



**Journal of Politics and Development**

**ISSN 2632-4911**

**Volume 13 ■ Number 2 ■ Summer 2023**

# the rest: journal of politics and development

*Previously published as Journal of Global Analysis (JGA)*

## Editors-in-Chief:

**Ozgur TUFEKCI, Assoc. Prof.** | CESRAN International, UK

**Rahman DAG, Assoc. Prof.** | CESRAN International, UK

## Associate Editors:

**Alper Tolga BULUT, Assoc. Prof.** | CESRAN International, UK

**Alessia CHIRIATTI, Dr** | CESRAN International, UK

## Assistant Editors:

**Ceren Hakyemez** | CESRAN International, UK

**Ekrem Ok** | CESRAN International, UK

## Editorial Board

**Sener AKTURK, Assoc. Prof.** | Koç University, Turkey

**Enrique ALBEROLA, Prof.** | Banco de España, Spain

**Mustafa AYDIN, Prof.** | Kadir Has University, Turkey

**Ian BACHE, Prof.** | University of Sheffield, UK

**Kee-Hong BAE, Prof.** | York University, Canada

**Mark BASSIN, Prof.** | Sodertorn University, Sweden

**Alexander BELLAMY, Prof.** | Uni. of Queensland, Australia

**Richard BELLAMY, Prof.** | Uni. College London, UK

**Andreas BIELER, Prof.** | University of Nottingham, UK

**Pinar BILGIN, Prof.** | Bilkent University, Turkey

**Ken BOOTH, Prof.** | Aberystwyth University, UK

**Stephen CHAN, Prof.** | SOAS, University of London, UK

**Nazli CHOUCRI, Prof.** | MIT, USA

**Judith CLIFTON, Prof.** | Universidad de Cantabria, Spain

**John M. DUNN, Prof.** | University of Cambridge, UK

**Kevin DUNN, Prof.** | Hobart and William Smith Colleges, USA

**Can ERBIL, Assoc. Prof.** | Boston College, USA

**Stephen Van EVERA, Prof.** | MIT, USA

**Marc FLEURBAEY, Prof.** | Princeton University, USA

**Bulent GOKAY, Prof.** | Keele University, UK

**Ayla GOL, Prof.** | York St John University, UK

**Stefano GUZZINI, Prof.** | Uppsala Universitet, Sweden

**David HELD, Prof.** | London Sch. of Economics, LSE, UK

**Tony HERON, Prof.** | University of York, UK

**Raymond HINNEBUSCH, Prof.** | Uni. of St Andrews, UK

**John M. HOBSON, Prof.** | University of Sheffield, UK

**Michael KENNY, Prof.** | University of Sheffield, UK

**Cécile LABORDE, Prof.** | University College London, UK

**Scott LUCAS, Prof.** | University of Birmingham, UK

**Kalypso NICOLAIDIS, Prof.** | University of Oxford, UK

**Ziya ONIS, Prof.** | Koc University, Turkey

**Alp OZERDEM, Prof.** | George Mason University, USA

**Danny QUAH, Prof.** | London School of Economics, UK

**José Gabriel PALMA, Prof.** | Cambridge University, UK

**Jenik RADON, Prof.** | Columbia University, USA

**Oliver RICHMOND, Prof.** | University of Manchester, UK

**Ibrahim SIRKECI, Prof.** | Regent's College London, UK

**Ian TAYLOR, Prof.** | University of St Andrews, UK

**Ali WATSON, Prof.** | University of St Andrews, UK

**Brian WHITE, Prof.** | University of Sheffield, UK

**Stefan WOLFF, Prof.** | University of Birmingham, UK

**Birol YESILADA, Prof.** | Portland State University, USA

**Hakan YILMAZKUDAY, Assoc. Prof.** | Florida International University, USA

*The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development is published on behalf of the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN) as an academic e-journal. The articles are brought into use via the website of the journal (<https://therestjournal.com/>). CESRAN and the Editors of The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development do not expect that readers of the review will sympathise with all the sentiments they find, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, which appears in The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development.*

*\* The surnames are listed in alphabetical order.*

# the rest: journal of politics and development

*Previously published as Journal of Global Analysis (JGA)*

## INDEXING & ABSTRACTING

- Academic Index
- Bielefeld Academic Search Engine (BASE)
- Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO)
- Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)
- EBSCO Publishing Inc.
- EconLit
- EconPapers
- Genamics JournalSeek
- IDEAS
- Index Islamicus
- Infomine
- International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR)
- International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBZ)
- International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)
- International Relations and Security Network (ISN)
- Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature
- Peace Palace Library
- Research Papers in Economics (RePEc)
- Social Sciences Information Space (SOCIONET)
- Ulrich's Periodicals Directory

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## RESEARCH ARTICLES

- 98** Turkish - Egyptian Relations under Erdoğan in the Light of the Regional Security Complexes Theory  
*By Martin Dudáš*
- 112** European Union's Role in the Maritime Security in Africa  
*By António Gonçalves Alexandre*
- 130** Climate Change: A Global Governance Challenge, Requiring Local Specific Responses - The Challenge of Formulating a Successful Response at The Appropriate Governance Level  
*By Christian Ploberger*
- 144** Adaptation of Law and Policy in an Aged Society: Guardianship Law and People's Behavioural Pattern  
*By Yukio Sakurai*
- 156** Clarifying China's Rise Puzzle: Comparison of the Modernisation and Primacy of Institutions Theories  
*By Ekrem Ok*
- 172** The Evaluation of the UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes or Failures?  
*By Mehmet Sirin Ogurlu & Rahman Dag*
- 187** The Representation of the Iranian Nuclear Program in the American Media  
*By Mikail Ugus & Fatma Dogrusozlu*



International Think-tank [www.cesran.org](http://www.cesran.org)

Consultancy

Research Institute

CESRAN International is headquartered in the UK

CESRAN International is a member of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI)

**CESRAN International** is a think-tank specialising on international relations in general, and global peace, conflict and development related issues and challenges.

The main business objective/function is that we provide expertise at an international level to a wide range of policy making actors such as national governments and international organisations. CESRAN with its provisions of academic and semi-academic publications, journals and a fully-functioning website has already become a focal point of expertise on strategic research and analysis with regards to global security and peace. The Centre is particularly unique in being able to bring together wide variety of expertise from different countries and academic disciplines.

The main activities that CESRAN undertakes are providing consultancy services and advice to public and private enterprises, organising international conferences and publishing academic material.

Some of CESRAN's current publications are:

- THE REST: Journal of Politics and Development (biannual, peer reviewed) [www.therestjournal.com](http://www.therestjournal.com)
- Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (biannual, peer reviewed)
- Political Reflection Magazine (quarterly) [www.politicalreflectionmagazine.com](http://www.politicalreflectionmagazine.com)
- CESRAN Paper Series
- CESRAN Policy Brief
- Turkey Focus Policy Brief

CESRAN International also organises an annual international conference since 2014

**International Conference on Eurasian Politics and Society (IEPAS)**

[www.eurasianpoliticsandsociety.org](http://www.eurasianpoliticsandsociety.org)

- **Ranked among the top 150 International think tanks**

# The Evaluation of the UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes or Failures?

the rest:  
journal of politics and development  
2023 | vol 13(2) | 172-185  
[www.therestjournal.com](http://www.therestjournal.com)

**Mehmet Sirin Ogurlu & Rahman Dag**

*ogurlu538@gmail.com & rahman.dag@beun.edu.tr*

## KEYWORDS

The United Nations,  
Peacekeeping  
Operations,  
Conflict,  
Case Studies,  
Success Criteria

*Received March 6, 2023*

*Revised May 23, 2023*

*Accepted June 21, 2023*

## ABSTRACT

*The United Nations Peacekeeping Forces are the forces tasked in order to end conflicts or impede potential conflicts from emerging. Forces' main aims are among with variety to their relationship with the conflict, fundamentally can be regarded as ending the conflict and protecting the civilians. Troops deployed to conflict zones may change unsteadiness at success and failure related to the operation's mandate and capacity. In this context, UN PKOs can be regarded as success or failure criteria discussed in the literature. Criteria as a result of evidence gathered in the aftermath of the check of the literature will be determined and applied to cases overall. Eleven criteria obtained from the literature review will be analysed in conjunction with 10 cases wherein the UN PKOs are conducted. As a consequence of this analysis, cases will be assessed as success and failure.*

## Introduction

Approximately half a billion people live in violence and are under threat in 50 conflict zones worldwide. In most of these places, there are blue-beret UN peacekeepers, not the region's official or state-affiliated security forces (Autessere, 2019: 101). Since its establishment in 1945, the UN peacekeeping forces can be described as the most effective and most used intervention instrument of the UN in terms of going from a conflict to a peace process. The UN convention states that all necessary measures will be taken for peacekeeping operations to preserve the peace. As noted in paragraph 1, the primary purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security.

Following paragraph 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, member states state that they must have all disputes by peaceful approach. The UN Security Council is primarily responsible for resolving global peace and security problems. With this respect, the Security Council, as a critical factor in the international order, has the capacity and authority to impose sanctions, call for peaceful initiatives, implement other coercive measures and use force to maintain peace by compelling if necessary (Alvarez-Espeda et al., 2022: 2).

The Security Council comprises 15 countries (Arvidsson, 2023: 4). It is determined by the authorisation of five permanent members and the other ten members by the General Council/Assembly for two years. The five permanent countries are the USA, Russia, Great Britain, China, and France. These permanent countries have veto power on any regulation or template. In this study, it can be stated that the five permanent countries are more substantial than all the other member states of the UN (Arvidsson, 2023: 4).

The Security Council is the institution which is responsible for establishing peace and peace operations. The responsibility is given from so stated in Article 24 of the founding treaty of the UN. It determines its duties and responsibilities in the form of 5 permanent and ten temporary members, changing over two years. The Security Council is the foremost advocate of the launch of peacekeeping operations both politically and financially. On the other hand, for peacekeeping operations to take place, the approval of both all five permanent members and at least four of the ten temporary members must be received.

### **Success Criteria of Peacekeeping Operations**

Peacekeeping operations are considered successful as some reach peace, while others are considered unsuccessful, connected to the UN's failure to achieve a conclusion in the conflict (Arvidsson, 2023: 2). What does success mean in peacekeeping operations? A situation where there are no hostilities, where civilians do not suffer? Did the peacekeepers achieve their mission by observing the elections and succeeding, or did they fail because they did not prevent human and civilian losses in the regions where they were deployed through operations (Pushkina, 2020: 261)? All these questions can be directed to UN peacekeeping operations, both in terms of objectives and consequences.

From this perspective, it can be stated that fundamental factors such as approval, impartiality and non-use of force are necessary for PKOs to make operations efficient and achieve the objectives. The results of peacekeeping operations can be considered failures in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia. The ongoing Darfur conflict may also be expressed as a failure to achieve the main objectives.

### **Criteria with Respect to Success and Failure**

#### ***Neighbourhood-Affinity***

With respect to success criteria, the first criterion may be presented as the connection between units to be deployed to the conflict zones and states in the conflicts. The main reason this may be considered a factor is the probability of the warring parties acknowledging the peacekeeping units as a threat. Therefore, this is a less threat than the units composed of non-regional states. But it is crucial not to have troops from states involved in the conflict. On the contrary, the peacekeeping forces of the warring parties may not find the PKOs peace-oriented and reliable operations (Heldt, 2002: 117) because the warring parties will be able to see troops in the peacekeeping force as a friend and support it, while the other side will see it as an enemy and act against the peacekeeping operations.

It can be stated that the operations should be carried out with the approval of the warring parties in the conflict zone. As a matter of fact, this approval is essential in terms of not evaluating the use of peacekeeping forces in the operation as a political tool. It can be expressed that this precaution not only ensures the reliability of the operations but also does peacekeepers not to be attacked (Peter, 2015: 355). Even though the UN peacekeeping forces are focused on a single country, the countries in charge of Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and South Sudan may be considered regional conflicts (Peter, 2015: 356).

#### ***Approve, Willingness and Sincerity of Conflicting Parties***

The probability of the peacekeeping operations being successful is stronger with the approval of the warring parties and the presence of a ceasefire agreement between the warring parties in the region (Lijn, 2009: 48). The consent of the warring parties is an important factor because the interventions of the peacekeeping forces, represented by their approval, will not be seen as a threat, unlike without the consent, which will require the use of coercive force or military intervention. It is important for

the parties in the conflict to see the peacekeeping operations as a part of the peace process. On the other hand, it can be stated that the progress in the peace process will be inconclusive in case the UN peacekeepers intend to cause a conflict again aftermath of the withdrawal from the region (Khalfan, 2020: 229).

It can be stated that it is very difficult for the operation to be within the permission, especially in cases where more than one state is involved and more than one military factor is active, which is willing to continue the conflict in conjunction with their interests and purposes, despite the ceasefire agreements (Pushkina, 2020: 264). It is not possible for peacekeeping operations to be successful if the warring parties do not cooperate in the implementation of the mandate of the operation. In this study, it can be said that UN peacekeepers cannot establish peace but may provide the necessary circumstances and conditions for peacebuilding. From this point of view, it can be argued that the will and approval of the warring parties are important factors for peacekeeping operations to be successful (Ndulo, 2011: 799).

### ***Impartiality and Non-Use of Force***

The main advantage of UN peacekeepers can be expressed in the form of impartiality with respect to observation and international assistance presented by the UN. For warring parties not to see the peacekeepers as a party to the conflict, the forces in operation should take military intervention only in cases where and when they are threatened. At this point, the consent of the warring parties is predominantly important (Lijn, 2009: 50). In this study, it can be stated that initiatives are beneficial within the framework of factors such as supporting observation and elections as an externally impartial supporting force and supporting peace (Dorn and Collins, 2020: 99).

The warring party or parties without approval may see the peacekeepers as a threat to them. From this point of view, it can be stated that while it compromises the impartiality of the peacekeepers who will feel obliged to intervene, it may cause a consequence for the unsuccessful conclusion of the operation and the objectives to be achieved. With this respect, the Brahimi report stated that the consent of local forces, impartiality and using force only for self-defence (Lijn, 2009: 50) are the main factors for the success of the operations. On the other hand, it can be stated that if it occurs, it should use force and act against the killings that will take place against the civilians and against the actions or attempts that will take place against the mandate of the operation. However, it can also be stated that this use of force should not be a routine to enable peacekeepers to be seen as a part of war or conflict, which is also one of the most predominant conditions of impartiality.

However, while peacekeeping operations cannot be stated to be impartial, on the contrary, it can be stated that they are biased. Although the DRC may be regarded as an example, it may be regarded in the instances of South Sudan and, most recently, Somalia (Peter, 2015: 359). It can be pointed out that the elements connected as a party in the conflicts are able to show more resistance in political and military terms than the governments may take over (Peter, 2015: 358).

### ***The Cooperation of the Outside Actors***

It can be stated that third-party involvement is an important factor in conflicts. In this respect, instruments such as arms or political support to the warring parties may be presented as decisive examples of the source of the conflict in this respect. It can be stated that the countries of the region may take initiatives or actions in favour of the UN peacekeeping operations for a party in the conflict aimed at their own interests or activities in the area (Diehl, 1988, 500).

The findings of several studies demonstrate the possibilities of success of peacekeeping operations are greater, mainly if they are supported by the permanent members of the Security Council (Lijn,



2009: 51). In particular, the support of the United States is profound in this perspective. The reports of the Independent Investigation of Rwanda and the Secretary General of Srebrenica present the main reasons for the UN's failure in these two conflict zones, which is the international community's unwillingness in terms of politics.

On the other hand, it can be expressed that the conflict should be prevented from going beyond the borders of the country so that the troops could ensure regional security. As a matter of fact, although the conflict in the conflict zone, defined as 'contagion', may spill over to neighbouring or other countries in the region, foreign interventions are also quite possibilities. Regarding this criterion, how many neighbouring countries play a positive or negative role in the conflict can be assessed in terms of whether they interfere in internal affairs through refugees or not (Pushkina, 2020: 265). Peace may be built with the UN peacekeepers, and the conflict may be concluded by observing the elections. In cases where the UN is not involved, short or medium-term negotiations, treaties, or planning for elections may pose a threat to be left in the hands of war barons or dictators or to the intervention of outside actors in the region (Dorn and Collins, 2020: 100).

### ***Security Concerns of the Warring Sides***

This article is significant for the disarmament and demobilisation of the warring parties. The main reason for this is that the warring parties demonstrate more will and willing behaviour in terms of disarmament and demobilisation when their own security concerns are met. Warring parties without security concerns can depend on the impartiality and fairness of the third party.

It can be stated that when the UN peacekeepers are presented in the conflict in such a representation, it can help to increase the authority of the state or to destroy the enemy combatants, besides they have an impact on the conflict and political dimensions at certain times (Peter, 2015: 364). by preventing such a situation during duty, alternative resources can be offered to the warring parties at the point of security (Lijn, 2009: 53). Warring parties, who have no hesitation or concern in terms of security, can take an approach that external intervention is impartial, sustainable, and dependable.

The fact that the troops have the necessary capacity and resources for the implementation of the ceasefire and are exceptionally authorised and educated in terms of necessary and sufficient training can also be considered as a factor that reduces warring parties' concerns about security concerns (Khalfan, 2020: 229).

### ***Clear and Implementable Road Map***

In the UN peacekeeping mandates, it can be stated that in addition to its duties in the context of security, protection of civilians, and implementation of ceasefire agreements, they can also be tasked with tasks such as organising elections in respect of peacebuilding, gender equality and promoting human rights. (Blair et al., 2021: 665). The items and objectives specified in the mandate are greatly important for the success of the conflict in general. Because the UN peacekeepers fail to achieve the goals of their duties due to the lack of resources and capacity required regarding military power (Dorn and Collins, 2020: 101), the Brahimi report also states that a clear, reliable, and implementable mandate is vital (Lijn, 2009: 54).

The most crucial point regarding the mandate is that there is a definite situation and order in which condition the troops will take action during the conflict or whatnot. In the case of an unclear mandate, the troops may not intervene effectively or find themselves on one side of the conflict or one of the warring parties. This may damage the impartiality of the operation, and it can be stated that it may even lead to the withdrawal of the troops. From this point of view, it can be stated that

the UN peacekeeping forces need more resources and a clear mandate within it (Dorn and Collins, 2020: 102).

### ***The Deployment of Troops on Time and in Place***

In conflict zones or situations, the process attracts the attention of outside actors and international actors or institutions only when the process evolves into a crisis or conflict. However, it can be stated that the peacekeeping operations that will be deployed when the process gets into conflict are less likely to be successful compared to situations where they are placed before by the time situation evolves into a crisis (Lijn, 2009: 55).

On the other hand, according to Doyle and Sambanis, the longer the duration of the conflict, the higher the probability that the United Nations' intervention will be successful (cited in Lijn, 2009: 56). The main reasons for this are that the warring parties are tired of the war, the conflict tires the parties, and the warring parties approve a third-party intervention for a ceasefire or peace. However, it is important that the timing is effective and that the conditions that will end the conflict are in the form of consent and implementation by the warring parties. On the other hand, the damage of these situations that will end the conflict must be less than the impact that the parties will be taken if the conflict continues. It can be stated that if UN peacekeeping operations are placed with the right timing, it can help to adjust to the process and to end the conflict or maintain peace (Khalfan, 2020: 230).

### ***The Competence of Duty Lengthiness-Duration***

It is difficult to put everything into place immediately after the war. Therefore, it can be stated that a reasonably comprehensive and structured development is deadly necessary as a challenging effort and process to put goals into action, such as primarily rehabilitating human and infrastructure services, on the other hand, retraining the judicial authorities and security forces, re-implementing the law, re-structure and applying the rules in a short time. Although these are very important, they may not be demonstrated to include the basis of the problem (Blair, 2019: 368).

During the mandate of the peacekeepers, they carry out their duties under three main features to realise the matters mentioned in the previous segment. These include patrols, public works, and concluding ongoing or suspended negotiations. Although these are not important at a quick glance, they can be expressed collectively as an important factor in the positive completion of the process and the achievement of the objectives of the peacekeeping forces (Blair, 2019: 370). Patrols are important for the government to retake and reassure the government, especially in terms of the citizens. In addition, it can be stated that it allows civilians to interact with state security forces and civilian employees in a controlled and observed environment (Blair, 2019: 370).

In general, it can be stated that the timely placement of troops is an important factor in putting an end to the main causes of physical violence and conflict. On the other hand, it is important for the soldiers to stay in the operation area for a good duration to ensure long-standing peace (Khalfan, 2020: 230).

### ***Domestic and Broad Coordination***

Another important criterion for the success or failure of peacekeeping operations is the cooperation with domestic and outside actors regarding the operation's missions and objectives. As stated in the Brahimi report, a UN peacekeeping operation with domestic and broad coordination has a higher probability and chance than an operation without it. Collaboration with external actors during the

United Nations operation period can be cited as an example when it is in cooperation and coordination within the World Bank or International Monetary Fund institutions.

### **Ownership**

Although the meaning of ownership is not completely clear, it can generally be considered as the ownership of the conflict by the peacekeepers (Lijn, 2009: 57). It can be stated that the UN's initiatives and actions to protect civilians, interact with the indigenous of the country and get local approvals (Dorn and Collins, 2020: 102).

Especially if the local people in the conflict area acknowledge the peacekeepers as a party to the conflict or have the purpose of giving direction, consequently they may take an opposite position. Therefore, it can be an impedance to obtaining the desired results, especially in terms of ending the conflict with peacekeeping operations and establishing peace in the aftermath process, in a way in which the procedure is being consented to and supported. In this perspective, it can be stated that peacekeepers should embrace the conflict, especially in terms of being contested from the perspective of the people in the conflict zone and achieving the objectives of the operations, and that they should not be a party to the conflict or tend to any side.

### **The Protection of Civilians**

Reducing human suffering and tragic situations may be defined as another goal of peacekeeping operations. The UN must prevent the human population from suffering. It can be stated that the most essential instrument to achieve this is peacekeeping operations. In the context of this criterion, it can be assessed as the decrease, increase or violation of the extent of human rights and the extent of the number and capacity of the refugee factor (Pushkina, 2020: 265). The amount of power being distributed between ethnic groups is effective in the success of UN peacekeepers in protecting civilians (Salvatore, 2020: 1108).

After assessing the literature from the basic point of view, it can be expressed that the assessment of peace operations as success or failure will be valid regarding the determined criteria. Although it can be said that these criteria have a common point in some points, it can be stated that they have been determined by different authors and institutions from different perspectives and are fundamentally different from each other. For example, the inclusiveness and appropriate application of the mandate can be considered common criteria. On the other hand, many authors choose to reduce the severity of conflict and support conflict resolution as a criterion (Garb, 2014: 53).

In the continuation of the study, the conflicts of the case studies and the main features of these conflicts will be tried to be explained to determine which criteria are successfully or unsuccessfully fulfilled in which case.

### **Evaluation of Success Criteria to the Cases**

	Neighbourhood-Affinity	Approval - Willingness and Sincerity of Conflicting Parties	Impartiality and Non-Use of Force	The Coordination of the Outsiders	Security Concerns of the Warring Parties	Clear and Implementable Map	The Deployment of Troops on Time and in Place	The Competence of Duty Lengthiness-Duration	Domestic and Broad Coordination	Ownership	The Protection of Civilians
DRC	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x

South Sudan	-	x	-	✓	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
North Macedonia	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-
Liberia	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	-	✓	✓	x	✓	✓
Darfur	-	✓	-	x	✓	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓
Mozambique	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sierra Leone	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
Bosnia-Herzegovina	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Rwanda	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Somalia	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

As for the Democratic Republic of Congo case to be handled, it appears as an unsuccessful case as a result of the literature review and examining the historical backgrounds of the cases. While there is a positive result for only 1 of the criteria, there is a negative situation for 7 of them.

In terms of neighbourhood affinity, approval-willingness-sincerity of the conflicting parties, impartiality and non-use of force, the DRC does not have certainty in evaluating as success or failure. It has been a completely unsuccessful case in terms of the cooperation criterion of outside actors. The main reason can be stated as the conflict between the USA and France in the region. The USA, which supported the Mobutu Government during the Cold War era, withdrew its support after the end of the Cold War, after the USSR threat disappeared, and supported Kabila in the context of a more democratic government. After this process, Mobutu came into close contact with France, and France saw it as an opportunity to be active in the region. These two states, which have veto power in the UNSC, where the UN peacekeepers are authorised, and are two of the five main founders of the UN, set an unsuccessful example in terms of cooperation between outside actors.

Another criterion is the inadequacy and limited powers of peacekeepers in the context of the protection of civilians, resulting in failures in protecting civilians in Congo. Kisangani in 2002, Ituri in 2003, Bukavu in 2004 and Goma in 2008, (Berdal, 2018: 14) can be cited as examples. Among all these, especially what happened in Ituri can be demonstrated as the biggest problem of UN peacekeepers. In the spring of 2003, civilian casualties, atrocities, and displacement of civilians occurred in the region due to the low resources and inadequate equipment of the peacekeepers. On the other hand, the DRC is an unsuccessful case in the context of the criterion of the security concerns of the warring parties. In particular, the change in support between Mobutu and Kabila in terms of the USA and France causes it to be an unsuccessful example in terms of the security concerns of the parties.

With respect to the South Sudan case, success was achieved in 7 of the criteria. In terms of the protection of civilians, the establishment of safe or protection zones ensured the protection of approximately 200,000 civilians and prevented civilian casualties (Alvarez-Espeda et al., 2022: 12). It has been successful in terms of domestic and broad coordination and institutions have been activated in the region with the UN initiatives.

However, it failed in the context of the criterion of approve-willingness and sincerity of the conflicting parties. As a matter of fact, the relationship between UNMISS and the South Sudanese

government has not been within the framework of friendship. As an example, the summit with the declaration of 'persona non grata' by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Jan Pronk, in October 2005 could be given as an example. The main reason for this is Jan Pronk's lack of capacity of the Sudanese Armed Forces in Darfur and the fact that brutal and violent acts committed in the region were represented to the public (Hutton, 2014: 8).

In the case of North Macedonia, success was achieved in 9 of the criteria. No evaluation can be made for the other two criteria. As an example, in the ownership criterion, it can be stated that peace forces provide great aid and contributions in terms of humanitarian efforts. An example is USBAT's sponsorship initiative for local orphanages. UNPREDEP's completion of its mandate in the region can be attributed to adequate human resources. On the other hand, the UN Security Council has established offices and institutions in Macedonia to combat local conflict within the region. Other factors, such as UN police monitors, social integration and unification projects, and economic development projects, can be cited as other elements carried out by the UN in the context of peacekeeping operations in the region (Baer, 2001: 152). The fact that UNPREDEP's mandate is strong and clear, on the other hand, and that it has a strong management network, has been the source of the successful evaluation of the operation (Robin, 2015: 24).

In the case of Liberia, success was achieved in 7 of the criteria. 2 of them failed. For example, it has resulted in success in the context of the competence of duty lengthiness-duration. As a matter of fact, UNMIL, which was initially assigned with a low number of personnel capacities, has both extended its mandate and been authorised in terms of capacity. On the other hand, another criterion for success was ownership. In support of this, it can be stated that the establishment of local police and security organisations and the training of their personnel and the establishment of a national education system in the country are supported.

The UNMIL forces tried to protect the civilians in the region throughout the operation and succeeded in general. Therefore, peacekeeping operations have been successfully completed in Liberia for the protection of civilians. In Liberia, where civil wars took place, UNMIL successfully completed its mission and withdrew from the region in 2016.

In the context of the Darfur case, 6 criteria might be assessed as successful while 3 as failures. In particular, success has been achieved in the protection of civilians, which is one of the most fundamental objectives of UNAMID. However, there was a failure in domestic and broad coordination. As a matter of fact, the neighbours of the Darfur region were affected by the instability in the region. Examples include Chad and Libya. The arms trade from these regions to the conflict zone Darfur again supports this failure. It can be stated that UNAMID has achieved success in terms of the deployment of troops on time and in place criteria. The main reason for this can be demonstrated as the main factor to urgently advance the process in order to protect civilians.

In the Mozambique case, 10 of them were successful in terms of criteria and became a completely successful example. For example, at the point of ownership, most of the conflicting parties in the region were disarmed during the post-conflict period, and at the same time, displaced civilians were resettled in the country after security was ensured in the region. Success has been achieved in the context of the criterion of protection of civilians, and incidents of violence have been reduced since the beginning of the conflict. In the context of the competence of duty, lengthiness-duration success has been another criterion. In order to support this, it can be stated that the troops should be kept in a way that will reduce the conflict during the conflict. At the same time, as a continuation of this, the resettlement of civilians forced to migrate to the region can be given as an example.

Sierra Leone has been the most successful case in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. Success was achieved in 8 of the criteria, and failure occurred in one of them. It can be considered a

completely successful example, especially in terms of protecting civilians and thus preventing civilian casualties (Salvatore, 2020: 1105). It can be stated that the British soldiers' security in the Freetown region was a positive step for the Sierra Leone army. From this point of view, it has been a successful case in the context of the coordination of outsiders. On the other hand, it can be said that the United States Special Union consisting of Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal military personnel is also a very helpful factor for UNAMSIL (Çiftçi, 2019: 27).

On the other hand, it can be stated that the civil war in Liberia also affected the civil war in Sierra Leone. In particular, Liberia, which is in a relationship due to being a neighbour, used the war fugitives in its own country or the deported Sierra Leone citizens as a tool during the civil war, causing further complexity for the war. From this point of view, Liberia's influence showed itself in conflict as a failure in the context of another criterion since the initiatives and support of neighbouring countries for peace and ending the conflict in conflict zones are important. From this point of view, there has been a failure in the context of neighbourhood and affinity criteria.

On the other hand, UNAMSIL was placed in the conflict zone in 1999, equipped with strong and comprehensive powers, especially in the context of the protection of civilians. At the same time, it can be stated that the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping operations is the first operation to be determined and authorised as the main objective. As a matter of fact, even after the UN forces settled in the Sierra Leone region, the population was exposed to serious large-scale acts of violence (Salvatore, 2020: 1105). In this context, success has been achieved in terms of the protection of civilians.

In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda and Somalia, UN peacekeeping operations concluded in utter failure. As a matter of fact, failure was achieved in all criteria determined as success criteria in the study. In three cases, especially in the context of the criterion of protection of civilians, peacekeepers failed to take necessary action to protect civilians and witnessed the mass extermination of civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda. One of the main reasons for this is that the troops deployed in conflict zones do not have a clear and implementable mandate. Forces without clear and implementable mandates could not take action at the time of criminal acts against civilians and could not even provide their own security, as has happened in the case of Rwanda and Somalia.

Only two conflicts have been recognised as genocide by the UN in the period after the Second World War. Two of these are the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, which are discussed in the context of the case study in our study. From this point of view, it is a complete failure that the UN peacekeepers were not able to prevent these genocides, even though they had peacekeepers in the conflict zones before the genocides took place.

On the other hand, in the case of Somalia, the criterion for the approval of the warring parties in the context of the criterion resulted in a complete failure. The main reason for this is the operations conducted against General Mohammed Aidid, which is a clear violation of the criteria of impartiality and non-use of force in the conflict zone of the UN peacekeepers and the USA. From this point of view, the failure of one criterion prepares the ground for the failure of another criterion. Therefore, the United Nations had to withdraw its forces from the Somali conflict, and the operation concluded unsuccessfully.

In general, for the successful conclusion of the operations, the most basic criteria are that the UN peacekeepers have a clear and implementable mandate and the capacity and ability to protect civilians.

## Conclusion

Although there are many definitions in the literature of the success and failure criteria of peacekeeping operations, it cannot be said that there is a single and comprehensive description. However, in general, two basic criteria can be mentioned in terms of the main objectives of peacekeeping operations. The first of these can be stated as ending the conflict, which is determined as the goal in almost all conflicts. The second criterion can be the protection of civilian citizens from conflicts that have nothing to do with the conflicts in general. With this respect, peacekeeping operations may be described as giving an end to the conflict and protecting civilians.

Throughout the study, success and failure criteria were tried to be discussed in the context of studies in the literature. From this point of view, sample conflicts were determined, and the main reasons and conclusions of the conflicts were tried to be emphasised. In terms of the basic criteria discussed, the cases were assessed at the end of the study.

The peacekeeping operations in Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which are considered a success from the general perspective, achieved success, especially in the protection of civilians, and the conflict was prevented in the Macedonian example. In contrast, in the DRC, it prevented the conflict from intensifying. It can be demonstrated fundamental criterion in increasing the success ratio of the operations is the deployment of the peacekeeping forces, which occurred as clearly as it was in the Macedonian case, especially before the conflict situation arose extremely unlike in Somalia, Rwanda or South Sudan, which remains as a question.

In the context of failure criteria, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina can be expressed as clear failure cases. The inefficiency of UNAMIR in Rwanda, in terms of capacity, authority and equipment, forced the UN to withdraw its troops from being helpless while the genocide took place. The lack of interest of the international community in Rwanda prevents the UN from taking active action here.

Yet another unsuccessful case, although located in Europe, Bosnia-Herzegovina, could not prevent the planned and targeted genocide of approximately 8,000 Muslims. Even though this conclusion is at the centre of attention or interest of the international public, it proves that both the UN and other global institutions, organisations or forces remain unresponsive or inattentive fair enough.

In the general framework, it can be stated that the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations must be mandated in terms of capability and capacity. The UN should also reveal a conflict-approached character. Because in the cases where the UN was considered unsuccessful in the study, the UN remained fair enough ineffective.

It is an obvious fact that the UN will demonstrate in time whether the faults and mistakes of the UN caused tremendously failed operations in the history of an organisation. On the other hand, whether new peacekeeping operations will be deployed in future, if necessary, conflicts will be authorised differently from missions that have been unsuccessful in the past will be a matter for the United Nations to decide as an organisation.

United Nations peacekeeping operations were assessed in the study in the context of a case study. As a result of the evaluation, the operations in North Macedonia and Mozambique were concluded as a complete success. On the other hand, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Somalia were considered complete failure cases. These evaluations were made in the context of the eleven criteria determined in the study. These criteria applied to the cases enabled them to be included in the case analysis successfully or unsuccessfully.

## References

- Ackermann A (1997) The Republic of Macedonia and OSCE, OSCE Yearbook. Baden-Baden-1998: 69-75.
- Ali AA (2020) Why Peacekeeping Operations in Somalia Fails. *Adalya Journal* 9(3): 1388-1396.
- Arvidsson M (2023) UN-A Guarantee for Good Peacekeeping? A Comparative Study on the UN's Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone and South Sudan. Master Thesis, 1-56.
- Autesserre S (2017) International Peacebuilding and Local Success: Assumptions and Effectiveness. *International Studies Review*. 19(1): 114-132.
- Autesserre S (2019) The Crisis of Peacekeeping: Why the UN Can't End Wars. *Foreign Affairs* (98): 101-116.
- Baer R (2001) Review of (Williams, A., Preventing War: The United Nations and Macedonia). *Journal of Conflict Studies*. 21(2): 151-152.
- Bayo AO (2012) The Factors Behind Successes and Failures of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions: A Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo. *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Science*. 3(4): 914-932.
- Berdal M (2008) The State of UN Peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo. *Journal of Strategic Studies*. 41(5): 721-750.
- Bilgin KR (2018) Conceptual and Theoretical Perspective on Peace Operations. *Journal of Baskent University Faculty of Commercial Sciences*. 2(2): 21-36.
- Bjarnessen M (2023) Hybrid Security Governance in Liberia Aftermath of UN Intervention, *Conflict, Security and Government*. 23(1): 1-22.
- Blair AR (2019) International Intervention and Rule of Law After Civil War: Evidence from Liberia. *International Organization*. 73(2): 365-398.
- Blair AR, Salvatore DJ and Smidth MH (2021) When Do UN Peacekeeping Operations Implement Their Mandates. *American Journal of Political Science*. 66(3): 664-680.
- Ciftci D (2019) Sierra Leone: Critical Discussion on the Conflict Resolution and United Nations Mission. *Conflict Studies Quarterly*. 26(2): 22-31.
- Denis T (2016) United Nations Peacekeeping and Use of Force: The Intervention Brigade in Congo is no Model for Success. *SWP Comments*. NO.20/2016.
- Diehl FP (1988) Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace. *Political Science Quarterly*. 103(3): 485-507.
- Dorn WA, Collins R (2020) Peacekeeping Works: The UN Can Help End Civil Wars. *International Journal*. 75(1): 95-103.
- Espeda-Alvarez MJ (2022) Approach and Success in the Management of Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs): Implementation to Two Cases Studies, the UNMISS and MONUSCO Mission of the UN. *Sustainability*. 14(10): 1-15.



- Eyanae AB (2022) Assessing the Performance of United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa: The Case of UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), Master Thesis, 1-68.
- Forrti D (2019) Navigating Crisis and Opportunity: The Peacekeeping Transition in Darfur. International Peace Institute. 1-33.
- Gady M B (2021) UNAMIR and Protection of Civilian in Rwanda in 1994: Scope and Limits, Undergraduate Thesis, 1-81.
- Garb M (2014) Evaluating the Success of Peace Operations. South African Journal of Military Studies. 42(1): 44-63.
- Grono N (2005) Briefing-Darfur: The International Community's Failure to Protect. African Affairs. 105(421): 621-631.
- Guerrero G, Rhodes S (2021) Human Rights and Protection of Civilians in UN Peace Operations. Revista Política y Estrategia. 140: 144-167.
- Hultmann L, Kathman J and Shannon M (2014) Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting. American Political Science Review. 108(4): 737-753.
- Hutton L (2014) Prolonging the Agony of UNMISS: The Implementation Challenges of a New Mandate During a Civil War, CRU Report, Netherland Institute of International Relations, 1-27.
- Ishaque W (2021) Evolving Trends in Peacekeeping: United Nations-African Union Hybrid Peacekeeping Operations (UNAMID) in Darfur. NUST Journal of International Peace and Stability. 4(1): 14-25.
- Jibril A (2010) Past and Future of UNAMID: Tragic Failure or Glorious Success? Human Rights and Advocacy Network for Democracy, 4-29
- Khalfan O (2020) International Peacekeeping and Stabilization Cases: Liberia, Mozambique, And Rwanda. International Journal of Education Humanities and Social Science. 3(4): 224-237.
- Kivil S (2021) The Role of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Resolution of International Conflicts: UNFICYP, UNIIMOG, UNSMIS Examples, Bursa Uludağ University Institute of Social Sciences, Master Thesis.
- Lahdili N (2016) Darfur Conflict: The Role of International Intervention in the Conflict Resolution. Conference Paper: 1-18.
- Lijn DVJ (2009) If Only There Were a Blueprint! Factors for Success and Failure of UN Peacebuilding Operations. Journal of International Peacekeeping. 13(1-2): 45-71.
- Mason E (2020) Failure to Protect? Applying the DDRI-2 Scales to Rwanda and Srebrenica, Genocide Studies and Prevention. An International Journal. 14(3): 27-47.
- Montenegro H (2017) United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Contribution of the People's Republic of China to International Peace and Security. Journal of East Asian Studies. 1(1): 55-74.

- Mpanza ES and Mlambo HV (2019) UN Peacekeeping in Africa, a Conundrum or Opportunity: A Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic. *African Renaissance*. 16(4): 9-32.
- Müller RT (2020) Protection of Civilians Mandates and 'Collateral Damage' of UN Peacekeeping Missions: Histories of Refugees from Darfur. *International Peacekeeping*. 27(5): 760-784.
- Ndulo M (2011) United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Security and Reconstruction, *Akron Law Review*, 44(3), 770-806.
- Olcay, R and Bayram, M (2020) A Comparative Assessment UNMIL-Liberia and UNOSOM II-Somalia Peacekeeping Operations. *The Journal of Diplomatic Research*. 2(2): 10-24.
- Ozcelik S (2006) The Theory and Practice of Preventive Diplomacy: The Case of Preventive Deployment in Macedonia. *International Relations*. 3(11): 103-128.
- Peter, M (2015) Between Doctrine and Practice: The UN Peacekeeping Dilemma. *Global Governance*. 21(3): 351-370.
- Pushkina B D (2020) Successes and Failures of United Nations Peace Operations. *Vestnik of Saint Petersburg University*. 65(1): 261-277.
- Pushkina D, Siewert B and Wolff S (2022) Mission (Im)possible? UN Military Peacekeeping Operations in Civil Wars. *European Journal of International Relations*. 28(1): 158-186.
- Rivaldi FM, Madjid AM and Legowo E (2021) Peace Efforts in Conflict: Case Analysis of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Conflict. *International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology*. 6(11): 708-713.
- Robin N (2015) Lessons Learned From UNPREDEP: Preventive Peacebuilding in Macedonia. *Paterson Review of International Affairs*. 15(2): 20-29.
- Salvatore D J (2020) Obstacle to Peace? Ethnic Geography and Effectiveness of Peacekeeping. *British Journal of Political Science*. 50(3): 1089-1109.
- Sarjoon A and Yusoff AM (2019) The United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Challenges. *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies*. 8(3): 202-211.
- Saylan A (2021) A Civil War Leading to Genocide: Rwanda. *Journal of Kırşehir Ahi Evran University Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences*. 5(1): 29-48.
- Sebastián S and Gor A (2018) UN Peacekeeping and Host-state Consent: How Missions Navigate Relationships with Governments, *Stimson Center*.
- Steinert IJ and Grimm S (2015) Too Good to Be True? United Nations Peacekeeping and Democratization of War-Thorn States. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. 32(5): 513-535.
- Szasz CP (1995) Peacekeeping in Operation: A Conflict Study of Bosnia, *Cornell International Law Journal*, 28(3), 684-699.
- Törnberg, J (2021) Peace in Liberia? A Status Quo Evaluation of United Nations Peacekeeping Five Years Later, Undergraduate Thesis.

Varady T (1995) The Predicament of Peacekeeping in Bosnia. *Cornell International Law Journal*. 28(3): 700-708.

Williams DP (2020) The Council's Peacekeeping Trilemma. *International Affairs*. 96(2): 479-499.



[www.cesran.org](http://www.cesran.org)

Tower Court, Oakdale Road, York YO30 4XL, UK