moscow. After a time in Moscow, they pay people traffickers to get them to the UK. Ahmad later returns to Afghanistan to seek a wife. We are taken through the horrors of war and the tribal and religious feuds as it impacts on Ahmad and the people around him, including the woman he loves, the Lone Leopard.

Dorani in his notes says that taking refuge in the basements of his blocks in Makroryan, Kabul, while the Civil War of 1992 continued, he decided (if he made it alive) to write about what ordinary Afghans went through (Dorani, 2022: 430). He did make it alive, and the result is *The Lone Leopard*. His description of the horrors the Afghan people suffered, the pain Ahmad, and I believe, Dorani experienced, grip the reader, and take you there. One can only feel deeply for the people who lived and died through these times.

The Lone Leopard teaches us a great deal about the Afghan Civil War, which took place when the “pro-Communist” Najibullah regime collapsed in April 1992 and the Mujahideen took over Kabul. Turning Shia against Sunni and vice versa, setting Afghanistan’s main ethnic groups of

Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek against each other, the several Mujahideen parties fought each other on the streets of Kabul (Dorani, 2022: 430). The book describes the recent Afghan history, the Civil War in particular, and it does so from the peoples’ perspective. Russia, the US, Pakistan, and the UK have all played their part, but this story is from the ground. Reading *The Lone Leopard* has given me a greater understanding of the tribes and beliefs in that troubled country and insights into Afghanistan’s religious and tribal groups and their power.

The book also introduces the reader to the origin of the conflict, which has led to decades of war in Afghanistan: the arrival of books in Kabul from Afghanistan’s neighbours and beyond. These books attempt to spread ideologies “foreign” to Afghans, including Communism, radical interpretation of Islam or jihadism, excessive liberalism/democracy, nationalism, to name but a few. For Dorani’s protagonist, Ahmad, those “extreme ideologies were tied around us like chains and strangled our values. Sucked our blood like leeches. Demolished our infrastructure like a bulldozer” (Dorani, 2022: 370). And in the power struggle between those “foreign ways of life”, Ahmad continues, he does not know how much more he will suffer, how much more his people will pay, and what will be next for his country (Dorani, 2022: 370).

Dorani's message is clear: the conflict in Afghanistan is fuelled by foreign interference: different countries have conflicting interests in Afghanistan and that has been the leading cause of the war, insecurity and instability. Furthermore, change that is not originated from the within and is dictated from the outside will not work. Unsurprisingly, the Soviet Union and the US failed in Afghanistan.

But there seems to be some sympathy in writing for America's intervention in Afghanistan when it is distinguished from the Soviet Union's invasion of the country because the former's intervention was "authorised" (Dorani, 2022: 309) by the UN. The below passage is another example of the sympathy which equally (and so powerfully) characterises the US experience in Afghanistan:

"A school [girl] runs towards the American. He [the American soldier] shouts, 'Stop, stop,' but she doesn't know what 'stop' means. He fires by her feet. She freezes – her schoolbag drops. The Afghan soldier finds nothing in the backpack but books, notebooks and pens, telling the American she raced because she was late for school. The American collapses, his body trembling, saying, 'Same-age daughter, same-age daughter'. Another American walks out of a Humvee, gives the crying [girl] chocolates, and tells her to rush for her class. He drags his weeping friend in." (Dorani, 2022: 265)

In his recent podcast interview with USSO,ⁱ Dorani speaks about *The Lone Leopard's* intended reader. In addition to the Western one, he had future Afghan generations in mind when writing the novel. Dorani has a message for them (and arguably us) regarding what needs to be done with those imported books and their divisive intention: "These books have destroyed Afghanistan. Throw them away...We all are meant to encourage a feeling of mutual love and respect, not hatred...[God] has created this world for

living; live in it and let others live." (Dorani, 2022: 11)

Described through the excellent writing is the strength a faith can give a true believer, but also how it can be manipulated to make neighbours enemies and individuals suicide bombers. There is a powerful scene in the book where an Afghan intellectual and a Taliban leader discuss Islam. For the Taliban leader, democracy is hypocrisy but for the intellectual, the "origins of democracy" lie in Islam. The intellectual asks the Taliban leader how a mullah would look after a woman in need of a midwife. "Allah would assist her...", the Taliban leader replies. He then accuses the intellectual by saying that, at the invaders' orders, the intellectual preaches democracy and human rights at the expense of "Sharia law *he will rot in hell*" (Dorani, 2022: 335-37).

One cannot help but help to be drawn into this debate. On reflection, we can see the Afghan situation has many features of so many religious wars: Pakistan and India – the Hindu and Buddhist, Ireland – Catholics and Protestants, the Crusades in Europe of the Middle Ages. The list is long and continues. Is religion used as a tool, corrupted, to motivate people to fight for land, resources and power to be held by their leaders? As far as Dorani is concerned, "Islam", "democracy", "human rights", etc., have been used ("as a means, not a goal") for decades by different Afghan parties and their foreign backers to achieve "their ulterior objectives" (Dorani, 2022: 245).

This argument takes us to another powerful (and timely) scene between a conservative Afghan woman and a progressive Afghan girl, the Lone Leopard or Frishta, in which they debate the value of education for women. While they agree that education for women is valuable, the conservative woman adds that she has to be "realistic" as young women need husbands for financial support. Parents won't be around all the time. The best future for young women is to have their *own* homes. The progressive girl replies that they can have their own homes but after they finish

university. But the conservative woman claims that university will take away that opportunity from them because some Afghan families won't marry a young woman who has been to school, let alone university. The progressive girl's mother chastises her daughter, telling her that her views are not for everyone (Dorani, 2022: 33-4).

Dorani in this scene evidently explains that some changes require time, that is, some preconditions must be met before they are introduced, and changes must not be rushed, especially from the outside. In other words, did NATO and the US try (and still do!) to impose changes on societies which were not ready for them; societies that were thousands of miles away from the West; societies that the West had little knowledge of and yet attempted to impose Western culture?

The author does not seem to put all the blame on the shoulders of invaders, though; there is some blame that the locals must also bear. Through the protagonist, Dorani writes that sadly Afghan politicians opened the gates for those foreign ideologies to enter Afghanistan. Except for a few, all Afghan politicians after Daoud Khan have been "shopkeepers", selling what foreign intelligence agencies needed in return for money and power. Ironically, adds the protagonist, they all invoked national interests or Islam for selling their people and country (Dorani, 2022: 370).

In reading *The Lone Leopard* I am reminded of T. E. Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*,ⁱⁱ which was later turned into a critically acclaimed movie *The Lawrence of Arabia*. He describes how during 1916-1918 the Western powers, led by Winston Churchill, wanted to secure the oil from the Middle East to support the war effort by taking the territories from the Turks. This was achieved in large part by lying to the Arab nations about the Allies plans and Lawrence's efforts working with the Arab leaders.

"The Arab Revolt had begun on false pretences. To gain the Sherif's help our Cabinet had offered, ... to support the establishment of native governments in

parts of Syria and Mesopotamia, 'saving the interests of our ally, France'. The last modest clause concealed a treaty (kept secret,) by which France, England and Russia agreed to annex some of these promised areas, and to establish their respective spheres of influence over all the rest." (Lawrence, 1997: 266)

At the end of the First World War, and this deception, the Allies divided the Middle East taking little account of the societies in those lands leading to the turmoil that has followed.

As I read *The Lone Leopard* and was reminded of the French, American, British, and Russian attempts to impose their ideas on Afghanistan I could not help but think "Do we never learn?"

The Lone Leopard has taught me a great deal about Afghanistan and, by extension, the region. It has made me realise how little we in the West know about Afghanistan and the Greater Middle East. *The Lone Leopard* is a powerful book that tells a story I will never forget. It is an emotional roller coaster. And it is an eye-opener. The book has the potential to become a classic over time. Owing to its extensive information on recent Afghan history from the locals' perspective, the book can be an ideal choice for university/college courses on Afghanistan, South Asia and even the Greater Middle East.

David Dwyer
Bedford, UK

davidxdwyer@gmail.com

ⁱ Dorani S (2022) 017 – Narratives of America in Afghanistan (W/Sharifullah Dorani). USSO.cast, [Online] Available at: <https://ussocast.podbean.com/>.

ⁱⁱ Lawrence T.E. (1997) *Seven pillars of wisdom*. Wordsworth Editions; New edition.

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