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# Turkish - Egyptian Relations under Erdoğan in the Light of the Regional Security Complexes Theory

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## ABSTRACT

AKP's rise to power in Turkey brought economic development and the re-examination of the country's self-perception. Erdoğan's foreign policy aimed to develop relations with Middle Eastern countries so that Turkey could become the region's leader. This article focuses on Turkey's relations with Egypt within the Regional Security Complexes Theory framework. It argues that the rise of Turkey's influence and power led to new alignments between the region's countries. Following the coup led by General el-Sisi, Egypt became hostile to Ankara and sought allies to help it counterbalance Turkey. Thus, it began cooperating with Greece and Cyprus, states that do not belong to the Middle Eastern RSC. This new alignment then slowed down the process of normalisation of ties between Cairo and Ankara, which became possible only after both countries experienced economic problems, and the regional climate changed after the blockade of Qatar ended.

## Introduction

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Turkey's domestic and foreign policy has undergone significant changes due to social, political and economic transformation brought about by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) that came to power in 2002. Turkey's activism in the Levant and broader Middle Eastern region brought it to a collision course with the interests of Egypt, the most populous Arab country. Following a promising development during the presidency of Mohamed Morsi, the relations between Turkey and Egypt broke down in 2013 after a coup led by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. In 2021, meetings were held between the two countries' Foreign Ministries officials, but there was little progress in the process of normalisation of relations. During the 2022 World Cup opening ceremony in Qatar, el-Sisi and Erdoğan met and shook hands (Ertan, 2022). Still, only after seven additional months were the diplomatic ties thoroughly restored. Both Turkey and Egypt currently suffer from economic problems (Financial Times, 2023), and a complete restoration of friendly relations would facilitate bilateral trade and economic cooperation to the benefit of both Cairo and Ankara. So why does the rapprochement process between Turkey and Egypt takes so long? Aside from conflicting interests in the Eastern Mediterranean region and perhaps personal animosity between Erdoğan and el-Sisi, what else complicates the normalisation process? To answer this question, we will turn to the Regional Security Complexes Theory (RSCT), whose authors had some relevant ideas about Turkey's potential role in the Middle Eastern (and, by extension, the Eastern Mediterranean) region under certain conditions.

## Theoretical Framework

The RSCT presumes that since most threats travel more easily over short distances, security interdependence is usually patterned into regionally-based clusters: security complexes. It means that the processes of securitisation (and the degree of security interdependence) are more intense inside such a regional security complex (RSC) than they are between actors inside the RSC and outside of it (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 4). In other words, they are defined by "*durable patterns of amity and enmity taking the form of sub-global, geographically coherent patterns of security interdependence*" (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 45).

According to the RSCT, the international system is structured around a power spectrum consisting of superpowers, great powers, and regional powers. *Superpowers* have the most far-reaching military, political and economic capabilities. Their actions and policies have a global reach. The United States is currently the only superpower. *Great powers* have neither the global reach nor capabilities of superpowers. Yet, they are treated in the calculations of other major powers as if it has the economic, military, and political potential to become a superpower in the short or medium term. Russia, China, Japan, or the EU can be considered great powers. *Regional powers* have a considerable reach on the regional level but minimal capabilities at the global level. In other words, their power and ambition are limited to the RSC they belong to. Examples of regional powers are India and Brazil (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 34-36).

To classify a great power as an international, its material (military and economic) capabilities are considered, as well as whether it is formally recognised as such by the other leading international actors and how it is incorporated into their strategies and behaviours (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 32). Moreover, great powers think of themselves as more than regional powers and can operate in more than one region (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 35). In other words, we must consider the state's capacities, perceptions of its peers, and self-perception.

The Regional Security Complex Theory categorises Turkey as an insulator: "*a location occupied by one or more units where larger regional security dynamics stand back-to-back*" (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 41). Turkey acts as an insulator between the Middle Eastern, European, and post-Soviet RSCs. Buzan & Waever (2003: 394-395), however, note that Turkey challenges the concept of insulators as passive states that only absorb energies from the surrounding RSCs. Turkey is very active in the neighbouring regions, yet the authors insist that it still is an insulator because it does not bring different RSCs together into one strategic arena. The categorisation of Turkey as an insulator may be questioned if actors from different RSCs began strategically cooperating, and as a result, the boundaries of the complexes would become thin. Such a development would be possible if Turkey became a great power, and thus, it would be analysed as a pole in some RSC, not an insulator between RSCs. However, they believe that Turkey will remain an insulator in the foreseeable future.

This article argues that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Turkey changed its foreign policy doctrine, expanded its power projection capabilities, and became intensely involved in the Middle Eastern region, which led to a dramatic change in the power and security dynamics in it and had a significant impact on Turkey's relations with Egypt. This argument is supported by the analysis of Turkey's relations with Egypt in political, military, and economic sectors of security analysis as defined by the Copenhagen School. Environmental and societal sectors are skipped since there are very few interactions between Turkey and Egypt within them.

## Turkey under Erdoğan

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded modern Turkey as a secular republic, and the Turkish Army, as a guardian of this vision, intervened in Turkish politics when Islamist politicians threatened the secular character of the state. Despite this, political Islam gradually established itself as an essential force in the political system (Eligür, 2010: 76-77), culminating in the electoral victory of Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party in 2002. During its first term, many reforms were adopted – from civil-military relations to minority rights, and the country enjoyed economic growth. Thanks to conventional tools, support from foreign powers and then under a more explicit electoral mandate and populist strategies, AKP took over crucial institutions from the secularist opposition by 2011 (Castaldo, 2018: 478). As Erdoğan intensified the centralisation of power in his hands, the economy experienced a downturn due to the world financial crisis. Public discontent manifested in the May 2013 Gezi Park protests that were violently suppressed. Repression of AKP's opponents intensified: owners of media houses, activists and journalists were intimidated, fired, or imprisoned. After the December 2013 corruption scandal, AKP's alliance with the religious movement of Fethullah Gülen collapsed, and members of the group became targets of persecution. After a Gülenist faction of the Turkish Armed Forces unsuccessfully attempted a coup on July 15 2016, the Turkish government escalated the purge of the military, police, administration, judiciary and education to unprecedented levels (Castaldo, 2018: 479-487).

In April 2017, constitutional amendments were approved in a referendum that changed the Turkish political system to a presidential one. In the snap presidential and parliamentary elections held in June 2018, Erdoğan was elected President for the second term, and AKP maintained the majority in the Parliament thanks to the alliance with the nationalist party MHP (Castaldo, 2018: 481).

### *New foreign policy doctrines*

Following Kemalist secular and pro-Western ideology that was the dominant force in Turkish politics until the 1990s, Turkey developed relations with the West while staying distinct from the Middle Eastern states. In the Kemalist view, Muslim countries represented backwardness and threat to modern, secular and Westernised Turkey (Pehlevan, 2019: 16-17).

AKP's coming to power dramatically changed the understanding and implementation of Turkish foreign policy. One of the prominent architects of this transformation is Ahmet Davutoğlu, who served as a foreign policy advisor under prime minister Erdoğan between 2002 and 2009 and then as a foreign minister until August 2014 (Arkan and Kınacıoğlu, 2016). Turkey became eager to play a significant role in the mediation of conflicts and contribute to peace and stability in its near abroad as a part of the "zero problems with neighbours" principle (Tüfekçi, 2017: 77). In his book *Strategic Depth*, Davutoğlu points to the legacies and continuities cognitively present in the fabric of Turkish society, as well as the societies of neighbouring communities. He believes that Turkish society needs a multi-dimensional transformation to equip it with profound knowledge and awareness of history. Turkey must remember, re-interpret, and re-imagine its history and geography to see the strategic depth and be able to shape the future of its civilisation and fulfil its responsibility towards the former elements of its civilisation. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey is geographically located in the centre of various geopolitical areas of influence and historically at the epicentre of historical events. The idea of having impact and responsibility for the surrounding regions lies in Turkey's historical depth, while the geographical depth is based on the geographical continuity of links between various cities within and in the proximity of present-day Turkey that were artificially severed by the modern state borders. Discovering Turkey's historical and geographical depth changes the perception of its position in the international system – it is no longer a wing country or a bridge between the East and the West, but a central country that enjoys a broad area of influence and has the capability to simultaneously manoeuvre in several regions (Tüfekçi, 2017: 87-90). The "Strategic Depth" is

conceptualised through four principles: a safe neighbourhood based on a shared understanding of security; pro-active, high-level political dialogue with all neighbours; fostering regional economic interdependence; and promoting multi-cultural, multi-sectarian peace and harmony. In practice, this meant increasing international humanitarian assistance by Turkey; intensifying public diplomacy by governmental institutions such as Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), The Turkish Red Crescent (*Kızılay*), or Disaster and *Emergency Management Authority (AFAD)*; and opening new embassies and increasing diplomatic representation abroad. The ultimate goal of this proactive foreign policy was to transform Turkey from a peripheral actor in world politics into a central one (Tüfekçi, 2017: 148-153).

Apart from Davutoğlu's doctrine, expansionist visions of Turkey's foreign policy grew in importance in the later years of the AKP rule. Adnan Tanrıverdi, a former Brigadier-General expelled from the Turkish Army for being an Islamist and founder of a private military company SADAT, promoted a pan-Islamist, anti-Israel and anti-Western foreign policy ideas from the position of President Erdoğan's chief military advisor he obtained after the July 2016 coup attempt. He called for military cooperation between Muslim states, as well as the formation of a union of Islamic countries with a constitution based on Shariah law (Middle East Media Research Institute, 2020).

The second doctrine, *Mavi Vatan* ("Blue Homeland"), was formulated by former rear admiral Ramazan Cem Gürdeniz and promoted by the former navy's chief of staff, Cihat Yayci. It claims that Turkey's maritime jurisdiction in the Black, Mediterranean and Aegean seas should be much larger than it is now. In recent years, Erdoğan's government has adopted this doctrine to justify its claims on the natural gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean at the expense of Greece and Cyprus. Although both Gürdeniz and Yayci are currently retired, Turkey's policy in the Eastern Mediterranean is shaped by the *Mavi Vatan* vision (Gingeras, 2020).

## Overview of Turkey's Relations with Egypt

### *Political Sector*

Initially, Turkey's relations with Egypt gradually developed after AKP came to power. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak visited Turkey in 2007 and 2009, and the two countries cooperated in the fields of energy and security (Middle East Monitor, 2014).

The Arab Spring represents a milestone in Turco-Egyptian relations. After the mass demonstrations began in January 2011, Erdoğan called for Mubarak to step down. Egyptian opposition was led by the Muslim Brotherhood, and Turkey hoped that should it oust Mubarak; Egypt would become Turkey's ally and help it spread its influence into more remote parts of the Middle East. Although Turkish-Egyptian relations were improving under Mubarak, it was not fast enough and therefore, Turkey opted to support the regime change (Stein, 2015: 38-40).

At first, it seemed that the Turkish strategy worked. Mubarak resigned on February 11 2011, and Turkish foreign minister Gül, the first foreign leader, visited Egypt after Mubarak's fall. In September, Erdoğan visited Egypt and was greeted by cheering (Stein, 2015: 40-41). In the parliamentary elections, the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) emerged victorious, and its leader, Mohammed Morsi, was elected President in June 2012. But large segments of the Egyptian public rejected the Brotherhood's ideology, as well as Turkish meddling in the country's internal affairs. Soon, demonstrations against Morsi erupted, and on July 03 2013, a coup led by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi overthrew Morsi. The new regime brutally suppressed protests organised by the Brotherhood, and many of its members fled to Turkey. Following the coup, Turkish-Egyptian relations nosedived, and the two countries began competing for regional influence (Stein, 2015: 41-47).



Another flashpoint of Turco-Egyptian relations is Libya, where the two countries supported the opposing sides of the conflict. Turkey backed the Government of National Accord (GNA) mainly because after the 2015 electoral defeat, Erdoğan allied himself with ultranationalist groups that wanted to pursue aggressive foreign policy in the region. In the Eastern Mediterranean, this is embodied by the *Mavi Vatan* doctrine that envisages Turkey's jurisdiction over large areas in the Eastern Mediterranean. In November 2019, Turkey signed a Memorandum on the delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean with the GNA that legitimises Turkey's claims. This would allow Turkey to exploit the Eastern Mediterranean's hydrocarbon resources and cut the EastMed pipeline's planned route.

Moreover, Turkey has commercial interests in Libya, ambitions in Africa and ties with Muslim Brotherhood, participates in GNA and controls several militias (Harchaoui, 2020). Egypt backed the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) and its Libyan National Army (LNA) because it wanted to protect its borders from smuggling, human trafficking and the flow of jihadists; it considers the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist militias in Libya to be terrorist organisations; wishes to restore the mutual trade and oil import from Libya that plummeted sharply after Qadhafi's downfall (Westenberger, 2019). Egypt became increasingly worried about Turkey's growing involvement in Libya but ultimately did not pursue military action. Instead, it chose to develop ties with Libyan tribes and militias affiliated with LNA (Horton, 2020).

In January 2021, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt ended the de facto blockade of Qatar that has been in place since June 2017 due to its support to the Muslim Brotherhood, ties with Iran, and propaganda activities of the state-owned AlJazeera media network. At this point, the Brotherhood lost a considerable portion of its influence in the region and was no longer viewed as a threat by the other Arab states (Stratfor, 2021). This allowed the gradual normalisation of relations between Cairo and Ankara. In May and September 2021, two rounds of negotiations were held (Reuters, 2021); Turkey offered to mediate the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (Tok, 2021), and Turkish authorities requested Egyptian opposition media based in the country to soften their criticism of the Sisi regime (Soylu, 2021). In May 2022, Turkey's then-Finance Minister Nebati visited Egypt to attend a meeting of the Islamic Development Bank, making it the first ministerial-level visit of the country since 2013 (Daily Sabah, 2022). In November 2022, Turkish President Erdoğan met with Sisi on the sidelines of the football World Cup opening ceremony in Qatar (AlJazeera, 2022). This process of rapprochement was facilitated by the general climate of warming ties in the Middle Eastern region – not only did the blockade of Qatar end, but Turkey was able to normalise relations with the United Arab Emirates and mend ties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt's allies, and financial backers (Baycar, 2022; AlJazeera, 2022). The devastating February 2023 earthquake that hit Turkey and Syria led to a wave of solidarity – Turkey's former opponents, including Egypt, rushed to provide material and financial aid and rescue personnel. At the end of February, Egyptian Foreign Minister Shoukri visited Turkey, and a month later, its Turkish counterpart paid a visit to Cairo (Maher, 2023). Sisi congratulated Erdoğan after his victory in the May 2023 Presidential Elections, and the two leaders agreed on upgrading diplomatic relations and exchanging ambassadors (The Arab Republic of Egypt Presidency, 2023). This took place in early July, and thus the relations between Cairo and Ankara finally continued at the highest diplomatic level (Uras, 2023).

### ***Military Sector***

Turkish-Egyptian relations in the military sector have never been particularly intense, and AKP's rise to power did not change much. In 2009, the first Turkish-Egyptian naval exercise, the *Sea of Friendship*, took place (Bosphorus Naval News, 2009). After Mubarak's regime fell, Turkey and Egypt became closer than ever before, but this did not manifest in the military sector. Joint naval exercises occurred in 2011 and 2012 (Elbakyan, 2016). Morsi's overthrow ended any military

cooperation between Turkey and Egypt, and instead, Egypt became concerned about Turkey's expansion into areas that Egypt considers its zone of influence. In 2017, Turkey and Sudan signed a contract allowing Turkey to build a naval base on Suakin Island in the Red Sea. Egypt has territorial and water disputes with Sudan, so it negatively perceived the Sudanese alignment with Turkey (Karasik and Cafiero, 2018). The overthrow of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019 put these plans on hold (Gurbuz, 2019).

Egypt and Turkey competed for influence in Libya, where Turkey initially backed the GNA by providing diplomatic support and supplying weapons. On November 27 2019, Turkey and the GNA signed a memorandum on security and military cooperation that committed Turkey to defend the Tripoli government threatened by LNA's offensive (Harchaoui, 2020). Since January 2020, Turkey sent Libya dozens of military advisors and thousands of mercenaries from Syrian rebel groups under Turkey's control and deployed UCAVs. Turkish military support turned the tide in the Libyan Civil War: GNA stopped Haftar's push towards Tripoli, and by the end of March 2020, it launched a counterattack that recaptured the coastline between Tripoli and Tunisian border, as well as the strategic Al-Watiya airbase in May (Ramani, 2020).

Egypt has provided Haftar with political support and weapons but has not intervened directly. For the Egyptians, Haftar's territory serves as a buffer zone between the GNA (and the Muslim Brotherhood) and Egypt. As GNA pushed eastwards, Egypt declared the cities of Sirte and Jufra in central Libya a "red line". On July 20, the Egyptian Parliament approved the deployment of troops in Libya should it be required to protect the country's security, but this did not occur as the ceasefire was declared later in August (Horton, 2020).

Turkey's assertive policy in the Eastern Mediterranean that aims to exploit the large deposits of natural gas has led to military cooperation between Egypt, Greece and Cyprus. Since 2015, the three countries have conducted at least one naval and air force exercise yearly (Shay, 2019).

### ***Economic Sector***

AKP's coming to power intensified economic relations between Turkey and Egypt. In 2005, the two countries signed FTA. The mutual trade blossomed: while in 2005, it accounted only for 301 million USD, in 2013, it reached 5 billion USD (Cagaptay and Sievers, 2015). In March 2012, Turkey and Egypt signed an agreement to establish the "Roll/on – Roll/off" (RO-RO) maritime transportation system. Turkish ships would bring containers to the Egyptian ports on the Mediterranean Sea, and then they would be transported by land to Egyptian ports on the Red Sea. From there, other Turkish ships would carry them to different destinations (Alsahary, 2014).

In September 2012, Mohammed Morsi, the new President of Egypt, visited Turkey and negotiated a 2 billion USD loan to stabilise the currency, develop financial institutions, and encourage the entry of Turkish companies into Egypt and the export of Egyptian goods into Turkey (Elbakyan, 2016). His downfall temporarily had a negative effect on Turco-Egyptian relations in the economic sector as the regime of General Sisi refused to prolong the RO-RO agreement, but FTA remained in place (Adly, 2022). The bilateral trade dropped to 4,1 billion USD in 2016, but then it grew again and reached 7,7 billion USD in 2022 (State Information Service, 2023).

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the energy sector became an increasingly important factor in the relations between Egypt and Turkey due to the discoveries of substantial volumes of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean (Winrow, 2018). In 2003, Egypt and Cyprus signed a treaty delineating the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). According to Turkey, however, the treaty violates its continental shelf. Moreover, Turkey does not recognise Cyprus's sovereignty over the entire island but only over the territory not governed by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In the following years, the

Cypriots began the exploitation of natural gas deposits in the area, while Turkey signed an EEZ agreement with Northern Cyprus in 2011 and began its own exploration of the deposits (Aydin, 2018).

In January 2019, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Cyprus, Greece and Italy established the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) to promote regional cooperation in the energy sector. In January 2020, Greece, Cyprus and Israel signed an agreement to construct the *EastMed* pipeline to connect the EU with natural gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean and bypass Turkey (Stanicek, 2020: 2-3). However, in November 2019, Turkey signed a Memorandum on the delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean with the Libyan GNA, according to which Turkish EEZ would be significantly expanded, thus interrupting the planned pipeline's route. On May 11 2020, foreign ministers of Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt, together with the UAE and France, issued a joint statement condemning the memorandum. During the summer of 2020, Turkey continued drilling activities in the disputed waters off the coast of Cyprus. As a result, Egypt and Greece grew even closer, and in early August 2020, the two countries signed an agreement to demarcate maritime borders that ignored the maritime deal between Turkey and GNA (Stanicek, 2020: 5-6).

Turkey's relations with Greece and Cyprus are historically hostile, and in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the relations with most of the Levantine countries deteriorated rapidly, resulting in its exclusion from regional cooperation initiatives in the energy sector. Ankara, therefore, chose to pursue a unilateral and assertive policy that ultimately led to the formation of two blocs of countries in the Eastern Mediterranean: one consisting of Turkey (and the TRNC), the other comprising Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt.

### **The Emergence of the Greco-Cypriot-Egyptian Bloc in the Eastern Mediterranean**

As Turkey began to pursue more and more assertive policy in the Mediterranean Sea, Egypt found itself in the same boat with two other regional rivals of Turkey: Greece and Cyprus. Since 2014, the three countries' leaders began to meet to discuss various regional issues, such as energy security, natural gas exploitation, maritime borders, illegal migration, terrorism, economic cooperation, and tourism. So far, nine of these trilateral summits have taken place: the first one in November 2014 and the most recent one in October 2021 (Al-Monitor, 2021). On May 11 2020, the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, the United Arab Emirates and France agreed on the formation of an alliance that would focus on confronting Turkey's actions in the Eastern Mediterranean – namely the drilling and exploration operations in disputed waters, violations of Greek air space and intervention in Libya (Mikhail, 2020).

In October 2022, Turkey and the Libyan Tripoli government signed another Memorandum of Understanding, this time on oil and gas exploration in Libya's soil and territorial waters. This prompted condemnation from both Greece and Egypt, whose foreign ministers met to discuss the issue (France24, 2022).

The cooperation between Egypt, Greece and the Republic of Cyprus also expanded the military sector. In 2015, Greek and Cypriot air forces took part in the Egyptian *Horus 2015* exercise, and Egyptian Air Force and Navy participated in the *Medusa 2015* exercise, organised by Greece. In the following years, more Greek-Egyptian joint naval and aerial exercises took place: *Medusa 2016* and *Medusa 2017* (Shay, 2017). Since 2018, Cyprus has joined the military cooperation with the two countries by participating in the series of joint military exercises *Medusa 6*, *Medusa 7* (2018), *Medusa 8*, *Medusa 9* (2019) (Farouk, 2019), *Medusa 10*, *Medusa 11* (2021) and *Medusa 12* (2022)(Liam, 2022). Special forces from Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and other countries also began joint



exercises, *Hercules 2021* and *Hercules 2022* (Obeid, 2022), while Egyptian and Greek air forces conducted joint exercise MENA-II in December 2022 (Mohamed, 2022).

In April 2021, Egypt, Greece and Cyprus signed a trilateral treaty on the military cooperation programme (Al-Monitor, 2021). In June, the Defense Ministers of the three countries met to discuss military cooperation to overcome shared security challenges and threats (Saied, 2022). Despite numerous meetings and joint military exercises, Ankara remained largely undeterred by the collaboration between Greece, Egypt and Cyprus and continues to pursue its interests in Libya and Eastern Mediterranean.

### **The Regional Security Complexes Theory and the "New Turkey"**

The RSCT considers Turkey an insulator between European, Middle Eastern, and Post-Soviet regional security complexes. Its authors, however, noted already in 2003 that Turkey was not a typical, passive insulator like Afghanistan or Mongolia but played an active role in its surroundings. Yet they insist that for Turkey not to be considered an insulator, it would need to bring together actors from different RSCs into one strategic area. Such development would be possible if Turkey became a great power and these actors from different RSCs would cooperate to counterbalance it.

According to Buzan and Waever (2003: 32), to classify a state as a great power, we must assess its capabilities, how it is perceived by other states and how it perceives itself. Turkey is one of the biggest countries in the Middle East; it has the second-largest army in NATO and a strategic geographical position. Therefore, it has always enjoyed a degree of respect from both Western and non-Western countries.

AKP's coming to power in 2002 brought not only changes in foreign and security policies but also substantial economic growth that lasted until 2018, expansion of its defence industry, modernisation of the military, and development of its power projection capabilities (most recently reinforced by the amphibious assault ship and drone carrier TCG Anadolu (Bekdil, 2023)). Thanks to its economic tools, as well as historical, religious, and cultural ties ("soft power"), Turkey was able to gain considerable influence in Arab countries, primarily in the Levant region. Given Turkey's deep involvement in the Syrian Civil War, Russia, the U.S., and other external actors in this conflict were forced to acknowledge its interests. In Libya, Turkey became the main backer of the GNA, and therefore, it has gained a voice in any discussions regarding the country's future. Thanks to its geographical position and military capabilities, Turkey could press claims regarding the hydrocarbon deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean. All of this was possible because, under AKP, Turkey had undergone a process of self-reassessment. The doctrines of *Strategic Depth* and *Blue Homeland*, as well as pan-Islamist ideas adopted under Erdoğan, have a common goal: to reinstate Turkey to its rightful position as a great power.

It may be too soon to designate Turkey as a great power – especially as its economy has been suffering from high inflation and depreciation of currency for more than four years, while the power of the Muslim Brotherhood (one of the main tools of influence in the Middle Eastern region) waned. But on the other hand, Turkey's activism in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean provoked a reaction from actors originating in different regional security complexes, as the authors of RSCT predicted in case Turkey becomes a great power. While they stated cooperation between Syria, Greece and Russia as an example (Buzan and Weaver, 2003: 395), in reality, it was Egypt (Middle Eastern RSC), Greece and the Republic of Cyprus (European RSC) that formed an informal anti-Turkish alliance that will most likely continue to exist in some form even after Ankara normalises relations with Cairo.

While Turkey's current behaviour in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean is less belligerent due to the economic downturn, and the Muslim Brotherhood now plays a marginal role in its soft power, Ankara is still very active in these regions – it maintains a military presence in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Northern Cyprus, strong economic ties with Israel, and actively develops relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (ironically enabled by the decline of the Muslim Brotherhood). Thus, while Turkey's status as a great power is debatable, it could be argued that it became one of the poles of the Middle Eastern RSC, and its policies blurred the boundaries between the Middle Eastern and European RSC (in the case of Greece, Cyprus and Egypt).

## Conclusion

AKP's rise to power brought radical changes in Turkey's both domestic politics and foreign policy. Erdoğan's government liberalised the economy, eliminated the political power of Turkish armed forces while developing their capabilities along with the domestic defence industry, and introduced a new vision of Turkey's foreign policy, radically different from the previous Kemalist doctrine. Following the *Strategic Depth* blueprint, Turkey developed long-neglected relations with Middle Eastern countries and used the Arab Spring and the Muslim Brotherhood to boost its regional influence. But this strategy backfired as the Arab Spring turned into "Arab Winter" – the regime of General Sisi was hostile to the Brotherhood and saw Turkey as foreign power interfering in Egypt's internal affairs. While economic relations remained relatively unharmed, all military and political cooperation between the two countries was terminated for more than five years, and Ankara and Cairo engaged in a struggle for influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. Egypt aligned itself with Greece and Cyprus to counterbalance Turkey, bridging the boundaries between Middle Eastern and European regional security complexes. Over time, the power of the Muslim Brotherhood declined, and with it did the fear of Arab monarchies of it. Beginning in 2021, the climate of reconciliation prevailed in the Persian Gulf as the blockade of Qatar ended. Ankara capitalised on it by normalising relations with the United Arab Emirates and launching the process of rapprochement with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Sympathy, humanitarian aid, and financial donations that followed the February 2023 earthquake facilitated these trends, and after it became clear that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan would be the President of Turkey for another term, Cairo and Ankara went on to fully restore their diplomatic relations. Still, this does not mean Egypt's cooperation with Greece and Cyprus which came into being as a byproduct of Ankara's assertive policies in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Levant region, will simply cease. Despite the reconciliation between Egypt and Turkey and Erdoğan's much softer stance towards Athens and Nicosia (so far, there have been very few naval incidents or rhetorical attacks in 2023), Turkey's growing power will continue to incite these countries to counterbalance it through cooperation in diplomatic, military, and energy sectors.

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# European Union's Role in the Maritime Security in Africa

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## ABSTRACT

*The European Union depends on safe oceans for economic development, free trade, transport, energy security, tourism and a good marine environment. Maritime security stresses the importance of protecting the maritime domain from numerous threats, including disputes between states and various forms of transnational crime, but also the need to ensure a good order at sea, which is mandatory for the well-being and prosperity of the citizens. This paper aims to analyze the global maritime security production strategy followed by the European Union in Africa in the last decade and how it has influenced the protection of its member states' interests in two of the most relevant maritime regions – the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. We argue that the EU has, in recent years, become a relevant global co-producer of maritime security in Africa and has even sought to strengthen its role in this area.*

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## Introduction

The sea has been relevant to humankind over the centuries, and it is the largest biosphere on the planet. It generates about half of the oxygen we need, absorbs nearly 25% of all carbon dioxide emissions (and captures 90% of the additional heat produced by such emissions), produces important living resources (with fish constituting a significant animal protein consumed by populations) and provides a substantial set of mineral resources, above all energy, which has been fundamental to the global economic development (United Nations, 2023). About two-thirds of the world's oil and gas supply is either extracted at sea or transported by sea, and up to 99% of global data flows are transmitted through undersea cables (European Commission, 2023:1). But the sea is also the connector par excellence between the different continents since it occupies almost 70% of the surface of the earth, 64% of which is high seas – a relevant set of maritime areas that are not under the authority of any State. In addition, almost 90% of international trade is conducted by the sea – 75% of which passes through canals and straits, making it an attractive target for groups of pirates and armed robbers (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2011).

The importance of the sea can also be seen through the fact that several scholars have dedicated themselves, especially throughout the present century, to the study of its different dimensions. In this sense, it is noteworthy that Steinberg (2001) noted that the sea has been a crucial area for the resources that sustain contemporary life. Till (2009) considered that the sea has been the basis for the prosperity and security of humanity. Kraska (2011) noted, in turn, that the sea was essential for the military tool (in terms of manoeuvre and strategic mobility) and an important vector for migration, smuggling and various illicit traffics and that the history of humanity can be read as a



permanent attempt to dominate the sea. Sloggett (2014) stressed that a secure maritime environment was a vital ingredient for the success of the global economy, and Bueger and Edmunds (2017) referred to the sea as a stage for the projection of geopolitical power, military disputes, a source of specific threats or as a mean that enables various phenomena (for instance, from colonialism to globalization).

The European Union (EU) is heavily dependent on maritime security not only in the spaces within its maritime borders but also in regions far away – since they are considered vital to its own security and of its member states (MS). And the reasons are easy to understand: 90% of its external and 40% of its internal trade is seaborne; around half of its population lives in areas close to the coast; close to 40% of gross domestic product is generated in maritime regions, and 75% of the Union's external trade volume is carried out by sea; the vast majority of oil imports that the EU needs (roughly 90%) use maritime transport; the EU is among the largest importers (3rd) and producers (5th) of marine living resources; over 70 % of the Union's external borders are maritime, and hundreds of millions of passengers transit through its ports every year; finally, of the 27 MS, 22 have coastal areas, representing a large part of the Union's external borders (Pejsova, 2019: 1; Jacques Delors European Information Centre, 2023).

The concept of maritime security emerged in the post-Cold War period, with the appearance of a new (called “broad”) vision of security studies, as opposed to the traditional (called “narrow”) state-centred vision. Several theorists – among them, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (the most iconic authors of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies) – understood that the concept of security had remained too subordinated, for instance, when compared to the concepts of power and peace and created a new framework of analysis that examined the distinctiveness of security dynamics in five different sectors. Thus, to the political and military sectors followed by the traditionalists (who were in favour of narrowing the concept), those theorists then added, to the newly constructed framework of analysis, the new sectors: economic, societal and environmental. Under these circumstances, in addition to military threats, the new concept of maritime security came to include, also, non-military threats. In this new vision, the military sector concerns relations of forced coercion; the political sector deals with relations of authority; the economic sector focuses on relations of trade, production and finance; the societal sector focuses on relations of collective identity; and the environmental sector is limited to relations between human activity and the planetary biosphere (Buzan et al., 1998: 1-3).

Several theorists have been dedicating themselves to the phenomenon of maritime security, especially throughout the present century. Among them, we highlight Klein (2011: 11), who referred to maritime security to state that it underlies the protection of territory, both terrestrial and maritime, from unlawful acts that may occur at sea or from the sea. Germond (2015: 137) stated, in turn, that maritime security could be understood as a concept (referring to the security of the maritime domain) or as a set of policies, regulations, measures and operations to ensure the security of that domain. Bueger (2015: 161) opted for a holistic definition of the concept by building a matrix where he defined four dimensions (marine environment, economic development, national security, and human security) and four concepts (marine security, seapower, blue economy, and resilience), as well as various risks and threats, and stated that maritime security could be interpreted through the relationships that could be established between all of them.

In summary, we can say that maritime security involves several different entities (public and private), with three distinct aspects in mind: preserving freedom of navigation, protecting maritime commerce, and maintaining good governance of the sea. As we will see in the following chapters, the EU's action as a major maritime security co-producer in different regions of the African continent – Horn of Africa (HoA) and Gulf of Guinea (GoG) – has been aimed at ensuring those three subjects.

In line with what was proposed by Santos and Lima (2019), this study is delimited in terms of content, space and time. Regarding the content, it examines the EU's role in Africa's maritime security. In terms of space, it focuses on two specific regions – the HoA and the GoG. And it covers the period 2008-2022.

The study follows an interpretivist epistemological framework, inductive reasoning and a qualitative research strategy. The research design is a case study, and written documentary sources were used as the main method of data collection.

## **European Union and the maritime domain**

This chapter aims to emphasize the great importance of the maritime domain for the European Union, for her security and for the security of its Member States.

### **The maritime domain**

Europe is surrounded by four seas – Mediterranean, Baltic, North and Black – and two oceans – the Atlantic and Arctic – and the EU also has a presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Caribbean Sea through its outermost regions. As a global trading power, the EU is extremely dependent on safe oceans for economic development, free trade, maritime transport, energy security, tourism and a good marine environment. The oceans are also a valuable source of growth and prosperity for the Union and its citizens (Jacques Delors European Information Centre, 2023).

In March 2022, the Council of the European Union approved the "Strategic Compass", which sets a prominent level of ambition for the European security and defence agenda. With regard to Africa, the document states that the future of this continent is of strategic importance to the EU and that the stability of regions such as the GoG, the HoA and the Mozambique Channel is a security imperative, given the fact that key maritime routes pass through them (Council of the European Union, 2022a). At the same time, there has been growing geopolitical competition in Africa involving both global and regional actors. In these circumstances, compounded by the fact that the maritime domain has become increasingly contested, the strategic compass reaffirms the EU's interest in the sea and the strengthening of the maritime security of both the Union and its MS. Building on the ongoing experience in the GoG and the western Indian Ocean, this new document, therefore, aims to extend the EU's Coordinated Maritime Presences Concept (CMP) to other areas of maritime interest with an impact on EU security, such as the Mediterranean Sea for instance. The EU's strategic compass aims not only to ensure unrestricted access to the high seas and the security of global lines of communication but also to protect the maritime interests of its MS (including the seabed) and critical maritime infrastructures. To this end, it intends to strengthen maritime situational awareness by increasing its capacity to collect, process and share information with other relevant actors, both military and civilian.

To achieve these ambitious goals, the EU intends to continue to develop joint operational, technological and capacity-building solutions using the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)<sup>1</sup> framework. In this sense, it should further develop the mechanism of CMP (both those already implemented and launching new projects), as well as reinforce interactions and coordination

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<sup>1</sup> Following the Foreign Affairs Council (November 2017), 23 MS signed a notification that marked the beginning of the establishment of PESCO. The MS committed themselves to developing defence capabilities, to investing in common projects and to increasing the operational readiness of their armed forces (Permanent Structured Cooperation, 2023). There are eight projects that are being developed in the context of PESCO in the maritime area: Deployable Modular Underwater Intervention Capability Package; Harbour and Maritime Surveillance and Protection; Medium Size Semi-Autonomous Surface Vehicle; Essential Elements of European Escort; Maritime (semi) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures; Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance; European Patrol Corvette; and Maritime Unmanned Anti-Submarine System (Permanent Structured Cooperation, 2023).

between Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) naval operations and other relevant actors. In order to enhance the Union's maritime operations and the readiness and resilience of its forces, a policy of organizing regular naval exercises of the navies of its MS and coastguards should be pursued, as well as increasing the level of training provided and capacity building.

The action plan proposed in the strategic compass itself to overcome the critical gaps that may remain in the maritime domain points towards making full use of PESCO and the European Defence Fund (EDF)<sup>2</sup> for the development of high-end interoperable systems and advanced technologies. In this context, a commitment is made, for example, to develop strategic capabilities through projects to ensure a more assertive presence of EU assets at sea, as well as an increasing capacity for power projection, which will involve the need for state-of-the-art naval platforms, including unmanned surface and underwater platforms. The focus on building a class of European Patrol Surface Ship is an example of a programme that could be a significant step in the direction it is intended to take.

### **European Union Maritime Security Strategy**

In this context, maritime security is a necessity for the well-being and prosperity of the Union and the world at large and links issues of internal and external security. Maritime security is then understood as a set of circumstances of the global maritime domain in which national laws and international laws are applied, freedom of navigation is guaranteed, and citizens, infrastructures, transport, the environment and marine resources are protected. Threats to maritime security are multifaceted, constitute a potential danger to European citizens and can be detrimental to the strategic interests of the Union and its MS (Council of the European Union, 2014: 3).

The Maritime Security Strategy adopted by the Council of the European Union in June 2014 (EUMSS), revised in June 2018, represents the maritime dimension of the CSDP, enabling the EU to respond effectively to challenges in the area of maritime security. This document provides the political and strategic framework to address maritime security challenges in an effective and comprehensive manner through the employment of all relevant instruments, but it needs to be updated in light of evolving maritime security challenges and the geopolitical context. Russia's military aggression against Ukraine has raised the need for the EU to strengthen its security and increase its capacity to act not only on its own territory but also in its neighbourhood and beyond (Jacques Delors European Information Centre, 2023).

Under these circumstances, on March 10 2023, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy issued a joint Communication on strengthening the EUMSS and a new Action Plan. With these new instruments, the EU aims to reinforce six strategic objectives: step up activities at sea; cooperate with partners; lead in maritime domain awareness; manage risks and threats; enhance capabilities; educate and train (European Commission, 2022: 4).

Concrete actions have been identified for each of these strategic objectives. Within the scope of reinforcing maritime security, the definition of new maritime areas of interest where the concept of CMP can be implemented and the increasing mechanisms to fight against the different illicit acts that may occur in the maritime domain are highlighted. Regarding international cooperation with partners, information exchange and the surveillance of critical maritime infrastructures, including undersea cables, ship and port security, emerge. The leadership that the EU intends to take in the area of maritime situational awareness means that this review of the EUMSS has identified key

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<sup>2</sup> The European Defence Fund is made up of two legally distinct but complementary areas and both are being implemented gradually: the research area; and the capability area (European Defence Agency, 2023a). The Strategic Compass provides for harnessing the full potential of this EU financing instrument, since it is fundamental for strengthening the EU's own defence capabilities and for equipping MS (Council of the European Union, 2022a).

actions to be implemented in a relatively short timeframe, namely ensuring that the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE)<sup>3</sup> is operational by mid-2024, enabling the exchange of classified and unclassified information between authorities from different maritime surveillance sectors (both military and civilian); strengthening the Defence Maritime Surveillance Information Exchange Network (MARSUR)<sup>4</sup> (establishing links between MARSUR and the CISE); and enhancing partner countries' maritime situational awareness, notably through the Gulf of Guinea Inter-Regional Network (GoGIN)<sup>5</sup> project. With regard to risk and threat management, this new document identifies a very extensive number of key actions to be developed, highlighting the following: conducting exercises focused on port protection and the fight against cyber and hybrid threats; using surveillance means and tools (such as remotely piloted aircraft) to patrol and to protect critical maritime infrastructures; and drafting new risk assessments (or strengthening existing ones), contingency plans and disaster recovery plans concerning ports, coastal infrastructures, as well as the safety of passenger ships and transport/supply chains. Regarding capacity building, the key actions identified involve, among others, the development of requirements and concepts for surface and subsurface defence technology and the construction of interoperable unmanned systems to monitor critical maritime infrastructures, the increasing of modern mine countermeasures capabilities and the development of capacity building related to maritime patrol aircraft. Finally, the education and training strategic goal is joined by the following key actions: enhancing cyber, hybrid and space security skills; conducting specific training programmes open to non-EU partners to address existing (and emerging) threats to maritime security; and conducting scenario-based civil-military exercises involving shared authority or shared use of capabilities.

Based on the updated EUMSS, the intention is that by 2025 the mechanisms that have been contributing to maritime security, such as the CISE and the MARSUR, will be developed and strengthened in order to promote interoperability, facilitate the decision-making process and increase operational effectiveness. Also, in accordance with the latest version of the EUMSS, the achievement of greater visibility of the Union's naval forces within and beyond its borders should be pursued, through naval presence (and diplomacy) actions in various regions, an increase in the number (and degree of complexity) of maritime training actions and exercises, and the development of capabilities.

## **The Role of the European Union in the Horn of Africa**

This chapter focuses on the EU's intervention in the Western Indian Ocean in the present century and how it has contributed to its assertion as a relevant co-producer of maritime security in that region.

### **European Union Naval Force – Operation Atalanta**

It is important to note that the EU has consistently contributed to improving security in the HoA, mainly through the implementation of a comprehensive approach that includes instruments

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<sup>3</sup> EU initiative aimed at making European surveillance systems (both EU and European Economic Area MS) interoperable, in order to provide all interested authorities from different sectors with access to additional classified and unclassified information needed to conduct missions at sea, namely: surveillance in various fields (such as maritime security, maritime safety, marine pollution prevention and fisheries control), preparedness and response to pollution at sea, customs, border control, law enforcement and defence (European Maritime Safety Agency, 2023).

<sup>4</sup> MARSUR is a technical solution enabling dialogue between European maritime information systems. It consists of 19 EU MS and Norway and aims to improve common maritime situational awareness by facilitating the exchange of relevant operational information, such as geographical positions of ships, maritime routes, ship identification data, chat services or images of ships and other platforms (European Defence Agency, 2023b).


<sup>5</sup> which aims to improve maritime security and safety in 19 countries of the region, mainly by supporting training and the creation of the regional information sharing network, known as the Yaoundé Architecture (European Union External Action, 2021a).

specifically created for the region: the naval military operation (EU Naval Force - Somalia), the military training mission (EUTM-S); and the civilian capacity-building mission (EUCAP-S).

The first instrument came in November 2008, in support of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1838 – issued during that year – which led the European Council to set up a military operation in the HoA (Operation Atalanta). This was mainly to ensure the protection of merchant vessels chartered by the World Food Programme (WFP) carrying emergency food aid to Somali populations in dire need, but also to prevent and repress acts of piracy in the region (European Council, 2008).

The effectiveness of Operation Atalanta can be easily seen in Figure 1, and it is due to the fact that it has contributed decisively to the almost complete absence of attacks by pirate groups originating from Somalia since 2014.

**Figure 1 – Number of piracy incidents in the HoA (2008-2022)**



Source: (International Maritime Bureau, 2012), (International Maritime Bureau, 2017), (International Maritime Bureau, 2020), (International Maritime Bureau, 2023)

On the other hand, the escorting of numerous merchant ships chartered by the WFP has ensured the safe arrival of several millions of tonnes of essential food products to more than 3.5 million Somalis. Regarding the disruptions to pirate attacks (in preparation or already underway), the resources of the EU Naval Force arrested dozens of perpetrators, who were subsequently handed over to the authorities of the coastal states in the region with which the EU had concluded agreements so that they could be tried there. Moreover, as this was the first CSDP naval operation, it broke new ground



in many ways. For instance, it made it possible to develop and consolidate links with NATO (in the maritime field). But the sudden increasing presence of several naval forces and means in the maritime spaces of the HoA also highlighted the emergence of new maritime power games. In this sense, operation Atalanta proved to be an essential tool for the EU to engage with global maritime actors, such as NATO, but also with China, Japan and Russia, which were present with several means of their military power at sea in those maritime spaces (Alexandre, 2022: 164).

### **European Union Training Mission - Somalia**

The second instrument, still under the CSDP, came in March 2010 and consisted of a military mission to contribute to the training and education of Somali National Army soldiers. That mission was called EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM-S) and represented, once again, the first time that CSDP was used to provide direct basic military training. The three pillars on which the EUTM-S was based were advice, mentoring and training. The objectives of this mission consisted of contributing to increasing the proficiency, effectiveness and credibility of the defence sector in order to enable the Somali authorities to progressively assume the responsibilities for the country's security (European Union External Action, 2019).

EUTM-S has been playing a major role in reforming Somali security institutions (both at the level of the Ministry of Defence and the command of the armed forces), providing military advice at the political and strategic levels to the respective authorities and supporting the building and sustaining of a military training system of its own, adopting a new concept that provides the Somali army with the policies, procedures, expertise and experience to manage its own force generation. It has also focused on developing training for future (Somali) trainers, in close coordination with other international partners, and on collective training, with the ambitious goal of training three light infantry companies (115 soldiers each), three engineering platoons and three training teams (each with 15 soldiers) each year. In total, these activities have been involving more than 500 Somali trainees, along with 14 trainers and two mentors from seven EU countries - including Portugal (Alexandre, 2022: 282) annually.

### **European Union Maritime Capacity Building Mission - Somalia**

Finally, in July 2012, the EU launched the third instrument, the European Union Maritime Capacity Building Mission to Somalia (initially called EUCAP Nestor), a civilian mission - which nevertheless had military expertise - intended to operate in five states in that region: Djibouti, Seychelles, Kenya, Somalia and, later, Tanzania. The purpose was to assist the development of self-sustaining capacities in the HoA that would ensure good governance of those maritime spaces and the subsequent maritime security of the entire region (European External Action Service, 2014).

The mission focused on conducting mentoring, advising, training, and maritime capacity-building activities in the states concerned while involving experts in areas related to law-making and the development of specific organizational structures. In 2015, activities were deactivated in all states where they had been conducted, except Somalia. The mission headquarters was relocated from Djibouti to Somali territory, and in December 2016, the mission was renamed EUCAP Somalia (EUCAP-S) (European External Action Service, 2021).

Key actions included the development of a draft Somaliland coast guard bill and the support to the Somali federal government's national security office in further developing strategic options for a federal coast guard model, a national draft of maritime threat assessment and a national draft of a maritime security plan, as part of the implementation of Somalia's overall maritime security architecture. The mission also supported Somalia's strategic maritime security mechanisms, namely

the national maritime coordination committee and the maritime security coordination committee (Alexandre, 2022: 286-287).

### **The EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa**

In 2011, the EU adopted a strategic framework for the HoA, which included actions to be taken to help the people of that region to achieve peace, stability, security, prosperity and responsible governance (Council of the European Council, 2011). To achieve such objectives, the EU committed to:

- Assist all countries in the HoA to build sound and accountable political structures, including civil institutions, enabling people to express their legitimate political aspirations and to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms were respected;
- Work with the countries in the region and international organizations (especially the United Nations and the African Union) to resolve existing conflicts, particularly in Somalia and Sudan, and to avoid potential future conflicts between (or within) countries;
- Ensure that insecurity in the region did not pose a security threat to others beyond its borders, for example, through acts of piracy or terrorism;
- Support efforts to promote economic growth for all countries in the region to enable them to reduce poverty and to increasing prosperity;
- Support regional political and economic cooperation.

This strategic framework and the appointment of a Special Representative for the HoA<sup>6</sup> served to interlink engagement in Somalia within EU policies for the region. In this regard, Ehrhart and Petretto (2012: 44) noted that the EU should (and could) demonstrate its ability to play a leading, coordinating role with regard to engagement policy in Somalia and the region. However, the strategic framework and the appointment of a Special Representative were considered, in the opinion of those academics, the right steps in this direction, particularly as this placed a special focus on Somalia.

### **Reasons for EU involvement in enhancing maritime security in the Horn of Africa**

The question about the reasons for the EU's involvement in operations to combat Somali piracy has been addressed with some frequency, particularly in academic circles, especially considering this was the first naval military mission under the CSDP.

Helly (2009: 393-394), for example, considering that it would have been strong economic and commercial interests that had mobilized key European decision-makers – since more than 15% of world trade passed annually through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden and a very significant share of Europe's energy imports and European goods exports depended on (safe) transit through those maritime spaces. On the other hand, for countries like France and Spain, where the fishing trade (including in the Indian Ocean) played an important economic role, Somali piracy became a serious threat to their national economic interests.

Ehrhart and Petretto (2012: 9) considered, in turn, the intervention in Somalia's maritime spaces was just another of the challenges that the EU responded to in its effort to improve its approach to foreign and security policy over the past decades. The emergence of the EU as a relevant security co-producer has driven the need to increase the coherence of its internal and external action, i.e., the

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<sup>6</sup> The European Council approved a proposal submitted by the EU High Representative to appoint a Special Representative for the Horn of Africa, with an initial focus on Somalia to deal with piracy, pending the development of action plans to support the implementation of the strategic framework (Council of the European Council, 2011).

generation of a truly comprehensive approach that could make use of the different instruments (military and civilian) at its disposal.

Riddervold (2011: 393) stressed that although all major powers were present with naval forces in the maritime spaces of the HoA by the end of the first decade of this century, there was no evidence that "the actors present were engaged in zero-sum power games over influence in the region", or that "the EU decided to intervene militarily because of any attempt to balance the sphere of interests in Africa".

Restoring peace and security in the HoA region was the main motive for the EU's intervention to combat the Somali piracy phenomenon, according to Paige (2013: 4). The protection of global trade and the human security dimension of the problem were two other relevant reasons for the EU to get involved in that issue.

### **The Role of the European Union in the Gulf of Guinea**

This chapter focuses on the EU's intervention in the GoG region - with the aim of helping the states in the region to achieve peace, security and prosperity through the development of their economies and institutions - and how it has been contributing to the improvement of the maritime security in those spaces.

#### **Main threats to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea region**


Piracy and armed robbery at sea against ships, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and transnational organized crime (in particular the one engaged in drugs and arms trafficking) have been the most relevant threats to maritime security in the GoG region since the beginning of this century. However, as the object of this study is piracy and armed robbery at sea against ships, the analysis will be focused on this phenomenon.

Piracy and armed robbery at sea against ships<sup>7</sup> have gained significance in the GoG, especially since 2015, with the region even taking over as the hotspot with the most reported events worldwide between 2018 and 2020, as can be seen in Figure 2 – data provided by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).

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<sup>7</sup> The difference between maritime piracy and armed robbery lies in the space where the action is conducted: piracy occurs on the high seas – parts of the sea not included in the exclusive economic zone, territorial sea or in the inland waters of a state – and armed robbery is conducted in waters under the sovereignty of a state – territorial sea and inland waters (Alexandre, 2022: 44-45).




**Figure 2 – Frequency of piracy / armed robbery attacks (2015-2020)**

Source: (International Maritime Bureau, 2020)

The three states with the highest number of recorded incidents in the 2016 to 2020 period were Nigeria (187), Ghana (26) and Benin (20) (International Maritime Bureau, 2021). In 2021 and 2022, the number of incidents decreasing worldwide<sup>8</sup>, and the GoG was no exception, as can be seen in Figure 3.

<sup>8</sup> According to Morizur (2021), there may be multiple reasons for this decline in maritime piracy in the GoG region, potentially including, among others, increasing numbers of assets/operations by coastal countries and the EU Coordinated Maritime Presence, a multilateral maritime patrol effort by European nations in the GoG.

**Figure 3 – Number of reported incidents between 2017 and 2022**

Source: (International Maritime Bureau, 2021), (International Maritime Bureau, 2023)

Considering 2022, we find that in the GoG, there were quite significant incidents involving crew members of ships targeted by pirates/armed robbers when compared with other existing hotspots: of the 16 armed robberies of seafarers on civilian ships, six occurred in those maritime spaces; 29 crew members were taken hostage (out of a total of 41 worldwide); and the only two kidnappings of seafarers for subsequent payment for their release occurred in the GoG (International Maritime Bureau, 2023). This shows that in addition to the GoG being one of the regions where in recent years, more events related to piracy/armed robbery at sea against ships have occurred, it is also the most dangerous for the crew of civilian ships in transit (or active) in those maritime spaces.

In the GoG, several states (including European ones) have been committing their assets at sea for several years. However, the fact remains that it has not been possible to formally set up a maritime security operation (under the aegis of the UNSC) to prevent and disrupt attacks by pirate groups at sea. It was the UNSC's much more restrictive attitude towards the GoG<sup>9</sup> when compared to the one it had adopted just a few years earlier in the HoA region that was one of the reasons for some of the international community's growing alienation from the phenomenon of piracy and armed robbery at sea against ships in the GoG. And of the international organizations that have had assets engaged in the HoA, only the EU has been continuously present in the GoG, although following a different

<sup>9</sup> It issued only two resolutions (2018 and 2039) and in both it considered that the phenomenon of piracy and armed robbery at sea against ships in the GoG was a regional issue that should involve regional actors and the African Union, with the support of international stakeholders, if (and when) its intervention was requested (United Nations Security Council, 2011), (United Nations Security Council, 2012).

model, as we show below, which is, even so, a clear indicator of the intention to assume a relevant position in the increasing of the maritime security in that region.

### **Coordinated Maritime Presences Project**

What we have been witnessing over the last few years – in the absence of military operations – is an ad hoc commitment of EU MS' military assets in the Gulf of Guinea, dedicated to maritime capacity-building actions for the security structures of the littoral states, in compliance with national orders and/or bilateral agreements.

The EU – which had already launched two naval operations, one in the HoA<sup>10</sup> and the other in the Mediterranean Sea<sup>11</sup> – decided to implement, in January 2021, a pilot project – named Coordinated Maritime Presences Concept – aimed at strengthening its commitment to maritime security in the GoG, with the following objectives: to increase the EU's capacity as a reliable partner and producer of maritime security; to provide greater European operational engagement in that region; to ensure a permanent presence in maritime areas of interest; and to promote international cooperation and partnership at sea (Council of the European Union, 2021).

This concept can be implemented in any maritime region around the globe that is considered by the Council of the EU to be a maritime area of interest. It uses MS' existing naval and air assets in those regions – which have been deployed by the decision of the MS. The implemented model relies on (good) coordination of existing assets – which remain under the national command of the states – and provides continuity, complementarity and cooperation between the actions of those assets. It reinforces awareness, analysis and information sharing among EU MS through the maritime area of interest coordination cell created within the EU Military Staff, making use of the MARSUR network in an operational environment (European Union External Action, 2022a).

The GoG was the first region to be established as a maritime area of interest, and the launch of that pilot project was intended to strengthen the EU's role in the region by supporting the efforts of coastal states and the organizations of the Yaoundé Architecture in achieving concrete responses to growing maritime security challenges, such as piracy and armed robbery at sea against ships (Council of the European Union, 2021).

In February 2022, the Council of the EU decided to extend the initial term of this pilot project, considering that it provided adequate support to address the security challenges affecting freedom of navigation in that region, as it had contributed to reducing maritime security incidents by more than 50% in 2021<sup>12</sup>. On the other hand, it was assumed as an instrument capable of ensuring a continuous presence of EU MS in the region and allowing for increased cooperation and partnerships with the coastal states of the GoG and with the other regional states and maritime security organizations included in the Yaoundé Architecture. The Council of the UE will review the implementation of the CMP Concept in the GoG by February 2024 (Council of the European Union, 2022b).

### **Reasons for EU involvement in enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea**

It should first be noted that the EU's extensive contribution to maritime security in the GoG over the second decade of this century to date is reflected in a wide range of projects covering areas as diverse

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<sup>10</sup> Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta, discussed in the previous chapter.

<sup>11</sup> Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI, launched on 31 March 2020 and extended until 31 March 2025, and whose main task was to implement the UN arms embargo on Libya (European Union External Action, 2022b).

<sup>12</sup> According to the IMB, in 2020 there had been 84 reported events of piracy and armed robbery at sea against ships in the GoG region and by 2021 they had fallen to just 37 incidents (International Maritime Bureau, 2022).

as fisheries and port security to combating drugs trafficking and law enforcement at sea (Côte-Real, 2022: 69). EU programmes for the region – focusing on the legal framework, operational rules, information sharing, training and capacity building – are designed to improve maritime security in the GoG and to actively contribute to the development of the capacities of coastal states in the region (European Union External Action, 2021).

Maritime trade to and from the GoG is driven by the EU, which imports about half of its energy needs (with almost 13% of the oil and 6% of the natural gas it needs coming from the GoG). Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are important suppliers of crude oil to Europe and Nigeria also of natural gas. In these circumstances, ensuring maritime security in the region is crucial for the EU. It should be noted that the GoG is one of the most dynamic and important regions of the global energy sector. One of the reasons is due to the great reserves of oil existent, especially in Nigeria. Secondly, it is also worth noting the general high quality of the oil from this region, given its low viscosity, which contributes to making refining less expensive, especially when compared to oil from other parts of the world (such as Venezuela, for example), which makes it a desirable product in international markets.

According to the British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy 2022, the 2021 oil trade flow diagram shows that Asia-Pacific (87.1 billion tonnes) and Europe (53.2 billion tonnes) are the most relevant oil importing regions from the GoG. And regarding the flow chart of the natural gas trade in the same year, once again, Europe (with 14.8 billion cubic metres) and the Asia-Pacific region (with 14.1 billion cubic metres) are the main importers from the GoG (British Petroleum, 2022).

The need to ensure the security of maritime routes linking the European continent with the GoG is thus the main reason for the EU's involvement in the region, given its position as an important trading partner with most western African coastal states and the growing energy dependence of many EU MS on the GoG's main producer countries.

## **Conclusions**

This article aimed to analyze the strategy of maritime security production at the global level followed by the European Union, in particular in the African regions of the HoA and the GoG, and how it has influenced the protection of the interests of its MS.

The EU has shown in recent years – especially since 2008 when it launched its first naval operation under the CSDP in the HoA region – the will to be a major player as a global co-producer of maritime security. Since then, it has maintained a continuous presence in the region through a comprehensive approach – made up of military and civilian instruments – which has ensured it a leading position in combating not only Somali piracy at sea but also the root causes of the phenomenon on land. The establishment of a strategic framework for the HoA and the appointment of an EU special representative has increased its visibility as a major actor in the pursuit of maritime security in the region. And the fact is that the results achieved confirm that the efforts of the different actors in increasing maritime security in maritime spaces have been successful, as there has been almost no piracy activity since 2017. Among the most significant actors is the EU.

However, in recent years EU action has also been extended to the West African coast, particularly to the GoG, which is truly relevant in geostrategic and geoeconomic terms for the EU, which is highly dependent on energy imports from the region's producer countries. The implementation of the strategic framework for the GoG and the plethora of instruments, initiatives and projects established over recent years with regional organizations and African states – albeit without the formal launch of military operations to address the threats to maritime security, particularly piracy in the absence of a UNSC decision to support such intervention – have earned the EU the leading role in supporting

the fight against illegal activities at sea in that region, which has been declared a maritime area of interest. In those maritime spaces, there was also a significant decrease in the number of incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea against ships in 2021 and 2022, to which the EU's concrete actions contributed a lot.

The Strategic Compass, formally approved in March 2022, will allow the building of an ambitious action plan to strengthen the EU's security and defence policy until 2030. The aim is to make the EU a global co-producer of security that is able to guarantee the protection of its citizens and to make a decisive contribution to international peace and security. In line with the adoption of that strategic document, a new maritime area of interest was established earlier this year, now in the North-West Indian Ocean, with the purpose of strengthening the EU's strategic focus on that region, ensuring a European naval presence in the Indo-Pacific – thus following on from its involvement in the HoA since 2008 – and thereby increasing its international visibility and enhancing its role as a global maritime security co-producer.

In conclusion, it has been possible to prove that the EU's intervention, both through CSDP operations and missions and dedicated programmes and projects in two important maritime spaces in Africa, the HoA and the GoG, has clearly contributed to increasing security in those regions and to protecting the interests of its MS, elevating it to the status of an important global co-producer of maritime security.

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# Climate Change: A Global Governance Challenge, Requiring Local Specific Responses - The Challenge of Formulating a Successful Response at The Appropriate Governance Level

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KEYWORDS	ABSTRACT
Climate Change, Global Governance, The State, Local Level Civil Society	<p><i>While Climate Change is a global phenomenon, the impact it generates is locally specific. Take, for example, the issue of sea-level rise. While we can identify a general process of sea-level rise, some localities are facing stronger impacts than others; this applies not only to island nations but also to coastal areas and coastal cities, including several so-called Megacities. Or take the issue of temperature increase, as some areas will experience more heatwaves or longer and more intensive periods of droughts. A comparable argument can be made in regard to intense rainfall and floods. Consequently, a critical issue is how to address global climate change by formulating a response at the global level or by formulating a variety of specific strategies at the local level. Yet, while some localities may react faster because of the threat they are exposed to, local-specific responses alone will be less likely to generate the scale effect required to arrest the global climate dynamic. Hence, at what level, local or global, should strategies formulated to address climate change represent a key issue. One may argue that a combination of responses at all three levels may offer a successful response, though this would raise the issue of how to integrate all three levels into one strategy.</i></p>
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## Framing the Discourse

The year 2021, with its floods, wildfires, storms, and heat waves, was a compelling reminder of the impact climate change has recently been generating. Yet, based on previous years' experiences, the indications are that 2021 was not a so-called 'once-a-century' episode. On the contrary, we have to recognise that the impacts caused by climate change will increase with time, not in a distant future, but it is happening right now. Underlining such a perception is the UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2021, stating that by missing the emission targets to keep global warming at 1.5° Celsius, extreme weather events are becoming rather regular occurrences, describing climate change risks as a combination of exposure and vulnerability to climate challenges. Yet, within this scenario, it is worth remembering that while climate change represents a global threat and therefore offers a fitting illustration for formulating a global governance response, its impact is always locally specific. It is also worth remembering that global cooperation efforts like the Paris Agreement are based on climate models and consequently represent a top-down approach to addressing the impacts of

climate change, while climate impact assessments made at the local level represent bottom-up evaluations of the risks of climate change pose to specific localities and communities. Though the prospect for addressing climate risks and their impact at the local level may be higher, since it is the level where people and communities are directly confronted by the negative impacts of climate change, global commitments to address climate change impacts may still be required, not only as climate risks generate a transboundary impact but it is at the global level where the scale effect to address the climate change dynamic can be generated through global cooperation. At the same time, the global level is characterised by a plethora of different national and non-state actor interests, generating a considerable challenge for reaching robust agreements.

An equally crucial aspect of the climate change dynamic is that time is of vital importance, as related risks and impacts are on the increase, as well as the associated costs to people, communities, and the economy. There exists a real danger that we may pass a critical threshold beyond that the climate change dynamic can change from a linear process to one characterised by rather abrupt system changes. This trend will only continue because of our failure to address climate change comprehensively, that is, to stay within the 1.5° target. Based on the actual implementation rate of reducing GHG emissions, we are on course to a 2.7° warming scenario by the end of the century (Climate Action Tracker, 2021). This underperformance is addressed in various IPCC reports, as well as in other risk analyses like the most recent edition of the Global Risk Report (2022), stating that, short of a comprehensive response, our capacity for mitigating and adapting will shrink fast. Adding that the failure to act in addressing climate change has been identified as the risk category with the highest damage potential at the global level within the next decade. It should be remembered that mitigation failure enhances the adaptation pressure; as such, the primary focus should be on mitigation. After all, reducing the climate change dynamic in the first place is preferred to address the impact it generates. When considering the mitigation-adaptation context, one can think of a comparison with cancer, as it is preferred to avoid the outbreak of cancer in the first place, over-treating the symptoms of it later or, indeed, failing to do so altogether.

The failure to comprehensively address the climate change challenge is also related to the 'global commons' controversy. The global commons refer to shared natural resources and spaces outside national jurisdictions to which all states have access. The associated challenges have been well described by Hardin (1968: 1,244), who formulated the expression the 'tragedy of the commons', that the tragedy of the commons refers to a situation in which individual rational behaviour will lead to collective consequences no one wished for as individual interests are not aligned with group interests. Primary examples include the open ocean or the atmosphere. As climate change-related negotiations strongly indicate, addressing global commons issues to agree on rules and regulations underlines the complexity associated with such an undertaking.

While we have witnessed a steady increase of awareness and worries about the impacts of environmental degradation and the impacts generated by climate change, there still seems to be some failure to recognise the extent of the challenge we are facing, as indicated by our inability to reducing GHG emission as required to stay with the 1.5-degree target. Aside from poor risk evaluation practices, despite improvements, there is a lack of understanding about the appropriate solutions (Adapt Now, 2019). Even as events in 2021, and the years before, highlight the various climate change-related risks and impacts, it seems there still persists a lack of local climate change-related risk awareness, though one may argue that a process of recognition has already begun. Yet, if one considers the resources spent on military expenditures while recognising our failure to provide enough resources for a comprehensive mitigation strategy to address the climate change dynamic, one could argue that the level of awareness with regard to climate change risks is still rather limited. To address this continuous shortcoming in recognising climate change-related risks, Ploberger and Filho (2016) argued for the integration of climate change-related risks in standard risk evaluation procedures. Assigning a particular risk category to climate change, comparable to economic or

political risks, therefore supporting a rising awareness of those specific risks and consequently highlighting the vulnerability of specific locations, communities, and regions, as well as countries, to the impacts of climate change. One can express hope that major recent risk evaluations, like the Global Risk Report 2022, will also contribute to greater awareness of climate change-related risks.

Addressing climate change represent one of the most pressing global governance challenges of our time, aside from another infectious outbreak like COVID-19, and will remain so for the foreseeable future with potentially long-lasting impact generated by climate change-related dynamics and risks. Based on our failure to implement agreements and targets on reducing GHG emissions raises questions about what level - local, regional, or global is the most appropriate to focus on. Indeed, whether we should aim for a coherent global approach or for a variety of local and regional-specific strategies when trying to address the climate change dynamic represents a still not answered but crucial question. An equally critical topic is whether we need support and even merge strategies at different levels or if only one level response would be able to generate enough impact to arrest the climate change dynamic and thus reduce the related risks to people and communities. However, we should remember the local-specific impact global climate change generates since there is no uniformity in the impact generated by climate change. Indeed, climate change vulnerability is context-specific.

### **Climate Change: a global challenge generating diverse local and regional impacts**

While we rightly consider climate change a global phenomenon since multiple climatic impact drivers are projected to generate changes in all regions of the world (IPCC, 2021), we still have to acknowledge the specific local and regional impact climate change creates. According to the Fifth IPCC Assessment Report's chapter on Asia, precipitation trends in Asia are characterised by strong variability, consequently generating regionally diverse impacts on food production and food security. It adds that a large number of Asia's communities living in low-elevation coastal zones are highly vulnerable to the impact of sea-level rise, storm surges, and typhoons (IPCC, 2014). The 2019 IPCC report on the impact of sea-level rise also highlights the diversity and dynamic character of regional and local impacts with regard to coastal infrastructure, communities, and agriculture areas based on risks associated with coastal erosion, flooding and salinisation (Oppenheimer et al., 2019). The IPCC (2021) report continues to confirm earlier predictions of regional variations of climate change impacts generated by heat extremes, heavy precipitation, and observable changes in agricultural and ecological drought. A UNESCO water report offers additional insight into the climate change-generated impact by emphasising the implications for local and regional water run-off, evapotranspiration, and flood risks, as well as for water quality (UNESCO UN-Water, 2020). By emphasising the local specific impact of sea-level rise, Hooijer and Vernimmen (2021: 1-2) point out that land less than 2 meters above sea level is most vulnerable to sea-level rise, adding that 59 per cent of the global land associated with the 2-meter level risk is located in tropical Asia, accounting for 31 per cent of the global population exposure. Strassburg et al. (2015: 744) stress that Southeast Asia has, in the last two decades, experienced rates of sea-level rise more than double the global mean. Even so, when considering the regional variability of climate change impacts, one has also to consider the variety of impacts within a region. Indonesia, for example, has been identified as the country with the largest extent of land below the 2-meter mark, so its exposure to rising coastal flood risks encompasses 6.1 per cent of its land territory (Hooijer and Vernimmen, 2021: 4). One can add other examples like Vietnam's Mekong delta which is also under threat from sea-level rise and saltwater intrusions; Bangkok's metropolitan area and Singapore provide additional examples of critical sea-level rise exposure, as it the case with Ho Chi Minh City and Manila. Hence, albeit sea-level rise represents a global threat, various localities and regions are facing a greater challenge.

This recognition of climate change-related risks to coastal cities not only draws our attention to local and regional-specific climate change-related risks but emphasises a spatial focus for climate change-

risk evaluation. The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, for example, emphasises that climate change-related risks are impacting every city differently, linked to geographic settings as well as socioeconomic and demographic aspects (C40 Policy Brief January 2022). Taking extreme heat as an example, the number of people affected by it will rise from the current 200 million to over 1.6 billion, from 350 to 970 affected cities. Regarding the impact of sea-level rise, it is anticipated that over 800 million people in more than 570 cities will be affected (The Future We Don't Want, 2018: 6). Taking into account that climate change impacts are not restricted by specific localities or borders, their impact can also be felt within the regional level. As for the regional level, in this paper and within the context of the climate change dynamic, it is treated as an extension of the local level. Within this context, its main relevance is linked to the basic character of climate change-related risks, as coastal and land features are of more relevance than any imagined political border. Even within the regional level, some localities are stronger exposed to the negative impacts than others. Northeast Asia's Dust storms (Yellow Dust) or the impact generated by the El Niño-Southern Oscillation offer good examples, as does sea-level rise. Hence, the impact of climate change can be scattered over a wider geographic area, consequently adding the regional level as another focus. Just take sea-level rise as an example. While the impact is locally specific, like threatening particular communities, the exposure to sea-level rise can also encompass a wider area like delta areas or extended coastlines. Indeed, considering the impact of climate change on international river systems, like the Mekong, the Brahmaputra, or the Danube River Basin, offer additional insight into the value of taking a regional focus.

While it is evident that progress in addressing the climate change dynamic has been made over the last couple of decades, the scale of this process has not been extensive enough to arrest the climate change dynamic or to reduce climate change-related risks. Indeed, exposure to climate change risk is increasing locally, regionally and globally. So far, the occasional, strongly articulated statements at the global level about addressing climate change have not been translated into meaningful responses to reduce the global climate change dynamic. For sure, the variety of GHG sources and their link to the economy and our way of life increases the complexity of reaching an agreement at the global level. And while the database for climate change, its impacts, and its sources become more evidence-based and solidified, some scientific uncertainty regarding local and regional impact predictions remain and contribute to further impediments to comprehensively addressing the global climate change dynamic. At the same time, locally felt impacts related to the climate change dynamic do generate a stronger awareness of related risks, especially at the local level. This does raise questions, like at what level - global, regional, local - the response generated will be enough impact to arrest the climate change dynamic, and to what extent different level responses either support one another or generate a diverting trend, consequently undermining our efforts to address climate change?

### **Global Governance - offering a solution or mission failure (2006)**

While global governance signifies a form of governance, rules, and regulations at a particular level, global governance does not refer to a government, as no formalised hierarchical order within global politics exists. Weiss (2013) describes global governance as a collective effort in identifying and addressing global challenges that go beyond the capacities of individual states. Thakur and Langenhove (2006: 22) add that global governance represents an additional layer of consultations and decision-making between and alongside governments and intergovernmental organisations. Hence, global governance offers an opportunity to address specific cross-border issues that individual countries cannot address on their own by formulating specific rules and regulations as a means of tackling issues related to the global commons challenge. Chasek, Downie and Brown (2017: 162) emphasise that climate change represents the prototype of global commons issues by affecting all nations but also requiring comprehensive cooperation in response to address it. While one can argue that the pressure to address the challenges the global commons faces has increased



considerably (with the climate change dynamic offering the most insightful example), there is a fundamental failure to formulate global governance regimes to address those challenges. Indeed, a UN report reminds us that increasing interdependence between states has not been matched by an equal development of global cooperation mechanisms, as no comprehensive framework addressing global commons topics exists; it added that enhancing the governance of the global commons represents a specific task of environmental policy and in support of sustainable development (Global Governance and Governance of the Global Commons, 2015). However, some are still optimistic about the ability of the global community of states to cooperate, as argued by Hagen and Crombez (2018), stating that the destruction of the global commons would have such disastrous impacts on humanity that a strict global governance response may still be agreed on.

It is worth pointing out that global governance is linked with allocating responsibility of 'who will do what' and 'how much', as it aims to establish a regulatory setting when addressing a specific global challenge. What Karns, Mingst, and Stiles (2015: 39) described as a request for clarity concerning 'to whom', 'for what', and 'by what mechanism', adding that global governance actors should be accountable. Weiss (2013: 32) reminds us of a critical limitation of global governance; that it is governance minus government, indicating a missing capacity when implementing collective decisions adding that the diversity of actors involved in global governance also dilutes the political authority and accountability. Addressing climate change at the global level, or the inability to do so in ways that can stop its ongoing dynamic, indicates both a demand and task for global governance, even if there is an absence of authority. Indeed, we must be explicit about to what extent states and civil society actors are accountable in formulating a response to a specific global challenge, as well as implementing specific steps once an agreement has been reached. Indeed, with the increasing involvement of different actors in addressing the climate change impact, we can observe a shift of responsibility from the state to non-state actors or what Hickmann (2015) describes as a discussion about the potential shift in authority in world politics. Even though we tend to celebrate civil society involvement in governance and global governance affairs, there are still lasting questions about the legitimacy of NGOs (beyond their imminent support groups), such as a lack of wider accountability and representation or the concern that they may be self-serving and represent a non-elected body. On the other hand, one can argue that the support they generate does indicate the level of legitimacy they hold. But again, it is not unproblematic to determine how far this support reaches within a population or, indeed, at the global level. Though, global climate change and environmental protest movements like 'Fridays for Future' or 'Extinction Rebellion', not to mention Greenpeace, are a strong indication of the ability of global non-government activism. Examples include their ability to organise global climate strikes (September 25, 2019, and September 24 2021) with extensive participation around the world, such as 'Fridays for Future', among a plethora of ongoing actions globally, at the regional and local level. In addition, it cannot be denied that NGOs provide extensive technical expertise to many people and for specific challenges, which strongly suggests that they could provide the capacity for compliance monitoring. In that way, NGOs can affect strategies for addressing specific challenges, whether they are local, regional, or global in character. However, even when they are able to mobilise beyond national borders, they are still limited in their ability to generate a lasting impact, as they do not have the same institutional legitimacy and formal political power as the state. Climate activism can certainly change the domestic political discourse by adding specific subjects to the domestic political discourse, as the Green Movement in various European states has done successfully for decades now. Yet, they are able to influence the domestic political agenda and, thus, extension, the international agenda, as they transformed from protest groups into established political parties, thereby generating lasting political impact. Still, while the impact non-state climate activists may generate on the global level is less evident with regard to binding political decision-making, even though it should not be denied that activism outside of state power can generate a political impact even at the global level, we still have to recognise their impact on global governance in general. As emphasised by Porter (2009: 87), a distinctive characteristic of global governance is its entanglement of non-state and state activities, one which is often underestimated.

Yet, a global public, as a specific political entity, does not exist, and for that reason, any impact generated by globally acting NGOs still will need to be translated via state power. Only states have the ability to make binding international decisions, even though state authority has been coming under increasing pressure. As for NGO influence, despite their power to mobilise regularly and on occasion globally, such protests did not prevent the United States from withdrawing from the Paris Agreement in November 2019, which encouraged anti-climate change activists and governments critical of introducing a transformation towards a non-fossil fuel-based economy.

This leads to another lasting and linked question: the enduring power of the state. States share some unique characteristics not available to other actors, among them a bureaucracy, a legislative and legal system, sovereignty, and coercive capacities. After all, multilateral negotiations are key aspects of global governance. States also provide a structural setting for other actors. Hay and Lister (2005: 12) emphasise that the state generates an institutional contextualisation in which other actors are able to orient themselves. We may also remember North's description of state structure, which he identifies as an 'institutional matrix' (North 1999: 115). All of which underscores the continuous relevance of the state. Another equally critical aspect of state power is linked to their legitimacy to act and their ability to agree on binding agreements with other states. As stated by the recently published UNEP Adaptation Gap Report (2021), national adaptation planning remains a critical aspect in the global emphasis to address the impacts of climate change, yet the report added that, despite an increase in national adaptation strategies, national adaptation policies are falling short in comprehensively addressing climate change risks. Hence, at the same time, states can also be identified as the source of failure to agree on global governance strategies to address global problems because of particular national interests.

Considering the plurality of actors in global policies, a related topic is how many actors should be involved when formulating a response to a global governance challenge. Primarily, one can differentiate between a strategy focusing on a small number of participants, based on a so-called 'coalition of the willing', with the aim of agreeing on strong targets, or alternatively, on a large number of participants, but aiming at focusing on a softer target. These alternative approaches are usually described as 'narrow-but-deep' versus 'broad-but-shallow' approaches. One can identify arguments for and against each strategy. For example, one could argue that a small number of participants may allow a faster conclusion and implementation of a global governance strategy, in addition to a stronger commitment to addressing a specific challenge. However, a counterargument would be that such an agreement based on a small number of actors may not be strong enough to comprehensively address a particular challenge. This is a topic especially relevant in addressing climate change and its impacts. Biermann et al. (2009) ask for caution, as it is doubtful whether an agreement reached with a small membership would improve the overall performance in addressing a global challenge, as it may preclude an extension of participants since the agreement reached may be linked to specifically to the interests of the involved participants. On the other hand, with climate change in mind, if it would be possible to get the major GHG emitters to agree on a strategy to address their emissions, the reduction achieved may be sufficient to reduce the climate change dynamic. In such a scenario, the participation of an even wider variety of actors may not be essential, even though it still would be welcomed. Within the climate change context, one may consider applying such a strategy to the G20 grouping. It is worth taking into account that the G20 as a group not only contributes 76 per cent of global emissions (Dagnet et al., 2021: 16) but also represents 63 per cent of the global population and generates 87 per cent of gross world output (Global Commons Stewardship Index 2021). Another thought concerning the discourse between a small or large membership when agreeing on a global governance strategy may deem it appropriate to focus on a more extensive membership, despite the earlier mentioned challenges, as this could increase the legitimacy of such a strategy and consequently support its implementation. However, global government strategy formulation with an extended membership does face the challenge of integrating numerous and often diverse interests, potentially undermining a successful and timely

response to a particular global challenge leading to a fundamental question: can unity be found within plurality?

Karns, Mingst, and Stiles (2015: 1) emphasise that the requirement for global governance is not an 'if' question; indeed, it is a 'how' question. If anything, the failure of international cooperation in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, one of the most fundamental challenges humanity has faced in recent times, has exposed our incapacity for successful global cooperation. Addressing climate change seems to be another candidate for global cooperation failure, even though some agreements have been reached. What the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change have in common is that they represent global, regional, and local challenges at the same time. There is an additional aspect we should be aware of when advocating a global governance solution to a specific global challenge: that building or enhancing a particular global governance structure may be described as a late response to the emergence of a particular issue. This position is advocated by Thakur and Langenhove (2006: 17), pointing out that an evolving global governance setting represents a lagging response to an emerging collective action challenge. This reveals a critical aspect, especially with regard to global climate change.

However, while it would be inappropriate to state that climate change-related announcements at the global level are nothing but 'hot air', it is still an observable fact that the global community is missing earlier agreed targets, such as staying within a 1.5° or even 2° increase temperature. This brings us back to the general focus of this paper: what level of response - global, regional, or local - can offer the best response in addressing climate change? The relevance of addressing climate change and related risks at different levels increases with rising threat intensity since it is at the local and regional levels where those threats manifest themselves.

### **Local responses: an alternative focus for addressing the climate change dynamic and related risks?**

The basic argument put forward is that local and regional responses are being implemented more quickly and will not need to wait until an agreement at the global level has been reached. Indeed, whatever global governance strategy is agreed on, it is still necessary to translate such global guidelines into domestic law, again consuming time in the process. Alternatively, one can argue that local initiatives take advantage of the dynamics at the local level, where the climate change impact is felt most acutely, and thus mobilise strong social, economic, and political responses based on a perception that there is a necessity to act now. There is another potential trade-off, as such local and regional cooperation may also contribute to a change of perception on climate change, thus enhancing the willingness of more people and communities to participate in identifying a response to climate change impacts by supporting not only adaptation strategies but by contributing to mitigation efforts, as well. Cooperation arrangements like the C40 also remind us of the growing relations between civil society and non-state and state actors to address the various impacts generated by climate change. Extensive regulations and agreements at the local and regional levels offer additional support for a transnational focus on addressing climate change risks and impacts. From such a perspective, fragmentation or climate anarchy does offer an opportunity to act and to act now. Indeed, there is no need to wait for a global governance policy strategy to await the outcome of ongoing negotiations at the global level. In addition, there exists the ability to disseminate specific knowledge and experience in addressing climate risks and mitigation strategies through such networks, consequently supporting the application and adaptation of different policy strategies. This, in turn, even further highlights the local level as an appropriate focus for climate change policy.

While local responses are crucial in addressing the impact of climate change, there exist limitations as to what extent local responses can generate enough impact in arresting global climate change. Such concern is linked to the ability of local resources to instigate mitigation and adaptation

strategies and to implement them. Undeniably, such an undertaking does require comprehensive capacities and resources at different government levels to access and interpret data, as well as to formulate and, importantly, to implement adaptation strategies. Recognising the complexity of adaptation, Mfitumukiza et al. (2020) point out that while there is a need for a local response to climate change risks and impacts, community-based responses have been badly organised. The GAR Special Report on Drought identifies various shortcomings regarding local responses. For example, local responses often constitute an ‘after response’ once a negative impact already materialised; or the discontinuation of policy responses once a situation improves; even a similar threat may re-occur in the near future. Capacity gap, limited knowledge, poor assessments of vulnerability, weak coordination at national and regional levels, and lack of policy option awareness were identified as additional challenges (GAR, 2021). Adding to the challenge is that adaptation strategies need to be implemented in the context of a rising climate change dynamic since mitigation strategies are failing to limit global warming. Take the example of sea-level rise. One scenario plans adaptation measures based on the 1.5-degree goal. Yet, as we are en route to missing this target, though for now, none can estimate to what extent, there is a recognition that current adaptation planning will not be sufficient. Still, additional challenges are for what alternative scenario should adaptation strategies be formulated, and what will be the impact on the sea-level rise of our failure to keep GHG level to the previously agreed level? Still, one may argue, as Mfitumukiza et al. (2020) indicates, that a merging of local knowledge with climate science data would greatly enhance community-based adaptation responses, though he cautions, as adaption represents a continuing and repeating process, divided into planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. Regarding adaptation strategies at the local and regional levels, the 2019 IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate point out that, with regard to coastal erosion, flooding, and salinisation, technical limits to hard protection strategies exist (Oppenheimer et al., 2019).

In addition to adaptation, the local level also takes on a crucial role in mitigation efforts. The UN World Cities Report (2020) identifies not only the challenges of climate change-related risks for urban development but also the contributions of cities to the climate change dynamic by pointing out that cities not only generate 70 per cent of global carbon emissions but also consume two-thirds of global energy. Considering their contributions to the climate change dynamic and their increasing exposure to the associated risks, it becomes apparent that cities have a vital role in mitigating climate change as well as in formulating adaptation strategies to reduce the impact of climate change-related risks. Taking together cities’ contribution and exposure to global climate change provides another argument for a regional and local focus when considering how best to respond to such risks. Indeed, the local ability to support mitigation should not be neglected; after all, locally-based mitigation efforts, like a reduction in GHG, can have the additional effect of reducing local air pollution and thus contribute further to the health of the local population. Considering local responses to address climate change and related risks, this adds a bottom-up, decentralised governance feature to the existing global governance structure based on UN-supported global climate change policies like the Paris Agreement. Therefore, the ability or inability of the local level to address and respond to climate change risks and the global climate change dynamic has become a critical issue in both addressing and arresting climate change impacts.

Within academia, a related discourse between transnational and multilateralists takes on a central relevance. While multilateralists focus on international climate negotiations, transnationalism point to the variety of climate initiatives at the subnational and civil society level, such as the previously mentioned C40 city cooperation; they also include cooperation beyond national borders. The multifaceted and numeral cases of such cooperations give support to what Dyer (2014: 182) describes as ‘climate anarchy’. Yet, limited cooperation in pursuing a more active response in addressing climate change can also be found at the national level, where we can witness the occurrence of what is often described as ‘minilateral initiatives’ or ‘climate clubs’, representing a loose form of cooperation between nation states with a shared interest in addressing climate change (Hickmann



2017: 433). Bulkely and Newell (2010: 69) stated that transnational climate change governance addresses issues of effectiveness and accountability, while Baeckstrand (2008) claims that transnational cooperation may be interpreted as a response to both a regulatory and implementation deficit associated with multilateral cooperation. In offering another perspective on this mosaic of climate change cooperation, Ostrom (2010) applied the term 'polycentric systems', which indicates the existence of various independent centres which are still loosely connected through various cooperative arrangements, which allow them to enhance innovation and to learn from one another, and which are characterised by the absence of a central authority.

Even so, further challenges remain. When considering that global governance mitigation efforts fail to address the climate change dynamic, like missing the 1.5-degree target, the pressure on adaptation increases in its relevance. This applies especially at the local level, where the impact is felt directly and thus will require updating existing and adding additional adaptation strategies. With reference to the 2021 extreme climate events, one could argue that adaptation planning should include a greater margin of future risk exposure evaluation. The discourse about the scale of reference to future climate change impacts and the formulation of related adaptation strategies is also related to what is described as the 'precautionary principle'. Accordingly, responses should be formulated when threats of serious or irreversible damage are anticipated, while a lack of full scientific certainty should not offer a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to address such risks (TAR Climate Change, 2001). Yet applying the precautionary principle implies that we have to make assumptions not only about the potential impact of a particular climate change risk but also the costs associated with implementing such a strategy. This could constitute a particular political challenge since resources are not only always scar, but political pressure to divide resources into different policies also exists. Adding to this challenge is that policy strategies are mutating throughout the mobilisation and implementation process as different economic and social interests are mobilised.

While local government, non-government, and civil society actors interpret a local and regional focus as an alternative to the dragging-on of climate change-related negotiations at the global level, some potential limitations can be identified. After all, these varieties of limited cooperation focus on the specific impacts of climate change on a specific locality or region. As a result, the orientation and implementation perspective has become rather narrow, and so far, actions taken at the local level have not generated a response sufficient enough to arrest the global climate change dynamic. The Global Commission on Adaptation also alerts us to the needs and challenges involved in supporting local adaptation processes by stating that, while the requirement for wide-ranging adaptation is already recognised, the pace and scale required to address climate change risks and impacts are missing (Adopt Now 2019). Hence, critical questions remain, like to what extent such cooperation below the national level will help with solving versus merely addressing the impacts generated by climate change. This situation is further aggregated by our seeming inability to implement stronger and more timely mitigation strategies, which further enhances the adaptation pressure. While local and regional level responses are increasing in their relevance, not least in the protection of threatened communities, Hickmann (2016) points out that transnationalism does not seem to indicate a shift in global climate governance in undermining multinational cooperation, even if it seems to indicate such a shift in focus. So, we may still have to look towards the global level to formulate a scale effect response, to further a strong focus on global mitigation strategies, as this would reduce the pressure on local adaptation processes.

## Conclusion

This paper discusses the complexity of addressing climate change as a global governance challenge by raising the question of at what level the climate change dynamic and related risks can be best addressed. While there are convincing arguments for focusing on the global level – by formulating a global governance response which may generate the required scale of response to address and



eventually minimise the global climate change dynamic – there are equally strong arguments to be found for focusing on the local level. After all, it is at that level where people and communities are experiencing the actual impact of climate change, where climate risks are transformed from abstract considerations into real-life experiences. There are additional trade-offs identifiable when focusing on the local level as the reduction of local GHG emissions not only contributes to addressing the climate change dynamic but also contributes to a reduction of the local, even regional, air pollution impact. Offering another positive contribution to the health of the local population. This concreteness of climate change-related impacts at the local level also generates another effect as various localities share their experience and their responses when facing the impacts of climate change-related risks. This, in turn, leads to the building of locally based international networks, like the global C40 city networks, facilitating a wider distribution of specific experiences made as well as sharing adaptation experiences. In doing so, their cooperation generates a scale effect in addressing global climate change. There exists another argument for focusing on the local level: since a smaller number of actors are involved when compared with the global governance level, this offers the opportunity for a faster response to climate change-related risks and impacts.

While there exists agreement on the increasing contribution of the local level in addressing (adaptation) and arresting (mitigation) the global climate change dynamic and related risks, it is also recognised that, for the time being, the extent of responses generated at the local level is not sufficient in scale to reduce the climate change dynamic to a level that will limit global warming by 1.5° Celsius, or even to stay below the 2° Celsius target agreed within the Paris Agreement. There is also evidence that actors at the local level often do not have sufficient capacities or know-how to address climate change risks and impacts and to implement appropriate adaptation strategies. This represents a specific issue for lesser developed countries. This, in turn, indicates some limitations of the local level approach and suggests that we may still have to turn to the global governance level as the relevant level to generate the required scale effect in arresting the global climate change dynamic.

Returning to the global governance level, we are still facing the same fundamental challenge as previously outlined: how to align the plethora of diverse interests to formulate a timely response that can address climate change at the global level with agreed targets that have a binding character. We may remember the US government changing its attitude to global climate commitments, by first joining, only after insisting that their demands are met and then quitting global climate agreements like the Paris Agreement. While the actual US government has now re-joined the Paris Agreement, one may wonder for how long? This episode offers a clear indication of the additional challenges global government approaches are facing. As such, a focus on the local level to provide a timely response to climate change-related risks to people and communities does offer an alternative perspective. Yet, it is the global governance level that has the potential to generate the scale of response capable of addressing global climate change, even though, for the present time, the global community is failing in this task. As a final thought, we should keep in mind potential challenges in aligning local and global approaches in addressing climate change. After all, it could be a considerable challenge to align local-specific responses with global governance strategies, thus contributing to further fragmentation of climate change responses, with the potential of undermining global governance strategies and the ability to generate the required scale effect in reducing the climate change dynamic.

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# Adaptation of Law and Policy in an Aged Society: Guardianship Law and People's Behavioural Pattern

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KEYWORDS	ABSTRACT
<p>Ageing, Guardianship, People's behavioural patterns, Family reliance, Individual autonomy</p> <p>Received April 6, 2023 Revised May 18, 2023 Accepted May 29, 2023</p>	<p>This essay reviews some typologies of people's behavioural patterns and examines relationships between guardianship laws and policies and people's behavioural patterns in Japan and the State of Victoria. Through such analysis, a consideration regarding the adaptation of law and policy in an aged society is addressed. By reviewing people's behavioural patterns in these two states, two keywords appear essential in practice under the guardianship law and policy: one is "family reliance"; the other is "value of individual autonomy." Most Japanese do not rely on legal measures, including adult guardianship when it concerns private autonomy for property management and personal affairs, but they can use legal measures even staying with family reliance. The guardianship law in Japan must be reformed to create a limited guardianship type with less than one year for self-revocation. With the value of individual autonomy, people can decide by themselves what to do for the future. This issue is difficult to tackle because of the legal consciousness of older Japanese adults and the nuanced relationships between relatives. It is recommended that Japanese people should debate value issues in public for a better society and to ensure the people's participation in social affairs through their own initiatives for establishing the value of individual autonomy. The baby boom generation, who are educated at schools in democracy postwar, may change the behavioural pattern of older adults in the future. The research method is an interdisciplinary literature survey and interviews with experts, with a particular focus on comparative guardianship law and policy studies in Japan and the State of Victoria.</p>

## Introduction

The long-term future is certainly ambiguous, but long-term projections of demography are an exception that is most likely to materialize as expected. Therefore, the future must be planned based on such long-term demographic projections, which have been clarified globally for the years until 2100 (UN, 2022). Among countries, Japan boasts the world's most advanced aged society. In Japan, 29.1% of the national population was aged 65 and over in September 2022. The percentage of older adults aged 65 and over is projected to rise 38.4% in 2065 (Cabinet Office of Japan, 2021: 3). The national population is approximately 125 million and slightly decreasing year by year. Currently, the number of older adults with dementia is estimated at 6.0 million, which is projected

to increase to 7.3 million by 2025, when one in five older adults aged 65 and over will suffer from dementia.

In Australia, the percentage of the population aged 65 and over was 16.2% (2021) and is expected to rise between 21% and 23% by 2066 (AIHW, 2021). 30% of older adults aged 85 and over suffer from dementia. The population of Australia is approximately 25 million and is slightly increasing year by year. First-generation immigrants with diverse cultural backgrounds, such as from the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Middle East, and Asia, are ageing, and the state and special territory governments are being forced to deal with their treatment. Therefore, the uniqueness of Australia lies in its ageing population with cultural diversity.

Adults with cognitive impairment cannot protect their interests in daily life and face the risk of harm. Therefore, measures are needed to support and protect older adults from harm. In countries that share a similar law system, the responses to law and policy measures by people differ. It is necessary to introduce law and policy measures as well as devise modes of operation that matches people's behavioural pattern in the country. Therefore, in addition to a design of law and policy in theory, people's behavioural patterns in practice must be considered. This is because a law- and policy-based system is workable through mutual transactions between law and policy, which provide the social norms and guidance on the one hand, and people who may observe the law and policy on the other hand.

Comparative law is a discipline of law that analyses differences and similarities between the laws of countries. It is useful not only to understand the law system but also to develop the laws in question. Comparative law studies can offer suggestions from other countries with the same challenge to the country. Building relationships with researchers and practitioners is important for researchers to understand not only the legal theory but also the practice of the law. Comparative law studies must be based on a multi-dimensional dialogue between researchers and practitioners at both ends.

In a law related to the motives of human beings, such as guardianship law, it is essential to clarify the state of practices and discuss people's behavioural patterns. Such a theme is difficult to generalize and is not discussed in the articles or at conferences. This essay attempts to answer the research questions: "What people's behavioural patterns may influence guardianship law and policy practice in Japan and the State of Victoria, and how should the legislatures and policymakers in these two states consider people's behavioural patterns when legislating or reforming the guardianship law and policy?"

The State of Victoria is regarded as a leading state for Australian guardianship laws and policies because it has created modern guardianship legislation since the 1980s, known as the "Victorian model" (Carney and Tait, 1997: 19). Japan and the State of Victoria, having different population sizes of 125 million and 6.5 million, share similarities in a democratic society, advanced economic standards, and lifestyle, but people's behavioural pattern differs. This essay provides implications of adapting law and policy in an aged society, focusing on guardianship law and people's behavioural patterns in Japan and the State of Victoria.

## **Methodology**

The research methods are an interdisciplinary literature survey and interviews with experts based on comparative guardianship law and policy in Japan and the State of Victoria. The scope of laws and policies is limited to those related to statutory guardianship, enduring power of attorney, and supported decision-making. The literature research covers academic books, articles, and websites within the scope of law and policy as described above in Japanese and English, which were

available between October 2018 and March 2023. These sources are reviewed through research in the discipline of civil law. The previous studies on the Victorian guardianship system and supported decision-making refers to local literature surveys because those in Japan are limited to several ones.

The author conducted interviews with experts in Melbourne on March 1–3, 2017, March 4–12, 2019, and February 22–27, 2023. The subjects of the interview were experts in universities, research institutes, not-for-profit organizations, and public agencies, including the Office of the Public Advocate, Civil and Administrative Tribunal, State Trustees, and the Department of Health. Questionnaires were sent to experts by email in advance, and interviews were conducted in their offices in Melbourne by the author. Interviews were recorded as minutes. Email correspondence of experts by the author followed when it was necessary. The author adheres to the ethical standards imposed on academic research and has no conflict of interest with any of the interviewees.

The primary limitation of this study is that the essay is a literature analysis and does not include quantitative data related to relationships between the guardianship law and policy and the people's behavioural patterns in question. In this sense, people's behavioural pattern illustrates the main factors that may give influence people consciously or unconsciously. Therefore, people's behavioural pattern is conceptually described as a general tendency that people may understand. However, this limitation does not negate the importance of academic analysis of the research question.

In the sections below, the essay first reviews the guardianship law and policy instruments that support and protect older adults with cognitive impairment in Japan and the State of Victoria. Second, the essay reviews some typologies of people's behavioural patterns based on literature surveys in these two states. Third, the essay examines relationships between the guardianship laws and policies and the people's behavioural patterns in the two states based on the keywords "family reliance" and "value of individual autonomy." Lastly, the essay is concluded.

## **Guardianship Law and Policy**

Every country has its own adult guardianship system for statutory guardianship system, enduring power of attorney, and supported decision-making, but law and policy design and practices of these legal measures differ. Law and policy design and practices in Japan and the State of Victoria are briefly summarized below.

### **Japan**

Japan is one of the civil law countries, and the adult guardianship system is regulated in the Civil Code and relevant laws. The adult guardianship system is composed of two legal measures: (a) statutory guardianship stipulated in the Civil Code; and (b) voluntary guardianship by a specific law. Statutory guardianship comprises three types according to the principal's relevant capacity: "guardianship," "curatorship," and "assistance". The principal refers to the represented person or the person who is supported by others. Guardianship is applied to all legal acts regarding property management and contracts of the principal, while curatorship and assistance are applied to specific legal acts specified by the family court through a hearing. Adult guardians are supervised by family courts through regular reports to the courts.

The number of statutory guardianship users in December 2022 was 242,348, and approximately 74% of them are guardianship type (Courts of Japan, 2023). In response to the ageing of the population and increasing troubles resulting from older adults with dementia, the Act on Promotion of the Adult Guardianship System was enacted in March 2016. The Government of

Japan has implemented advocacy assistance initiatives so that older adults may access easier to the adult guardianship system.

The voluntary guardianship system is similar to a system to use an enduring power of attorney, but the proxy contract creating the voluntary guardianship must be notarized by a notary public. After the mental capacity of the principal declines, the voluntary guardian lodges a petition to the family court and conducts legal acts for the principal in line with the contract. The voluntary guardian is under the supervision of a voluntary guardian supervisor appointed by the family court. The voluntary guardianship contract can provide unique support according to their own intentions.

The number of voluntary guardianship cases in December 2022 was 2,739 (i.e., 1.1 per cent of all guardianship cases; Courts of Japan, 2023), although more than 250,000 contractors have concluded the proxy contracts (i.e., May 2021 survey report of the Ministry of Justice of Japan). Most proxy contracts do not develop voluntary guardianship with the supervisor. One of the reasons it happens is because the proxy contract remains valid and voluntary guardians continue receiving fees even after the mental capacity of the principal declines (Article 111, Civil Code of Japan). This is a difference of law and its interpretation between the civil code and common law.

Once the petition procedure is completed, statutory guardianship authority and voluntary guardianship contracts will be registered with the Legal Affairs Bureau. The registry can be disclosed registered information by issuing a document certifying the registered particulars (Ministry of Justice of Japan, n/a). Safe transactions to deal with estates or assets in the market can be secured through such disclosure to third parties.

The Government of Japan provides supported decision-making guidelines for nursing home managers and adult guardians, which encourage them to go through the process of supported decision-making (MHLW, 2020). The training programs of supported decision-making on the basic practice have been implemented for the staff of public agencies and relevant practitioners since December 2020, and several pilot projects, including Toyota City, to excise supported decision-making in the community have just started.

### ***The State of Victoria***

The State of Victoria inherited the common law of England, which it continues to use today. The guardianship system is defined by three Acts: Guardianship and Administration Act, Powers of Attorney Act, and Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act. These Acts regulate three public agencies: the Office of the Public Advocate, Civil and Administrative Tribunal, and Public Trustees. The uniqueness of their guardianship system lies in separate functions for the guardian (personal affairs) and the administrator (financial management). Five principles are summarized: the presumption of capacity; the least restrictive option taken by the decision-maker; respect for autonomy; inclusion as a valued member of the community; and the adult's welfare and interests (Willmott et al., 2017).

The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal appoints relatives or close friends of the principal as guardians with self-revokable terms and does not appoint legal/welfare practitioners as guardians. This is to avoid conflicts of interest resulting from remuneration. The duration of guardianship is usually limited to dealing with legal issues according to the principle of necessity. The deliberations on guardianship constitute a legal examination, and a decision is made after hearing the circumstances of the parties. Observing a hearing gave the impression of people involved in a casual interview at a city hall when the author attended a hearing as an observer on March 12, 2019.

Enduring powers of attorney are frequently concluded, but there is no obligation to register with authorities, and thus the state government has no idea as to how many enduring powers of attorney have been concluded. In the event of fraudulent activity in an enduring power of attorney, the victim or its stakeholders can lodge a petition with the tribunal and have an expeditious hearing. The number of such hearings is limited, but it takes a lot of time to sort out the facts related to fraudulent activity in an enduring power of attorney (i.e., from an interview of a member of the tribunal with the author on March 12, 2019).

In the State of Victoria, two tracks of supported decision-making have been in operation since March 2020. Namely, one is contract-based supported decision-making, and the other is supported decision-making with the supporters appointed by the tribunal by law.

The number of tribunal orders in the State of Victoria 2020/21 was 3,373 (1,336 guardians, 2,036 administrators; AGAC, 2022). The number of newly appointed guardianship orders in 2021 was 39,800 in Japan (Courts of Japan, 2022). The statutory guardianship system is used relatively more in the State of Victoria than in Japan on the same population scale, but Victorian tribunal orders include the number of renewal and emergency orders and some overlapping of guardian/administrator orders that the Japanese guardianship orders do not include.

## People's Behavioural Patterns

### Japan

Japan remains a hierarchically organized social system, which was called a “vertical society” (Nakane, 1970). When an individual goes against an authoritative person, such an individual could be excommunicated from the community or group. As such, even in unpleasant situations, the much a dissenting individual can do is to remain silent. There is the wisdom of the commoners who unconditionally accept the unwritten rules of the institutions, follow the majority views, and spend their lives without any turbulence.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, a storm of self-restraint raged over Japan, and those who opposed it were seen to be socially defeated. It was found that Japanese people oppress each other not only vertically but also horizontally. This was called “peer pressure”. Various factors are assumed to constitute a phenomenon of peer pressure, such as historical reasons (e.g., effects of Buddhism, the mentality of agricultural society), primary educational effects (e.g., collective moral education), and a local practice not to make things transparent (e.g., part of traditional Japanese philosophy), and none of them is more overwhelming than the others (Kokami and Sato, 2020).

If any social problem arises, the government agency responsible for overseeing the case will be blamed by the mass media or consumers. This may be a factor that impedes the behaviour of those who are willing to take risks and try new things. The formal opinion (*tatema* in Japanese) is prioritized, and little custom of discussion in public is available based on what those willing to take risks really think (*honne* in Japanese; Nakata, 2014).

In Asia, including Japan, the family is a social unit, and even if the law system was not well in place, it is customary for people to help each other based on their shared kinship. This applies to other regions, such as the Middle East and the Mediterranean region. This behavioural pattern is related to life culture in the region, and a tendency that shows how much people rely on the law and policy or their family or relatives differs by region.

The system of patriarchy and succession to the head of the family established in the former Civil Code of Japan in 1898 set the family as the basic unit of Japanese society, and as a general rule, the



eldest son inherited the property of the family as the next head of the household. No public authority entered the family, and the patriarch was supposed to settle domestic affairs within the family. This system was abolished in 1947 as a democratic program. The Imperial Family is the one to maintain this traditional system under the Constitution of Japan.

A view appears that even today, the consciousness of patriarchy continues to live in society and influences Japanese people's activities in business (Emanuel Todd, 2022). Older Japanese aged over 85 were born in prewar and wartime and educated at schools in the old regime. Younger generations are influenced by those people from generation to generation, and it might be inevitable for Japanese people to follow patriarchy to some extent. If so, it makes sense that most Japanese people support the Imperial Family system.

### ***The State of Victoria***

The State of Victoria constitutes a multicultural society, and today many ethnicities interact frequently. One-fourth of Australians are first-generation immigrants born outside Australia, of which 60% were born in non-English speaking countries (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Since Australia is located in the Southern Hemisphere and surrounded by the sea on all sides, it is characterized by its geographical isolation. However, Australia has been actively accepting refugees and migrants from conflict areas. This national policy has led to the formation of a multicultural society.

There is respect for the human rights of the indigenous peoples, and the government's policy of maintaining cultural diversity is clearly set out (Department of Home Affairs, n/a). The State of Victoria enacted the Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2016, considering that the Constitution in Australia does not state a bill of rights. The State of Victoria is a contract-based society and is concerned with individual autonomy and self-determination.

Australians, including Victorians, think highly of relationships with others, known as "mateship." Rather than rely on lawyers to protect their interests, it is said that they help each other in the community or within the same group of relatives and cultural backgrounds and utilize public institutions when necessary. They generally respect public institutions. An officer of the Victorian Ministry of Health has disclosed that they will explain their state law and policy to the fourteen ethnic group leaders in Melbourne to activate communication with non-English speaking citizens (i.e., from the interview of the Ministry of Health by the author on February 27, 2023).

### **Discussion on Guardianship Law and People's Behavioural Pattern**

By reviewing the people's behavioural patterns in Japan and the State of Victoria, two keywords appear essential in practice under the guardianship law and policy. One is "family reliance"; the other is "value of individual autonomy." Below, the discussion will be explored based on these two keywords.

#### ***Family Reliance***

It is apparent most older adults in Japan who do not use the adult guardianship system rely on informal arrangements to manage their personal affairs and property. In fact, the number of adult guardianship users is estimated to be equivalent to 2% to 3% of potential users with cognitive impairment (Regional Guardianship Promotion Project, 2022). The remaining 97% to 98% are estimated to be supported in informal arrangements. In such cases, they have potential risk of abuse, particularly financial exploitation. Elder abuse is regulated by the elder abuse prevention

law, but the annual statistics show how many elder abuses happen, although it does not capture the whole picture as only a few cases of elder abuse are reported (MHLW, 2021).

The family courts appoint law/welfare practitioners as adult guardians at 85%, with fees paid by the principal. This is one of the reasons people do not lodge a petition for guardianship because it is costly, and people do not want to have the situation controlled by a stranger even if he/she is a professional guardian. In Japan, other than family or relatives, people tend not to be interested in guardianship or welfare activities unless they are paid, although some exceptions are seen as that welfare practitioners or volunteers work for principles without fees. The economic reason is important.

In the State of Victoria, the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) report, *Guardianship Final Report 24*, was published in 2012. This is a Victorian guardianship law reform report. Paragraph 8.89 of the report states that “supporter arrangements are designed for close, personal relationships, which cannot be replaced by professional appointments” (VLRC, 2012: 139). The Victorian guardianship laws 1986 and 2019 adopted the policy that the tribunal should prioritize relative or close friend appointments as guardians or supporters without remuneration. In this respect, Victorian guardianship largely relies on relatives or close friends of the principal.

Informal arrangements and family agreements are common in the State of Victoria. Family agreements between a principal and their relatives are that the relatives take care of the principals in exchange for the principals' property transfer. Such agreements are not typically put in writing and are fragile, and the principals' interests are not guaranteed by law.

Victorian people use enduring powers of attorney or adult guardianship as far as it is necessary. Even family members use the adult guardianship system for a short period for crucial decision-making on behalf of the principal (i.e., email correspondence of a member of the tribunal with the author on September 2, 2021). Elder abuse is one of the social issues, and the move to legislate the elder abuse prevention act in the State of Victoria is underway.

In contrast, most Japanese people rely on family members or relatives but do not rely on the adult guardianship system. They can use the law system, even staying with family reliance as Victorians do. To materialize this combination of family reliance with guardianship, the guardianship law in Japan must be reformed to create a limited guardianship type with less than a year of self-revocation. People can then use limited guardianship as long as it is necessary, even staying with family reliance.

### ***Value of Individual Autonomy***

In the State of Victoria, the Terms and Reference of the VLRC Report 24 (2012) addresses “the principle of respect for the inherent dignity, individual autonomy including the freedom to make one's own choices, and independence of persons” (VLRC, 2012: xi). This term demonstrates that the purpose of the Victorian guardianship law reform is maximizing individual autonomy and independence. The policy of the Victorian Government stays with the value of individual autonomy.

A research program by Monash University, known as the Protecting Elders' Assets Study (PEAS), examines rural and multicultural responses to intra-familial and inter-generational asset management (King C et al., 2011). This research implies gaps in behaviour in asset management among older Victorians according to their cultural backgrounds. It establishes the fact that Victorians with roots in non-English speaking countries, such as Vietnamese Victorians, do not use enduring powers of attorney as much as Victorians with English-speaking ancestry do. It can be said that, generally, people with Asian origins do not use EPAs.

In Asia, enduring powers of attorney have become relatively common only in Singapore, and a total of 3.5% of the national population (i.e., Singapore nationalities and permanent residents with foreign passports; approximately 4 million) have concluded lasting powers of attorney, mostly with relatives (96%) as counter contracting parties (Office of the Public Guardian of Singapore, 2023). This is due to the initiatives conducted by the Government of Singapore, including the digitalization of lasting powers of attorney procedures.

In Japan, considering that voluntary guardianship is exceedingly underutilized, one researcher has wondered whether a legal culture of self-determining matters of a principal, such as contracting them with a voluntary guardian, will ever take root in Japan (Fukada, 2018). According to some Japanese lawyers, parties who are reluctant to consider voluntary guardianship or estate planning have two things in common. They have an ardent desire not to entrust their property management to anyone, including relatives, while they are healthy. If they entrust someone in their family with their property management, they do not want to be intervened by other relatives as to why they chose to entrust it to that person (i.e., an online symposium sponsored by Elder Law Society Japan on March 26, 2022). This issue is difficult to tackle because of the legal consciousness of older adults and the nuanced relationships between relatives.

The legal system, like the governance system and business, has become Westernized in Japan, but the people's traditional mindset persists, and Western-style legal thinking is yet to hold sway over the people. Article 244 of the Penal Code of Japan regulates exemption from criminal acts by relatives. This provision is meant to address the idea that "law does not enter into home" (Sukimoto, 2009). This rule, however, does not work in the case that the relative is an adult guardian. [The Supreme Court of Japan ruling on a defendant's case of business embezzlement, Supreme Court of Japan, Penal Code Vol. 66, No. 10, page 981 on October 9, 2012]. Relative guardians who violate the law are revoked by the family courts. These may hint that many relatives use their parent's money for their own interests.

Considering primary education at schools and following the life environment of older adults aged 85 and over who were born in prewar or wartime, it can be assumed inevitable that older adults, particularly older women, do not disclose their will and preferences to third parties because they were not educated to do so. It can be assumed that the baby boom generation, who were born in the postwar and are familiar with democracy, will have initiatives to change people's behavioural patterns in the future based on the value of individual autonomy.

In the State of Victoria, welfare practitioners often use the term "dignity of risk" (Ibrahim and Davis, 2013). This implies providing measures against the risk of harm expected from a certain action and taking predetermined actions within a risk-controllable range. For example, older adults with dementia should be treated on a case-by-case basis to determine whether to stop them from driving. The dignity of risk should be boldly challenged to the extent that risk can be controlled. There is a sense of the value of individual autonomy and the principle of necessity, and the protection of the individual by the supporter should be kept to the barest minimum.

In contrast, in the field of welfare in Japan, if a practitioner recognizes a risk, they should not expose the person being supported to this risk. At the root of this is the value that a person should suppress their desires to harmonize with society. This is the idea of objective best interests. This sense of value may be included in the community of Japan. The debate about which value should be respected is not openly held, and things are often decided behind the scenes in Japan. Together with this traditional custom is the apparent feeling by the silent majority that one should know what values matter most without being told.

It is, however, recommended now that Japanese people, particularly the baby boom generation and younger generations than them, should debate such values in public for the betterment of their society and participation in social affairs according to the people's own initiatives for establishing the value of individual autonomy.

## Conclusion

The relationship between law and policy and people's behavioural patterns in an aged society has been discussed by drawing from comparative guardianship law and policy studies on Japan and the State of Victoria. Appropriate law and policy frameworks for the future should be established, and efforts should be made to understand the people's concerns. A good combination between law and policy and understanding people's behavioural patterns is assumed to be of paramount importance. Human society is made up of people's invisible thoughts and accumulated values, which are shared as unwritten rules in a certain group, and these unwritten rules are impolitely disseminated to outsiders. For this reason, people's behavioural patterns may be difficult for outsiders to understand, and this becomes a barrier when conducting comparative law studies. Besides the language barrier, there is a deeper and less tangible barrier. Clarifying this barrier domestically is the key to law adaptation in an aged society. By reviewing people's behavioural patterns in Japan and the State of Victoria, two keywords appear essential in practice under the guardianship law and policy: one is "family reliance"; the other is "value of individual autonomy." These two contradictory keywords are useful for understanding and explaining people's behavioural patterns in the two states. It can be concluded that it is appropriate to consider guardianship laws and policies based on these two keywords.

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# Clarifying China's Rise Puzzle: Comparison of the Modernisation and Primacy of Institutions Theories

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## ABSTRACT

Academics show great interest in the progress of countries and the disparities between developing and developed countries. This is grounded on a belief that the change in the number of developed/developing countries may play a significant role in determining the future of the international system. Therefore, China's rise has a vital place in the study of international systems. Given its sui generis economic and political structure, China is a hard-to-predict country for most academics working on international systems. In this context, this study will look at China's rise through the lenses of Modernisation and Primacy of Institutions theories and discuss which describes China's rise more accurately. This will involve a comparative analysis of both theories with historical and political data in order to evaluate their respective arguments.

## Introduction

For years, the rise of China and the difference in the development levels of countries have been highly engaging topics for academics. They seek to understand how China rose to prominence and its reasons (e.g., Bergsten et al., 2008; W. I. Cohen, 2007; Goldstein, 2007; Kang, 2007). Additionally, they seek to understand why some countries are on the rise while others are stagnant or declining (e.g., Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; D. Cohen, 1998; Gilder, 2012; Landes, 1998; Sachs, 2006). In this paper, by combining China's rise and theories on its development, we will evaluate the following questions: which theory better describes China's growth? Does a theory yield the same results in all cases? Additionally, how reliable are future predictions made by comparing a country with other countries?

At the beginning of the study, it will be helpful to define the regime type in China using the Polity Project (Polity IV version) dataset, widely regarded as one of the leading datasets in democracy studies. The Polity IV Dataset collects data on all independent countries with populations of 500,000 or more from 1800 to 2013. It classifies them into three categories based on a score ranging from 10 to -10: autocracies (-10 to -6), anocracies (-5 to +5), and democracies (+6 to +10). According to this data, China, with a score of -7, is ranked as an autocracy (Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, 2013).

When it comes to the motivation for selecting these two theories, it is that they have opposite causality. More specifically, while the Modernisation theory argues that economic development induces modernity and reform, the Primacy of Institutions argues that reforms cause economic

development. These two theories represent different views on the correlation between institutional change and economic development.

On the one hand, the Modernisation theory has been a highly contentious subject of academic study since Lipset (1959) introduced it in the latter half of the 20th century. It has had a significant impact on both the academic and political spheres and has garnered much attention. Many academics appeal to this theory to explain political and economic transitions in specific countries, and many policymakers consider it when constructing their policy. It is unsurprising that Lipset's renowned study, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy", is among the most cited five articles in *The American Political Science Review* (*Cambridge Core*, 2022).

Moreover, there is a notable example of the impact of this theory on policymakers. In accordance with the theory of modernization, former president of the United States, George W. Bush, delivered a speech that included these clauses:

"The case for trade is not just monetary but moral, not just a matter of commerce but a matter of conviction. Economic freedom creates habits of liberty. And habits of liberty create expectations of democracy. There are no guarantees, but there are good examples, from Chile to Taiwan. Trade freely with China, and time is on our side..." (The New York Times, 2000)

On the other hand, the Primacy of Institutions Theory is another leading theory explaining variations in the developmental levels of nations with a particular emphasis on the role of institutions. Specifically, Acemoglu & Robinson's (2012) seminal work "Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty" has generated significant repercussions in the academic literature. In this paper, when analyzing the Primacy of Institutions theory and arguments on China, the work of Acemoglu and Robinson holds a preeminent place.

The first two sections start with the theoretical introductions of the Modernisation and Primacy of Institutions theories, respectively, and proceed with their arguments on China's rise and its democratic future. Following the theoretical introductions, we will evaluate each theory's arguments on China and their criticisms. In conclusion, we will adopt a comparative analysis to assess which theory - Modernisation or Primacy of Institutions - more accurately describes the rise of China. As a result of the analysis, we conclude that while Modernization Theory can explain the growth of certain countries like South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, the rise of China is better explained by the Primacy of Institutions Theory. In China, reforms caused development rather than development causing modernization and reform. China experienced significant growth after implementing institutional and radical reforms. However, it was crucial for China to carry out these reforms in a sui generis way.

### **Modernisation Theory and Its Arguments on China**


The correlation between economic development and democracy has so far been the subject of many academic studies and discussions, and the Modernisation theory might be one of the established theories on this debate. Since Seymour Martin Lipset, the originator of the Modernisation Theory, put forward this theory in 1959, it has created considerable repercussions in academic circles. Lipset is also recognized as the first academic to establish a correlation between economic development and the possibility of transitioning to democracy (Wucherpfennig and Deutsch, 2009: 1).

Lipset employed a comparative analysis of political behaviour in European and Latin American democracies and tested his hypothesis by comparing European, English-Speaking and Latin

American Countries in terms of more or less democratic countries. Lipset's main argument is that "the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy." Furthermore, he clarifies the socioeconomic factors that enable a democratic political system, such as economic development, legitimacy, and system of government. (Lipset, 1959: 70–75).

The simplistic interpretation of this statement is that an increase in GDP leads to the emergence of democracy, but it is more complicated than that. According to Lipset, "all the various aspects of economic development—industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education—are so closely interrelated as to form one major factor which has the political correlate of democracy" (Lipset, 1959: 58). In essence, wealth is not the only requisite for democracy and is not enough alone; it must be accompanied by other factors such as industrialization, urbanization, and education. Together create social and economic development. And this social and economic development leads to a rise in the open class system and sizeable middle class, and this open class system and large middle-class caused to transition to democracy. However, if a country is already a democracy, these factors contribute to the stability and consolidation of democracy in the country.

**Graph I: Modernization Theory**



Source: Wucherpennig & Deutsch, 2009, p. 2

One of the initial criticisms against the theory was that it was West-oriented and Eurocentric (Wang, 2009: 3). However, in subsequent years, the theory began to attract attention beyond the West. For example, in China, one of the countries where the Modernisation Theory is excessively discussed, the Chinese Academic Journal Database (CNKI) recorded over 400 studies only between 1994 and 2009 that focused on Modernisation theory (Wang, 2009: 5).

One of the most important reasons for this fame is that China meets some essential criteria outlined by the theory itself. As China has undergone significant economic growth over the past decades, it has experienced some socioeconomic developments, which is one of the primary driving forces of Modernisation Theory. That is why, it can be argued that this socioeconomic development in China may lead to the emergence of democracy. Some are optimistic about this possibility and believe the Modernisation theory will also work in China.



Henry Rowen was one of the leading optimistic academics. He thinks there are some apparent signs of modernizing in China, such as the growth of grassroots democracy, the push for the rule of law, and the liberalization of the mass media (Rowen, 1996: 61). The first sign, grassroots democracy, means democratic implementation at the grassroots level. When the peasants left the local communes and returned to their countryside, some problems regarding their needs, such as education and infrastructure, came to light. The Communist Party was required to devise a solution for the village committees and officials.

The essence of the matter was how these officials would come to the office. In 1987, the central government decided that villagers would choose them. Despite the lack of organization in the electoral process, the influence of party membership on candidacy, and the lack of secrecy in voting, the method was a secret ballot. By the early 1990s, 90 per cent of village committees had been elected through this process. First, the voting system in the village was based on one vote per house, and in 1991 it changed to one vote per person (Rowen, 1996: 61,62). Furthermore, Rowen believed that this application of grassroots democracy would gradually expand from the village to the national level.

The second sign is the rule of law. In his view, the Supreme People's Court began legislating independently through its interpretations and decisions. Moreover, in 1994, China established local taxes and tax services. These practices contradicted communist doctrine, which permits no space for independent institutions. The third sign is the liberalization of the mass media. According to Rowen, some developments after the 1980s demonstrate the liberalization of the mass media, such as the publication of some books critical of the government, the emergence of private publishing houses in 1984, the publishing of non-partisan newspapers, the abolishment of the state's monopoly on TV in 1992, and a heightened tolerance for journalists. As far as Rowen is concerned, these things were indications of a democratic future in China (Rowen, 1996: 62–67).

Liu & Chen (2012) confidently argue that China is about to validate classical Modernisation Theory and initiate democratization around 2020. According to them, this prediction is grounded on four major trends: economic development, the changing political culture, leadership transition and globalization. First, the level of economic progress and the degree of inequality in China impact its potential for democratization. Second, economic and technological development also affect China's political culture. Specifically, young generations have less trust in the government. Third, the power of Chinese leaders is gradually diminishing. Each leader in China will have less power than their predecessor. Lastly, globalization also affects China's democratization in three ways, the contagion effect, the spread of liberal norms and practical benefits.

Chin (2018, pp. 64–66) classifies optimistic arguments. He argues that optimism regarding China's democratic future is founded upon five major assumptions. The first assumption is the declining tendency in the number of world autocracies. They believed China's authoritarianism would not survive against this declining tendency. The second is that China has reached the level of development assumed by the Modernisation Theory. The third is that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is in a "state of decline" and "atrophy." The fourth is the rise in support for democracy in China. The last is the potential outcome of a slowdown in the Chinese economy, which would make the Chinese population less tolerant of corruption and increase demands for greater transparency. Moreover, one of their essential arguments is that no single-party autocracy has survived for more than 70 years.

## **Evaluation**


One significant criticism of Modernisation Theory was Przeworski and Limongi's paper "Modernization: Theories and Facts." Przeworski & Limongi (1997, p. 159) argue that political regimes do not transition to democracy as per capita incomes increase. However, this ensures the

stability of the political system. On the one hand, democracy survives if a country is modern, but this is not a result of modernization. On the other hand, GDP also impacts the survival of autocracies. According to Przeworski & Limongi (1997, pp. 159–177), transitions to democracy are more probable as per capita income in dictatorships increases, but only until it reaches a threshold of about \$6,000. Beyond that, dictatorships become more durable as nations become wealthier. Since a wealthy autocracy will be stable, a transition to democracy is improbable. The crucial level is a per capita income of \$6,000. According to this perspective, dictatorships would survive in wealthy nations for years.

Increasing prosperity in an authoritarian regime is likely to have an adverse impact on democratization. Pei (2006, p. 19,45) states that the ruling elites may not be willing to abandon their power since increasing prosperity will make their monopoly more valuable. Moreover, this prosperity will enable them to strengthen their repressive capacity. Such a situation can be observed in China as well. In the mid-1980s, when the reforms were in the early stages and had not yet yielded results, the CCP was more open to criticism. However, as economic reforms improved living conditions in the country, the CCP has moved away from democratization, has not allowed public discussion about political reform and has adopted a zero-tolerance policy toward dissidents.

According to Modernisation theory, the large middle class's role in the transition to democracy is significant because it is the middle class that will demand democracy. However, G. Wang (2016, p. 10) argues that the middle class in China does not act as the Modernisation Theory predicts. Those who desire democracy in China also oppose various democratic activities because their demands for democracy do not stem from a desire for democracy but rather from dissatisfaction with the current political system. Nathan (2016, pp. 9–10) argues that there are several reasons why the middle class in China acts differently than the Modernisation Theory predicts. One of the reasons is that the middle class in China is not independent, mainly dependent on the government. Most of them either work directly for the state apparatus, such as civil servants or are employed in companies that are either owned or controlled by the state. It is unrealistic for a middle class that relies on the government to demand democracy. Another reason is the proportion of the middle class in the Chinese social structure. Lipset referred to a large middle class. As Graph II illustrates, it is like a diamond-shaped social structure consisting of a substantial middle class in the middle, a small lower class at the bottom, and a small upper class at the top. However, China's reality is a pyramid-shaped social structure with a tiny upper class at the top, a small middle class at the centre and an enormous lower class at the bottom.

**Graph II: Chinese Social Structure: Lipset's Expectation And Reality, Respectively**



The declining tendency in the number of world autocracies deserves a more comprehensive perspective. The transition rate from autocracies is different from the transition rate to democracy. As for Chin (2018, p. 72), while the number of autocracies has declined, the number of mixed regimes has risen. Diamond (2002, p. 27) asserts that in 1974, the number of electoral autocracies was half a dozen, while in 2002, the number increased to at least 45. For instance, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many former Soviet Union countries in Caucasia did not transition to democracy. According to Polity IV data (Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, 2013), Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are categorized as autocracies, while Russia is classified as an anocracy. Therefore, even if China is to abolish autocracy, it cannot be ensured that the new system would be a democracy.

Reaching the limits of the development level assumed by modernization theory does not necessarily mean that the democratic transition is inevitable. Chin (2018, p. 74) argues that even after achieving economic modernization, autocracies can survive for a long time, as in the case of Singapore. Furthermore, unlike the Modernisation Theory suggests, some steps have been taken to consolidate China's autocracy. A good example is the 2018 constitutional changes made by the National People's Congress in China, which cancelled the term limit for the president and enabled Xi Jinping to remain in power for good (BBC News, 2018). Furthermore, China is consistently expanding its police power as a tool for suppression. The police force of China is enormous, better funded, more equipped technologically, and very well at suppressing. They punish individuals whom are viewed as a threat to the regime, prevent the dissemination of discourses that challenge the regime, and promote the propagation of discourses that support the regime (Nathan, 2013: 22). Pei (2006, p. 45) also asserts that since 1990, as living conditions have improved in China, the CCP has become more conservative towards democracy, enforcing a zero-tolerance policy towards calls for political reform and dissents.

2020 invalidated Liu & Chen's (2012) democratization prediction on China. Moreover, Xi Jinping is currently the longest-serving leader of China since the 1970s and has no political rival to his power. Noone is able to claim for sure that this will be his last term (Bagshaw, 2022). Therefore, we have excuses to say that the assumption that each leader in China will have less power than their predecessor has been falsified. 2019 also invalidated the blanket statement that no one-party autocratic regime has ever survived much longer than 70 years. 2019 and 2018 marked the 70th anniversaries of the Chinese Communist Party's rule in China and the Workers' Party of Korea's rule in North Korea, respectively. As illustrated in this, history abounds with falsified projections regarding China's political future. Chin (2018, p. 78) summarised some of them:

Jack Goldstone (1995) predicted a CCP collapse by 2005-2010. Zbigniew Brzezinski, I-tzu Chen, and Arthur Waldron (1998) each surmised the end of CCP one-party rule by 2008. Gordon Chang (2001) famously predicted that the "shock therapy" of WTO accession would trigger the collapse of CCP rule by 2011. In 2011, he predicted the collapse in 2012 (Chang 2011). None of this came to pass. Similarly, predictions of China's "creeping democratization" (e.g. Pei 1995) have not been born out. For example, village elections have not expanded to the township level as many had expected (e.g. Craner 2006). Nor has the National People's Congress become "a potential challenger to the CCP's monopoly of power" (e.g. Pei 1998, 74). Similarly, as many hoped, the internet has yet to liberate China's media and foster freedom of speech fully.

### **The Primacy of Institutions Theory and Its Arguments on China**


The Primacy of Institutions, also called the Institutional Theory, New Institutional Economics, or Institutional Approach, is among the leading theories employed by experts to understand China's unique path of economic development. While the theory is primarily associated with Nobel laureate Douglass North's works in the 1980s and 1990s, its assumptions date back to old times. Limiting the

power of the rulers, a king or emperor, by distributing it among various institutions was asserted by both Montesquieu (1949) and A. Smith (1977) in the 18th century.

In North's (1990, p. 3,4) words, the institutions are the rulers of the game, humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. Institutions determine what actions to take and what to avoid, as well as when to do them. The primacy of Institutions theory suggests that institutional quality plays a crucial role in driving economic development and income level. A well-established institutional framework in a country can significantly influence income level and a society's capacity for modernization. Rodrik & Subramanian (2003, p. 32) find that institutions' quality is the only positive and significant determinant of income levels. Moreover, Dollar & Kraay (2003, p. 161) suggests that rapid growth in the very long-run, high levels of trade, and good institutions are interrelated. The Primacy of Institutions theory has an opposite causality compared to the Modernisation Theory. In other words, unlike the latter, countries and their citizens do not demand better institutions when they reach prosperity. Instead, better institutions lead to prosperity.

It is insufficient for an institutional mechanism to be in force, and investors must also have confidence in it. Rodrik et al. (2004, p. 157) find that the economy grows when investors have confidence in the security of their property rights in the country to invest. They compare the experiences of China and Russia. Today, China maintains a socialist legal system, whereas Russia is a country where the right to private property is in force. However, Russia's score in institutional quality indicators is significantly lower than China's. Therefore, investors feel more secure in China, so they have invested more in China. Investors feel insecure, and private investment remains low in Russia. In sum, ensuring that property rights are effectively protected is more important than just enacting them. Moreover, as Acemoglu et al. (2001, p. 1395) assert, the 1868 Meiji Restoration in Japan and the reforms in South Korea during the 1960s show how improving institutions can lead to economic gain.

### Graph III: Institutional Quality and Income



Source: Rodrik & Subramanian, 2003, p. 33

So, this raises questions about which institutions are crucial for this economic growth and how these institutions should be. Rodrik & Subramanian (2003, p. 32) calls them market-creating institutions. In the absence of these institutions, markets either do not exist or perform inadequately. Moreover, they also argue that three types of institutions are necessary for sustainability. These are market-regulating institutions (e.g. regulatory agencies in telecommunications, transport, and financial

services), market-stabilizing institutions (e.g. central banks, exchange rate regimes, and budgetary and fiscal rules and market-legitimizing institutions (e.g. pension systems, unemployment insurance schemes, and other social funds).

As for Acemoglu and Robinson (2012: 428-429), two types of institutions shape political and economic life; inclusive and extractive institutions. Therefore, the precondition of development is having a central authority and inclusive political and economic institutions. Furthermore, inclusive institutions are pluralistic; in other words, the country's resources are not monopolized by small elite groups, they are accessible to all people, and these institutions protect property rights. Conversely, extractive institutions utilize the country's resources for the benefit of a small, privileged group rather than for the general population. On the other hand, Przeworski & Curvale (2006, pp. 2-4) asserts that it is vital for institutions to be stable and capable of preventing conflicts between elites rather than being egalitarian. They show the difference in the level of development between North and Latin America as evidence for their argument. They assert that institutional stability is the reason for the sharp distinction between North and Latin America.

Acemoglu & Robinson (2012, p. 430) also argue that their arguments do not mean extractive institutions do not lead to economic growth.. On the contrary, those elite groups exploiting the country's resources encourage growth for further exploitation. If an authoritarian country with extractive institutions has a central authority, growth can be achieved to a certain degree. Nevertheless, this growth is far from sustainable economic growth. At the end of this limited growth, if the country switches from extractive institutions to inclusive ones, their growth will become sustainable.

The rise of China is a good example of this extractive growth, as stated by Acemoglu & Robinson (2012, pp. 438-442). Following the death of Mao in 1976, Deng Xiaoping and his allies took to power and initiated political and economic reforms, which was a move towards inclusive institutions. As a result of these moves, China began to experience growth. After these reforms, China's institutions are not as extractive as they once were, but they are not inclusive in the modern sense. Therefore, if China fails to transition to inclusive institutions, its growth will gradually decline and become limited. On the other hand, if China successfully transitions to inclusive institutions before reaching the limits of extractive growth, its growth will last. Nonetheless, there is little reason to wait for the transition to more inclusive institutions in China.

## Evaluation

Following the radical reforms of Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of China, in the fields of agriculture, trade and education, China reached one of the enormous growth rates in world history. The effect of these radical reforms during the post-Mao era on China's growth is widely recognized. Eric X. Li, a venture capitalist and political scientist, regards these reforms as "something unimaginable during Mao's rule" (Li, 2013).

So, what kind of economic growth was China experienced? Was it an authoritarian growth, as Acemoglu & Robinson mentioned? In fact, when the methods of reform are scrutinized, it is understood that it is not a very democratic reform. Indeed, upon closer examination of the reform methods, it becomes apparent that the ways reforms were made were not particularly democratic. Firstly, Deng Xiaoping's Reforms were not for bringing democracy to the country but to increase the economic level of the country. They also attempted to implement political reforms but failed to achieve them. Therefore, in China, the concept of 'reform' has become nearly synonymous with economic reform (Brødsgaard, 1987: 43). Secondly, one of Xiaoping and his allies' first actions after taking power was 'smashing' the "Gang of Four" headed by Mao's wife (Cook, 2016: 20). Moreover,




when he took office, Xiaoping appointed his own supporters to important positions in the party, army, and government by purging old ones (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 420).

Moreover, despite many private companies in China today, many elements of the economy are still under the party's control. For example, the CCP gives orders to companies regarding their operations, investment timings and locations, and appointments of executives for these big companies (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012: 438). Additionally, China is gradually extending its control over the economy. When Xi Jinping took power, private companies accounted for half of China's investment and 75% of its economic output. Nevertheless, today, the state assumes a more significant role in the economy. Under Xi's leadership, the CCP has significantly strengthened its role in both government and private enterprises (McGregor, 2019). All these things show us that this is an authoritarian growth based on extractive institutions.

Although China has experienced authoritarian growth, one might wonder whether this growth results from some institutional reforms. To investigate the potential correlation between institutional reforms and growth, it is necessary to briefly analyze some key reforms that were initiated in 1978. The reformist team's first priority was the agricultural sector because most of the problems in the Mao period were due to agricultural issues (Brandt and Rawski, 2008: 8). They initiated The Household Responsibility System. This reform brought a quota system to villagers. Before this change, the villagers used to take as much as they needed from their harvest and give the rest to the government. Under the new system, they were required to submit their quota to the government first, and the rest of the harvest would belong to them. This led to a significant increase in production. Furthermore, in 1980, China established Special Economic Zones, which marked the end of over two decades of isolation. Subsequently, in 1984, China began implementing a socialist market economy, which merged socialist principles with market-oriented policies. Taxation, banking, and real estate were also significant areas of reform. (Hou, 2011, pp. 421–423).


Since the implementation of the 1978 Reforms, China has transformed from a country where people suffered from starvation to the world's second-largest economy. After these reforms, many people rose above the poverty line, the quality of life for citizens improved significantly, and life expectancy increased (Yao, 2018: 75). The graphs below show that China experienced significant growth following the 1978 reforms. Moreover, this growth resulted from institutional reforms, as depicted by the Primacy of Institutions theory, and was an authoritarian growth that relied on extractive institutions, as highlighted by Acemoglu and Robinson.

**Graph IV: China's GDP (current US\$ x Billion)**



Source: World Bank

**Graph V: China's GDP per capita (current US\$)**



Source: World Bank

On the other hand, Acemoglu & Robinson (2012, p. 442) predict that unless China's extractive institutions are transformed into inclusive ones before its growth reaches its limit, this growth will lose its energy. However, Acemoglu & Robinson do not provide a duration for their prediction. In other words, there is no answer to the question of when China's economy will slowly evaporate if it fails to transition to inclusive institutions. Additionally, as noted in previous sections, China is a game-changer in forecasts. With its *sui generis* structure, China falsified many predictions deduced by comparing China to other countries, as Acemoglu and Robinson compared with Soviet growth.

### Comparison and Final Remarks

China's rise and differences among nations' development levels are two fascinating academic subjects. Many academics have studied those issues and proposed some explanations and suggestions for developing countries. We have discussed the Modernisation Theory and Primacy of Institutions theory's arguments on China's rise and democratic future and try to assess which theory more accurately describes the rise of China in this study. As a result of the discussion above, we concluded as follows:

First, expecting a theory to explain everything and yield the same result everywhere is unfair, especially in the social sciences. Theories serve as tools that try to explain the world around us. Every country, event, and phenomenon has its own dynamics, and a specific process in a country may produce opposite results in another country or vice versa. As S. Smith (2013, p. 11) suggested, we should view theories as different coloured lenses. By wearing one of these lenses, we can perceive things differently and gain an alternative understanding of the world. While a theoretical lens may adequately explain an event, process, or phenomenon in one country, it may be inadequate in another country.

Second, Modernisation Lens effectively explains the developmental progress in countries such as South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. However, it does not imply that it can explain every phenomenon everywhere. Indeed, the Modernisation Lens fails to explain China's rise precisely. Therefore, the arguments based on Modernization Theory have not been confirmed yet, and there are no indications that they will be. On the one hand, China has continued to grow and modernize; on the other hand, it has increasingly consolidated its authoritarian rule.

Furthermore, Pei (2006, p. 18) states that all former communist regimes have transitioned to democracy only after a sudden collapse of the old ruling regime. No communist regime has completed a step-by-step democratic transition as envisioned by the Modernization theory. This is partly due to the reluctance of the elite to give up power, which has become more valuable due to increasing wealth. As wealth increases, they consolidate their monopoly. If the economic indicators for China remain positive, expecting such a transition would be pointless.

Third, despite some of its shortcomings, the Primacy of Institutions theory provides a better description of China's rise than the Modernisation theory. As a result, its arguments regarding China's rise are more accurate. China's rising was primarily due to reforms made in the post-Mao period. As Acemoglu and Robinson correctly stated, this rise was an example of authoritarian growth that depended on extractive institutions. However, we must say something different about other arguments of this theory, especially regarding China's future. As we mentioned above, Acemoglu and Robinson do not provide a limitation for their prediction. They argued that if China fails to transition to inclusive economic institutions before growth under extractive institutions reaches its limit, its growth will gradually evaporate. Conversely, the argument will be invalidated if China's growth continues after reaching this limit. However, questions like where this limit lies and when China will be reached this limit still need to be clarified for this theory to be tested.

Fourth, explaining China's rise only with fundamental and fundamental reforms would be inadequate. One of the critical reasons for China's rise following its institutional and fundamental reforms is that China implemented these reforms in a *sui generis* way. Qian (2002) claims that China did not simply adopt "best practice institutions" from other nations but instead opted for "transitional institutions" that were better suited to their unique circumstances. These included a dual-track approach to market liberalization, an innovative form of firm ownership, a specific type of fiscal federalism, and certain limitations on the government to safeguard private incentives in the absence of the rule of law. Moreover, China implemented these reforms in three ways: gradual, experimental, and with a bottom-up approach from the sphere to the centre. The reason for implementing reforms "from the periphery to the centre" was opposite approach had been attempted and failed during Mao's rule. The primary reason for adopting "gradualism" was to overcome political resistance to reforms because the reforms encountered significant challenges in each stage. Additionally, they were aware that Mao's rashness was not helpful. The motivation behind "experimentalism" was to evaluate the effectiveness of a policy by testing it in a specific region before implementing it on a broader scale. Namely, reforms were first initiated in a particular area, and if successful, they were extended more widely. Conversely, if a reform failed, it was abandoned (Garnaut, 2018: 36; Hofman, 2018: 58,59).

Another important conclusion is that forecasting a country by comparing it with other countries may not always provide correct results. Each country may have independent variables that can significantly impact the result. Especially in *sui generis* countries like China, these variables may be more. Consequently, as evidenced by many examples mentioned by Chin, China has falsified many predictions about it. The one last word is that we do not claim that the Primacy of Institutions Theory is superior to the Modernization Theory. Likewise, we do not intend to suggest that the Primacy of Institutions Theory will always be accurate. It is possible that, in another case, a puzzle could be better explained by the Modernization Theory instead of the Primacy of Institutions Theory. However, for now, this is not the case for China.

In summary, while Modernization Theory can satisfyingly explain the growth of countries like South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, the rise of China is better explained by the Primacy of Institutions Theory. In China, reforms cause development, not development cause modernity and reform. China experienced significant growth after enacting institutional and radical reforms. However, it was crucial for China to carry out these reforms in a *sui generis* way.

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# *Leadership*

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# The Evaluation of the UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes or Failures?

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## ABSTRACT

*The United Nations Peacekeeping Forces are the forces tasked in order to end conflicts or impede potential conflicts from emerging. Forces' main aims are among with variety to their relationship with the conflict, fundamentally can be regarded as ending the conflict and protecting the civilians. Troops deployed to conflict zones may change unsteadiness at success and failure related to the operation's mandate and capacity. In this context, UN PKOs can be regarded as success or failure criteria discussed in the literature. Criteria as a result of evidence gathered in the aftermath of the check of the literature will be determined and applied to cases overall. Eleven criteria obtained from the literature review will be analysed in conjunction with 10 cases wherein the UN PKOs are conducted. As a consequence of this analysis, cases will be assessed as success and failure.*

## Introduction

Approximately half a billion people live in violence and are under threat in 50 conflict zones worldwide. In most of these places, there are blue-beret UN peacekeepers, not the region's official or state-affiliated security forces (Autessere, 2019: 101). Since its establishment in 1945, the UN peacekeeping forces can be described as the most effective and most used intervention instrument of the UN in terms of going from a conflict to a peace process. The UN convention states that all necessary measures will be taken for peacekeeping operations to preserve the peace. As noted in paragraph 1, the primary purpose of the UN is to maintain international peace and security.

Following paragraph 1, paragraphs 2 and 3, member states state that they must have all disputes by peaceful approach. The UN Security Council is primarily responsible for resolving global peace and security problems. With this respect, the Security Council, as a critical factor in the international order, has the capacity and authority to impose sanctions, call for peaceful initiatives, implement other coercive measures and use force to maintain peace by compelling if necessary (Alvarez-Espeda et al., 2022: 2).

The Security Council comprises 15 countries (Arvidsson, 2023: 4). It is determined by the authorisation of five permanent members and the other ten members by the General Council/Assembly for two years. The five permanent countries are the USA, Russia, Great Britain, China, and France. These permanent countries have veto power on any regulation or template. In this study, it can be stated that the five permanent countries are more substantial than all the other member states of the UN (Arvidsson, 2023: 4).

The Security Council is the institution which is responsible for establishing peace and peace operations. The responsibility is given from so stated in Article 24 of the founding treaty of the UN. It determines its duties and responsibilities in the form of 5 permanent and ten temporary members, changing over two years. The Security Council is the foremost advocate of the launch of peacekeeping operations both politically and financially. On the other hand, for peacekeeping operations to take place, the approval of both all five permanent members and at least four of the ten temporary members must be received.

### **Success Criteria of Peacekeeping Operations**

Peacekeeping operations are considered successful as some reach peace, while others are considered unsuccessful, connected to the UN's failure to achieve a conclusion in the conflict (Arvidsson, 2023: 2). What does success mean in peacekeeping operations? A situation where there are no hostilities, where civilians do not suffer? Did the peacekeepers achieve their mission by observing the elections and succeeding, or did they fail because they did not prevent human and civilian losses in the regions where they were deployed through operations (Pushkina, 2020: 261)? All these questions can be directed to UN peacekeeping operations, both in terms of objectives and consequences.

From this perspective, it can be stated that fundamental factors such as approval, impartiality and non-use of force are necessary for PKOs to make operations efficient and achieve the objectives. The results of peacekeeping operations can be considered failures in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Somalia. The ongoing Darfur conflict may also be expressed as a failure to achieve the main objectives.

### **Criteria with Respect to Success and Failure**

#### ***Neighbourhood-Affinity***

With respect to success criteria, the first criterion may be presented as the connection between units to be deployed to the conflict zones and states in the conflicts. The main reason this may be considered a factor is the probability of the warring parties acknowledging the peacekeeping units as a threat. Therefore, this is a less threat than the units composed of non-regional states. But it is crucial not to have troops from states involved in the conflict. On the contrary, the peacekeeping forces of the warring parties may not find the PKOs peace-oriented and reliable operations (Heldt, 2002: 117) because the warring parties will be able to see troops in the peacekeeping force as a friend and support it, while the other side will see it as an enemy and act against the peacekeeping operations.

It can be stated that the operations should be carried out with the approval of the warring parties in the conflict zone. As a matter of fact, this approval is essential in terms of not evaluating the use of peacekeeping forces in the operation as a political tool. It can be expressed that this precaution not only ensures the reliability of the operations but also does peacekeepers not to be attacked (Peter, 2015: 355). Even though the UN peacekeeping forces are focused on a single country, the countries in charge of Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and South Sudan may be considered regional conflicts (Peter, 2015: 356).

#### ***Approve, Willingness and Sincerity of Conflicting Parties***

The probability of the peacekeeping operations being successful is stronger with the approval of the warring parties and the presence of a ceasefire agreement between the warring parties in the region (Lijn, 2009: 48). The consent of the warring parties is an important factor because the interventions of the peacekeeping forces, represented by their approval, will not be seen as a threat, unlike without the consent, which will require the use of coercive force or military intervention. It is important for



the parties in the conflict to see the peacekeeping operations as a part of the peace process. On the other hand, it can be stated that the progress in the peace process will be inconclusive in case the UN peacekeepers intend to cause a conflict again aftermath of the withdrawal from the region (Khalfan, 2020: 229).

It can be stated that it is very difficult for the operation to be within the permission, especially in cases where more than one state is involved and more than one military factor is active, which is willing to continue the conflict in conjunction with their interests and purposes, despite the ceasefire agreements (Pushkina, 2020: 264). It is not possible for peacekeeping operations to be successful if the warring parties do not cooperate in the implementation of the mandate of the operation. In this study, it can be said that UN peacekeepers cannot establish peace but may provide the necessary circumstances and conditions for peacebuilding. From this point of view, it can be argued that the will and approval of the warring parties are important factors for peacekeeping operations to be successful (Ndulo, 2011: 799).

### ***Impartiality and Non-Use of Force***

The main advantage of UN peacekeepers can be expressed in the form of impartiality with respect to observation and international assistance presented by the UN. For warring parties not to see the peacekeepers as a party to the conflict, the forces in operation should take military intervention only in cases where and when they are threatened. At this point, the consent of the warring parties is predominantly important (Lijn, 2009: 50). In this study, it can be stated that initiatives are beneficial within the framework of factors such as supporting observation and elections as an externally impartial supporting force and supporting peace (Dorn and Collins, 2020: 99).

The warring party or parties without approval may see the peacekeepers as a threat to them. From this point of view, it can be stated that while it compromises the impartiality of the peacekeepers who will feel obliged to intervene, it may cause a consequence for the unsuccessful conclusion of the operation and the objectives to be achieved. With this respect, the Brahimi report stated that the consent of local forces, impartiality and using force only for self-defence (Lijn, 2009: 50) are the main factors for the success of the operations. On the other hand, it can be stated that if it occurs, it should use force and act against the killings that will take place against the civilians and against the actions or attempts that will take place against the mandate of the operation. However, it can also be stated that this use of force should not be a routine to enable peacekeepers to be seen as a part of war or conflict, which is also one of the most predominant conditions of impartiality.

However, while peacekeeping operations cannot be stated to be impartial, on the contrary, it can be stated that they are biased. Although the DRC may be regarded as an example, it may be regarded in the instances of South Sudan and, most recently, Somalia (Peter, 2015: 359). It can be pointed out that the elements connected as a party in the conflicts are able to show more resistance in political and military terms than the governments may take over (Peter, 2015: 358).

### ***The Cooperation of the Outside Actors***

It can be stated that third-party involvement is an important factor in conflicts. In this respect, instruments such as arms or political support to the warring parties may be presented as decisive examples of the source of the conflict in this respect. It can be stated that the countries of the region may take initiatives or actions in favour of the UN peacekeeping operations for a party in the conflict aimed at their own interests or activities in the area (Diehl, 1988, 500).

The findings of several studies demonstrate the possibilities of success of peacekeeping operations are greater, mainly if they are supported by the permanent members of the Security Council (Lijn,

2009: 51). In particular, the support of the United States is profound in this perspective. The reports of the Independent Investigation of Rwanda and the Secretary General of Srebrenica present the main reasons for the UN's failure in these two conflict zones, which is the international community's unwillingness in terms of politics.

On the other hand, it can be expressed that the conflict should be prevented from going beyond the borders of the country so that the troops could ensure regional security. As a matter of fact, although the conflict in the conflict zone, defined as 'contagion', may spill over to neighbouring or other countries in the region, foreign interventions are also quite possibilities. Regarding this criterion, how many neighbouring countries play a positive or negative role in the conflict can be assessed in terms of whether they interfere in internal affairs through refugees or not (Pushkina, 2020: 265). Peace may be built with the UN peacekeepers, and the conflict may be concluded by observing the elections. In cases where the UN is not involved, short or medium-term negotiations, treaties, or planning for elections may pose a threat to be left in the hands of war barons or dictators or to the intervention of outside actors in the region (Dorn and Collins, 2020: 100).

### ***Security Concerns of the Warring Sides***

This article is significant for the disarmament and demobilisation of the warring parties. The main reason for this is that the warring parties demonstrate more will and willing behaviour in terms of disarmament and demobilisation when their own security concerns are met. Warring parties without security concerns can depend on the impartiality and fairness of the third party.

It can be stated that when the UN peacekeepers are presented in the conflict in such a representation, it can help to increase the authority of the state or to destroy the enemy combatants, besides they have an impact on the conflict and political dimensions at certain times (Peter, 2015: 364). by preventing such a situation during duty, alternative resources can be offered to the warring parties at the point of security (Lijn, 2009: 53). Warring parties, who have no hesitation or concern in terms of security, can take an approach that external intervention is impartial, sustainable, and dependable.

The fact that the troops have the necessary capacity and resources for the implementation of the ceasefire and are exceptionally authorised and educated in terms of necessary and sufficient training can also be considered as a factor that reduces warring parties' concerns about security concerns (Khalfan, 2020: 229).

### ***Clear and Implementable Road Map***

In the UN peacekeeping mandates, it can be stated that in addition to its duties in the context of security, protection of civilians, and implementation of ceasefire agreements, they can also be tasked with tasks such as organising elections in respect of peacebuilding, gender equality and promoting human rights. (Blair et al., 2021: 665). The items and objectives specified in the mandate are greatly important for the success of the conflict in general. Because the UN peacekeepers fail to achieve the goals of their duties due to the lack of resources and capacity required regarding military power (Dorn and Collins, 2020: 101), the Brahimi report also states that a clear, reliable, and implementable mandate is vital (Lijn, 2009: 54).

The most crucial point regarding the mandate is that there is a definite situation and order in which condition the troops will take action during the conflict or whatnot. In the case of an unclear mandate, the troops may not intervene effectively or find themselves on one side of the conflict or one of the warring parties. This may damage the impartiality of the operation, and it can be stated that it may even lead to the withdrawal of the troops. From this point of view, it can be stated that

the UN peacekeeping forces need more resources and a clear mandate within it (Dorn and Collins, 2020: 102).

### ***The Deployment of Troops on Time and in Place***

In conflict zones or situations, the process attracts the attention of outside actors and international actors or institutions only when the process evolves into a crisis or conflict. However, it can be stated that the peacekeeping operations that will be deployed when the process gets into conflict are less likely to be successful compared to situations where they are placed before by the time situation evolves into a crisis (Lijn, 2009: 55).

On the other hand, according to Doyle and Sambanis, the longer the duration of the conflict, the higher the probability that the United Nations' intervention will be successful (cited in Lijn, 2009: 56). The main reasons for this are that the warring parties are tired of the war, the conflict tires the parties, and the warring parties approve a third-party intervention for a ceasefire or peace. However, it is important that the timing is effective and that the conditions that will end the conflict are in the form of consent and implementation by the warring parties. On the other hand, the damage of these situations that will end the conflict must be less than the impact that the parties will be taken if the conflict continues. It can be stated that if UN peacekeeping operations are placed with the right timing, it can help to adjust to the process and to end the conflict or maintain peace (Khalfan, 2020: 230).

### ***The Competence of Duty Lengthiness-Duration***

It is difficult to put everything into place immediately after the war. Therefore, it can be stated that a reasonably comprehensive and structured development is deadly necessary as a challenging effort and process to put goals into action, such as primarily rehabilitating human and infrastructure services, on the other hand, retraining the judicial authorities and security forces, re-implementing the law, re-structure and applying the rules in a short time. Although these are very important, they may not be demonstrated to include the basis of the problem (Blair, 2019: 368).

During the mandate of the peacekeepers, they carry out their duties under three main features to realise the matters mentioned in the previous segment. These include patrols, public works, and concluding ongoing or suspended negotiations. Although these are not important at a quick glance, they can be expressed collectively as an important factor in the positive completion of the process and the achievement of the objectives of the peacekeeping forces (Blair, 2019: 370). Patrols are important for the government to retake and reassure the government, especially in terms of the citizens. In addition, it can be stated that it allows civilians to interact with state security forces and civilian employees in a controlled and observed environment (Blair, 2019: 370).

In general, it can be stated that the timely placement of troops is an important factor in putting an end to the main causes of physical violence and conflict. On the other hand, it is important for the soldiers to stay in the operation area for a good duration to ensure long-standing peace (Khalfan, 2020: 230).

### ***Domestic and Broad Coordination***

Another important criterion for the success or failure of peacekeeping operations is the cooperation with domestic and outside actors regarding the operation's missions and objectives. As stated in the Brahimi report, a UN peacekeeping operation with domestic and broad coordination has a higher probability and chance than an operation without it. Collaboration with external actors during the

United Nations operation period can be cited as an example when it is in cooperation and coordination within the World Bank or International Monetary Fund institutions.

### **Ownership**

Although the meaning of ownership is not completely clear, it can generally be considered as the ownership of the conflict by the peacekeepers (Lijn, 2009: 57). It can be stated that the UN's initiatives and actions to protect civilians, interact with the indigenous of the country and get local approvals (Dorn and Collins, 2020: 102).

Especially if the local people in the conflict area acknowledge the peacekeepers as a party to the conflict or have the purpose of giving direction, consequently they may take an opposite position. Therefore, it can be an impedance to obtaining the desired results, especially in terms of ending the conflict with peacekeeping operations and establishing peace in the aftermath process, in a way in which the procedure is being consented to and supported. In this perspective, it can be stated that peacekeepers should embrace the conflict, especially in terms of being contested from the perspective of the people in the conflict zone and achieving the objectives of the operations, and that they should not be a party to the conflict or tend to any side.

### **The Protection of Civilians**

Reducing human suffering and tragic situations may be defined as another goal of peacekeeping operations. The UN must prevent the human population from suffering. It can be stated that the most essential instrument to achieve this is peacekeeping operations. In the context of this criterion, it can be assessed as the decrease, increase or violation of the extent of human rights and the extent of the number and capacity of the refugee factor (Pushkina, 2020: 265). The amount of power being distributed between ethnic groups is effective in the success of UN peacekeepers in protecting civilians (Salvatore, 2020: 1108).

After assessing the literature from the basic point of view, it can be expressed that the assessment of peace operations as success or failure will be valid regarding the determined criteria. Although it can be said that these criteria have a common point in some points, it can be stated that they have been determined by different authors and institutions from different perspectives and are fundamentally different from each other. For example, the inclusiveness and appropriate application of the mandate can be considered common criteria. On the other hand, many authors choose to reduce the severity of conflict and support conflict resolution as a criterion (Garb, 2014: 53).

In the continuation of the study, the conflicts of the case studies and the main features of these conflicts will be tried to be explained to determine which criteria are successfully or unsuccessfully fulfilled in which case.

### **Evaluation of Success Criteria to the Cases**

	Neighbourhood-Affinity	Approval - Willingness and Sincerity of Conflicting Parties	Impartiality and Non-Use of Force	The Coordination of the Outsiders	Security Concerns of the Warring Parties	Clear and Implementable Map	The Deployment of Troops on Time and in Place	The Competence of Duty Lengthiness-Duration	Domestic and Broad Coordination	Ownership	The Protection of Civilians
DRC	-	-	-	x	x	x	x	✓	x	x	x

South Sudan	-	x	-	✓	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
North Macedonia	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-
Liberia	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	-	✓	✓	x	✓	✓
Darfur	-	✓	-	x	✓	x	✓	✓	x	✓	✓
Mozambique	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Sierra Leone	x	✓	✓	✓	✓	-	✓	✓	-	✓	✓
Bosnia-Herzegovina	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Rwanda	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
Somalia	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

As for the Democratic Republic of Congo case to be handled, it appears as an unsuccessful case as a result of the literature review and examining the historical backgrounds of the cases. While there is a positive result for only 1 of the criteria, there is a negative situation for 7 of them.

In terms of neighbourhood affinity, approval-willingness-sincerity of the conflicting parties, impartiality and non-use of force, the DRC does not have certainty in evaluating as success or failure. It has been a completely unsuccessful case in terms of the cooperation criterion of outside actors. The main reason can be stated as the conflict between the USA and France in the region. The USA, which supported the Mobutu Government during the Cold War era, withdrew its support after the end of the Cold War, after the USSR threat disappeared, and supported Kabila in the context of a more democratic government. After this process, Mobutu came into close contact with France, and France saw it as an opportunity to be active in the region. These two states, which have veto power in the UNSC, where the UN peacekeepers are authorised, and are two of the five main founders of the UN, set an unsuccessful example in terms of cooperation between outside actors.

Another criterion is the inadequacy and limited powers of peacekeepers in the context of the protection of civilians, resulting in failures in protecting civilians in Congo. Kisangani in 2002, Ituri in 2003, Bukavu in 2004 and Goma in 2008, (Berdal, 2018: 14) can be cited as examples. Among all these, especially what happened in Ituri can be demonstrated as the biggest problem of UN peacekeepers. In the spring of 2003, civilian casualties, atrocities, and displacement of civilians occurred in the region due to the low resources and inadequate equipment of the peacekeepers. On the other hand, the DRC is an unsuccessful case in the context of the criterion of the security concerns of the warring parties. In particular, the change in support between Mobutu and Kabila in terms of the USA and France causes it to be an unsuccessful example in terms of the security concerns of the parties.

With respect to the South Sudan case, success was achieved in 7 of the criteria. In terms of the protection of civilians, the establishment of safe or protection zones ensured the protection of approximately 200,000 civilians and prevented civilian casualties (Alvarez-Espeda et al., 2022: 12). It has been successful in terms of domestic and broad coordination and institutions have been activated in the region with the UN initiatives.

However, it failed in the context of the criterion of approve-willingness and sincerity of the conflicting parties. As a matter of fact, the relationship between UNMISS and the South Sudanese



government has not been within the framework of friendship. As an example, the summit with the declaration of 'persona non grata' by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Jan Pronk, in October 2005 could be given as an example. The main reason for this is Jan Pronk's lack of capacity of the Sudanese Armed Forces in Darfur and the fact that brutal and violent acts committed in the region were represented to the public (Hutton, 2014: 8).

In the case of North Macedonia, success was achieved in 9 of the criteria. No evaluation can be made for the other two criteria. As an example, in the ownership criterion, it can be stated that peace forces provide great aid and contributions in terms of humanitarian efforts. An example is USBAT's sponsorship initiative for local orphanages. UNPREDEP's completion of its mandate in the region can be attributed to adequate human resources. On the other hand, the UN Security Council has established offices and institutions in Macedonia to combat local conflict within the region. Other factors, such as UN police monitors, social integration and unification projects, and economic development projects, can be cited as other elements carried out by the UN in the context of peacekeeping operations in the region (Baer, 2001: 152). The fact that UNPREDEP's mandate is strong and clear, on the other hand, and that it has a strong management network, has been the source of the successful evaluation of the operation (Robin, 2015: 24).

In the case of Liberia, success was achieved in 7 of the criteria. 2 of them failed. For example, it has resulted in success in the context of the competence of duty lengthiness-duration. As a matter of fact, UNMIL, which was initially assigned with a low number of personnel capacities, has both extended its mandate and been authorised in terms of capacity. On the other hand, another criterion for success was ownership. In support of this, it can be stated that the establishment of local police and security organisations and the training of their personnel and the establishment of a national education system in the country are supported.

The UNMIL forces tried to protect the civilians in the region throughout the operation and succeeded in general. Therefore, peacekeeping operations have been successfully completed in Liberia for the protection of civilians. In Liberia, where civil wars took place, UNMIL successfully completed its mission and withdrew from the region in 2016.

In the context of the Darfur case, 6 criteria might be assessed as successful while 3 as failures. In particular, success has been achieved in the protection of civilians, which is one of the most fundamental objectives of UNAMID. However, there was a failure in domestic and broad coordination. As a matter of fact, the neighbours of the Darfur region were affected by the instability in the region. Examples include Chad and Libya. The arms trade from these regions to the conflict zone Darfur again supports this failure. It can be stated that UNAMID has achieved success in terms of the deployment of troops on time and in place criteria. The main reason for this can be demonstrated as the main factor to urgently advance the process in order to protect civilians.

In the Mozambique case, 10 of them were successful in terms of criteria and became a completely successful example. For example, at the point of ownership, most of the conflicting parties in the region were disarmed during the post-conflict period, and at the same time, displaced civilians were resettled in the country after security was ensured in the region. Success has been achieved in the context of the criterion of protection of civilians, and incidents of violence have been reduced since the beginning of the conflict. In the context of the competence of duty, lengthiness-duration success has been another criterion. In order to support this, it can be stated that the troops should be kept in a way that will reduce the conflict during the conflict. At the same time, as a continuation of this, the resettlement of civilians forced to migrate to the region can be given as an example.

Sierra Leone has been the most successful case in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. Success was achieved in 8 of the criteria, and failure occurred in one of them. It can be considered a

completely successful example, especially in terms of protecting civilians and thus preventing civilian casualties (Salvatore, 2020: 1105). It can be stated that the British soldiers' security in the Freetown region was a positive step for the Sierra Leone army. From this point of view, it has been a successful case in the context of the coordination of outsiders. On the other hand, it can be said that the United States Special Union consisting of Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal military personnel is also a very helpful factor for UNAMSIL (Çiftçi, 2019: 27).

On the other hand, it can be stated that the civil war in Liberia also affected the civil war in Sierra Leone. In particular, Liberia, which is in a relationship due to being a neighbour, used the war fugitives in its own country or the deported Sierra Leone citizens as a tool during the civil war, causing further complexity for the war. From this point of view, Liberia's influence showed itself in conflict as a failure in the context of another criterion since the initiatives and support of neighbouring countries for peace and ending the conflict in conflict zones are important. From this point of view, there has been a failure in the context of neighbourhood and affinity criteria.

On the other hand, UNAMSIL was placed in the conflict zone in 1999, equipped with strong and comprehensive powers, especially in the context of the protection of civilians. At the same time, it can be stated that the protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping operations is the first operation to be determined and authorised as the main objective. As a matter of fact, even after the UN forces settled in the Sierra Leone region, the population was exposed to serious large-scale acts of violence (Salvatore, 2020: 1105). In this context, success has been achieved in terms of the protection of civilians.

In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda and Somalia, UN peacekeeping operations concluded in utter failure. As a matter of fact, failure was achieved in all criteria determined as success criteria in the study. In three cases, especially in the context of the criterion of protection of civilians, peacekeepers failed to take necessary action to protect civilians and witnessed the mass extermination of civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda. One of the main reasons for this is that the troops deployed in conflict zones do not have a clear and implementable mandate. Forces without clear and implementable mandates could not take action at the time of criminal acts against civilians and could not even provide their own security, as has happened in the case of Rwanda and Somalia.

Only two conflicts have been recognised as genocide by the UN in the period after the Second World War. Two of these are the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, which are discussed in the context of the case study in our study. From this point of view, it is a complete failure that the UN peacekeepers were not able to prevent these genocides, even though they had peacekeepers in the conflict zones before the genocides took place.

On the other hand, in the case of Somalia, the criterion for the approval of the warring parties in the context of the criterion resulted in a complete failure. The main reason for this is the operations conducted against General Mohammed Aidid, which is a clear violation of the criteria of impartiality and non-use of force in the conflict zone of the UN peacekeepers and the USA. From this point of view, the failure of one criterion prepares the ground for the failure of another criterion. Therefore, the United Nations had to withdraw its forces from the Somali conflict, and the operation concluded unsuccessfully.

In general, for the successful conclusion of the operations, the most basic criteria are that the UN peacekeepers have a clear and implementable mandate and the capacity and ability to protect civilians.

## Conclusion

Although there are many definitions in the literature of the success and failure criteria of peacekeeping operations, it cannot be said that there is a single and comprehensive description. However, in general, two basic criteria can be mentioned in terms of the main objectives of peacekeeping operations. The first of these can be stated as ending the conflict, which is determined as the goal in almost all conflicts. The second criterion can be the protection of civilian citizens from conflicts that have nothing to do with the conflicts in general. With this respect, peacekeeping operations may be described as giving an end to the conflict and protecting civilians.

Throughout the study, success and failure criteria were tried to be discussed in the context of studies in the literature. From this point of view, sample conflicts were determined, and the main reasons and conclusions of the conflicts were tried to be emphasised. In terms of the basic criteria discussed, the cases were assessed at the end of the study.

The peacekeeping operations in Macedonia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which are considered a success from the general perspective, achieved success, especially in the protection of civilians, and the conflict was prevented in the Macedonian example. In contrast, in the DRC, it prevented the conflict from intensifying. It can be demonstrated fundamental criterion in increasing the success ratio of the operations is the deployment of the peacekeeping forces, which occurred as clearly as it was in the Macedonian case, especially before the conflict situation arose extremely unlike in Somalia, Rwanda or South Sudan, which remains as a question.

In the context of failure criteria, Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina can be expressed as clear failure cases. The inefficiency of UNAMIR in Rwanda, in terms of capacity, authority and equipment, forced the UN to withdraw its troops from being helpless while the genocide took place. The lack of interest of the international community in Rwanda prevents the UN from taking active action here.

Yet another unsuccessful case, although located in Europe, Bosnia-Herzegovina, could not prevent the planned and targeted genocide of approximately 8,000 Muslims. Even though this conclusion is at the centre of attention or interest of the international public, it proves that both the UN and other global institutions, organisations or forces remain unresponsive or inattentive fair enough.

In the general framework, it can be stated that the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations must be mandated in terms of capability and capacity. The UN should also reveal a conflict-approached character. Because in the cases where the UN was considered unsuccessful in the study, the UN remained fair enough ineffective.

It is an obvious fact that the UN will demonstrate in time whether the faults and mistakes of the UN caused tremendously failed operations in the history of an organisation. On the other hand, whether new peacekeeping operations will be deployed in future, if necessary, conflicts will be authorised differently from missions that have been unsuccessful in the past will be a matter for the United Nations to decide as an organisation.

United Nations peacekeeping operations were assessed in the study in the context of a case study. As a result of the evaluation, the operations in North Macedonia and Mozambique were concluded as a complete success. On the other hand, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, and Somalia were considered complete failure cases. These evaluations were made in the context of the eleven criteria determined in the study. These criteria applied to the cases enabled them to be included in the case analysis successfully or unsuccessfully.

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# The Representation of the Iranian Nuclear Program in the American Media

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## ABSTRACT

*This article aims to unfold what sort of ideological representation the Iranian nuclear program has had in two of America's predominant newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post (through their headlines). The study, which sets out for this objective, concentrates on Edward Said's work titled "Orientalism", an exclusive theorist of post-colonial theory. In other words, this article will examine the "Islamic Threat" generally described in the West in conjunction with the theoretical framework of Orientalism and the reflection of the Iranian nuclear program in these two newspapers in terms of controlling it. Consequently, in this media news, the Iranian nuclear program is described as an object that might cause harm at any moment through the discourse of the Islamic enemy. Therefore, it is represented that the subject must control this dangerous object.*

## Introduction

Edward Said made an essential contribution to Postcolonialism, which questioned the legacy of Western colonialism, with his Orientalism. On the one hand, Said took the frame of Orientalism from the scope of its singular meaning through his work. On the other hand, Orientalism made Orientalism the most used concept in academic usage. Said presented a new perspective on East-West relations with this prominent work. According to him, the West produced an imaginary East so as to define itself, justify its colonial objectives, and accomplish this goal, based on the knowledge-power relationship.

The West, which puts itself at the core of the world based on the separation between "I and others", has drawn its own East with oriental studies. It started with Eastern cultures, civilizations and beliefs for an extended period of time. The image of the East is being put, which emerged as a result of these studies and on which all the negativities that come to mind were filled into use in almost every field of life, from a range of daily life to politics, social sciences to fine arts and the media, and still continues to do so. With this separation, the West has also created its identity, which it describes as "superior," and has tried to consolidate it constantly.

In Orientalism, the West represents the most advanced stage of humanity, while the East reflects laziness, lethargy, sinfulness, and tyranny. Furthermore, the East has been diminished to the position of an object that lags behind Western civilization and must reach the highest level that the West has. The East, which is desperate against the West, is in need of the West. For this cause, the West has continuously legitimized its right to tutelage and disposition over the backward, uncivilized

East (Said, 2013). Briefly, the representation of the East within this perspective gives the West the right to colonize the East and intervene. The West has constructed its intervention, sometimes for democratic purposes, sometimes through human rights or for familiar reasons, based on the values that it had previously tried to persuade the East, whatever the name might be.

As a result of the power it holds, the West has constantly reproduced the East-West differentiation according to the conditions. Therefore, it has served as information to keep the above-mentioned superior-subordinate relationship continuous (Young, 2016). By doing so, it has flourished itself economically, culturally and politically in particular. For this purpose, the relationship has been covered in many Western academic works. In addition, by employing rapid and effective communication brought by globalization, the West has initiated the media to be used as the most crucial source in this direction since the information which the West produces expands very quickly to almost everyone. For the West, the media has become the instrument that will best represent the definition of the most critical outsider or enemy.

To sum up, the West satisfied its necessities for the shape and continuation of its own identity by establishing an imaginary picture of the East. In conclusion, the West utilized this situation by constantly creating and spreading information with the purpose of preserving the superior-subordinate connection in the bilateral relationship (Hall, 2013). Undoubtedly, in this process, it should be underlined; The other was not left alone. On the contrary, it was intervened when necessary to be taken under control to prevent their 'barbaric' outcomes.

### **Orientalism, Islam and Iran**

In the last quarter of the 20th century, the image of the East, which was adopted as the opposition of the West, specifically America, mentioned above in the introduction, has gradually left its position to an Islam-centred discourse. According to Said, the 1973 oil crisis was the breaking point in this situation. As a conclusion of this event, oil prices raised, and the West started to see this situation sort; the Muslims were on the corner of repeating the old conquests (Said, 2013). The oil embargo, which brought a tough economic shock to the West, reaped the seeds of the fear of Islam in the West, which was incompatible with its interests. Said pointed out that before this event, it was challenging to face Islam in American culture or the media, but rather Arabs, Turks, Iranians, or Pakistanis were seen and heard. In other words, the word Muslim was rarer than not seen or heard in the US media before the 1970s (Said, 2013).

Following the oil crisis, the outbreak of bombing occasions in the 1980s and 1990s, considering Islam with terrorism, concluded in a way that the depth and intensity of this shock increased. At the beginning of 1979, the revolution that took place in Iran caused the West's, particularly America's, concerns to amass. These and similar situations in Islamic countries have taken the perception of the outsider and the enemy, Islam, one step higher in the West over time. But its peak, that is, the replacement of communism, was unquestionable with the end of the cold war.

With the end of the cold war, communism, the ultimate enemy of America in particular and the West in general, was defeated, and this situation led the West to seek another to feed itself. Considering the need for the other to define or make sense of identities in post-colonial theory, the need for another to replace communism for the continuation of the West's supra-identity emerged after the Cold War period (Foucault, 2021). At a point when this expectation was at its peak, Samuel Huntington, in his famous article published in the journal *Foreign Affairs* in 1993, signalled that Islam would be the one to fill the vacuum left by the defeat of the West's arch-enemy of the Cold War era which was communism. Judith Miller for this thesis of Huntington; He supported the idea that Islam, whose unique mission is militant, is very dangerous for the West, stating that it is the thesis of the millennium. As mentioned in previous segments, the enemy Islam, whose infrastructure had



been shaped and formed before, started to take its place in the gap in need of the other that the West needed with such resounding academic works. The West has now assessed Islam to a particular and dominant position to give the continuation of its upper identity (Huntington, 1993). In other words, Islam has now become a cultural and ideological other sub-identity of Western civilization. As Said also pointed out, an emphasis on the US and the outsider started to become the core of the writings and works about Islam written in the West.

The West, which found its need for the "outsider" with Islam following the Cold War, did not put off supporting it in the media. For instance, in the January 21, 1996, issue of *The New York Times*, the "View of the Week" section was titled: "The Red Trouble Is Gone, but Islam Has Come". Another instance unfolds the point that Islam has reached in a short period of time in terms of hostility. Robin Wright, the leading Islamic scholar for the *Los Angeles Times*, wrote in his January 26, 1991, article that US and Western officials are still looking for strategies to deal with "Islamic forces" and that dealing with Islam from the Bush administration, 30-40 years ago, it was way better to fight communism. To sum up, as Said emphasized, "Islam" in Western writings has now started to be reflected as an object that includes everything that is most disapproved from the point of view of civilized and Western rationality.

After introducing Islam as the primary enemy of the West through academic works and media representations, another vital point to be mentioned here is: The representation of Islam in the West is coherent and generally aimed at spreading fear. Said; Islam gathers the entire Muslim world, with all its diversity, representing an extraordinary evil and thoughtless essence. From the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to oil and Afghanistan to Iran, most of the most striking and often bad news, wherever there is a Muslim population, is about Islam. Every occasion that occurs in Islamic countries or is asserted to be done by Muslims abroad and is not supported by the vast majority of Muslims is reduced to Islamic fundamentalism (Hentch, 2012). Taking sides against this situation, Said points out that no one equates the Jonestown massacre, the devastation of the bombing in Oklahoma, the destruction of Indochina with the West or Christianity, and states that such events are only equated with "Islam" (Said, 2013).

The title of Daniel Pipes' article in *The National Interest*, published through the end of 1995, most clearly exemplifies what is meant above: "There is no moderation: Fighting Fundamentalist Islam" (Pipes, 1995). Every single one of the Muslim populations of more than a billion has furious emotions towards the West. The reason for that is they are always ready to shed blood, and even their religion has made them enthusiastic about it. In addition, the logic of autocracy and medievalism, which many Muslims reject, has also been consistently associated with Islam. According to Karim, in the news on Islam in the Western media after the cold war, Islam is shown as a reason for the turmoil in the "Third World countries" and has a representation that threatens a peaceful world order of the West.

In conclusion, the enmity of Islam as another in line with the interests of the West has found its counterpart in Western society. For instance, students at any American university, including the most elite, are asked what they think of when the word 'Muslim' is mentioned, and they almost entirely get the same answer: the armed bearded and fanatical terrorist, bent on destroying his enormous enemy, the United States (Ashcroft, 1995). Furthermore, Said expresses the success of the enemy representation of Islam as follows: "Most Americans now shudder as the slightest news about Muslims or Islam comes unfolds, or a scourge begins to be expected" (Said, 2013).

In short, Islam is represented to be ideologically hostile to the values of the West; in the meantime, it is described as a threat to the West at any time. Of course, Islam, which has been made hostile in this way, should not be left alone. Otherwise, he may become a monster that will destroy the superior values of the West at the slightest opportunity (Ghazvinian, 2021). Consequently, the West not only

negates its war with Islam but also works in its representations that it should not be left unattended and should be taken care of by intervening.

It has been tried to exemplify the struggle, as mentioned above, of Islam's othering through the West, predominantly Iran. In his other fiction, there is no question that an anti-Western and Islamic-oriented administration came to power with the 1979 revolution in Iran, which elevated Iran to a unique position for the West (Izadi and Saghaye-Biria, 2007). With this transmission, Iran has become a window opportunity to satisfy the West (Islam) about the other. While the news about Iran, which took little place in the American media until the 1979 Iranian Revolution, had an affirmative representation, it was perceived as a modern state. Nonetheless, after the revolution, particularly the hostage crisis that came with the revolution, Iran's affirmative representation has altered the direction. Said states the panic in the West after the seizure of the American embassies in the language of the West: "They had us cornered; along with us the normal, democratic, rational order". In short, as Said pointed out again, with the Islamic revolution, Islam came to the point of insanity by provoking itself in Iran. With the revolution, Iran became an irritating manifestation of this Islam image (Said, 2013).

Following, Iran got out of the control of the West under the name of an Islamic administration, and as a consequence, the West suffered from oil-oriented economic damage; the West did not represent Iran as an enemy in the media. For example, the Sunday supplement of the New York Times on January 6, 1980, had an outstanding headline: "Militant Islam: The Historic Whirlwind." On December 8 of the same year, New Republic made a news report such as "Islamic explosion". Unquestionably, the most surprising of these were the statements in the editorial of the Wall Street Journal on November 20. The article stated that "the reason for the decline of civilization is, above all else, the weakening of the Western power, which has these ideas and expands these ideas". In addition, the following cover of Time magazine on April 16, 1979, shortly after the Iranian revolution, summarizes the above-mentioned issue clearly: "Militant Awakening".



A bearded muezzin calmly reads the call to prayer in the painting he placed on the cover of Time magazine. The 19th-century image, which is one of the examples of Orientalism, does not correspond to the time of the news. In other words, the re-emergence of this picture after a long time, right following the Iranian revolution, symbolizes the West's representation of Islam in the best way. And its publication after the revolution signals that Iran will be a major target of its representation.

In brief, after the Iranian revolution, the Iranian representation in America was shown with an emphasis on "Islam" in the context of "Threats and terrorism". Besides, America's relations with Iran are also reflected in this procedure. The fact that Americans learn about ninety per cent of the information about Iran after the revolution from radio, television and newspapers makes the perception of Iran in society dramatically valuable. As a result, the Iranian nuclear program, mentioned below, will

be shown as proof that it is trying to be represented as an "Islam"-oriented other in the Western media, particularly the American media.

## Representation of Iran's Nuclear Program in the American Media

### Islamic Iran versus the West

By assumption, we look at the news of the two leading American newspapers (New York Times and Washington Post) regarding the Iranian nuclear program; the two put the pressure on the forefront as representation in the context of me and the outsider: Islamic Iran against the West. In other words, while Iran's nuclear program is being covered in these two newspapers, it is perceived that Iran's Islamic identity is tried to be brought to the core. For example, the headline of the New York Times dated April 9, 2013, "If the talks turn out to be negative, Iran has said it will increase its nuclear fuel production." As can be seen, there is no abnormality in the literary content of the news. But what is interesting in the delivery of the news is the photo used for the news. Although it has nothing to do with the news, the photo in question includes Iranian women wearing chadors. The presence of four women wearing chadors next to the two men clearly shows that the emphasis on Islam is aimed to be brought to the fore in the news. In short, with the photo used for this news, Iran's Islamic identity was tried to be emphasized while reporting Iran's nuclear event.

#### After Talks End, Iran Announces an Expansion of Nuclear Fuel Production:

Family members of slain nuclear scientists stood with Fereydoun Abbasi-Davani, far right, a nuclear official, on Tuesday. By DAVID M. HERSZENHORN and RICK GLADSTONE Published: April 9, 2013

Iran's president announced an expansion of the country's uranium production and claimed other atomic energy advances on Tuesday, striking a pugnacious tone in the aftermath of diplomatic talks that ended in an impasse with the big powers last weekend in Kazakhstan.



Another example presents an image as interesting as the photo above. The headline of the article written by Victor Morton in the Washington Post in November 2014: "Obama will bypass Congress on the embargo on Iran if the Nuclear deal is successful." As it is understood from the title of the report, the event is a nuclear issue. However, as in the present news above, the photograph used in this news also reveals that Iran's Islamic identity is being tried to be brought to the core. As seen in the photo below of the news: There is a flag as a symbolic representative of Islam, and the *Kelime-i shahada*, which is the pre-requisite of Islam, is written in Arabic on the flag. The Iranian flag is on the right side of the lower part of the flag. The fact that the flag is given in the background shows that Iran is not trying to be represented in private, but rather the Islamic identity is trying to be brought to the core.

**Obama will bypass Congress on Iran sanctions if nuclear deal is reached:**


In another example of the White House bypassing Congress to avoid a vote it would lose, the Obama administration will not to seek congressional approval to suspend sanctions against Iran if a deal on the Islamic republic's nuclear program can be reached, The New York Times reported Sunday nit.....



One of the systematic methods that newspapers use to demonstrate Iran's Islamic identity in Iran's nuclear news is using exclusive terms to present this identity. These words are generally; "Mullah regime" and "Fundamentalist". In conclusion, of the use of words such as "Mullah" and "Fundamentalist or Radical" in the news, the image that comes to mind in the reader's mind is Islam. Because the West generally tries to present these statements in the news, it tries to reflect Islam. For example, in an attack by non-Muslims or any event threatening the West, the word radical or fundamentalist is used alone concerning the perpetrators. In other words, in the event of an attack: "Radical Christians ..... did it" is not reported in the Western media. To sum up, the perception that Islam equals fundamentalism or radicalism, which was previously placed in the subconscious of the readers in the Western media, as the Iranian nuclear program is the subject of this concept (fundamentalism), both Iran's Islamic identity is automatically emphasized, and this discourse is repeated. In addition, the adjective mullah, frequently used among Muslims and describes a person with a specific religious background, is one of the words used in case the Iranian nuclear issue is in the news.



The most striking example of this issue, which emphasizes Iran's Islamic identity with special terms, is the title of the comment written by Bill Keller in the New York Times on September 9, 2012, and the photo used. The photo used in the title "Nuclear Mullahs" (Nuclear Mullahs) is as follows:



While the news exaggerated the nuclear program, it also reflected Iran's Islamic identity using the Mullah concept.

The following sample news is the analysis written by Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar from the Washington Post newspaper. The news speaks of "anti-Americanism within Iran". Two interesting points are presented in this article. The first of these was the photograph used in conjunction with the event. In this news, which resembles another photo above, a woman in a chador is used. It is evident that the photo of the woman, which has little to do with the event described in the news, was used for a determined and deliberate purpose in the news. In addition, another interesting situation is the frequent use of the word "radical Islamists" in the nuclear news, which includes a photo of a woman in a chador. The words underlined in a few sample sentences from the news prove this.



### Strategic anti-Americanism in Iran from the hostage crisis to nuclear talks

By Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar November,4

.....Those radical Islamists tapped into widespread anti-Americanism in Iran to consolidate the post-revolutionary regime.....  
.....there were rumors that they were planning to attack the embassy again before their radical Islamist rivals outbid and preempted them.....



As seen in the sample news above, two newspapers (New York Times and Washington Post) tried to highlight Iran's Islamic identity while the Iran nuclear incident was reported. In summary, considering Islam is the outsider of the West, the Western media tried to identify the event with Islam while reporting on the Iranian nuclear program and thus tried to repeat the distinction between me and the outsider.

### Oriental Distrust and the Islamic Threat

Another important point that should be emphasized while examining how the two newspapers in question represent the Iran nuclear event is that these two newspapers try to present the event within the framework of the cold war discourse. The news written in this direction is trying to show the Iranian nuclear program as an Islamic threat to the West. Given that if we look at the news, when it comes to the Iranian nuclear issue, the word threat or danger is used frequently in most of this news. Despite the lack of clarity in the West that Iran has nuclear weapons and that many other countries have multiple nuclear weapons, the word nuclear threat is generally associated with the Iranian nuclear program. This situation has been so internalized that the word threat or danger is compressed somewhere, even though negotiations are in question.

For example, the news of negotiation in the November 27, 2013 news of the New York Times was given under the title of "A Most Dangerous Deal". As it is easily understood from the news title, the negotiation event is portrayed as a great danger. In addition, the emphasis of the news title shown in the Washington Post below was also a threat. The analysis article titled "Iran's Growing Nuclear Program Threat" constantly repeated that the nuclear program is a threat to the West.

### The growing threat of Iran's nuclear program

*By Stephen Rademaker and Blaise Misztal November 7, 2011*

When the computers that control Iran's centrifuges were attacked by the Stuxnet worm beginning in 2009, the assault was widely ascribed to intelligence services intent on setting back Iran's nuclear program. More significant than the damage to Iran, however, has been the damage to Western resolve, as the United States and other countries have become more complacent about the Iranian threat.


Combined with attacks targeting Iranian nuclear scientists and reports of shortages of key materials needed for centrifuges,

As can be seen in the examples above, in the majority of the Iranian nuclear news given in the mentioned newspapers, the news is either; ..." given under the title of Iran's nuclear threat (Iran's Nuclear Threat) or it is emphasized with titles such as "Iran's growing nuclear threat ..." (Growing Threat of Iran). For example, in the title of an article in the Washington Post on May 25, 2013 (Iran's nuclear designs are the greater Middle East threat), it was stated that the Iranian Nuclear Incident poses a threat to the Middle East. In summary, when it comes to the Iranian nuclear program, there is a threat, one way or another.

The frequent use of words that evoke threats in the news, the underlining of Iran's Islamic identity, and an attempt to give messages that pose distrust. An article in the Washington Post in 2003 was published with the title Iran's Bomb, and the article mentioned a fundamentalist regime in Iran several times. The news highlighted the threat by using the word bomb next to Iran's name. In addition, the term fundamentalist and the word Islam and reactionary were used together by blending them. As a result, the news tries to tell us the following; As an Islamic state, Iran is both a threat and a barbarian state. Furthermore, the possession of a nuclear bomb by an uncivilized Islamic state is also reflected as an unacceptable situation.

In some other news of these two newspapers, there are reports that the West has taken for granted both the extent of the threat in Iran's nuclear incident and its insecurity about Iran, as well as by other states in the Middle East. In this news, it is understood that some countries of the Middle East and especially the Gulf countries fear Iran's nuclear incident and do not trust Iran in a possible negotiation. For instance, the Washington Post's November 20, 2013, news report mentions the concerns of the Gulf countries against negotiations in the Iran nuclear incident. In the context of the news, it is reported that the Obama administration's negotiation with Iran will be a mistake and will actually carry the threat to the region to a greater extent. This situation shows that the danger and distrust of Iran, represented by the West, have been investigated in the Middle East or Islamic countries. This and similar news clearly reveal the conclusion of the oriental view of the West on Iran.

### Oriental Control



The photo above is from the New York Times nuclear article on March 20, 2010. In the news, it is aimed to provide the message that the Monster Iran, which was created before, should be captured and put into its place; to do so, it should be taken under control. The round shape of the place is intended to imply that Iran is a bomb ready to explode for the entire world. Perhaps the finest detail among these

interpretations is unquestionably the foregrounding of the Arabic word Allah used on the Iranian flag. In a way, the message goes beyond Iran and emphasizes the threat of Islam. Giving the photo in this way is to confirm the West's right to intervene or control, which is one of the leading objectives of Orientalism mentioned above. Because according to Orientalism, the hostile other must be taken under control. Otherwise, the level of civilization that the West has brought to the world with the power and resolution will be threatened.

The threat and distrust of Iran reflected in Western society has also led the West to justify the embargo imposed on Iran. The sanctions imposed on Iran, which cause great fear for the West, are actually tools aimed at controlling the beast. When we look at the two newspapers about the incident, it is mentioned in the news that the US embargoes against Iran should be increased more and that European countries should act jointly with the US on this issue (Küpeli, 2016). Otherwise, it is mentioned that great danger will come. For example, in an editorial in *The Washington Post*, he advises European countries to support the United States so that Iran does not have nuclear weapons and that the United States should also strengthen these embargoes.

In a commentary of the *New York Times*, the series of disasters expected with Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is mentioned. The article predicts that if Iran has nuclear weapons, other Islamic states in the region will also have them, and therefore the presence of the United States in the region may come to an end. Furthermore, the article suggests that as a consequence of this, it will be more than the trouble experienced during the cold war period. Another news of the *New York Times* stated that if Iran had nuclear weapons, the gravity of the incident would be tremendous and harshly criticized that the steps to prevent this are still not taken.

In addition to the fact that the armed solution to Iran's nuclear incident is voiced realistically in both newspapers in general, they also present Israel's armed solution discourses on Iran as if it were ordinary news in their news. To sum up, two newspapers cover military threats from Israel against Iran as usual news. For example, the *Washington Post* the event; news that "Israel is considering pre-emptive war against Iran if nuclear talks fail" proves this. As the content of the news, it talks about Israel's concerns about Iran, and it is constantly mentioned that Israel is considering a military option as a solution.

In addition, although some news content is different, the images or photos used highlight the necessity of using the military option. For example, the photo used in the article "We Don't Have Nuclear Weapons" by Iranian Foreign Affairs President Javad Zarif in the *New York Times* in 2006 confirms this. The photo depicts the surrender of the bearded person representing Iran in the face of a gun.

**We Do Not Have a Nuclear Weapons Program** By JAVAD ZARIF Published: April 6, 2006

THE controversy over Iran's peaceful nuclear program has obscured one point in particular: There need not be a crisis. A solution to the situation is possible and eminently within reach.....



## Conclusion

The representation of Islam, built by the West as the other, was covered in two of America's profound newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post, over the Iranian nuclear program and still continues. These two newspapers emphasized Iran's Islamic identity in the news concerning Iran's nuclear program, sometimes in the context of the article and sometimes in the photos used independently of the content of the article. The traces of the Islamic identity of Iran are reflected in most news related to the nuclear issue in the two newspapers. Nonetheless, in the news of North Korea's nuclear program, which is also perceived as a threat, the state has no religious identity. This situation proves that there is a different intention behind unfolding Iran's Islamic identity. In short, the West is trying to represent Islam through Iran's nuclear incident, which it has marginalized.

Furthermore, the Islamic identity is not only reflected in the news but also the other "Islamic" object, which the West laid the groundwork for after the cold war, is constantly tried to be dehumanized in the Iranian nuclear news. In other words, the need for repetition of the "outsider" after constructing the "outsider" is best met through Iran's nuclear program. The West, which set out for this goal, is repeatedly trying to satisfy itself within the face of Islam, the sub-identity it has constructed. As Said states, the West tries to identify every feature that would terrify humanity with Islam.

The West also represents the threat of Islam, which it constructs as the other, as an object that will harm its values. Therefore, it empowers itself to prevent this disaster. In this regard, the embargo or military intervention options that the West is trying to implement in the Iran nuclear incident exemplify this. The fact that the nuclear weapons incident, which the West owns in greater numbers, is never covered in the media confirms this.

The fact that Muslim countries or other countries are more interested in Iran's nuclear program regarding whether Israel has nuclear weapons or whether it poses a threat reveals the success of the representation that the West strives for. The victory of this effort has reached such dimensions that the intervention of Iran in the Muslim Gulf countries seems justified. Finally, the point that should be mentioned is that with this policy, the West also covers up the gain (exploitation) from Islamic countries. Again, due to the Iranian threat it poses in the Gulf countries, it condemns these countries to purchase weapons from him.

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