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Defining Peace: A content analysis of Brazil's, China's, and the European Union's discourses on the Ukraine War

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ABSTRACT

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, many political leaders have vowed to settle this conflict. Although Brazil, China, and the European Union were among these voices, some have accused these international actors of propelling the war. This study offers a content analysis of the speeches proffered by Lula da Silva, Ursula Von der Leyen, and Xi Jinping, the political leaders of these three actors. This analysis concluded that Ursula Von der Leyen mentions peace fewer times, accounts solely for Russia's responsibility for the war, and presents a perspective akin to International Relations neoliberal theory. Meanwhile, Lula da Silva provides some views closer to Johan Galtung's theories. Nevertheless, the Brazilian president does not clearly explain the beginning of the war, affirming that negotiation is the pathway to peace. Finally, Xi Jinping stresses his Global Security Initiative and avoids calling "war" what is happening in Ukraine.

Once again, in the centre of Europe, innocent women, men and children are dying or fear for their lives. We condemn this barbaric attack. (Von der Leyen, 2022b).

Conflict and war benefit no one. (...) Dialogue and negotiation are the only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2022b).

I want to end the war. What I think, in the case of Ukraine and Russia, is that you need someone to speak for peace. (Lula da Silva, 2023).

Introduction

In February 2022, Russian troops trespassed the Ukrainian border. Since then, several political leaders have pleaded for terminating the war and re-establishing peace. As the three quotations presented above demonstrate, among these voices are the governments of Brazil, China, and the European Union Commission. However, even though these three defend the settlement of this conflict, they mutually accuse each other of propelling the war. When the Brazilian president visited Portugal, some local parties accused him of being complacent with Russia (Correia, 2023). Also, European leaders and NATO have affirmed that China intended to support the Russian war effort (Fernandes, 2023). In the meantime, the Brazilian president indicated that the EU puts more fuel to the conflict since it sends weaponry to Ukraine (Silva, 2023). His Chinese counterpart also criticizes

the EU and what he considers a “cold war mentality” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022c). The exception to this exchange of accusations is Brazil and China.

Hence, a paradox arises: one defender of ending the war points out that the other defender puts more fuel to the conflict. Thus, some crucial questions pop up: What are these political leaders discussing about conflict resolution and peace? Are they talking in the same terms? Do they comprehend peace in different definitions? Once these are three key players in the international arena, understanding their perspectives on the Ukraine War gains prominent importance.

A first possibility to answer such questions would be that such positions might be merely rhetorical, not corresponding with a practical application of conflict resolution. Such actors’ *de facto* behaviour might differ from their leaders’ discourses. Although this perspective seems entirely plausible, cognitive linguistics literature attests that the language applied indicates a lot about the speaker’s personality, perceptions about the world, and ideas (Stemler, 2015). In the case of conflicts, the language used by political leaders reveals how they perceive or attempt to convince their audience regarding what they consider morally right (Demasi, 2022). In the ultimate case, messages evoked by political leaders function as stimuli to other leaders (Jervis, 1967). Thus, such messages do have an impact on other international actors and domestic audiences.

A second possibility is that the messages of one international actor do not arrive correctly to a second international actor. As the literature identifies, in periods of war, the official propaganda dismisses the capacity to hear the other (enemy) side of the conflict (Ron, 2009). Since 2014, John Mearsheimer has claimed that the West has not listened to Russian security concerns in the case of Ukraine and Russia. For the American realist, the West reduces its perspective on Ukraine to its rhetoric of Putin’s imperialism (Mearsheimer, 2022). This hypothesis has been primarily discussed in the literature in a reductionist discussion of whether Putin’s concerns were legitimate. Albeit answering such interrogations is pivotal, finding robust evidence to support one of these sides seems considerably challenging.

Finally, mutual accusations may arise from incompatible peace and conflict resolution perspectives. Hypothetically, the three leaders might comprehend the concept of peace in different terms. This hypothesis turns us automatically to International Relations (IR) theory and peace studies. Indeed, these disciplines discuss the definition of such a concept, not finding a consensual conceptualization (Gouveia Junior, 2022). Definitions of peace appeared as the mere absence of war or violence (Galtung, 1969) to more complex perspectives like security communities (Adler, 1999) or spaces of tranquillity and cooperation (Anderson, 2004; Gouveia Junior, 2022). The literature dismisses this hypothesis concerning the Brazilian, the Chinese, and the European Union’s perspectives on the Ukraine War.

Then, this article will focus on the last hypothesis. As the literature vows, analysis of conflict resolution and peace, its properties, and conceptualizations should be more studied (Diehl, 2016; Gleditsch et al., 2014; Gouveia Junior, 2022). This investigation seeks to mitigate such gap, opening new boundaries for further research and searching for substantive evidence to answer the proposed research question.

On this behalf, I proceeded with a content analysis. This method of textual analysis arguably is the most indicated to research aiming to answer “what” questions (Hardy et al., 2004; Pashakhanlou, 2016). My analysis concentrated on official discourses proffered by the presidents of Brazil, Lula da Silva, of China, Xi Jinping, and of the EU Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen. Such examination strives to comprehend what these leaders discuss about conflict resolution and peace in Ukraine and how they conceptualize and believe peace/war emerges and ends.

In the next section, I present a theoretical discussion on peace and war. Such debate will offer the ground for the empirical analysis. After presenting my methodology, I divided my results into two sections: a quantitative content analysis and a qualitative content analysis. The conclusions are presented straight after the results.

International Relations Theory and The Conceptualization of War and Peace

The first scholars to focus on international relations sought to understand why wars emerge and how to create international peace (Richmond, 2008). Since then, theories and approaches have proposed various definitions and conceptualizations of peace/war. Once this study seeks to discuss the purpose and conflict resolution processes defended by decision-makers, introducing IR theories becomes inevitable.

For decades, the realist and the liberal traditions dominated the literature. Whereas the former believed states could achieve international peace, many perceived the realists as more pessimistic (Richmond, 2008). The realist tradition introduced the idea of international anarchy because of the lack of international governance. Earlier realists, like Hans Morgenthau (1948), will argue that states will always seek power under this system. For a neorealist, due to international anarchism, states' vulnerability within the system leads states to seek their security (Waltz, 1988). Thus, one state does not know other states' expectations, being encouraged to invest in military power (Mearsheimer, 1994; Waltz, 1988).

Thereby, bellicism is an inherent consequence of anarchy. John Mearsheimer (1994: 12) elucidates this view well, arguing that “[p]eace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquillity or mutual concord, is not likely to break out in this world.” Most realists comprehend peace as the absence of war. A few tools can mitigate the tendency to violence, like balance of power (Morgenthau, 1948) and nuclear weapons (Waltz, 1993). Even though fear and confrontation permeate the system, the Cold War is also considered a peaceful moment for realist authors (Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1988).

The liberal IR tradition is considerably more optimistic about international possibilities for peace (Richmond, 2008). Immanuel Kant is a massive influencer of this tradition, primarily due to his piece *Perpetual Peace*. The philosopher proposes a few steps to establish international peace, including spreading the Republican forms of government (Kant, 1795). From this perspective, many liberal approaches emerged to explain peace and war internationally.

The early idealists, including US President Woodrow Wilson, believed that international organizations of states, like the League of Nations, would disentangle states' propensity for war (Richmond, 2008). Thereupon, some authors like Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane would introduce a theoretical framework called neoliberalism (Jervis, 1999). Neoliberals do not deny the existence of anarchy and its perils. However, for these scholars, international organizations, economic interdependence, and cooperation foster peace and reduce conflict risks (Keohane and Nye, 1973; Keohane and Martin, 1995; Nye, 1971). Through information sharing, international organizations arguably lessen states' mistrust (Keohane and Martin, 1995).

Another perspective prompted by the liberal tradition is the democratic peace theory. Supported by robust quantitative data, this theory contends that democracies never fight each other (Chan, 1997; Russett et al., 1995). Albeit the result seems quasi-consensual, the explanation for this peaceful behaviour is more controversial. Whereas some authors highlight how the democratic voting process discourages political leaders from going to war, others reinforce how existing democracies share some ideological and identitarian features (Chan, 1997).

While realism and liberalism were the two mainstream IR theories for decades, in the 90s, a new stream of thought came to challenge their dominance: constructivism. Emmanuel Adler might be the constructivist writer who gave more attention to theorizing peace and war (Gouveia Junior, 2022). For Adler (1999), peace must be something rather than a mere absence of war. Otherwise, peace does not exist. Then, Adler (1999) proposes that peace represents a security community, a transnational area where actors peacefully conduct changes. Security communities are socially constructed places. Therefore, for a constructivist, peace/war materializes according to shared identities and ideas (Richmond, 2008).

Although many other IR theories discuss how conflicts arise and cease, in my analysis, I will only look at realism, liberalism, and constructivism. This choice is because previous authors have identified these three as the most applied theories among scholars (Maliniak et al., 2012; Snyder, 2009; Walt, 1998). Nevertheless, IR is one of many disciplines concerned with conflict resolution. Peace and conflict studies also dive into such theoretical debates.

Johan Galtung might be the most prominent author from this tradition (Wallensteen, 1988). Refuting to conceptualize peace as a mere absence of war, he argues that peace is the absence of all forms of violence, which “is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations” (Galtung, 1969: 168). Such a broad definition became a target of harsh criticism (Adler, 1999; Boulding, 1978; Schmidt, 1968). Notwithstanding, it allowed Galtung to formulate two ground-breaking concepts: positive and negative peace. The former represents the absence of structural violence, while the latter propounds the absence of physical violence (Galtung, 1969). Later, he proposed the concept of cultural violence, framing the idea of the violence triangle (Galtung, 1990, 1996). For the Norwegian scholar, achieving peace requires finding innovative and harmonious paths to solve conflicts (Galtung, 1996, 2006). Conflict resolution must not only stop a war but also construct a long-lasting peace (Galtung, 1996). From this perspective, Galtung (1990) proposes a differentiation between peace-making, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding.

Many authors deserve a deep analysis within the frame of peace and conflict studies. Nevertheless, it is feasible to delve only into some works in an article. Because of his importance to peace studies, I focused only on Johan Galtung. Considering the three IR mainstream traditions (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) and Johan Galtung's work, I have enough lenses to examine how political leaders present their views on peace.

Methodology

This article proceeds with a content analysis of the official portals of three international actors and their leaders: the European Union (EU) and its president of the EU Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen; Brazil and its president, Lula da Silva; and China and its premier, Xi Jinping. I opted to analyse the discourses of these three leaders for a few reasons. First, the three have been active actors in the Ukraine war. While the EU and China, due to their political and economic size, automatically play a decisive role in global affairs, the Brazilian leader attempted to bring his country to a central position in solving the Ukraine War¹. Secondly, the three actors represent three different parts of the international system. The EU is central in the Western Hemisphere and supports the Ukrainian war effort. Meanwhile, China represents an antagonist to Western preponderance with an indirect pro-Russia posture (Júnior and Branco, 2022; Sjoli, 2023). Finally, Brazil seeks to maintain a non-aligned position, condemning Russia's military operation without resorting to sanctions (Júnior and Branco, 2022). As China and Brazil are states and the European Union is an international organization, I must refer that comparisons between the EU and other states' foreign policies are

¹ The result of this attempt is debatable once some authors perceive Brazilian position as merely rhetorical. See Sjoli (2023).

considerably common in the literature (Tocci and Manners, 2008). Foreign policy is a component of the EU, and it will not be problematic to carry out such a comparison.

Thus, I conducted a content analysis of the discourses of these three leaders. I comprehend content analysis as “a research method that systematically analyses the content of communication” (Pashakhanlou, 2017: 3) and “attempt to infer the characteristics and intentions of sources from inspection of the messages they produce” (Holsti apud Jervis, 1967: 367). Content analysis can be conducted in different formats, including text, visual, or audio (Stemler, 2015). This method is particularly efficient in answering “what” research questions rather than “how” and “why” questions (Hardy et al., 2004; Pashakhanlou, 2017). Since this study seeks to comprehend what international actors and their political leaders are defending for resolving the Ukraine War, content analysis works better than other potential methods of textual analysis, like discourse analysis. Furthermore, since the development of new technologies, the IR literature has witnessed a re-emergence of content analysis (Pashakhanlou, 2017; Stemler, 2015).

However, a purely quantitative content analysis can mislead the conclusions of a study. A mere word counting may only provide part of the picture of an IR complex research (Bennett, 2015). Hence, I followed the proposal advanced by Pashakhanlou (2017) of a “fully integrated content analysis.” This proposal identifies the necessity to converge a quantitative with a qualitative content analysis while proceeding with a computerized and manual research design (Pashakhanlou, 2017). Such an approach brings content analysis closer to discourse analysis since it comprehends that objective counting cannot measure meaning (Hardy et al., 2004). Several authors have defended combining quantitative and qualitative methods for analysing textual data (Bennett, 2015; Hardy et al., 2004; Pashakhanlou, 2017). Arguably, such multi-method fosters the reliability and validity of the content analysis, mitigating the flaws of this method (Bennett, 2015).

Thus, I divided the results into two sections: the quantitative content analysis and the qualitative content analysis. The former indicates the general recurrence and application of the words, and the latter provides a deeper analysis of the contexts in which these leaders applied some recurrent words. I used the software “Sketch Engine” for both parts. This computerized tool is used primarily in social sciences research and allowed me to identify word recurrence and its application. In the quantitative content analysis, the results reproduce the recurrence of words in the three official portals, including direct citations of leaders and parts written by journalists. For the qualitative content analysis, I considered only direct citations of the three political leaders.

I gathered my dataset from official sources to analyse how the three political leaders discussed peace and conflict resolution. Regarding Von der Leyen, I collected her statements from the European Union Commission portal (www.ec.commission.eu). Concerning Lula da Silva, I got his comments from the governmental portal in English and Portuguese (www.gov.br). Meanwhile, for the Chinese leader, I only considered the official pages written in English because of linguistic limitations. Thus, I included texts from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.fmprc.gov.cn).

In the three official portals, I searched their internal research engine for the combination of “statement on Ukraine” and the leaders’ names. For instance, I searched the Brazilian governmental portal for “statement on Ukraine Lula.” I gathered all the results, excluding only the joint statements of these leaders. I restricted the search between January 2022 and June 2023. Unfortunately, in the Brazilian portal, the data collected in English was considerably small. It comprises only 16320 words. Thus, I made a second dataset for Lula da Silva’s speeches in Portuguese. When linguistics inferences did not require the text to be in English, I used the data in Portuguese. Concerning Xi Jinping, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website shows any official activities as a result of the search. Some of them did not mention directly the Chinese president.

My dataset comprised a total of 169307 words, divided as follows:

Table 1- Distribution of words per international actor

Actor	Words
Brazil	79032
China	54356
European Union	35919

Data composed by articles [online] from gov.br, fmprc.gov.cn, ec.commission.eu.

I must highlight that although the European Union data is smaller than the other two, it includes mainly direct citations of Ursula Von der Leyen. Thus, it was not a problem for the qualitative content analysis. Meanwhile, the Brazilian and Chinese portals display texts in which official journalists quote the two leaders in Lula da Silva's and Xi Jinping's datasets. This difference is due to how the three official portals displayed their information. While the Commission website offers complete samples of Von der Leyen statements, the Chinese and Brazilian portals quote their presidents akin to journalistic news. Hence, the quantitative content analysis focuses on the words used by the official portals, while the qualitative part dives into the leaders' discourses.

Conceptual Analysis - General Comparison

The first quantitative content analysis conducted was the identification of the recurrence of four keywords: peace, war, Ukraine, and Russia. I depicted these results, including the media of words per one thousand words spoken, in Table 2. This table also indicates some characteristics of my data. For example, summing up the four words, the Brazilian portal has considerably fewer mentions per one thousand words. It indicates that Lula da Silva probably talks more about issues beyond the Ukraine War in the articles collected.

Table 2 – Mentions and mentions per one thousand words (peace, war, Russia, Ukraine)

Words	Brazil	China	European Union
Peace (total mentions)	148	159	16
Peace (mentions/one thousand words)	1,87	2,92	0,44
War (total mentions)	110	27	136
War (mentions/one thousand words)	1,39	0,49	3,77
Russia (total mentions)	81	369	159
Russia (mentions/one thousand words)	1,02	6,78	4,41
Ukraine (total mentions)	144	152	339
Ukraine (mentions/one thousand words)	1,82	2,79	9,42

Data composed by articles [online] from gov.br, fmprc.gov.cn, ec.commission.eu.

Table 2 also offers some initial results. First, Von der Leyen seldom talks about peace. Indeed, the EU portal is the one that discussed more about war. In the contrary direction, assuming the entire articles published in the Brazilian official portal, “peace” (161 times) was more cited than “war” (113 times). Nonetheless, when considering only Lula’s speeches, I found that he still mentions the word “war” (42 times) more than “peace” (34 times). It is a bewitching result, given that the Brazilian recurrently contends that some political leaders have only discussed the war to the detriment of peace. The same happened to China, where peace (165 times) arose more frequently than war (27 times). Nevertheless, I must reinforce that the Chinese portal avoids using this word in referring to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. They mentioned “crisis,” for instance, 91 times.

Concerning the number of mentions of “Russia” and “Ukraine,” the European Union portal includes more mentions of the word “Ukraine,” while the Chinese website mentions the word “Russia.” The Brazilian dataset stands in the middle, with a more balanced citation. It coincides with the postures of the three states towards the two countries. I must note, however, that “Russia” probably appeared more in the Chinese data because their portal included many articles not directly connected to Ukraine in the research results.

Having concluded this initial identification, I analyse the three portals’ most used terms. A vital outcome of this analysis is the difference between how the official communication channels call what is happening in Ukraine. Xi Jinping and his Ministry of Foreign Affairs refer to it as the “Ukraine issue” (26 times) or the “Ukraine crisis” (55 times). Therefore, like the Russian president, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs avoids using “war” to refer to Ukraine. In the meantime, Lula and the Brazilian official portal utilize a variety of terms, “war in Ukraine” (11 times) being the most applied, followed by “Ukraine War” (7 times), “Conflict in Ukraine” (6 times), and “Ukrainian issue” (4 times).

Notwithstanding, the most important result of this analysis is regarding Von der Leyen. The Commission president calls it the “Russian war” (13 times), the “Putin’s War” (13 times), or the “Kremlin War” (1 time). This reference is particularly representative. The EU reinforces Russia's accountability for the occurrence of the conflict through this terminology. Usually, we name wars after the location where they occur. If this is not the case, the Vietnam War and the Iraq War would be called the US War. However, Von der Leyen avoids using the expression war in Ukraine or Ukraine War. This combination, “war in Ukraine,” only arose five times; in three, it appeared as “Russian war in Ukraine.”

Another ubiquitous method in content analysis studies is identifying modifiers of particular words. Below, I present the most used modifiers and words modified in the three datasets. The only expressive result concerns China. The word “crisis” accompanied “Ukraine” many times. Furthermore, “peace talks” indicate a defence of peace negotiation. On the other hand, “nuclear” was the most used modifier of the word “war.” It suggests that nuclear war is a primary concern for China.

Table 3 – Most used modifiers for “peace”, “war”, “Russia” and “Ukraine”.

Word	Condition	Brazil*	China	European Union
Ukraine	Modifier	War (2)	Crisis (55)	Member (2)
Ukraine	Modified by	President (1)	Eastern (1)	Russian-occupied (2)
Russia	Modifier	-	Circumstance (2)	
Russia	Modified by	-	Leadership (5)	
Peace	Modifier	Agreement (2)	Talks (32)	-
Peace	Modified by	World (4)	World (20)	Lasting (3)
War	Modifier	President (1)	Benefit (1)	Crime (5)
War	Modified by	Ukraine (2)	Nuclear (11)	Brutal (6)

Data composed by articles [online] from gov.br, fmprc.gov.cn, ec.commission.eu.

*Since modifiers are not used in Portuguese, I used the dataset in English.

Another stimulating tool for conceptual analysis is the N-grams. N-grams determine the recurrence of combinations of specific words. The results of N-grams of 3-4 words were quite illustrative. The data of the Brazilian government indicates that “*os dois países*” (the two countries), “*as Nações Unidas*” (the United Nations), and “*o Conselho de segurança*” (the Security Council) are among the most cited N-grams with 63, 57 and 53 mentions respectively. Only the president’s name appeared more frequently than these phrases. The combination *Rússia e Ucrânia* (Russia and Ukraine) emerged considerably fewer times, with 22 mentions. This result demonstrates how Lula da Silva and its government give primacy to the United Nations and its Security Council in their official discourses. As depicted later in this article, reframing the Security Council is one of the solutions proposed by the Brazilian president to solve further international conflicts.

The Chinese data N-grams reveal that the most common combinations of three words are “the two sides” (121 times), “between the two” (89 times), and “China and Russia” (76 times). These terms do not necessarily refer to the Ukraine war since many of the excerpts in my dataset also discussed other issues besides this conflict. Meanwhile, only one combination connected to the Ukraine-Russia conflict arises among the fifty most cited: “the Ukraine crises” (44 times). The Chinese N-grams demonstrate that the Russia-Ukraine war did not receive the special attention of Chinese officials in the texts collected.

In the meantime, “the European Union” (81 times), “we have to” (28 times), and “Russian fossil fuels” (23 times) are the three most recurrent combinations mentioned by Von der Leyen in the EU portal. Besides “Russian fossil fuels,” “the Russian economy” (13 times) and “dependency on Russia” (12 times) appeared among the most cited terms. It certifies how the economic aspect gains prominence in Von der Leyen’s speeches. In particular, she asserts the necessity to surmount the dependence on Russian oil. With the word Ukraine, the most frequent combination is “people of Ukraine” (14 times). This result proposes that the European Union attempts to talk more about the victims of the war. Neither the Brazilian nor the Chinese portals commonly employ this term. Mentioning the victims reinforces the finding that the EU considers Putin guilty of the war.

Qualitative Content Analysis: European Union.

Searching for the positions where the words “war”, “peace”, “Ukraine”, and “Russia” appeared in the European Commissioner dataset can offer some key findings. For Von der Leyen (2023), the reason for the war in Ukraine lies in Putin’s imperialistic desires. She affirms that the Russian president aims to bring the world back to a past of “power politics” and “brutal use of force” (Von der Leyen, 2022d). The EU Commission President goes even further, asserting that:

[t]he playbook of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine comes straight out of another century. Treating millions of people not as human beings but as faceless populations to be moved, controlled, or set as a buffer between military forces. Trying to trample the aspiration of an entire nation with tanks.” (Von der Leyen, 2022f).

According to the EU leader, Russia is also waging a war in energy (Von der Leyen, 2022g) and in public media (Von der Leyen, 2023). She accuses the Russian president of circulating propaganda and boosting energy prices, expecting to disentangle what she considers to be the EU unity (Von der Leyen, 2022g). Therefore, according to the statements analysed in this study, Von der Leyen affirms that the Ukraine War occurred due to Putin’s antiquated perspective of global affairs. Moreover, the Russian president seeks to re-establish an old international order based on power politics while destabilizing the European Union.

Von der Leyen indicates her perspectives about constructing peace on a few occasions. First, she argues that “[t]he very reason why our Union was created is to put an end to all European wars.” (Von der Leyen, 2022a). This statement interacts particularly well with neoliberals’ assertion that the European Union “has created a Kantian Island of peace in the international system” (Nye and Goldsmith, 2011: 52). For IR neoliberal theorists, economic interdependence diminishes the perils of international anarchy since it raises the losses for going to war (Keohane and Martin, 1995). Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Von der Leyen reinforces this proposition: “It is difficult to believe that in Davos today we are talking about war. Because the Davos spirit is the antithesis of war, it is about forging ties and together finding solutions for the big challenges of the world.” (Von der Leyen, 2022f). Concerning the grain crisis the war created, she affirms that “[g]lobal cooperation is the antidote against Russia’s blackmail” (Von der Leyen, 2022f).

Besides the ties created by international organizations and economic interdependence, Von der Leyen stresses how the antithesis of war/peace intertwines with autocracy/democracy. The war in Ukraine appears in her discourses as being Russian aggression against European “energy,” “democracy,” and “values” (Von der Leyen, 2022g). This connection brings her closer to another liberal theory of IR, the democratic peace theory. The Commission President makes her point clear in such a statement pronounced a few days after the beginning of the invasion:

This is a clash between the rule of law and the rule of the gun, between democracies and autocracies, between a rules-based order and a world of naked aggression. How we respond today to what Russia is doing will determine the future of the international system. The destiny of Ukraine is at stake, but our own fate also lies in the balance. We must show the power that lies in our democracies, the power of people who choose their independent paths freely and democratically. (Von der Leyen, 2022c).

In her meeting with India’s President Narendra Modi, Von der Leyen demonstrates how she perceives democracy as fundamental to any solid peace. She affirms: “I am convinced that democracies will have a crucial role to play in defining the world of tomorrow.” (Von der Leyen, 2022e). Indeed, the European leader refers considerably to the words democracies (21 times), democracy (16 times), and democratic (6 times).

Finally, concerning how to end this war, Von der Leyen (2022f) is particularly clear: “Ukraine must win this war. And Putin’s aggression must be a failure”. The Commissioner reinforces how overcoming the European economic dependence on Russian fuels signifies a fundamental step towards making the invasion a failure (Von der Leyen, 2022b). The economic sanctions arose as another tool to damage the Russian economy. The European politician did not mention “negotiation” or “negotiate” in any official statements considered in this analysis.

China

The data collected in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs portal indicates a distinct comprehension of Chinese officials concerning the causes of the war. Xi Jinping speaks with Vladimir Putin on the phone on 25th February 2022, a few days after the Russian invasion of Ukraine began. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs affirms that the Russian president told his Chinese counterpart he initiated his “special military operation” because of NATO’s discredit of Russian security concerns (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022c). Xi Jinping affirms that he comprehends Russia’s concerns, rejects the “Cold War mentality,” and supports a negotiated cessation of the conflicts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022c). Months later, Xi Jinping “explicitly pointed out that we in the international community should reject zero-sum games and jointly oppose hegemonism and power politics.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2022e).

The foreign ministry Wang Yi fosters Xi Jinping's perspective affirming that "the legitimate security concerns of any country must be respected (...). What has happened on the Ukraine issue has much to do with the long delay in effectively implementing the Minsk II agreements." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2022a). Wang Yi deepens his thoughts on the causes of the war in Ukraine in a conference with Sergi Lavrov, the Russian ministry of foreign affairs. To the Chinese representative, the war in Ukraine "is both an outburst of long built-up tensions over Europe's security problems, and an outcome of Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2022d).

Finally, Xi Jinping indicates his views on creating peace in a few passages. His "Global Security Initiative" stands at the centre of his proposal and appeared recurrently in my dataset (13 times). The Chinese president introduced this initiative at the G20 summit in Bali as follows:

I have put forward the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Our goal is to work with all parties to champion the spirit of the UN Charter, act on the principle of indivisible security, uphold the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security, advocate the resolution of conflicts through negotiation and settlement of disputes through consultation, and support all efforts conducive to the peaceful settlement of crises. (Xi Jinping, 2022).

The Global Security Initiative (GSI) includes six core concepts and principles, twenty priorities of cooperation, and five platforms for cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2023a). Focusing on the core principles, we can find some indications of Xi Jinping's perspectives on peace. First, he advances the concept of "common security," upholding a view of symbiotic world peace. The second principle is sovereignty and territorial integrity, followed by a defence of the United Nations charter. The fourth principle defends the necessity to take the security concerns of all countries seriously. Finally, the fifth principle is to solve conflicts through dialogue, and the sixth principle commits to traditional and non-traditional security.

The second and the fourth principles appeared as a dichotomy regarding the Ukraine War. Xi Jinping's GSI defends the territorial integrity of sovereign states like Ukraine, automatically refusing occupations in territories like the Donbas. Nevertheless, in a few articles in my analysis, I have found that the Chinese leader demonstrates some comprehensiveness regarding Russian reasons to invade Ukraine. On this behalf, the fourth point of China GSI explains this position. According to a few excerpts, Xi Jinping believes that to end the war in Ukraine, negotiation must consider the security concerns of both sides (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2022f; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2023b).

Brazil

In the texts analysed in this study, I did not find a clear indication by the Brazilian president on how he comprehended the beginning of this conflict. In an interview with Brazilian journalists, the president defends the necessity of considering all countries' political interests in peace negotiations (gov.br, 2023b). Hence, he interrogates: "Is NATO the problem? Let us discuss with Americans and Europeans (...) I think that at a negotiation table, we can make miracles." (gov.br, 2023b). Thereby, Lula da Silva indicates that he perceives that any peace negotiation shall consider Russia's security concerns.

Nevertheless, Lula da Silva deplored the Russian invasion of Ukraine in a few opportunities (gov.br, 2023a). Once the criticism of his position rose, Lula attempted in a few moments to clarify his perspective: "I have never equalized Russia and Ukraine. I know what an invasion is and what

territorial integrity is. However, now, the war has already started, and someone needs to talk about peace”² (gov.br, 2023c, author’s translation).

A few passages expound on how Lula’s perspective interacts with the abovementioned theories. The most elucidative of these statements is: “The first step is not peace. The first step is the necessity to stop the war. When this war ends, it is possible that we create conditions to negotiate the end of this war forever and that the countries can put themselves in a deal.”³ (Lula da Silva, 2023e, author’s translation). In this excerpt, Lula da Silva demonstrates that for him, only stopping the war does not signify the creation of peace. Such an argument brings him closer to Johan Galtung’s differentiation on negative/positive peace or peacekeeping/peacebuilding. I did not find this approach in Xi Jinping or Von der Leyen’s speeches.

The word “food” appeared most recurrently cited by the Brazilian president. Although his Chinese and European counterparts also showed profound concerns about the grain deals between Russia and Ukraine, Lula da Silva was the leader who brought this issue to the spotlight. He claimed on different occasions against the unfairness that the poorest states were the ones that suffered the most from famine (gov. br, 2023a). To some extent, his argument lays in an imperative necessity to stop the war to stop food insecurity in the Global South (gov.br, 2023f). This view also brings him closer to Galtung’s theorization since the Norwegian scholar endeavours to include famine as a form of structural violence (Galtung, 1969).

In many moments, Lula da Silva uses the phrase *falar em paz* (to talk about peace). Consolidating Brazil as a potential mediator, the Latin American leader asserts that Brazil was willing to call all crucial parties and bring them back to dialogue (gov.br, 2023e). Moreover, he asserts at the G7 meeting in Japan that it is necessary to talk about peace “because no solution will be lasting if it is not based on dialogue”⁴ (Lula da Silva, 2023, author’s translation).

Lula even proposes the creation of a G20 for peace to deepen the conversations about peace (gov.br, 2023b; gov.br, 2023d). In his words, such a G20 could overcome the dominant discussion on war and open the way to discussions about settling the conflict (gov.br, 2023b). Comparing the current situation caused by the Russian invasion to the 2008 financial crisis, Lula proposes that “when there was the economic crisis in 2008, rapidly, we created the G20, attempting to save the economy. Now, it is important to create another G20 to end the war and to establish peace”⁵ (gov.br, 2023d, author’s translation). The Brazilian president advances this proposal, especially in conversations with European leaders like Emanuel Macron and Pedro Sanchez.

This claim for a return in peace conversations always accompanied criticism of the Security Council (gov.br, 2023d; Lula da Silva, 2023). At the G7 meeting, after reinforcing the necessity to create bridges of dialogue about peace, Lula da Silva (2023) pointed out the paralysis of the council. The Brazilian leader also criticizes how its members have disrespected the UN charter by waging wars without the Security Council’s consent (Lula da Silva, 2023). In another moment, Lula da Silva argues that the US, France, the UK, and Russia have invaded other countries’ territories without following international law (gov.br, 2023d). Concerning the Ukraine War, the South American

² Original text: *Eu nunca igualei Rússia e Ucrânia. Eu sei o que é invasão e o que é integridade territorial. Mas agora a guerra já começou e alguém precisa falar em paz.*

³ Original text: *O primeiro caminho não é da paz. O primeiro caminho é da necessidade de parar a guerra. Quando parar a guerra, é possível que a gente crie condições de negociar o fim dessa guerra para sempre e que os países possam se colocar de acordo.*

⁴ Original text: *Nenhuma solução será duradoura se não for baseada no diálogo.*

⁵ Original text: *Quando houve a crise econômica de 2008, rapidamente, nós criamos o G20 para tentar salvar a economia. Agora é importante criar um outro G20 para acabar com a guerra e estabelecer a paz.*

politician concludes that the absence of discussion about this war at the UN Security Council attests to the necessity to reformulate this institution (gov.br, 2023).

Conclusion

Lula da Silva, Ursula Von der Leyen, and Xi Jinping do not discuss what is happening in Ukraine in the same terms. While the European leader criticizes the “Russia’s War,” Xi Jinping aims to mitigate the “Ukraine crisis.” This identification represents a first step to comprehending how countries perceive and discuss the conflict.

Bringing back Mearsheimer’s perspective after the invasion of Crimea in 2014, at that point, he affirmed that “according to the prevailing wisdom of the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression (...). But this account is wrong” (Mearsheimer, 2014: 77). The results found in this content analysis show that the EU leader maintains such a view. Nevertheless, the quotes from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate that neither Xi Jinping nor other Chinese decision-makers agree to blame Russia for the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Lula da Silva does not propose a clear explanation for the Ukraine war, blaming Russia and the West.

Von der Leyen’s statements reflect an IR neoliberal perspective. She reaffirms that cooperation and democracy are sources of international peace. Furthermore, the European leader highlights the economic necessity to overcome the European dependency on Russian fuels. Xi Jinping and the Chinese government have a more dual approach. While the Chinese excerpts indicate a comprehension of Russia’s security concerns, coming closer to realist thoughts, Xi Jinping claims against what the Chinese consider a “Cold War mentality.”

Furthermore, the Chinese president recurrently defends negotiation and peace talks, having some affirmations that bring him closer to peace researchers. In the meantime, Lula da Silva appears closer to Johan Galtung’s proposals, affirming that only stopping the war does not signify the creation of peace. He argues that through dialogue, leaders could find a solution for the conflict, which is pivotal to mitigating famine. His terminology highlights food insecurity as a form of structural violence.

The three leaders agree on rejecting power politics and using force. They all believe that war is undesirable, arguing for the necessity to stop it. Moreover, they refuse what they consider outdated international behaviour. Especially Xi Jinping and Von der Leyen assert that the crises arose because of old perspectives of the international order. Whereas the Chinese president argues that a Cold War mentality caused the conflict, the European leader claims that Putin has an antique, truculent comprehension of global affairs. Both reject the past, envisioning a world order without armed conflicts. The three leaders also defend the territorial integrity of sovereign states.

Therefore, this study deepens the theoretical discussion on leaders’ perspectives on peace. As some scholars have claimed, comprehending peace and war is still necessary. Once political leaders enjoy considerable autonomy in formulating foreign policy, studying leaders’ speeches is crucial to understanding conflicts, how they emerge, and how to solve them. Although the three leaders analysed in this study show different beliefs concerning the war in Ukraine, they all share some common claims. I found a convergent rejection of power politics, the use of force, and the international system forged by wars. These results can encourage further research about leaders’ perspectives on international conflicts.

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State Intervention in the Public and Private Spheres in Times of Crisis: Covid-19 Pandemic

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State Intervention

ABSTRACT

Especially in times of crisis, states can influence the public and private spheres by relying on their legitimacy power. Aside from its emergence and importance for humanity, the state reshapes individuals' private and public spheres by influencing them. The reshaped public and private spheres undoubtedly require a new perspective. Whether these areas have changed, the fate of their boundaries and the approach of individuals and the state to these areas may differ between ordinary and extraordinary periods. In the emergence of differences, the current understanding of governance is as important as how the state perceives its people and how the people perceive the state. Because these perceptions affect the parties' expectations in ordinary and crisis periods, criticism or acceptance develops due to the actual practices. In this article, the Covid-19 pandemic has been defined as a crisis period, and the Republic of Türkiye has been chosen as the subject whose policies implemented during the crisis period have been observed. The study examines the state's authority to intervene in the public and private sphere boundaries during the Covid-19 pandemic and the changes in these boundaries. Within the scope of the article, the study carried out in this direction examines how the edges of the public and private spheres were affected by the state's interventions/practices/policies during the Covid-19 crisis.

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Introduction

The 20th century was when many fundamental rights and freedoms, such as the right to live, personal inviolability, privacy and protection of private life, and freedom of movement, were granted to individuals. Some rights and responsibilities were also given to the state to realise these rights. One of these rights given to the state is negative rights. Negative rights include the right of the state not to interfere with the individual's freedoms, such as freedom of thought, freedom of conscience, inviolability of residence and freedom of movement. With negative rights, the individual is tried to be protected against the state. The freedoms that the individual cannot transfer, such as language, religion, gender, ethnicity and race, are negative freedoms. The state must respect and not interfere with these negative freedoms. Negative rights are a set of rights that limit the state and draw the boundaries of the state. However, the individual needs the state to utilize his fundamental rights and freedoms better. Since the individuals cannot fully realize their freedoms, they need the help and services of the state in some areas, such as social security, health and education—the assistance and services the state provides to the individual fall within the scope of positive rights. While the state

respects and does not interfere with the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with negative rights, it helps the individual better use the freedoms it respects with positive rights.

These rights and obligations given to the state, especially positive rights, are realized in the public sphere where individuals are equally present. In other words, while the state does not intervene by respecting the private sphere of the individual with negative rights, it intervenes in the public sphere where society is together with positive rights. While the state's authority exists in the public sphere, technological developments and changes have also begun to see the state's authority in the private sphere. Especially in crisis management, the state has intervened in the public and private spheres. The state intervenes in the private and public spheres to fulfil the negative and positive rights given to it and, most importantly, to protect the individual and society. This situation manifested itself during the Covid-19 pandemic.

On December 1, 2019, Covid-19 virus emerged in Wuhan, China. The Covid-19 virus, which spread throughout China, started to spread to many different parts of the world due to fast transportation networks. Upon the virus's rapid spread, the World Health Organization declared a pandemic on March 11, 2020 (WHO, 2020). The Covid-19 virus, which is effective worldwide, has caused millions of people to lose their lives. It has caused problems in many areas, such as worldwide economic, health, education, cultural and social issues. The state has played an essential role in managing this Covid-19 crisis. The state has taken many measures since the outbreak of the pandemic. In particular, the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual have been restricted to protect the health of the society. Although these restrictions are contrary to negative rights, the state has temporarily restricted the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual to protect the right to life of individuals and society. To protect the health of society, not only the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual have been restricted, but also the state's intervention in both the public and private spheres has paved the way. The state took many measures such as curfew restrictions, restriction of freedom of movement, mandatory use of masks, and these measures continued until the end of the pandemic.

To find an answer to the question of the level of state intervention in the public and private sphere during the Covid-19 crisis and whether the borders of the state towards the public or private sphere have expanded, this article first includes a literature review to see the place of the study in the literature. In the next section, the definitions and boundaries of the public and private sphere are mentioned under the public and private sphere title. In addition, based on today's debates, the changes in the boundaries of the public and private spheres have been emphasized. In the Covid-19 and precautions section of the study, the development process of the Covid-19 pandemic and the measures and restrictions taken by the state in Türkiye after the pandemic outbreak are mentioned. In the main part of the study, Covid-19 restrictions and the distinction between public and private space, the restrictions and precautionary decisions taken in the Covid-19 outbreak were analysed and evaluated in terms of public and private space and the individual-state relationship. Finally, the conclusion section was included.

Literature Review

Despite the end of the pandemic, the fact that the effects of the epidemic continue has been compelling in many studies on the Covid-19 outbreak. In the literature review, the studies on the social impact of the Covid-19 outbreak are mainly on the effects of the curfew imposed on individuals aged 65 and over, such as the feeling of loneliness, the sense of exclusion from society, the narrowing of movement areas, and the negative consequences in the socio-economic field (Kapıkıran et al., 2022; İnce, 2020). Fatma Duygu Bozkurt (2021) stated in her study that the curfew imposed on individuals aged 65 and over and individuals under the age of 20 violates the principle of discrimination by limiting freedom of movement and the right to work. In particular, it was stated

that although the 20-65 age range is likely to be infected with the Covid-19 virus, it is unlikely to be fatal. The discussions on whether the state should take responsibility for the individuals between the ages of 20-65 who are infected and die and whether restricting the movement of individuals under the age of 20 and 65 and over is beneficial for public health were not discussed. Considering the fact that individuals aged 65 and over experience the pandemic process differently and the effects of the practices for the elderly on the individual, the article analyses the relationship between the state, society and the individual during the pandemic.

Looking at the socio-economic impact of the pandemic, Mehmet Şükrü Nar (2020) and Emre Şimşek (2021) stated that the restrictions imposed during the pandemic will increase the inequality between different segments in socio-economic terms. Nar noted that the decisions taken during the pandemic will isolate the individual from the social sphere and that technological and internet developments will cause the individual's social life to move to the virtual space. Şimşek, on the other hand, stated in his study that the state has to protect the right to life; therefore, the state should take adequate measures to protect public health, but when the number of individuals who died due to the epidemic is considered, he claimed that the state did not take adequate measures. In both studies, the extent to which the socio-economic status of the society and the individual was affected in line with the steps taken by the state was emphasized. Within the framework of these claims, the article examines the extent of the state's authority to intervene in the public and private sphere during the pandemic.

Looking at the studies on the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic on education: In the studies conducted by Ramchandra Radha et al. (2020) and Kenan Orçanlı and Mustafa Bekmezci (2020), students' opinions on the effects of the pandemic on education were taken as a basis, and it was concluded that online learning is a suitable method and students can access education in a comfortable environment at any time. However, Orçanlı and Bekmezci drew attention to segments lacking the necessary tools to participate in distance education. Radha et al. only mentioned the positive aspects of online education in their study. Therefore, even though the main reasons for the inequality caused by distance education are not discussed in this article, the consequences of the state's decision for education will be included within the scope of the state-individual relationship.

In the literature, it is seen that there are many studies on the use of masks with the onset of Covid-19. Some of these studies are as follows: Shuo Feng et al. (2020) stated in their research that mask use varies worldwide. The study noted that while the use of masks is widespread in South Korea and Asian countries, the use of masks is mandatory in some countries, such as Japan and China. In the study, only the mask usage methods of the countries were mentioned. Still, it is seen that there is no research on the effect of masks used on the individual or that the state intervenes in the private sphere of the individual by imposing the obligation to use masks. Berna Fildiş (2020) and Ömer Karbuş et al. (2021) examined the effects of the mandatory use of masks on individuals in Türkiye during the pandemic period. Both studies stated that although individuals experienced particular difficulties using masks, they paid attention to wearing masks to protect themselves and their environment. In addition, it was stated that according to the individuals, using masks is their responsibility. Therefore, they are distant from the warning of people who do not use masks by the competent authorities or individuals. However, neither of the two studies discussed whether the state's compulsory use of acts violates the individual's rights and only focused on the effects of mask use on the individual. However, based on the results, such as the compulsory use of masks and its impact on the individual and the fines imposed on individuals who oppose the use of masks, we have examined the state-individual relationship and the violation of the individual's rights during Covid-19 in this article.

Since vaccination is a great solution to control Covid-19, vaccine studies were conducted, and the Covid-19 vaccine was found as a result of the studies. In the literature review, many studies were found in which individuals' attitudes towards vaccination were examined. Some of these studies are

as follows: Hatice Şahin (2022) and Hanife Başal and Elif Emir Öksüz (2022) examined the variables towards Covid-19 vaccine and anti-vaccination. In the studies, the idea that the existence of the Covid-19 virus is not accurate, the belief that the vaccine is produced to control social life, mistrust towards scientists, politicians and social media that produce the vaccine, the idea that the vaccine is not suitable for religion, the idea that the vaccine is made for profit on a global scale or for biological warfare without scientific basis were shown as the main reasons for the opposition to the Covid-19 vaccine. In addition, Başal and Öksüz, unlike Şahin, examined the positive or negative attitudes of individuals towards the vaccine based on their age, education level and gender. However, the state's intervention in the public or private sphere for vaccination, such as the state's decisions and the inability of the unvaccinated individual to enter the public/private sphere, were not examined. Considering the characteristics of individuals, such as age, education level, gender, and opinions against vaccination, this article examines the state's intervention in the public and private sphere during the pandemic.

Another study on the Covid-19 vaccine belongs to Mert Aykut Akbulak and Meltem Çöl (2022). The study examined the current situation of vaccine opposition in the world and Türkiye and included the policies and legal arrangements made by countries for vaccination. The study stated that lack of information was the basis of vaccine refusal and hesitation and that an environment of trust was not created. In the study, the suggestion that the individual should be vaccinated through coercion for the benefit of the general public was mentioned. However, it was not said whether making the necessary legal arrangements for the compulsory vaccination of the individual is a violation of the individual's rights. Based on all these, in this article, we investigated the effect of mandatory vaccination on the individual to ensure the general good.

There are studies examining the effects of technological applications such as the Hayat Eve Sığar (HES) application used during the pandemic on individuals. Hasan Giray Ankara and Büşra Tekin (2021) conducted a study on this subject. In their research, Ankara and Tekin included the thoughts of citizens using the HES application regarding privacy and security. It was stated that individuals trust the HES application and that this is because it is an application developed by the state. However, the study did not include publicising the public and private sphere with the HES application and that this situation poses a risk for the individual. The article examines the issue of making the individual's privacy open to authorized persons and sharing it with society in general. Şakir Eşitti (2021) stated that frequent surveillance practices during the Covid-19 pandemic may cause the practices to become internalized, ordinary and normalized in individuals. He emphasized that if the use of surveillance practices becomes permanent after the pandemic, the privacy of the individual and the idea of a democratic society will be at risk and that the individual is prevented from expressing his/her own opinion comfortably in private and public spaces. Unlike Eşitti, Bayram Noyan et al. (2022), who examined the use of the HES application in the Covid-19 pandemic, stated that the HES application made positive contributions to the fight against the pandemic and that individuals took care not to travel to places where risk intensity was shown in the application. However, the study did not mention that the individual makes his/her private area visible with the application and shares it with society and that the state can spy on the individual at any time with the application. The issue of the visibility of the public and private spheres with the application, such as the individual trying not to be in the places shown as red areas in the HES application, is included in the article.

The state has taken many decisions in the management of the Covid-19 pandemic. Studies have shown that some of the decisions made by the state lead to violations of the rights of the individual and society. In the survey conducted by Mine Kasapoğlu Turhan (2020), the curfew imposed by the state was discussed in terms of administrative law, the effect of the curfew on fundamental rights and freedoms and whether administrative sanctions imposed on individuals who violate the curfew are subject to judicial review. In the study, it is stated that the declaration of curfew in ordinary

periods is unconstitutional, and according to the Law on the State of Emergency from an Administrative Perspective, the duty to declare the curfew is not assigned to the Ministry of Interior. Therefore, the declaration of the curfew has no legal basis. A similar study was conducted by Çağrı Çeliköz (2021). His research stated that the restriction of travel freedoms with the circular issued by the Ministry of Interior was not based on the law. In addition, the measures taken were not based on the Public Hygiene Law and the Provincial Administration Law, and the decisions taken were only for show. Volkan Aslan (2020) has stated that the measures taken to restrict fundamental rights and freedoms during the pandemic must comply with Article 13 of the 1982 Constitution, as a state of emergency was not declared. However, he has pointed out that even if the measures were taken in accordance with the relevant articles of the 1982 Constitution, the curfew is contrary to the principle of legality and, therefore unconstitutional. It has been emphasized that the scope, duration, and form of the restrictions should be clearly defined in the law for the implementation of curfews. Additionally, it has been stated that the lack of clarity regarding which law will be enforced in case of individuals violating the restrictions is problematic. Aslan has highlighted that the government's decision to restrict rights and freedoms during the pandemic is unconstitutional. Considering that the decision to impose curfew and restriction of freedom of movement during the pandemic was not based on the constitution, the article analyses the decisions taken by the state during the pandemic within the scope of the state-individual relationship and the state's intervention in the public and private sphere.

In the literature studies, the decisions made by the state in the management of the pandemic were evaluated to be insufficient in some studies. In contrast, in some studies, it was stated that they were appropriate and natural decisions. One of the studies emphasizing that the measures taken by the state during the Covid-19 pandemic were insufficient belongs to Yahya Alameşe (2021). Alameşe stated that the traditional understanding of security was insufficient against a critical security threat such as Covid-19 and that the state's traditional understanding of security was weak for human security. However, İzzet Erdem (2020) stated in his study that public health was prioritized in Türkiye with measures such as starting to take precautions when the Covid-19 virus was not seen in Türkiye, raising public awareness on this issue and implementing some practices for social isolation, taking decisions by the scientific board, and taking measures according to the spread of cases and deaths. However, neither Alameşe's nor Erdem's study mentioned whether the measures restricted the public and private spheres of the individual. Based on the claims in the articles on whether the decisions taken by the state during the pandemic were sufficient to ensure the safety of the individual, the size and limit of the state's authority to intervene in the individual are discussed in the analysis and evaluation part of our study.

The study by Ari R. Joffe (2021) stated that although the quarantine decision taken by governments in the Covid-19 pandemic was aimed at protecting public health, economically disadvantaged groups were more affected by this situation. It has been claimed that unemployment, loneliness, food insecurity, interruption of education, increase in mental disorders and increase in partner violence will lead to significant losses in welfare now and in the future. It was emphasized that governments' increasing spending on health and decreasing spending in the social sphere for the health of the society would lead to economic stagnation and cause more loss of life than the pandemic. All of this is the source of our study in analysing the impact of the decisions taken by the state during the pandemic on the individual and the effects on the public/private sphere.

Finally, the central area of the article is the state's observance of public health while managing the pandemic and entering the border of fundamental rights and freedoms. Therefore, it is necessary to mention the studies conducted in this field. A similar study was conducted by Artur Jasinski (2020). In his study, Jasinski stated that changes were made in social life and the functioning of cities during the pandemic. He examined these changes around the public sphere and discussed the changes that the public sphere has undergone. In the study, it was emphasized that the public sphere narrowed,

and the private sphere expanded. It is stated that the individual avoids crowded environments to avoid getting caught in the epidemic and isolates himself from the atmosphere by wearing masks, sunglasses, hats and headphones. Thus, it was stated that the public space was privatized from the public environment to another dimension of the virtual space. Similar studies were conducted by Betül Şahin (2022) and Özge Tekçe (2021). Şahin stated that with the emergence of the pandemic, the need for personal space increased in individuals. She noted that grocery shopping occurs in online markets, but some individuals go to the markets and shop by creating personal space for themselves. He explained that individuals try to create private space in the public sphere. Teke stated that the need for close public spaces increased in individuals due to the curfew during the Covid-19 pandemic. He stated that individuals use the closest public spaces by visiting neighbourhood parks, doorsteps, and streets. The effect of the state's measures in managing the epidemic on the individual's public and private sphere constitutes the main subject of our study. The studies from the literature review constitute the source of the article's main subject. However, in the literature review, very few studies discuss the impact of the state's crisis (Covid-19 pandemic) management on the boundaries of the public and private spheres. To fill the gap in the literature, this article evaluates the authority and limits of the state in the public and private spheres during the crisis period in Türkiye.

In this study, which examines whether the preventive decisions taken during the pandemic have created an expansion and contraction in the authority of the state and the changes in the state-individual relationship during the pandemic, it is necessary first to address the issue of public and private space to make the subject comprehensible.

The Concept of Public and Private Space

The concept of public space dates back to Ancient Greece. The concept of public space, based on the word "public", means the space open to the knowledge and control of citizens in Ancient Greece. On the other hand, private space refers to the intimate/secret space associated with the individual himself/herself, his/her family, his/her work, and his/her friends. In the 17th century, public and private space concepts began to clarify. While the public sphere is an area open to the knowledge and control of all people, the private sphere is an area that is not open to everyone, has certain boundaries, and where relationships such as oneself, one's family and friends, and work are carried out (Onat, 2010: 14-18).

Aristotle spoke of three lifestyles. The lowest lifestyle is the private sphere of the body's work and pleasure. Freed from the difficulties of this life, the individual turns to the political sphere of life. This political sphere of life is the public sphere. This sphere is called "polis". The sphere of life considered superior to the polis is "theoria"; it is where man is alone with himself, and the act of thinking takes place. However, according to Aristotle, the polis is "the sphere of freedom of citizens" (Onat, 2010: 10-11). In Ancient Greece, the condition for entering the polis was to own property. However, foreigners, enslaved people and women residing in Athens were not allowed in the Polis. Women, enslaved people and children are included in the private sphere. The Polis is an area established on the grounds of freedom where virtue can be acquired (Aristotle, 2011).

Hannah Arendt, who analyses the public and private spheres in her work "The Human Condition", bases her public sphere model on Aristotle's political sphere of life mentioned above. According to Arendt, the public sphere is where subject differences emerge. In the public sphere, the individual exists in his/her own space. It is in this space that he/she acquires identity. In this sphere, politics is not understood based on personal characteristics such as language, religion, race and ethnicity. In the public sphere, the individual freely defends his/her thoughts and represents his/her power. There is continuity and equality in this sphere. However, in the private sphere, the individual may

not be aware of what is happening around him/her. Because the individual has not yet gained his/her political identity in this field (Arendt, 2021: 31-50).

The natural sphere in which the individual exists is the private sphere. This is the sphere in which human beings have to survive, in which relationships are obligatory, and in which there are no political activities. "... *the police sphere was the sphere of freedom, and if one were to speak of a relationship between these two spheres (the household and the police), it would naturally be a relationship like this: the condition for the freedom of the police is to be master of the necessities of life in the household*" (Arendt, 2021: 68). According to Arendt, the public sphere is a space of freedom, where the meaning of being human prevails and politics is active, while the private sphere is a space of secrecy and oppression. In the public sphere, there is freedom, speech and action, while in the private sphere, there is labour, work, obligation and violence. While the public sphere is a transparent and more open space, the private sphere is one where some things must remain hidden. Everything is visible in the public sphere, and there are things to hide in the private sphere, which expresses the distinction between the private and public spheres (Arendt, 2021: 50-122). While the private sphere is dominated by violence and command instead of speech, the public sphere is dominated by speech and persuasion. "*To be political, to live in a polis, meant that decisions were made not by force and violence but by words and persuasion*" (Arendt, 2021: 62). We can say that there is no longer a public sphere when violence instead of speech occurs in the public sphere. Equality, freedom, action, speech, and plurality also disappear in this space.

Habermas arrived at the idea of a new public sphere based on the characteristics of the "bourgeois public sphere". The bourgeois public sphere is based on the relationship of social production: It is controlled by capitalists and depends on the capitalist's profit. It is a public sphere not open to women, workers and people from different ethnic groups (Zabcı, 2018: 5-8). Habermas defines the public sphere as follows: It is a specific space born in civil society, a central area that enables the formation of public opinion in modern society, and an institutionalized area of interaction where citizens discuss common issues (Özbek, 2004: 20-28). According to Habermas, the public sphere is the space where people debate equally, critically and rationally. This form of discussion constitutes the basis of democracy (Karaoğlu, 2010: 20-28; Onat, 2010: 78).

In the public sphere, there is the state and the nobility, i.e. public power, while in the private sphere, there is the public. Habermas made the following statements: "*The private sphere includes bourgeois society in the narrow sense, that is, the sphere of the circulation of goods and social labor; it also includes the family with its sphere of privacy*" (Habermas, 2015: 98). In short, the nuclear family is seen as a sphere of privacy and is included in the private sphere. In addition, since people see themselves as autonomous in the market sphere and the market depends on need, it is in the private sphere.

Even though the family and work spheres are in the private sphere at the liberal level, socio-economic development has enabled the family and work spheres to develop in opposite ways. As a result, while the family has maintained its place in the private sphere, the fields of work or profession have moved out of the private sphere and taken their place in the public sphere. However, the family has not successfully maintained its place in the private sphere because the fact that it met its basic needs in the public sphere caused its place in the private sphere to be shaken. "*The so-called basic needs, which the bourgeois family once assumed as a private risk, are now met publicly on behalf of the individual family member*" (Habermas, 2015: 274). Habermas also states that "*(...) the family now becomes a pure consumer of income and leisure, a recipient of publicly guaranteed compensation and benefits*" (Habermas, 2015: 275). Developments such as the deterioration of family walls and the transparency of privacy have impacted consumption activities in the public sphere. After this, it is seen that reasoning in the public sphere has been abandoned. Habermas explained this situation

as follows: "*The world created by the mass media is public only in appearance*" (Habermas, 2015: 295). Mass media has made the boundaries of the private sphere visible.

There are many reasons for the state to operate in the public sphere. However, it has primarily been seen to use public spaces as a means of disseminating culture, and these public spaces have become a part of democracy (Pratt, 2017: 2). Here, the idea that the social perspective of the ruling cadre of the state is reflected in public spaces is explained. The way these spaces are used and how the concept of the public is filled in can be shaped by the preferences of the political power-seeking legitimacy.

The development of the Internet, technology, and the social square have led to changes in society's lifestyles. With these changes, individuals have started to reflect their private sphere to the public sphere through social media. This leads to the publicization of the private sphere and the narrowing of boundaries. Thus, the private sphere has entered the agenda of the public sphere. Social media and other new media tools, such as virtual public spaces, allow individuals to carry out activities online that they can perform in the public sphere. However, social media and other technological tools will enable the individual to be visible in the public sphere at any time and place. This situation provides the opportunity to enter the individual's privacy beyond the individual's control (Alacahan and Vatandaş, 2021: 721-730).

Throughout history, activities such as entertainment, leisure, research, information, and consumption have primarily occurred in the public sphere. However, the internet and technological development have allowed these activities to happen in the private sphere (Carmona, 2021: 134). In this way, the individual can carry out activities not in public spaces that the state can directly limit and control but in private spaces whose borders are determined by the state. Considering the regulations, limitations and rules that the state has made on the Internet, the individual in the private sphere is monitored by the state just like in the public sphere. The state narrows the boundaries of the private sphere for itself. The state's regulations, inspections and surveillance for the security of the individual violate the privacy of private life. However, the individual does not feel uncomfortable about being monitored and controlled by the state in the public sphere because these inspections and controls by the state make the individual feel safe. However, the state spies on the individual not only in the public sphere but also in the private sphere through secret wiretapping and monitoring e-mails and messages. The individual feels this but does not know they are being spied on clearly (Alacahan and Vatandaş, 2021: 728-729). In other words, the individual narrows the boundaries of his/her private space by using technology, the internet and social media. In addition, the state enters the boundaries of this private sphere with or without the individual's consent. As a result, the boundaries of the state's public and private spheres cannot be clearly stated because the boundaries of public and private spheres change and become unclear.

The Covid-19 Pandemic

The Covid-19 outbreak, which has affected the world and Türkiye, emerged on December 1, 2019, in Wuhan, China, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). The Covid-19 virus spread throughout China within two days. WHO declared a global emergency on January 30, 2020. After the virus started to spread worldwide, it was declared a Covid-19 pandemic on March 11, 2020 (WHO, 2020). The pandemic spreading around the world has led states to take many measures. However, despite the actions taken, according to WHO, 6,972,132 people died worldwide due to the virus (WHO, 2023).

State Policies during Covid-19

As the Covid-19 outbreak started to spread worldwide, the Coronavirus Scientific Advisory Board, consisting of 31 academicians from public experts, was established by the Ministry of Health in

Türkiye on January 10, 2020. The progress of the disease will be monitored, reporting will be made, measures will be taken, and treatment methods and opinions will be stated by this board (Anadolu Agency, 2020). At first, the Ministry of Health published a poster with 14 rules for the pandemic. These rules are as follows: hand hygiene, not touching the mouth, nose and eyes without washing hands, wearing a mask, social distancing, etc.

With the emergence of the first case in Türkiye, it was announced that education was suspended for three weeks in all higher education institutions according to the decision taken at the meeting held under the presidency of the President of the Republic on how to deal with the Covid-19 outbreak (YÖK, 2020a). After the suspension of education in universities, all higher education institutions started infrastructure studies for distance education due to the spread of the disease throughout the country. Later, universities decided to provide instruction in the form of distance education, digital pathways and open education in the spring semester (YÖK, 2020b).

As the pandemic spread rapidly to many parts of the world, many states have implemented some measures and restrictions to stop the spread. One of these restrictions is flight restrictions. Many states, including Türkiye, have imposed flight restrictions on specific countries. According to the decision taken by the Scientific Council, Türkiye first restricted flights to the People's Republic of China, Switzerland, Egypt, Austria, Italy, Iran, Iraq, Spain, England, Norway, Sweden, Germany, France, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands and Azerbaijan. Later, 46 more countries were added to these 21 countries and in the following period, all flights from Türkiye to abroad were stopped. In other words, citizens were restricted from travelling abroad as of March 27, 2020 (Directorate General of Civil Aviation, 2020a; 2020b; 2020c).

On March 10, 2020, a circular was issued stopping the activities of civil society organizations and condolence houses. It was also reported that in 81 provinces, being in public places where the community spends time together was temporarily restricted (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2020c). In addition to these measures taken to prevent physical contact due to contact and airborne transmission of the pandemic, the Ministry of Health has requested that all alcoholic or non-alcoholic restaurants, eateries, patisseries, etc., serve only on a "grab-and-go" basis and not allow customers to stay in these areas. For this reason, workplaces such as patisseries and restaurants were asked to remove places where customers sit to eat, such as tables and chairs (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2020a). In addition, workplaces such as hairdressers, barbers and beauty centres were suspended (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2020d).

All schools nationwide were closed from March 16 to March 30, 2020. The Minister of National Education announced the launch of distance education for students through the Education Information Network (EBA) programs (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of National Education, 2020).

Since the Covid-19 pandemic mostly affects people aged 65 and over, on March 21, 2020, people aged 65 and over, people with chronic lung disease, asthma, weak immunity and hyper blood pressure, liver disease, COPD, cardiovascular disease and people who use drugs that disrupt the immune system were restricted in open squares, parks and public transportation and these citizens were banned from going out (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2020b). On 22 March 2020, with the Presidential Circular, it was announced that to ensure that the fight against the pandemic is not disrupted, public services are not disrupted, and flexible working models such as remote working (working at home) and shift work have been introduced regardless of the working methods of public institutions and organizations, with the condition of employing minimum personnel (Republic of Türkiye Official Gazette, issue: 31076).

The scope of measures taken to manage the pandemic has been expanded. The service hours of grocery stores were set as 09:00-21:00, and the number of customers inside was limited. The number of passengers specified in the vehicle licenses of urban and intercity public vehicles was halved. In addition, arrangements were made to ensure that individuals sitting in vehicles do not come into contact (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2020 ç; d).

With the circular sent by the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior to governorships, activities such as walking and picnicking in picnic areas on Saturdays and Sundays, being on the coast, and ruins and promenades in residential centres are prohibited. Announcements/warnings were made to prevent people from leaving (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2020e).

With the circular issued by the Ministry of Interior on 03.04.2020, a new one was added to the measures taken to protect public order. According to this circular, entrances and exits to 30 metropolitan provinces and Zonguldak province, where lung disease is common, are banned for 15 days. In addition, a weekend curfew was imposed on all citizens in 30 metropolitan cities (Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Aydın, Balıkesir, Bursa, Denizli, Diyarbakır, Erzurum, Eskişehir, Gaziantep, Hatay, İstanbul, İzmir, Ordu, Sakarya, Samsun, Şanlıurfa, Tekirdağ, Van) and Zonguldak province. During this restriction, hotels, hostels, shelters, and nursing homes will be open (the Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2020g).

Despite the measures and restrictions, a curfew was imposed in 30 metropolitan cities and Zonguldak province on April 17-19-25-26 as the outbreak spread rapidly. It was reported that banks and markets can operate between 09.00 and 14.00 during the curfew restriction. It was stated that individuals going out on the streets during the curfew would be warned and cautioned. It was also announced that individuals who do not comply with the weekend curfew would be subject to administrative fines and judicial proceedings against criminal behaviour (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2020f).

With the recommendation of the Scientific Committee and the decision taken by the Presidential Cabinet, all citizens aged 65 and over and those with chronic diseases will be able to go out on the streets between 11:00 and 15:00 on Sunday, May 10, 2020, in 81 provinces, provided that they comply with the social distancing rule and wear a mask. Likewise, children aged 14 and under and citizens aged between 20 and 15 were allowed to go out on the streets between 11:00 and 15:00 on Wednesday, May 13, 2020, and Friday, May 15, 2020, respectively (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2020 ğ).

Due to the increasing number of marriages during the pandemic, the Ministry of Interior sent a circular dated 02.09.2020 to 81 provincial governors and temporarily banned events such as weddings, circumcisions, henna nights, and engagement ceremonies. Only the wedding ceremony is allowed to take place within one hour. However, this wedding ceremony was allowed on the condition that social distancing was observed, areas such as runways were closed, food and beverage service was prohibited, and only first and second-degree relatives of the bride and groom were present. People over 65 and under 15 were not present (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2020i).

As the Covid-19 virus mutated and the pandemic continued to spread rapidly, the Presidential cabinet convened on April 13, 2021, and as a result of the meeting, it was announced that a 2-week partial lockdown would be imposed as of Wednesday, April 14, 2021. However, due to increased cases, a complete lockdown period was initiated between April 29 and March 17, 2021. That is, an uninterrupted curfew was imposed. During the curfew period covering 81 provinces, the working hours of grocery stores, markets, greengrocers, butchers, dried fruit shops and sweet shops were set

as 10.00-17.00 (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2021a). After these restrictions, there was a decrease in the number of cases.

On 08.09.2020, all citizens across the country (except residences) in public areas, streets, avenues, gardens, parks, picnic areas, shopping malls, public transportation, workplaces, factories, and beaches, etc., were obliged to wear masks without exception. It has been decided that no music broadcasting, such as live music or recordings, will be allowed after 24.00 in all eating and drinking or entertainment places such as restaurants, cafes, and hotels. It was stated that judicial and administrative actions would be taken if all measures taken were not followed (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2020i).

The Hayat Eve Sığar (HES) application developed by the Ministry of Health was implemented. Subsequently, with the circular issued by the Ministry of Interior as of 23.08.2020, the Hayat Eve Sığar (HES) code system has been implemented at the entrance of all public institutions and organizations (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2020h). With the Hayat Eve Sığar mobile application and the HES code received via text message and the Area QR Code Reader, individuals have been used in intercity journeys, at the entrance to public institutions, at the entrance of shopping malls, and in public spaces requiring individual communication (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Health, 2020). With the Hayat Eve Sığar application, citizens could see their location on the map and the risk status and intensity of the epidemic in the regions they wanted to visit. On the map, the areas where the risk intensity was high were shown in 'red' colour, medium-risk regions and areas in orange-yellow colours, and locations and regions where the risk was shallow were shown in blue.

Countries like Germany, China, Russia and Türkiye have started vaccine studies against the Covid-19 virus. As a result of the studies, the Covid-19 vaccine was found and made available worldwide. With the discovery of the vaccine in Türkiye, "emergency use approval" was given for the Turkovac vaccine, and it was put into use. The first vaccine was administered to the then Minister of Health Fahrettin Koca on December 29, 2021 (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Health, 2021c). The vaccine was first administered to healthcare workers and individuals aged 65 and over. In the following period, other citizens were gradually vaccinated. Individuals who wanted to be vaccinated were vaccinated by making an appointment through the appointment system (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Health, 2021a). However, as in the rest of the world, some individuals in Türkiye did not want to be vaccinated. While some countries impose sanctions against those who do not want to be vaccinated, Türkiye has not imposed any sanctions against individuals who do not want to be vaccinated. For those who did not want to be vaccinated, a negative PCR test result showing that they were not infected was required for them to travel. To be in public spaces, they were asked to scan a negative PCR test, HES code or QR code (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Health, 2021b).

With the decline in the speed of the outbreak and the negative PCR test result required upon the effect of the vaccine, the HES code inquiry required from citizens entering shopping malls, theatres, carpet fields and using public transportation such as planes, trains and buses was terminated with a circular issued by the Ministry of Interior on 03.03.2022 (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2022c). With the circular sent by the Ministry of Interior to 81 provincial governorships on March 27, 2022, the mask requirement was abolished in all indoor and outdoor areas and schools (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2022a). However, the obligation to wear a mask in public transportation continued until April 30, 2022. The use of masks in health institutions continued for a while (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2022b). As of 1 July 2021, the curfew and intercity travel restrictions were lifted, and a gradual normalisation process began (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Interior, 2021b).

Covid-19 Restrictions and Public-Private Space Distinction

While the private sphere is a secret, private world belonging to the individual and where the individual lives isolated from society, it has started to gain visibility with the development of technology in modern times. The individual's effective use of social media and the Internet in the private sphere causes the boundaries of the private sphere to narrow (Özbek, 2004: 44). With the visibility of the private sphere, the individual has become open to the intervention of the state to ensure security and protect personal data. In addition, with recent changes, private tendencies and public activities have developed in public spaces. All this shows that the boundaries of the private and public spheres are not clear and transitory. It can be stated that these areas are open to state intervention. Especially in times of crisis, the boundaries of public and private spheres can be fluid. The measures taken against the Covid-19 pandemic, which spread worldwide, caused the boundaries of the public and private spheres to be transitive. For example, education, concerts, and museum visits in the public sphere started to be seen in the private sphere thanks to technology and the internet during the pandemic. The fact that activities that belong to the public sphere can be seen in the private sphere outside the boundaries of the public sphere shows that there is transitivity in the boundaries of the private/public sphere in times of crisis.

The state's measures during the pandemic led to the transitivity of the boundaries of the public and private spheres. This section of the study analyses and evaluates the measures and restrictions taken by the state, such as curfew restrictions, restriction of freedom of movement, distance education, mask obligation, ban on going out in open spaces and limiting participation in special moments such as weddings, engagements, funerals, entry and exit restrictions of markets, HES application and HES code, vaccination obligation and transfer of Covid-19 data.

Curfew restrictions

With the emergence of the Covid-19 virus in China and its subsequent spread worldwide, many measures and restrictions have been implemented. One of these restrictions is the curfew. Türkiye first imposed lockdowns on March 21, 2020, for people aged 65 and over. Upon the progression of the pandemic, curfews were imposed on individuals aged 65 and over, as well as individuals under the age of 20. A segment has to work among people aged 65 and over who are subject to curfew restrictions. The rate of this group in their age group is 12%. (Euronews, 2021). In other words, it is thought that the 12% of people aged 65 and over who have to work are ignored. As a result of the research, it was observed that health workers who do not have chronic diseases and Covid-19 pandemic symptoms in individuals aged 65 and over are exempted from the curfew (Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 2021). Considering all these, it can be said that there are two different practices among all age groups and individuals aged 65 and over. First of all, among all age groups, elderly individuals were isolated from both social and economic spheres. Among individuals aged 65 and over, except for health workers, those who did not have health problems and epidemic symptoms and who had to work were kept at home. Thus, it was understood that they suffered economic losses. In addition, there is an idea that this group is protected by preventing those who do not work from going out on the streets. However, the state prioritized the health of this group on the grounds that individuals aged 65 and over were more affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. In regular times, the state does not obstruct individuals' transition from the private to the public sphere. However, during the pandemic, it required a particular group of individuals to remain in the private sphere for public health. Thus, it is understood that there is variability between the state practices in the ordinary period and the pandemic period and transitivity in the practices of intervention in spaces.

Individuals aged 65 and over could not do things within the individual's private sphere, such as shopping and withdrawing pensions, due to the restriction on going out on the streets. In the face of this situation, the state met the necessary needs of the elderly by using masks and following the rules of social distancing by the gendarmerie in villages and by public officials and helpful individuals in

cities and towns. This service provided by the state to individuals aged 65 and over leads to the interpretation that the state has entered the private sphere of elderly individuals. It is seen that elderly individuals are isolated from the public sphere, and their private space and private needs are narrowed with the restrictions.

In April 2021, 30 metropolitan cities and Zonguldak province were locked down on weekends. A "full lockdown" was then imposed on April 29-May 17, 2021. The lockdowns imposed in the country have brought about debates in terms of constitutionality. Due to the amendment of 13 articles in the 1982 constitution in 2001, the curfew restriction, which restricts the rights and freedoms of the individual based on "public interest, public order and public health", turned out to be unconstitutional (Gözler, 2001: 64-69). The state cited the Law on Public Hygiene and the Provincial Administrative Law as grounds for the curfew restrictions. The fact that these laws are cited as the basis means that the restrictions imposed and to be set on the society are in accordance with the law and that the state can manage the form, size and duration of the interventions as it wishes. At this point, it can be interpreted that the state can intervene in the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual by citing the laws as a basis in different matters.

It is unlikely that curfews will be imposed during normal periods. The situations in which curfews can be imposed are regulated by Extraordinary State Law No. 2935. However, according to the law, curfew restrictions are not considered as a measure to be applied in case of natural disasters and dangerous epidemics declared as a state of emergency. The law includes measures taken in case of violent incidents that lead to a state of emergency. According to Aslan, the law does not grant the government the authority to impose a general curfew even in the event of a state of emergency due to an epidemic. However, it is unlikely that the government will be able to impose a curfew based on the general regulations on powers and duties in the Public Health Law and Provincial Administration Law, which limit it to situations where there is a declaration of a state of emergency due to violent acts (Aslan, 2020: 828-829).

Administratively, according to the State of Emergency Law, the Ministry of Health was authorized to impose restrictions such as curfews and freedom of movement. However, during the pandemic, it was observed that measures were taken by the Ministry of Interior instead of the Ministry of Health, leading to a serious violation of authority (Çeliköz, 2021: 6-47; Kasapoğlu Turhan, 2020: 560-565). Since the Ministry of Interior did not have the power to announce the restrictions by issuing a circular and the curfew had no legal basis, there was considered a gap in the constitution in this area. Suppose there is a gap in the constitution. In that case, it can be interpreted as follows: To protect the individual's right to live, the state has intervened in the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual by using a right not granted to it in the constitution. This, in turn, indicates that the state has expanded its jurisdiction to intervene in the individual, that is, in the private sphere. In other words, it can be said that it has intervened in both the public and private spheres without relying on the Constitution and thus expanded the limits of its intervention. It can be stated that there is flexibility in the state's authority to intervene in society and the individual.

With the curfew decision taken by the state, preventing the individual from being in public spaces such as streets, avenues, sports fields, parks, and squares is state intervention in the public sphere. Likewise, the quarantine of the infected individual at home and the control by the police to ensure that the infected individual is at home is an intervention of the state in the private sphere. With the curfew restriction, individuals are prohibited from meeting with close relatives and friends, even in their own homes. Similarly, individuals are restricted from being in apartment gardens. All these are indicators of state intervention in the public and private spheres of the individual. It is clearly seen that the state has expanded its jurisdiction with these interventions.

Restriction of freedom of movement

Since the Covid-19 virus is transmitted from person to person by air and contact, individuals should act with their health and those around them in mind. However, some individuals could not protect themselves and their environment from the disease for reasons such as not believing in the reality of the virus. This situation jeopardized both the individual's health and the health of others in society. Upon this situation, in accordance with Article 23 of the principle of individual rights and duties in the constitution, if the individual's freedom to travel may constitute a crime, if there is a situation of endangering the right to life of another person or persons, the state may restrict the individual's freedom to travel to prevent crime. However, this restriction can be made by law (1982 Constitution of the Republic of Türkiye). In this way, the state can intervene in individuals who jeopardize their own right to life and the right to life of those around them and prevent individuals from committing crimes. In this regard, the state stopped all flights abroad on March 27, 2020. Thus, individuals were prevented from travelling abroad. This is a step that will reduce the rate of spread of the virus. In addition to preventing individuals from travelling abroad, many restrictions have been imposed on domestic travel. Among the restrictions on domestic travel, the number of passengers in intercity and urban public transportation was reduced, and the use of masks and travel with the HES code were obligatory. However, Abalı stated that in the 2001 amendment of the 1982 Constitution, travel restrictions were removed due to "general health" and stated that these restrictions were not in accordance with the constitution (Abalı, 2020: 97). However, Article 23 of the Constitution gives the state the right to protect the health of society and the individual by imposing certain restrictions on freedom of movement. However, the state can realize this restriction with a law in Article 23 of the Constitution. Based on all these, it can be interpreted that the travel restriction taken by the state is within the state's authority. Still, it is not fully compliant with the constitution since the restriction is not applied with a law enacted. However, since some individuals willingly tried to ensure that other individuals were infected during the pandemic period (Balantekin, 2020), the restriction imposed by the state on the freedom of travel was seen as a state of necessity, even if it was not in accordance with the constitution. The fact that the Constitution does not authorize the state to limit the freedoms of the individual due to public health but holds it responsible for protecting the health of the individual and society is an indicator of contradiction.

The State's restriction of freedom of movement is aimed at protecting society and the individual's right to life. However, this restriction is an intervention in the public space of the individual. By introducing the HES code or PCR test and the obligation to use a mask during intercity travel, a barrier has been placed in front of travel in public spaces. This barrier prevented the individual from travelling freely in public spaces, indicating the state's intervention in public space similarly, some individuals travelled by using their cars to avoid crowded places. The individual's vehicle use can be considered their private space. Authorized persons intervened in this private space due to the HES code or PCR test and the obligation to use a mask. Here, there is state intervention in the private travel of the individual for public health. Thus, during the pandemic, the state has expanded its jurisdiction by intervening in the private and public sphere of the individual with travel restrictions.

Obligation to wear a mask

The first of the measures taken in epidemic management is the 14 rules prepared by the Ministry of Health. These 14 rules and measures consist of hand hygiene, not touching the mouth, nose and eyes without washing hands, wearing masks, social distancing, etc. Individuals were required to comply with these rules, so the state needed individuals to wash their hands and to have disinfectants available and used in many areas outside. All this can be interpreted as the state's intervention in the hygiene preferences of the individual to protect public health. Despite the harmful aspects of wearing a mask and the discomfort experienced by the individual due to wearing a mask, it can also be stated that the state puts the individual in the second plan for the sake of public health. With the rules determined by the state, despite the individual's right over his/her own body, the state impacts the individual's body and restricts the individual by using authority.

With the social distancing practice, the level of interaction of individuals with the society was reorganized for the community's health. In short, these are examples of state intervention in the individual's private and public spheres for the general public's health. All these have expanded the state's jurisdiction during the pandemic, and with the rules introduced, the boundaries of the public sphere have been expanded, but the boundaries of the private sphere have been narrowed.

Administrative fines were imposed on individuals who did not wear masks during the pandemic. The administrative fines imposed on individuals who did not wear masks because they violated Article 282 of the Public Hygiene Law No. 1953 were appealed to the Court of Cassation. The Court of Cassation abolished the administrative fines imposed on using masks because there is no obligation to use masks in the Public Hygiene Law No. 1953. Even if the obligation to wear masks is accepted as a legal basis because the state must protect health, individuals should provide three masks per day as a requirement of being a social state of law. In addition, since the authority to issue administrative sanction decisions belongs to the local authority, not the administrative police, it was declared that the criminal proceedings were unlawful in terms of the element of authority (Uğur, 2023).

During the pandemic period, it was observed that individuals avoided crowded environments to prevent infection and isolated themselves from the environment by wearing masks, sunglasses, hats and headphones (Jasinski, 2020: 5). Jasinski claimed that public space has been privatized from the public domain to another dimension of virtual space. In public spaces, individuals tried to socialize using masks and with a social distance of 1.5 meters. In workplaces such as cafes, restaurants, patisseries and eateries, removing areas such as tables and chairs where customers sit to eat has pushed individuals into private space. To avoid being infected, the individual tried to be in the private sphere by performing their work in the public sphere quickly. All this has led to the narrowing of the public space. Preventing individuals from being in the public space collectively in an equal way has actually led to the privatization of the public space. This indicates transitivity in the boundaries of the public/private sphere.

Compulsory application of Hayat Eve Sığar (HES)

Individuals infected with the Covid-19 virus are identified in the HES application and monitored for 14 days to isolate them. In addition, individuals infected with the HES code and Scan Area QR Code are not allowed to be in public spaces. Only uninfected individuals with the HES code and Scan Area QR Code through the application were allowed to be on intercity travels, at public institutions, at shopping mall entrances, and in public spaces requiring individual communication. With the Hayat Eve Sığar application, individuals are notified by showing the regions where the epidemic is intense in red and where the intensity is low in yellow. By sharing their location information, individuals preferred to stay away from the red areas, showing that the outbreak was intense. With this application, even if individuals do not have the direct location information of other people, they can understand whether they are infected with the epidemic disease from the colour categories of the regions. By sharing personal data here, the individual causes the private sphere to gain visibility. The state can more easily observe this private space that has gained visibility. In fact, with the use of technology, it is noticeable that the state has expanded its dominance over the private and public spheres.

With the "Scan Area QR Code" application, access to the system was provided by scanning the QR code at specific locations such as shopping malls, university entrances, restaurants and public transportation. Thus, individuals in the same period and environment with the detected positive case were informed. In addition, uninfected individuals could be in public spaces by scanning the HES code or QR code and using a mask. All these practices prevented individuals from freely being in public spaces to protect the general public's health. However, some individuals, despite being infected, tried to survive the process on their feet by not going to the hospital in order not to be

restricted in terms of freedom and not to fall behind in public space and their working lives. This preference constituted one of the biggest obstacles to the pandemic. Should the individual be held responsible for the fact that individuals who bypassed the measures taken by the state acted without thinking about themselves and their environment, or should the state be held accountable for not taking harsher measures?

Ban going outdoors and not attending special occasions (engagements, weddings, funerals, etc.)

During the pandemic, the state banned citizens from being in open areas such as gardens, parks and forests. In addition, at first, special occasions such as weddings, engagements and funerals were banned. Still, with the decrease in the spread of the epidemic, only first-degree relatives were allowed to attend and special occasions were permitted to be held. During the pandemic, many events such as concerts, festivals and museum visits held in public spaces were moved to the virtual environment. The transition to a period in which the individual can visit a museum or participate in education at any time in his/her own home and in a comfortable environment has led to increased feelings such as comfort and laziness. The desire to work from home has increased in some individuals despite the end of the pandemic, as they spend less money by working at home, carry out their studies in a comfortable environment or access education at any time. This situation shows the individual's desire to move from the public to the private sphere. Children who stay at home during the pandemic and play with phones, tablets, and computers will prefer to live in the virtual space without leaving the private space in the future. This situation may affect the formation of a virtual public space within the private space of the next generation.

The ability of individuals to be in the public sphere with online applications in their own homes has led to the transformation of the private sphere into the public sphere. In addition, individuals' privacy and personal data are at risk with the devices used. In this case, the state, which is responsible for protecting the individual, must protect the individual against the public space created in the individual's private sphere and the risks that arise with it. This means state intervention in the private sphere. In particular, forming a public sphere in the private sphere will cause the state to increase its dominance over the private sphere. The situation in question shows that the boundaries of the private sphere have narrowed, and the state's intervention area has expanded.

During the management of the pandemic, the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Türkiye requested that all workplaces, such as restaurants, restaurants, patisseries, etc., provide service only on a "grab-and-go" basis and not allow customers to stay to prevent physical contact. Therefore, restaurants, patisseries and bakeries were asked to remove tables and chairs where customers sit to eat. In addition, the service hours of grocery stores were set as 09:00-21:00, and the number of customers was limited. These measures taken by the state to prevent the pandemic can be seen as direct intervention in the individual's daily routines. With the measures taken, the state tried to direct the individual's eating habits. Individuals cannot fulfil their daily routines freely, and they perform their routines around the conditions determined by the state. This is the state's intervention in the name of protecting public health. Individuals' accessible areas, such as shopping, daily routines, and nightlife, are restricted to protect public health.

The state has allowed non-contact individuals to be in public spaces by scanning the HES code or QR code and wearing a mask to protect public health. As a result of such measures, individuals began to experience a private space within the public space. The public space has become a space where individuals who meet certain conditions can enter rather than where everyone can enter; in other words, it has been privatized.

Between April 29, 2021 and May 17, 2021, a "full closure" period was implemented. During this period, the working hours of grocery stores, markets, greengrocers, butchers, dried fruit shops and sweet shops were set as 10:00-17:00. Apart from these, the working hours of some shopkeepers, shopping malls and many other commercial establishments were interfered with. In addition, due to the ban on events such as concerts and activities in the field of art, those working in these fields remained unemployed throughout the pandemic. However, factories continued to operate even during the entire shutdown period. All these are indicators that the state tried to balance public health and the economy. In short, the state tried to protect public health and prevent problems such as food shortages by keeping the country's economy afloat. However, despite the measures taken by the state, many businesses had to close down. Although the state tried to support tradesmen and working citizens with economic packages throughout the pandemic, financial problems occurred in Türkiye, as in many countries due to the pandemic. The uninterrupted operation of factories during the pandemic period, the change of working hours in some sectors, and the complete closure of some businesses caused some segments of the country to become richer and some segments to become poorer. However, the measures taken by the state were in the name of public health. Even though economy-oriented measures have been taken, some segments of society have been advantageous for some segments and disadvantageous for others.

Distance education

After the outbreak of the pandemic in Türkiye, education was suspended all over the country. Considering the course of the pandemic, the country switched to a distance education model at all levels, as the opening of schools would pose a risk. The Ministry of National Education created online platforms and tried to educate students through television channels. With the transition to the distance education model, it has become evident that some individuals have problems accessing education. The right to education was not fulfilled for those who wanted to participate in online education but lacked the necessary tools, such as technology and the Internet. The state has distributed tablets to students and provided internet connection up to a certain quota. However, some regions in the eastern parts of the country could not access distance education opportunities due to inadequate infrastructure (İHA, 2020). This has caused inequality in the field of education in society. With the distance education model, the state could not ensure all students had access to education. The first reason for this situation is that the pandemic emerged suddenly and caught the states unprepared. The second reason is that some regions of the country do not have sufficient technological infrastructure, and the third and last reason is that some segments do not have the financial means to access the necessary tools. For individuals to have access to the right to education, the state has provided make-up classes for those who could not participate in distance education, and it has been observed that the state has tried to fulfil its positive obligations for individuals to access their fundamental rights and freedoms during the pandemic period.

While education was seen in the public sphere in the normal process, with the emergence of the pandemic, the distance education model was switched to the distance education model so that education started to be seen in the private sphere. This situation has transformed the private and public spheres through online education. The individual could access education in the private sphere anytime and in a comfortable environment. This comfort experienced by individuals aroused the desire to continue after the end of the pandemic. With the use of technology and the internet, the public sphere has evolved into another dimension by performing some tasks, such as education and work, which are specific to the public sphere in the private sphere. In particular, doing public work in the private sphere has paved the way for the state's intervention in the private sphere. As a result, the process leads to the narrowing of the private sphere and the expansion of the state's intervention area.

Transfer of Covid-19 data during the pandemic

How the authorities manage during the crisis, the direction of travel and whether the measures and restrictions are sufficiently taken into account are understood from the information received by the public. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the Ministry of Health provided information to the public. In the Covid-19 table published daily, informative information was presented to the public by showing the number of patients who came to the hospital and were tested for coronavirus, the number of cases and the number of intubated patients. However, the Ministry of Health changed the coronavirus table on July 29, 2020. This new table shows only the number of patients who tested positive for coronavirus and were treated in the hospital. In short, those who tested positive but were isolated at home were shown as carriers, and this carrier group was not shown in the table.

The change in the coronavirus table has brought along many debates. According to some, the change in the table was intended to prevent panic in society and further damage to the economy with the pandemic. In addition, it has been claimed that the data is being harmonized with international data because the tests performed in Europe due to the virus descending into the lungs were negative and, therefore, not reflected in the number of cases. Another group claimed that the outbreak could not be controlled, hospitals were overcrowded, and this percentage of data was hidden (Yeni Safak, 2020).

The information shared with the public during the Covid-19 pandemic leads to a lack of trust or confidence in public authority. Preventing individuals' right to information brings along debates and causes unrest in society. In fact, the changes made to the coronavirus picture mean interfering indirectly, if not directly, in the public sphere. In light of the information received from the Ministry of Health, individuals choose whether or not to be in public spaces to protect themselves and those around them. In other words, the presence or absence of an individual in a public space is based on the information the individual receives. For citizens to comply with the restrictions and measures taken by the authorities, the data should be shared with society because there is a relationship between the public's access to information and the excellent management of the pandemic process.

Covid-19 vaccine mandatory

With the emergence of the Covid-19 virus, many countries have started vaccination studies since vaccination is the effective way to combat the epidemic despite many precautions taken. Vaccine discovery studies were conducted in many parts of the world, and Türkiye was also included in this race. As a result of vaccine studies, the Covid-19 vaccine called "Turkovac" was developed. With the discovery of the vaccine, the Turkovac vaccine started to be administered gradually throughout the country on the first vaccination of Health Minister Fahrettin Koca. At first, healthcare workers and individuals aged 65 and over were vaccinated. Despite the continuation of vaccination efforts across the country, some individuals did not want to be vaccinated because the vaccine was developed rapidly, the vaccine would have side effects, and there was no trust in vaccine companies. This situation was not unique to Türkiye, and anti-vaccination sentiment has emerged in different parts of the world. Especially in some European countries, restrictions were imposed on individuals who did not receive the vaccine, preventing them from participating in the public sphere. This has led to protests. Some countries have made vaccination compulsory. However, in Türkiye, vaccination is not mandatory, there are no sanctions against those who do not want to be vaccinated, and vaccination is voluntary. However, with the approval of the governor's office, anti-vaccinationists protested at the "Great Awakening" rally in Istanbul. At the rally, journalist-writer Abdurrahman Dilipak made a speech. In his remarks, it was stated that the vaccine was developed in a short period of 6 months and that there were seven different mutated viruses during this period, and he demanded an explanation of which microbe the vaccine was made against (Hürriyet, 2021).

No sanctions were imposed on individuals who were not vaccinated in the country. However, all measures and rules required for individuals to be in public spaces before the development of the

vaccine continued to apply to unvaccinated individuals. In other words, the PCR test and HES code requirement continued for non-vaccinated individuals to enter shopping malls, travel, and attend schools (universities) for education. The continuation of these rules and measures pushed individuals to get vaccinated. Although the individual is an entity that makes decisions with free will, directing the individual to be vaccinated has created a situation that can restrict free will for the benefit of society. Especially through traditional media and social media, the idea of the individual being vaccinated was positively influenced by the participation of well-known celebrities in public spots and advertisements. In the face of all these, it is seen that the individuals are directly or indirectly pressured to be vaccinated even though they do not consent, and it is ensured that they make their own decisions under this pressure. Due to factors such as the increase in the number of deaths caused by the virus and the spread of images of individuals who died due to the epidemic, the decision of individuals who have not yet been vaccinated to be vaccinated has been taken as a result of fear and pressure.

In the current legislation, vaccines developed for the Covid-19 virus are not included in the scope of legally mandatory vaccination. However, if the society is not vaccinated, the state can make necessary regulations in the constitution for public health and make vaccination compulsory. Making vaccination mandatory without the consent of the individual means interference in the individual sphere or individual life. Imposing compulsory vaccination by restricting the individual's freedom without relying on the Constitution causes a violation of rights.

Obligations such as PCR tests and HES code requirements for individuals who are not vaccinated to enter shopping malls, travel, and attend schools (universities) for education are actually indicators of state intervention in the private and public sphere of the individual. The state has put obstacles in front of the individual to be in the public and private sphere. Once individuals pass these barriers, they can comfortably be in the public and private spheres. This situation is actually an indication of the limitation of the individual's public and private sphere by the state. With the restriction made by the state, barriers are placed in front of the individual, and when the individuals pass these barriers, they can enter the area they own. This process shows that the state has expanded its authority for public health.

The discovery of the Covid-19 vaccine has brought many debates. One of these debates emerged after the end of the pandemic. This debate is about the BioNTech vaccine. A woman sued the BioNTech company because she experienced some side effects after receiving the BioNTech vaccine. BioNTech denied side effects, stating that 1.5 billion people had received the BioNTech vaccine and saved 20 million lives during the pandemic. The company stated that it had positive reports from European Union regulators and German vaccine evaluation institutions and that they had saved lives globally (Euronews, 2023). The decision to accept the woman's claim of post-vaccine side effects in the case in Germany affects not only German citizens but also approximately one and a half billion people who received the BioNTech vaccine. In this case, the question of whether the state can take responsibility for individuals who use the vaccine in Türkiye arises. Another question is whether the state will leave the responsibility to the individual since individuals voluntarily choose the BioNTech vaccine among the BioNTech, Sinovac and Turkovac vaccine options. In addition, the question of whether it is possible to use the documents signed by individuals before vaccination in cases of responsibility and payment is also asked at this point.

It was criticized that the measures the state took during the crisis (Covid-19 pandemic) were insufficient. It was criticized that the state's traditional understanding of security was inadequate and that its interventions to keep the individual safe were limited. In these criticisms, it was stated that the state should adopt an understanding of intervention that would ensure the security of the individual. According to Alameşe, the individual becomes free with the security provided by the state. Therefore, he emphasizes that the state should expand its scope of intervention (Alameşe, 2021: 46).

However, the state's priority is to protect public health. Therefore, during the pandemic period, the state restricted the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in many areas, such as curfews and restrictions on freedom of movement. It has already expanded its intervention area with these restrictions. If the state expands its intervention area further, the individual has no fundamental rights and freedoms. On the other hand, the risk of eliminating the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual may lead to the emergence of the state as an absolute power.

Considering the pandemic period, restricting some fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual can be regarded as a necessary measure to prevent the spread of the virus. In addition, it can be said that having a model understanding that is open to the state's intervention to protect the society's health enabled Türkiye to overcome the pandemic better than European countries. In many European countries, the fact that the state is closed to intervention may cause difficulties in managing the pandemic.

During the pandemic, there has been direct or indirect state intervention in society and the individual. Many measures and interventions have caused changes in the boundaries of the public and private spheres, such as the activities such as excursions, concerts, and education, which are carried out in the public sphere, being carried out in the private sphere with the use of technology and the internet, the state's measures and rules entering the public sphere, creating obstacles in front of the individual and turning the public sphere into a private sphere. However, it can be clearly stated that in managing the pandemic, the state has expanded its jurisdiction with its interventions, regardless of whether they are in accordance with or against the law.

Conclusion

With many changes in modern times, the boundaries of the public and private spheres have become blurred. Technology, the development of the internet and the development of individual rights cause the boundaries of the public and private spheres to become fluid. The fact that an activity in the public sphere starts to be seen in the private sphere indicates a change in the boundaries of the public and private spheres. Likewise, the recognition of a right in the public sphere, which is in the private sphere, in the public sphere leads to the transitivity of the boundaries of public and private spheres. Changes in these boundaries are not only due to technological advances or the development of individual rights. An event or a crisis period fragile the boundaries of the public and private spheres. This is because the state's intervention in the private or public sphere during a crisis also affects the other spheres. In other words, a change in the public sphere affects the private sphere, and a change in the private sphere affects the public sphere.

The rapid spread of the Covid-19 virus, which emerged in China, caused states to take measures and precautions against the pandemic. Many measures have been taken by the state in Türkiye during this crisis period. The measures taken affect the public and private spheres. In the Covid-19 pandemic, the importance and rules introduced by the state, such as the obligation to wear masks, the 1.5m social distance requirement, and the QR code or HES code for entry to public spaces such as shopping malls and restaurants, are indicators of intervention in the public sphere. These interventions have narrowed the public space. The individual creates a private space for himself/herself by isolating himself/herself from others in the public space. Thus, a private space has been created within the public sphere, and the boundaries of the private sphere have been expanded. Based on the rules and measures introduced by the state for the individual to access his/her fundamental rights and freedoms in the public sphere, it can be clearly stated that the state has expanded the limits of intervention.

Measures such as quarantine, restriction of freedom of movement, obligation to wear masks, and social distancing were used to reduce the interaction between individuals and ensure that the

individual was in the private sphere. However, the mass media and the internet, which individuals use in the private sphere, have enabled interaction between individuals, which has led to the formation of a public sphere within the private sphere. It may seem that the state has tried to restrict the public sphere by intervening in the public sphere. Still, turning the private sphere of individuals into the public sphere has caused the boundary of the public sphere to expand and the state to intervene in the private sphere. It is seen that the boundary of the public sphere has grown, but the boundary of the private sphere has narrowed in this regard. In other words, the restrictions/practices taken by the state have caused a narrowing or expansion in the boundaries of the public and private spheres.

It is thought that the state has expanded its intervention limits and authority by imposing curfews and restrictions on freedom of movement without relying on the Constitution. In short, during the Covid-19 pandemic that affected the world, the state took many measures and imposed restrictions to manage the crisis in Türkiye, as in many other states. All this was done to protect public health. The state has expanded its jurisdiction to protect public health. It has tried to overcome the crisis period by taking constitutional or unconstitutional measures. The fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual were restricted, and measures were taken to interfere with the boundaries of the public and private spheres.

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The Judgment of Climate Change on Food Availability in Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Climate change is a global phenomenon that has significant implications for food security, particularly in developing countries like Nigeria. This study is set to explore the nature of the relationship between climate change and food security and the various ways to address the impact of climate change on food availability in Ogun State, Nigeria. Relying on the green theory, this study investigated climate change's impact on the agricultural sector, compromising food security in Ogun State, Nigeria. This study's qualitative data collection methods include primary and secondary data sources. This study adopted the exploratory research design. Interviews were used to gather primary data, and existing literature was used to collate secondary data. This work covered the staff of the Ministry of Agriculture in the selected state, lecturers in the Department of Economics, Covenant University, and the faculty of agriculture at Obafemi Awolowo University. The thematic content analysis was adopted in analyzing the data in this study. The findings from the data revealed that there is a clear relationship between climate change and food security. It also revealed that climate change has a negative impact on food availability in Ogun State, Nigeria. In addition, strategies and policies put in place to address the issues of climate change and food security were discussed. It was concluded that climate change has affected Ogun State's food security between 2019 and 2023.

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Introduction

Food security has become a challenging issue at both a global and a national or state level (Matemilola and Elegbede, 2017). Climate change is vastly growing in the field of international relations with global attention, and there has been a widespread consensus in the literature over the past decades that the world would experience changing levels of temperature which would be accompanied by a series of effects (Santos et al., 2022). Significant changes in climate conditions pose a threat to food security through its impacts on global, national, and local food systems. Over 700 million people faced hunger in 2020. After remaining unchanged for five years, global malnourishment prevalence climbed to about 9.9 per cent as opposed to 8.4 per cent the previous year (FAO, 2021).

When people lack access to the necessary food and nutrition to meet their dietary requirements for a good and healthy living because of physical and economic forces, then food insecurity is said to be (World Food Summit, 1996). Therefore, it is only natural that when a country or region lacks the physical or economic ability to attain food resources required for standard living, such geographical area is prone to be disturbed by food insecurity. This physical or economic ability cannot be separated from the climate of the area.

The International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) for a definition of 'climate'. Their fifth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2013, cited in Bothe, 2018)

.. viewed that "Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the average weather, or more rigorously, as the statistical description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant quantities over a period ranging from months to thousands or millions of years. The classical period for averaging these variables is 30 years, as defined by the World Meteorological Organization. The relevant quantities are often surface variables such as temperature, precipitation, and wind. Climate in a wider sense is the state, including a statistical description, of the climate system."

The climate of a place remains subject to change, which has made the issue of climate change a matter of concern. Climate change, as submitted, can be a natural process where temperature, rainfall, wind, and other elements vary over decades or more (Fast Facts-FF, 2016)

Climate is policy-relevant, and discussions on climate and climate change are valid for scientific purposes and individual views (Bothe, 2018). Friendly policies of regions, states, and countries on climate will ensure more productivity, especially regarding Agriculture.

Many African countries, including Nigeria, lack the adequate mechanisms to tackle the global weather predicament, have a climate-sensitive agricultural-based economy and are more vulnerable to food insecurities. Nigeria's high vulnerability is attributed to its coastline of 800km, which is vulnerable to rising sea levels and heavy storms (Apata, 2009).

In Delta state, for instance, because of the commercial quantity in which crude oil was discovered in 1954, following oil exploration and exploitation by multinational corporations, the region has been subject to environmental degradation, coupled with the reoccurring flood that has resulted in the loss of not only agricultural produces but also lives (Omofonmwan, 2009). Climate change is, therefore, a significant cause of food unavailability today in Nigeria and, consequently, negatively impacting Nigeria's economy and overall development.

Past studies on this area of study have laid focus on its impact on the environment at a global or national scale, leaving aside the economic repercussions it has on the economy of a state and its

effects on the livelihood, well-being, and financial sustenance of the general population of a country or region. Abdulkadyrova (2016) defines the global food problem as an economic phenomenon with political consequences. Similarly, many experts have claimed that increasing and leaping food prices are the root of the world's issues. In Essence, the urgent environmental and food crises caused by the climate conditions in Nigeria mainly victimize the economy of Nigeria, which is reliant on the climate-dependent agricultural sector that characterises Nigeria's economy.

It is exactly in this matter that this research aims to discover the climatic factors responsible for the rampaging food insecurity in Nigeria, which in turn damages the country's growing economy. This study aims to identify not only these climatic factors and their health, agricultural, and economic effects but also the necessary coping mechanisms that Nigeria could adopt to curb the high level of food insecurity.

This research highlights the need to determine these responsible climatic factors because knowing and understanding the challenges they pose to Nigeria's food and economic systems will create the necessary position to offer solutions or alternatives to the problem. It is indeed when a diagnosis has been given that necessary solutions, which their practicability would characterize, can be offered to the problem. In the case of the Nigerian food and economic system, determining these climatic factors and the provided apparatus to control them would serve as a pivotal step to addressing the crises.

Problem Overview

Food security is a right, one that must be protected so that every human being can have physical and economic access to their necessary nutrition to ensure a healthy standard of living. A place where there is the availability of food unhindered by any weather or climatic issue, as well as the presence of the necessary resources like water for irrigation and lands devoid of degradation, stability, and utilization of food, is measured as food secure. The issue of food insecurity in Nigeria is a major consequence of the changing climate and environmental change rapidly increasing in the form of temperature, continuous rainfall, flooding, sea level rise, exaggerated weather events, and land degradation (Ebele 2016). In fact, (Madu, 2012) claims that the high vulnerability that the change in climate poses to the Northern states in Nigeria poses a peril to food security throughout the country.

Agbo (2012) maintained that these climate changes are accredited to the activities of humans which have altered the status of the earth. Nzewi (2009) blames agricultural activities, deforestation, wars, and high energy consumption for the issues that the environment is facing. Eze (2012) noted that environmental degradation from climate change is becoming more severe in Nigeria. Nwakama (2012) affirmed that the environmental issue of flooding in the Niger Delta which comes from abnormal rainfall patterns. Eze et al. (2012) vividly captured the situation in the country by noting that seasonal cycles and ecosystems are being disrupted, adversely affecting agriculture, water supply, and food production, which they claimed increases the level of poverty, malnutrition, and various socio-economic consequences.

Osuafor (2014) suggested that combating the issue would require an integrated approach involving stakeholders like the government, individual farmers, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations. Agbo (2012) noted that adopting agricultural technologies and innovations would be essential in giving attention to agriculture even in the face of the changing climate, claiming that involving disease and harsh climate-tolerant plants, irrigation technologies, and sustainable agricultural methods would reduce the impact of climate-related issues on crop production in Nigeria.

According to the United Nations, over 836 million around the world are living in dire poverty, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) claims that at least 70 per cent of these impoverished persons inhabit rural areas and rely on agricultural activities for their survival. A recent study also reveals that 70 per cent of Nigerian households engage in crop farming.

Another study shows that 80 per cent of Nigerians depend on local farms for their daily meals.

In conclusion, Nigeria depends severely on the agricultural sector, which is being threatened by climate change. The high increase in temperatures expands the rate of microbial decomposition, which, in the long run, negatively impacts soil fertility. As regards the changing climate conditions in Nigeria, there has been a push for measures to help tackle the negative effects that these conditions pose on the food system, health, and the economy. Any country's leadership style determines its success (Chukwudi et al., 2019). In other words, the government's efforts in managing climate change are very vital to the agricultural sector. According to Ogunjobi *et al.* (2021), heavy rainfall resulting from climate change has led to flooding in many parts of Nigeria, which damages crops and reduces yields. In addition, acid rain resulting from air pollution exacerbates soil infertility and degradation, further reducing the productivity of agricultural lands (Ogundiran et al., 2020).

These changes are particularly challenging for smallholder farmers who rely on rain-fed agriculture and have limited resources to adapt to the changing climate. As noted by Onyeneke and Emodi (2019), climate change exacerbates existing food insecurity challenges in Nigeria, including high levels of poverty, inadequate infrastructure, and limited access to markets. The combination of climate change, heavy rainfall, acid rain, soil infertility, and degradation poses a significant threat to Nigeria's economy, health, and social well-being. It is, therefore, crucial for the government to take urgent action to address the problem of climate change and food security in Nigeria. The primary of this study is to establish the importance of the need to devise the necessary mechanisms to curb the rampaging effects of Nigeria's changing climate, and the need for this to be seen as a serious issue by both the government and the general mass before meaningful solutions can be posed to these issues plaguing the food and economic system of Nigeria.

The conclusion of the above statement of the problem birthed the following objectives: examine the relationship between climate change and food security in Nigeria; examine the impact of climate change on food availability in Nigeria and assess the ways to address the impact of climate change on food availability in a selected area in Nigeria.

Methodology

A qualitative method of data collection is adopted for this study. Existing secondary materials such as books, journals, conference proceedings, and internet sources. The primary data was obtained through in-depth interviews, and secondary data sources were obtained through existing literature.

Five people were purposively selected for the interview. The five interviewees were selected based on their knowledge of the subject of study. They know and have practised in different fields with a wealth of experience. The five interviewees were selected from the staff of the Ministry of Agriculture in the selected state (2 members of staff), lecturers in the Department of Economics Covenant University (2 members of staff), and the faculty of agriculture at Obafemi Awolowo University (1 member of staff). Thematic content analysis was adopted in analysing the data in this study. This study adopted the exploratory research design.

The study faced challenges in terms of funding. More funding for this work would have enabled the combined involvement of professionals such as meteorologists, agronomists, sociologists, and other

experts. The bringing of the different ideas would have been very good for the perfection of the work because of the intersection of climate change, agriculture, and food availability.

Literature Review

Concept of Climate Change

At the root of the phenomenon called climate change is the greenhouse effect, a term used to explain the way that heat that would otherwise have been radiated upwards into space is trapped by certain atmospheric gases on Earth. However, the greenhouse effect is responsible for life on the planet, and if not for it, the Earth would be a glacial and inhabitable planet (Hulme, 2009).

During the 19th century, greenhouse gases began to be pushed to new levels, particularly because of human activities. This led to a warmer planet, which changed the natural weather pattern and cycle, further resulting in extreme heat, flooding, storms, and rising sea levels. These changes are known as climate change (Wearth, 2008).

Climate change falls under the many contentious topics in global politics in recent times. It is a change in the earth's weather pattern caused by anthropogenic activities that alter the configuration of the worldwide atmosphere and is an incorporation of natural climate changeability over periods (FCCC, 1992). Synonymously, it is a change in climate over time due to natural causes or human activities. Akande (2017) postulates that climate change extremities are majorly caused by anthropogenic activities. Similarly, Buba (2014) showed that anthropogenic factors are the main forces causing the diminution of the ozone layer. Emodi (2016) notes that humans cause climate change and mostly affect the poor, who contribute the least to the changes. It took almost a century of research and study of the phenomenon to convince a considerable majority of scientific minds that human activities could alter the earth's weather pattern. In the late 1950s, CO₂ readings offered some of the first data to verify climate change theory and show that it was not only real but posed serious consequences to the world. Scholars have described the effects of climate change on food availability and security:

The examination of the literature reveals that there are two distinct relationships between food security and climate change: on the one hand, all aspects of food security are impacted by climate change, while on the other hand, achieving food security has an impact on climate change. Regarding the availability and supply of food, it is generally accepted that climate change would lower crop yields and livestock production, particularly in the Global South. Food accessibility is impacted by factors such as production and availability, as well as by the effects of catastrophic weather events on the economy and physical environment (El Bilali et al., 2020: 2).

Causes of Climate Change

Although climate change displays great variations globally, Elisha (2017) identified two basic factors causing climate change- Natural or bio-geographical processes and anthropogenic factors. Throughout the Earth's existence, solar radiations and orbital changes have affected the Earth. According to NASA, the natural processes contribute to climate change but happen at a slow pace that cannot be credited for the rapid warming and effects that the earth has experienced over the decade.

The anthropogenic factors refer to activities done by human beings that affect the earth. This is popularly accepted as the primal driver of climate change by scientists and experts. The unmonitored burning of fossil fuels over the century has critically led to the increased presence of atmospheric

greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide. It has resulted in the ubiquitous ruination of forests and wetlands and the Carbon sinks that naturally help store carbon dioxide, stopping it from contaminating the atmosphere.

By continuously exposing the air to these gases, the earth's regular temperature has risen, bringing us to our current weather predicament. Anthropogenic activities that have played dominant roles in the state of the earth's weather cycle and pattern include:

Transportation

Transportation is essential for the movement of people and goods in the world today. Road transportation, especially, is a dominant means of movement in Nigeria, moving over 90% of internal goods and people across the country. However, this means of transportation is not energy efficient, hence a major source of GHG emissions in the country. The National Bureau of Statistics, in 2018, revealed that there were over 11 million vehicles in Nigeria, and this number rose to 13 million by 2021. The Nigerian government predicted that by 2035, greenhouse emissions from transportation sectors could increase by 50% and 100% by 2050.

Industry and Manufacturing

Nigeria is developing rapidly and has many major industries, consequently improving the quality of life for many individuals but also affecting the natural environment. This includes issues with oil spillage, deforestation, and other environmental predicaments associated with industrialization.

In the Niger Delta, oil spills are credited to pipeline and tanker incidents, lack of pipeline maintenance, as well as sabotage and non-functioning equipment. In 2011, the shell industry admitted to spilling 17.5 million litres of oil in the Niger Delta.

Modernized Agriculture

The presence of modernized and industrialized agriculture has altered the relationship between the earth's soil and the climate. 51.2% of Nigeria's greenhouse emissions are from agriculture- a sector that produces incredible amounts of gases for trapping heat. Slaughtering domestic animals in abattoirs all over the country contributes significantly to carbon emissions in the atmosphere. The disposal of animal waste is also a massive source of methane, which is emitted into the atmosphere daily.

Deforestation

Deforestation is a massive problem in the world, including Nigeria. Trees are an essential part of nature but have continued to be subject to the actions and activities of human beings. However, the abuse of these forests has disadvantages to the environment, of which climate change happens to be a part. In 2018, Dr Muhtari Aminu-Kano, the Director-General of the Nigerian Conservation Foundation, stated that the loss of trees in Lagos due to deforestation accounts for about 96 per cent. He said that less than five per cent of Nigeria's forest cover remains and emphasized the need to increase it to 25 per cent within the next 30 years. According to the FAO Global Forest Resources Assessment, deforestation is defined as converting forest to other land use. Humans are walking and breathing carbon emissions, but their activities release large amounts of this carbon into the earth's atmosphere. Trees are natural absorbers of carbon oxide. In essence, burning down trees and cleaning out forests disrupt a natural prevention mechanism for carbon emission and add to it. This is because when deforestation takes place, the carbon absorbed into the trees gets released into the atmosphere.

Impacts of Climate Change

Developed states, which are the main drivers of climate change, suffer less severe consequences due to high adaptation methods, modernised agricultural systems, stable economic status, and research-backed-up policies (Mcguian, 2002). However, because developing countries like Nigeria lack all these factors, they are prone to suffer more than others. Haider (2019) identified four ways in which climate change impacts Nigeria: geographical impacts, sector impacts, demographic sector impacts, and security impacts.

Geographical Impacts

The problems associated with climate change differ across the country. The tropical climate in Nigeria has two precipitation regimes. While the North has low precipitation, the case is the reverse in parts of the South. According to Akande (2017), this has left the North to experience drought and desertification and the South to suffer from desertification and flooding. Madu (2016) states that an analysis of vulnerability demonstrates that Northern states suffer a higher degree of vulnerability compared to Southern states. The rising heat and reduced rain in the North made it vulnerable, quickened desert encroachment, and led to a fast reduction of surface water (Abdulkadir, 2017).

Sectorial Impacts

Sector refers to distinct parts or areas of a state that specialize in activities. Many sectors in Nigeria are affected by climate change. The agricultural, fisheries, health, and economic sectors have been affected by climate change.

Economic Sector

Many Nigerian sectors are exposed to the effects of climate change. The agricultural sector, the health sector, the energy sector, etc. – all generally affect the growth of the economy (Ebele, 2016). In essence, it is the other sectors that determine the state of Nigeria's economic status. According to Anabaraonye (2019), people's livelihoods and the economy's condition depend hugely on agriculture. This is because crop yield and production affect Nigeria's gross domestic product (Solomon and Edet, 2018).

Agricultural Sector

Because of the linkage of the agricultural sector to poverty, the concern about climate change concerning agriculture is heightened. Ebele (2016) anticipated that climate change's impact on the agricultural sector would fuel rural poverty. Timing and amount of rainfall can significantly affect agriculture because water deficit could take a toll on crop and livestock production (Usman, 2013).

Scoones (2005) noted that climate change has caused a deviation in cultivated crops in Northern Nigeria. Due to increasing rainfall, the farmers moved from the cultivation and production of guinea corn, groundnut, and maize to the production of millet, maize, and beans as a means of adaptation. Reducing agricultural and arable lands due to desert encroachment and dunes is another major problem of agriculture in Nigeria. Nkomo (2006) notes that livestock production is affected by an increased level of climate change-influenced diseases and pests that cut investment profit in livestock production by over 20% per annum.

Fishery Sector

Evidence has shown that the coastal regions will be affected as climate change disturbs ocean currents and fisheries. According to the Nigerian Environment Study Action Team (NEST, 2004),

the loss of mangroves as sea level rises has consequences on fish spawning patterns because mangroves serve as a haven for young fish to mature. Similarly, rising sea levels and heavy rainfall have significantly reduced fishing activities in various eco-zones of Nigerian coastal areas. A significant waning in fish production businesses in these locations causes this.

Health Sector

According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), the absence of infirmity and disease is not the only parameter for measuring health but also the overall state of physical, psychological, and social well-being. Good health is essential for overall prosperity and well-being. Deprived or poor health, on the other hand, drives and facilitates poverty. Infectious microbial and parasitic diseases are primal contributors to poor health status around the world, occurring against the framework of socioeconomic underdevelopment, wars, poverty, low health sector investment, and changing climatic patterns.

Environmental health encompasses all the factors in man's physical environment that exert a dangerous effect on the survival, health, and overall physical development of human beings. It considers the various public health aspects determined by physical and biological environmental factors. Consequently, environmental changes upset the natural order, spreading disease agents and their contact with human life. Warming temperatures and extreme rainfalls will likely favour the outbreak of waterborne diseases.

Demographic Impacts

Climate change affects different populations and classes of people in gender, age and occupation. It affects women because many are poor farmers who depend on agricultural activities as a source of survival and livelihood. Due to limited access to rehabilitation and recovery, rural women are vulnerable and lack the means to adapt to climate change and natural disasters. Women face vulnerabilities in different forms- political, physical, emotional, and economic (Apeloko and Ayeni, 2012). Women find it difficult to find employment opportunities and lack access to economic resources. They suffer psychologically, which takes a toll on their body in the form of soreness, lack of sleep, and miscarriages.

Most climate change-induced diseases occur in developing countries and have been found to impact pregnant women, children, and the elderly (WHO, 2002). Furthermore, political vulnerability prevents proper representation of women in decision-making making, which limits their political power.

Children's bodies are still developing physically, making them vulnerable to climate-related issues like poor air and heat quality. Because they breathe faster, they get exposed to dangerous air pollutants (Gamble, 2016).

Climate change also impacts children's schooling because many are absent due to heavy rainfall and bad roads and landscapes. The ability of the children to learn can also be hindered by scarcity of food and consequent starvation and hunger. As their brains continue to grow throughout adolescence, children undergo emotional development. Consequently, storms, fires, and other extreme climatic events can impact their mental health.

Security Impacts

Nigeria is rich with ethnic diversity, and challenges regarding social needs and wants come with that. Failure to equally distribute limited resources has been associated with many violent conflicts in the country. Climatic challenges are a significant contributing factor to limited food and land resources.

Studies have shown that changing weather has played a crucial role in violent social challenges over the past century. Conflicts over resources in Nigeria are not a new component of Nigeria's social disorder. There is an estimate of the death of over 10,000 Nigerians due to communal violence, which is linked to climate change.

The farmer-herder clash is a contest over resources greatly attributed to climate change. More studies need to be conducted on the power that climate change has to disrupt the economy and destroy jobs. However, existing evidence suggests that climate change increases the risks of violence in youth-populated areas and that alienated youths who lack resources are most likely to join rebellions (Apeloko and Ayeni, 2012).

The Concept of Food Security

The primal biological function of human beings is to survive and reproduce, and to survive, humans need to eat food. There needs to be good quality and quantity of food for an individual to live a healthy and sustainable life. Hence, countries that have a large number of hungry people lack food security. This is prevalent in global Southern nations of Africa and Asia, with Africa having 18 out of the 23 most undernourished countries (Ogbonna, 2013).

The phenomenon of food security diversifies into the social, economic, and environmental spheres of life. At the World Food Conference in 1974, the term "food security" emerged and was defined as the assurance of availability and price stability of essential food resources at national and global levels. 23 years later, at another World Food Conference summit, it was agreed upon that food security exists when there is access to safe, sufficient amounts of food to meet their dietary and health requirement. The definition classified food accessibility into physical and economic access. Individuals should be able to get a hold of food resources and be physically able to acquire their food. Economic access is the financial capability to acquire physically available food resources.

According to FAO, there are four components or categorizations of food security. These components form the basis of the definition of food security. The four components are availability, accessibility, utilization, and stability.

Availability

According to FAO (2008), food availability is defined by the level of food production, stock levels, and net trades. In essence, food availability addresses the supply and presence of food resources in a geographical location.

Accessibility

The availability or supply of food resources does not necessarily connote a secure location because access to these food supplies for consumption is still needed. Policies addressing income, market, food prices, and economic access to food would need to be implemented to improve accessibility to food.

Utilization

Food utilization is defined by how individuals utilize and make good use of food to meet their dietary requirements and, thus, a healthy lifestyle. Appropriate food utilization speaks well about the nutritional status of individuals.

Stability

Constant or periodic fluctuation or break in the flow of food availability, supply, and production signals poor stability of food production. Food instability can result from famine, economic recession, and bad weather conditions. Conclusively, food stability is characterized by a constant, steady, and continuous flow of food production in a place.

Causes of Food Insecurity

Food insecurity is antithetical to food security, and while the latter refers to a state of adequate access, availability, utilization, and stability of food resources, the former represents a state of lack or scarcity of food resources and the presence of hunger and malnutrition.

According to the American Diabetic Association 1998, food insecurity is “limited or uncertain availability of nutritionally and adequate safe food”. The definition broadens to the ability to “acquire acceptable foods in socially acceptable ways”. There are diverse causes of food insecurity, which are:

Population and Urbanization

Despite Nigeria's vast population and steady growth in demography, agricultural production has experienced a decline (Eboh et al., 2012). In a comparative analysis conducted on Nigeria in contrast with other countries by Abdul Rahman (2012), between 2000 and 2012, Nigeria witnessed a 0.99% increase in population. Thomas Mathias (1978) posited that humans would always face problems relating to food production as long as there is a growing population. In essence, food shortage can often be attributed to a vastly rising population due to limited resources to tend to everyone.

Environmental Degradation

The environment encompasses all living and non-living elements occurring naturally and their effects influencing human life. It refers to the natural and external conditions that affect life forms' situation, development, and survival.

Environmental degradation occurs when the natural environment becomes compromised due to the depletion of resources like water and soil, reducing biodiversity and the general health of the environment. More than often, attributed to anthropogenic activities, environmental degradation has become a problem for the natural environment.

The environment is under pressure through the constant release of sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and steam-loaded emanations from toxic emissions of non-renewable energy and fossil fuels (Akella, 2009). Attention has been diverted to eco-friendly activities to curb the damage contributed by human or industrial activities. Some scholars have even tried to establish a connection between economic development and the quality of the environment. The increased use of energy is considered the main contributor to increased industrial production through non-renewable energy sources.

The Delta region is one of the most ecologically sensitive ones in the world because of the early stage in which oil and gas resources were discovered, leading to its dominance as the country's economic pillar and the main source of revenue for Nigeria (Uyigwe, 2007).

The Nigeria Environmental Study Team (2004) reported that sea level erosion would worsen the issue of erosion, which rampaged the Nigeria Delta, increasing food insecurity and destroying the ecosystem and agriculture, including fisheries. In their first report in 1990, evidence was produced to show that anthropogenic activities caused changes like this in a region's environment.

Omotonwan (2009) attributed the environmental degradation in Delta to the oil exploration and exploitation done in commercial quantities after the discovery in the colonial era. Hence, some

studies have linked trade and commerce with economic growth and environmental degradation (Ertugrul, 2016). Uyigue (2007) noted that the link between toxic emissions and commercial activities takes into consideration how pollution is attributed to the production of goods and their consumption. Ayobanji (2020) concluded that trade liberalization may not have a positive impact on the pollution level of a country. The hazard that oil spillage poses to the environment cannot be over-emphasized. The Niger region is evidence of the effects that oil spillage has on the ecosystem. A huge amount of Nigeria's oil is produced in Niger Delta, and while it serves as Nigeria's biggest source of income, it poses a variety of issues on the environment. Because oil infrastructures and operations are cited in ecological areas like fishing grounds and tropical forests, these areas are often exposed to oil leaks. The smoke released by these industries also affects the livelihood of people and exposes them to respiratory illness and death. Oil spillage affects the human population, wildlife, and aquatic life. When oil is spilled in water, spreading immediately occurs, and the hazardous components evaporate, causing soil contamination which affects terrestrial, aerial, and aquatic life (Etuonovbe, 2009).

Environmental Degradation and Food Insecurity

According to Dutse and Ibrahim (2013), the impact of environmental degradation and climate change is seen in food availability, accessibility, and utilization in countries. Over five hundred thousand people in tropical and subtropical states are not food secure (UNO, 2010). Harsh climatic and environmental conditions lead to the loss of crops and livestock. These conditions challenge food security, which affects the overall health of individuals and their livelihood, as well as household purchasing power, as crops make up over 90 per cent of the agricultural sector in Nigeria. Some areas in Nigeria are experiencing a decrease in the growing rate of crops like millet, rice, guinea corn, and maize due to rising temperatures, which degrades the necessary resources for rich and fertile land. Egbetokun and Ogundipe (2016) posit that the impact of environmental degradation on food production includes farmland depletion, reduced yields, changes in planting and harvesting, reduction in yields, decrease in arability, and pest threats.

Apart from the consequent natural disasters, wildfires, droughts, and other environmental issues that make it strenuous to grow food crops, among its impacts is the predicament of food insecurity and malnutrition, which directly and indirectly impact Nigeria's economy and hinder productivity. Recent studies have shown that fast-growing population countries are more prone to the effects of environmental degradation because as population increases, there is expected to be a rise in anthropogenic activities, which is, however, dependent on the level of industrialization and modernization in the country. Essentially, for a growing economy like Nigeria, the implication of this is the presence of slums and poor standard of living, which result from an increase in industrialization (Ogundipe, 2018).

This problem of environmental degradation would bring about an increase in the costs of food due to a decrease in crop yields. For a country like Nigeria, still undergoing development and struggling with inequality and poverty, it is more difficult for people to afford food, which would result in illness, malnutrition, and even death. It also impacts climate change and causes sea level rise, which leads to excessive soil moisture and reduced oxygen levels that affect the breathing process of the plants and make their roots weak, which causes them to die.

Green Economy

The green economy concept has become a foundational policy framework in developing states. In a conference on sustainable development, the United Nations defined green economy as one of the several instruments to attaining sustainable development, as it would eliminate poverty, sustain economic development, encourage social inclusion, and promote human living standards while

conserving the healthy function of the world's ecosystem. Green policies are primarily executed in energy, industry, agriculture, water, and waste management. Studies have shown that transitioning into a green economy would improve the standard of living, reduce inequalities, and prevent exposure to environmental issues (Schmitz et al., 2013). By stimulating agricultural productivity and enabling good ecosystem management, green economic policies would have a huge jolt on Nigeria's stability and availability of food resources.

If Nigeria adopts a green economic system, the policies will affect the accessibility of food by promoting infrastructural development and green job opportunities, thereby stimulating economic growth. Developing countries like Nigeria have an infrastructure deficit, which results in food insecurity and slowed economic growth.

Climate Change Adaptation

Climate change adaptation is defined as adapting to the adverse effects of climate change, which means anticipating and expecting the impact of climate change, following the necessary procedures, and taking actions required to minimize or prevent the damage the cause. It is simply adjusting to the existing problems and effects of climate change. This could include changes or adjustments in infrastructures to prevent sea level rise or human behavioural shifts such as reduction of waste.

Development of Climate-resilient Housing and Infrastructure

The housing and construction industry needs to adapt to the new predicaments that tag along with climate change, as well as develop sustainable building practices to prevent environmental degradation. The location, construction, and energy consumption of houses and building infrastructures directly affect the level of greenhouse emissions and climate change. Similarly, the degrees of exposure to and protection from climate-related risks and hazards are offered and determined by the location of the housings and how they are constructed. The building processes of the residential construction industry constitute about ten per cent of globally consumed energy, of which most are derived from non-renewable sources.

Mitigation of climate change is simply tackling the impacts of climate change, making it less severe by reducing greenhouse emissions. In essence, it is an intervention to manage the triggers of climate change and the sources of greenhouse emissions that affect the climate and the environment. Instances of this include the invitation of clean energy and increasing the size of forests. The energy sector is essential for the mitigation of climate in Nigeria and for overall economic growth and development. Controlling the emission of greenhouse gases through renewable energy adoption is crucial in Nigeria.

Climate-Smart Agriculture

According to Ozor (2011), agricultural activities contribute a huge amount to climate change as they are just below energy consumption in enhancing greenhouse emissions. Agriculture emissions account for 15 per cent of greenhouse gas emissions, and land usage contributes about 8 per cent overall. (Ozor and Nnaji, 2011).

Agriculture is the economic pillar in most African countries. In 2021, the agricultural sector generated more than 20 per cent of Nigeria's gross domestic product. This makes Nigeria vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Because Sub-Saharan African countries are affected by increased drought, changes in soil components, and flooding, agricultural activities are under threat, which affects the economy. According to the IPCC (1998), the predicament is worsened due to widespread poverty, limited capital, inappropriate infrastructure, etc.

Theoretical Framework

This study adopts green theory as the best theoretical framework that investigates the impacts that climate change has had an impact on the agricultural sector, thereby compromising food security in Ogun State, Nigeria. Green theory has its foundation in addressing environmental issues in a disciplinary way based on the analogy of “the tragedy of the commons” as suggested by Garrett Hardin, who stated that ordinary people are threatened by the misuse of the environment (Gunar, 2021).

The basic assumptions of green theory are the interconnectedness of ecosystems, limitation to success caused by the disruption of the ecosystem and the value of nature which are independent of their use by humans (Dyer, 2018). In application, climate change is a natural system that has affected food availability in Nigeria.

The green theory emphasises the notion of ecosystem services, and there are advantages that humans derive from ecosystems. Ecosystem services, including pollination, soil fertility, and water management, are critical to agricultural systems (Onofri, 2022). Climate change may disrupt these functions, impacting crop yields and total agricultural productivity. Acknowledging and comprehending the complex relationships that exist between agriculture and ecosystems is made more accessible by studying green theory.

Green theory advances the notion of sustainability by highlighting actions that preserve or improve the long-term health of the environment. This is essential for agriculture dealing with the effects of climate change. Permaculture, organic farming, and agroecology are examples of sustainable agriculture methods that support resilience against climate-related disturbances and are consistent with the ideas of green theory (Tittonell et. al., 2022).

The different ways of human abuse of the environment have affected food availability in Nigeria, thereby leading to food insecurity. However, the nature of the environment can still affect the outcome of food availability in Nigeria irrespective of the utility by Nigerians. According to Dyer (2018), a green theory understands climate change as a direct consequence of human collective choices. In other words, the activities of Nigerians cannot be disconnected from the food insecurity experienced in Nigeria.

Green theory has been criticized for not prioritizing human interest in the environment. The Green theorists have been accused of a lack of synergy on how decentralization of green theory should be since some held on to local organizations and others posit on global organizations (Edin, 2022). Despite the criticisms, green theory remains the best theoretical framework for this study.

Data Presentation And Analysis

Objective One

Examination of the nature of the relationship between climate change and food security in Nigeria

The Cause and Effect Relationship

Climate change threatens food production, risking grain, vegetables, fruits, livestock, and fisheries. It affects food availability and food accessibility. It also impacts human health and livelihood, as well as changes in market flows.

One of the respondents, an expert in economics, had this to say about the relationship between climate change and food security:

There is a strong connection between climate change and food security. Whatever changes experienced in weather patterns would affect crop yield, affecting Nigeria's food security. It affects food availability, food accessibility, and food affordability. This is as shown by low agricultural output. A lot of Nigerians are malnourished due to food insecurity, which is accredited to climate change. Poor yields lead to the unavailability of food, which changes the market flow for available food and makes it inaccessible and unaffordable to many. There is a cause-and-effect relationship between climate change and food security. (Respondent 1, 2023).

Respondent 4 holds the same view as Respondent 1, noting that climatic activities are connected to the problems being faced in the agricultural sector. All the variables of climate change contribute to the issue of food productivity and availability in Ogun State. She mentioned that:

The major source of income for about 70 per cent of the population of the nation is agriculture. Nigerian agriculture is majorly fed by rain, and farmers find it difficult to organize their operations due to rainfall variance. Cropland reduction, reduced agricultural productivity, droughts, and desertification have all affected crop production. (Respondent 4).

Another respondent also said this about the context of climate change and food security:

Climate change has a connection to food security not only in Ogun state or in Nigeria but in all parts of the world. It harms food production in general. When food production is affected, it leads to food insecurity. Its relationship with food security is a negative one. It does not have a positive connection to it. All the climate activities affect food availability- carbon emissions, environmental pollution, flooding, which washes off parts of soil and land, and deforestation. They all affect food production and availability (Respondent 2, 2023).

Climate change is undeniably connected to the issue of food insecurity. It has lingering implications for the food system in the state. All the respondents agreed that climate change and food security have a cause-effect relationship. Climate burdens the livelihoods in Nigeria, such as crop production, because rainfall patterns will be altered, and floods that devastate farmlands will occur, which would affect not only the livelihood of Nigerians but also their health and standard of life.

Another respondent commented on the nature of the relationship between climate change and food security:

Climate change and food security are intertwined. Climatic activities drastically affect food and crop production in Ogun State. In Ogun State, climate variables like rainfall patterns and temperature influence crop growth and compromise crop yields. Low crop yield spells food unavailability, which would mean poorer people would find it harder to access food because of the market flow of crops and food. (Respondent 3, 2023).

These climatic conditions are major factors undermining food security and threatening people's livelihoods. Variable rainfall, heat stress, and drought can harm food production and cause food shortages. The nature and character of freshwater supplies, on which many Nigerians rely, are

impacted by climate change. Fishing will be affected by weather extremes and rising sea levels. Rising salinity poses a threat to the fisheries.

Unaffordability of Food

One of the most visible impacts of climate change on food security is the disruption of stable food prices. The impact of climate change on Nigeria's food system disrupts the market flow of crops. Food is very unaffordable to the poor and even inaccessible to others.

A respondent gave insight into how climatic activities have affected the stability of food prices and affordability.

Unfavorable climate conditions reduce crop yields and prevent yield abundance, affecting the total food output. If food is available, it would be affordable for people to buy. Climate change reduces crop productivity, making certain foods unaffordable to many in the state. But if there is the availability of food, the price would be cheaper and more palatable to those in the lower income class in Ogun State (Respondent 1, 2023).

Numerous studies have found that the unfavourable effects of climate change on agricultural productivity result in reduced production outputs. This circumstance has caused food shortages, disruptions, and a significant increase in pricing. Similar to the previous example, a shortage of food due to climate change causes an increase in food costs in the state, worsening the already dire condition of food security. Climate change can lead to more frequent and severe droughts and floods, reducing crop yields and damaging infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, that are crucial for transporting food. This can lead to higher transportation costs and food shortages, which can drive up prices.

Objective Two

Examination of the impact of climate change on food availability in Nigeria

Damaged Agricultural Sector

All of the respondents agreed that the food system has become unstable and that the agricultural sector has been badly impacted by climate change. Respondent number five said:

Climate change has led to changes in rainfall patterns, with some areas experiencing prolonged dry seasons and others experiencing excessive rainfall. This has affected crop yields and led to crop failures in some areas. For example, farmers in Ogun State who rely on rain-fed agriculture have reported a decline in crop yields due to irregular rainfall patterns. It has also led to an increased incidence of pests and diseases: Climate change has led to the proliferation of pests and diseases that were previously not present in Ogun State. For example, the fall armyworm, a pest that was previously not found in Nigeria, has now become a major threat to maize production in Ogun State. (Respondent 5).

Respondent 2 shared similar views with Respondent 5, claiming that:

Climate change has caused changes in rainfall patterns in Ogun State, Nigeria, resulting in prolonged dry seasons or excessive rainfall, leading to a decline in crop yields. Additionally, pests and diseases that were not

previously found in the region, such as the fall armyworm, have proliferated, posing a significant threat to maize production. (Respondent 3).

Respondent 3 noted not only climate change's impact on crops and vegetables but also its adverse effects on livestock and fisheries. She added

Climate change has also led to changes in the species composition of fish populations in Ogun State. For example, some species of fish not previously found in the area may now be present, while others that were once abundant may have declined. Climate change has led to increased water scarcity in some areas, affecting irrigation systems and water availability for livestock. For example, farmers in areas with limited access to water resources have reported difficulties in accessing water for irrigation and livestock production. Climate change has also affected livestock productivity in Ogun State. For example, the high temperatures and increased incidence of diseases have led to reduced milk production in dairy cattle. (Respondent 3)

Respondent 4 added to the negative effect that climate change has on the agricultural sector, emphasizing flooding and how it destabilizes the crops and changes the soil, mentioning that:

Flooding can lead to soil erosion, which can wash away topsoil and nutrients, reducing soil fertility and affecting crop yields. This can result in lower crop yields and reduced income for farmers. Floodwaters can cause waterlogging in fields, which can limit oxygen availability to plant roots, leading to reduced crop growth and yield losses. This can also increase the susceptibility of plants to pests and diseases. (Respondent 4)

Respondent 1 shares similar responses to the other respondents, adding that:

Crop yields, soil fertility, and livestock output have all suffered due to climate change in Ogun State. The issues that farmers in the state face are a result of changing rainfall patterns, soil erosion, and degradation, as well as a rise in pests and illnesses. (Respondent 1)

The impact of climate change on the agricultural sector is evident in crops and vegetables and livestock and animals. Like respondent 3, respondent 2 gave insight into the context of climatic activities on livestock production, noting that:

High temperatures and increased humidity associated with climate change have led to heat stress in livestock, which can affect the growth, productivity, and reproductive performance of livestock, reducing meat and milk production. It has led to increased water scarcity in some areas, which has affected the availability of water for livestock. This can lead to dehydration, reduced feed intake, and lower productivity.

Climate change has increased the incidence of some livestock diseases in Ogun State, which can affect cattle productivity and herd health. (Respondent 2)

According to respondents, climate change harms the agricultural sector in Ogun State. These consequences include livestock loss, crop failure, and reduced production rates of harvests. Respondent 2 also went further to state how the effects of climate change on the agricultural sector of Ogun State ultimately undermine the economy, stating that:

The agriculture industry, a main driver of Ogun State's economy, has been significantly impacted by climate change. Farmers are facing issues as a result of the changing climate's impact on water availability, soil fertility, and crop output. As a result, agricultural output has decreased, which may have an impact on farmers' livelihoods and incomes as well as those of other parties involved in the agricultural value chain. Additionally, the prevalence of pests and diseases may rise due to climate change, which might harm crops and lower yields, further reducing agricultural output. (Respondent 2)

Respondent 1 attributed a specific climatic variable, carbon emissions, to be a major contributor to the distortion of the soil and failure of crops, mentioning that:

Carbon emissions have a significant impact on the agricultural sector in Ogun State, Nigeria. Carbon emissions are one of the primary drivers of climate change, which has led to changes in temperature, rainfall patterns, and weather extremes that affect the availability of water, soil fertility, and crop productivity in Ogun State. In this essay, I will discuss the effects of carbon emissions on the agricultural sector in Ogun State, as well as some of the strategies that can be used to mitigate these impacts. (Respondent 1)

Objective Three

Assessment of the ways to address the impact of climate change on food availability in a selected area in Nigeria.

Adapting to Agriculture to Climate

The third research question aimed at finding strategies in which the issue of climate change and its effect on food security can be addressed. The participants reviewed strategies that could be adopted to help mitigate the issue and reduce the burden climate-related activities have on the food system in Ogun State. Respondent 1 had a government-focused approach to addressing the issues. He stated that:

The government can encourage farmers to adopt sustainable farming practices such as crop rotation, conservation tillage, and agroforestry. These practices can help increase soil fertility, reduce erosion, and conserve water resources.

The government can provide support for the adoption of climate-smart technologies such as drought-resistant crop varieties, improved irrigation systems, and renewable energy sources. These technologies can help farmers adapt to the changing climate and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. (Respondent 1)

Similarly, respondent 2 attributed these methods to be government-focused, noting that most of the strategies could be easily adopted if the government oversees them. He noted that:

Several techniques could be used to address the issues of food security and climate change in Ogun State. Promoting sustainable agriculture is one tactic. To do this, it is possible to motivate farmers to use sustainable farming techniques, including crop rotation, conservation tillage, and agroforestry. These methods can aid in preserving water resources, reducing erosion, and improving soil fertility.

Aiding climate-smart technologies is another tactic. This would entail giving farmers stronger irrigation infrastructure, drought-resistant agricultural varieties, and sustainable energy sources. These innovations can aid farmers in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to climate change.

It's also essential to invest in research and development. The government can fund research to create new crop kinds that are more productive and adaptable to the changing climate. As a result, food security can be maintained despite climatic change. It's also crucial to build infrastructure that is climate resilient. The government can make investments in infrastructure that can withstand climate change effects like flooding and rising sea levels. As a result, agricultural lands and food production systems may be protected. Last but not least, supporting community-based adaptation strategies can be successful.

Respondent 5, however, suggested that communal effort to adopt agricultural adaptive measures would help improve the situation, noting that:

Communities may implement adaptation strategies, including agricultural diversification and soil conservation techniques. This can lessen the susceptibility of food systems to climate change and aid in local resilience building. Overall, addressing climate change and its impact on food security in Ogun State can be accomplished through a holistic strategy that integrates these tactics.

Respondent 3 added that:

The agriculture sector may effectively combat climate change by using sustainable farming methods. Crop rotation, conservation agriculture, and agroforestry are some techniques that can assist in enhancing soil health, lowering greenhouse gas emissions, and boosting carbon sequestration. Farmers can implement these methods by utilizing organic fertilizers, minimizing tillage, and planting cover crops.

Discussion of Findings

The Relationship between Climate Change and Food Security in Nigeria

Based on the responses from the interviews conducted by the researcher, it was discovered that an adverse correlation exists between climate change and food security, and the green theory emphasized the importance of climate on the ecosystem, thereby affecting agriculture and food security. This discovery is consistent and in line with most scholars researching the topic. Firstly, one of the discoveries in this research work is that the relationship between the two variables is a cause-and-effect one. Essentially, the issue of food insecurity in this context is attributed to climate change. It was discovered that climatic activities can lead to reduced agricultural productivity, crop failures, and food shortages and reduce food availability and accessibility.

Just like Olawale (2020) noted, the discoveries from this research affirmed that climate change has impacted agricultural productivity in Ogun State by causing variations in rainfall patterns and increasing the frequency of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods.

The findings explained that the changing rainfall patterns have caused a reduction in crop yields and quality, leading to a decline in food production and insecurity. Farmers in Ogun State have reported

that the rainy season has become shorter and less predictable, which has made it difficult for them to plan their farming activities. In addition to this, the findings showed that the presence of climate change had a direct impact on the Ogun State food system.

Furthermore, it was confirmed that the shorter and less predictable rainy season has made it difficult for farmers to plan their farming activities, while the increasing rainfall intensity has led to soil erosion and loss of soil nutrients. The findings from the responses suggested that droughts and floods have caused plant withering and death, soil erosion, crop damage, and loss of farmland, resulting in a loss of livestock and fisheries, which are important sources of income for many farmers in the state. Therefore, it is necessary to develop strategies that can help farmers adapt to the changing climate, such as the use of drought-resistant crops, irrigation, and improved soil management practices, to increase resilience and sustain food security in the region.

It is important to note that the discoveries in this research attribute carbon emissions as one of the main contributors to climate change, which in turn affects food security in Ogun State. Carbon emissions from industrial activities, transportation, and energy production contribute to the increase in global temperature and changes in precipitation patterns, which affect crop yields and food production. Therefore, reducing carbon emissions through sustainable practices and policies can help mitigate the impact of climate change on food security in Ogun State and other vulnerable regions. Similarly, scholars like Akinbode and Ogunniyi (2018) state that climate change and carbon emissions have significant impacts on food security in Nigeria, including Ogun State. The findings from this research stated that the effects of climate change, such as changes in rainfall patterns and extreme weather events, have led to a decline in agricultural productivity and food security in the state. The study also highlighted the contribution of carbon emissions to climate change and the need to reduce emissions to mitigate the impacts on food security.

Ogunniyi et al. (2019) emphasized the need to reduce carbon emissions from the food system to achieve sustainable food security in Nigeria. The study suggested promoting sustainable farming practices, such as agroforestry and intercropping, as well as reducing food waste and improving diets to reduce emissions and increase resilience to climate change.

Olaoye and Adeyemo (2020) also found that carbon emissions from energy production, transportation, and land-use change, as well as deforestation, contribute significantly to greenhouse gas concentrations and climate change in Nigeria, impacting food security. The study recommended reducing carbon emissions with renewable energy, improved transportation systems, and sustainable land-use practices to mitigate the impacts on food security.

The Impact of Climate Change on Food Availability in Ogun State, Nigeria

Based on the responses of the different respondents, it is evident that climate change has had a significant impact on the agricultural sector in Ogun State, Nigeria. The changes in rainfall patterns, soil degradation, erosion, and increased incidence of pests and diseases have all contributed to the challenges that farmers in the state face. The negative effects of climate change are not only limited to crops and vegetables but also extend to livestock and animals. High temperatures and increased humidity associated with climate change have led to heat stress in livestock, which can affect their growth, productivity, and reproductive performance, reducing meat and milk production. Additionally, climate change has led to increased water scarcity in some areas, affecting irrigation systems and the availability of water for livestock. This can lead to dehydration, reduced feed intake, and lower productivity. Overall, the impact of climate change on the agricultural sector in Ogun State is significant and requires urgent attention and action to mitigate its effects.

Due to its detrimental effects on food security, climate change has become a significant concern for the agricultural industry in Ogun State, Nigeria. Climate change has altered rainfall patterns, increased the prevalence of pests and diseases, degraded the soil, and caused erosion, which has decreased agricultural productivity. Animal husbandry and fisheries have also been impacted by the effects of climate change on agriculture, in addition to crops and vegetables. Ogun State's economy heavily relies on the agriculture sector; therefore, the effects of climate change have far-reaching implications.

Carbon emissions are one of the main causes of climate change. Extreme weather occurrences, global warming, and the building of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are all caused by carbon emissions.

Respondent 1 attributed carbon emissions to be a significant contributor to soil degradation, which affects crop yields. Carbon emissions lead to soil erosion, which can wash away topsoil and nutrients, reducing soil fertility and affecting crop yields. Floodwaters can cause waterlogging in fields, which can limit oxygen availability to plant roots, leading to reduced crop growth and yield losses.

Respondent 2 noted that climate change has also affected livestock production in Ogun State, with high temperatures and increased humidity leading to heat stress in livestock, which can affect their growth, productivity, and reproductive performance. The increased incidence of some livestock diseases in Ogun State can affect cattle productivity and herd health. Respondent 3 added that climate change has also led to changes in the species composition of fish populations in Ogun State, with some species that were not previously found in the area now present, while others that were once abundant may have declined.

Respondents 4 and 5 highlighted the impact of climate change on crop yields in Ogun State. Respondent 4 noted that flooding can lead to soil erosion, which can wash away topsoil and nutrients, reducing soil fertility and affecting crop yields, while floodwaters can cause waterlogging in fields, which can limit oxygen availability to plant roots, leading to reduced crop growth and yield losses. Respondent 5 added that climate change has led to changes in rainfall patterns, with some areas experiencing prolonged dry seasons and others experiencing excessive rainfall, leading to crop failures in some areas. The increased incidence of pests and diseases, such as the fall armyworm, has also affected maize production in Ogun State.

The impact of climate change on the agricultural sector in Ogun State has far-reaching consequences. The agricultural sector is a significant contributor to the economy of Ogun State, and climate changes have affected the availability of water, soil fertility, and crop productivity, leading to challenges for farmers and other stakeholders in the agricultural value chain. The reduced agricultural output affects the income and livelihoods of farmers and other stakeholders in the agricultural value chain.

Several strategies can be used to mitigate the impact of climate change on the agricultural sector in Ogun State. The findings suggested reducing carbon emissions with renewable energy, improved transportation systems, and sustainable land-use practices. Respondent 2 recommended promoting sustainable farming practices, such as agroforestry and intercropping, as well as reducing food waste and improving diets to reduce emissions and increase resilience to climate change. Respondent 3 suggested improving irrigation systems for crops and livestock and promoting sustainable fishing practices to increase resilience to climate change.

Strategies to Address the Issue of Climate Change and Food Security in Ogun State, Nigeria

The discoveries identified several strategies that could be adopted to address the issue of climate change and its effect on food security in Ogun States. The government-focused strategies included

promoting sustainable agriculture, providing support for climate-smart technologies, investing in research and development, creating a climate-resilient infrastructure, and encouraging community-based adaptation measures.

Promoting Sustainable Agriculture could encourage farmers to adopt sustainable farming practices such as crop rotation, conservation tillage, and agroforestry. These practices can help increase soil fertility, reduce erosion, and conserve water resources. Sustainable farming practices are an effective way to mitigate climate change in the agriculture sector as they help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improve soil health, and increase carbon sequestration.

Providing Support for Climate-Smart Technologies could provide support for the adoption of climate-smart technologies such as drought-resistant crop varieties, improved irrigation systems, and renewable energy sources. These innovations can aid farms in climate adaptation and greenhouse gas emission reduction.

New crop varieties with higher yields and climate adaptation could be created by investing in research and development. As a result, food security can be maintained despite climatic change. The government might make investments in infrastructure that is resistant to climate change effects like rising sea levels and flooding. As a result, agricultural lands and food production systems may be protected.

The government can promote community-based adaptation measures that can effectively build resilience at the local level and reduce food systems' vulnerability to climate change. The community-focused strategies included communal efforts to adopt agricultural adaptive measures such as crop diversification and soil conservation practices.

The findings suggested that communities can adopt adaptation measures such as crop diversification. This can help build resilience at the local level and reduce the vulnerability of food systems to climate change.

More discoveries from the responses were that farmers can adopt sustainable farming practices by using organic fertilizers, reducing tillage, and planting cover crops. These practices can help to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, improve soil health, and increase carbon sequestration.

Suggestion for further studies

Further studies should focus on the best ways that farmers in Ogun state can adopt to avert the negative implications of harsh climatic conditions that are common to the area and reduce farmers' vulnerability.

Conclusion

This research was conducted to examine the relationship that exists between climate change and food security. The study's outcome aligned with green theory as it became apparent that food security affects crop production and every facet of the natural environment. This issue of climate change must be taken seriously as it has long-term implications and negative impacts on the state of the country. Many individuals have lost their source of livelihood, and others do not have access to the basic food resources required to live a healthy life. Food insecurity has now become one of the very serious challenges that Nigeria needs to address. If the agricultural sector is going to thrive, conscious effort needs to be put into policies and agricultural practices to help reduce the impact that climate change has on food availability and production.

Because of uncontrollable natural causes and human negligence in the form of industrialization and modernization, the environment has been put under serious restraint and has affected many sectors in the state, including the agricultural sector. This has made food inaccessible, unaffordable, and unavailable for many people in the state, thereby increasing hunger and the poverty rate in the country. This also makes it difficult for the country to meet the basic economic and sustainable requirements, pushing it further into a state of underdevelopment. This led to a battle over resources and agitations throughout the country, adding to the already existing security threats.

This study offers solutions and recommendations to curb the issue of climate change and its effect on the food security of the country. Aligning with other successful countries will open more ground for success in achieving food security. The government should engage scientists to establish findings that will favour different types of economic and valuable plants in the environment.

Policy Implication of the Study

Policymakers should make policies on investing in better meteorological services and equipment so that farmers may receive timely and reliable weather information.

Policymakers for Ogun state and researchers should focus on creating and supporting early warning systems to assist farmers in anticipating and preparing for changes in rainfall patterns, allowing them to make well-informed decisions about when to sow and harvest.

Develop training programs to help Ogun State farmers become more capable and provide them with the information and abilities they need to adjust to shifting weather patterns.

Policies and Researchers should encourage neighbourhood-based programs that motivate farmers to exchange insights and strategies for addressing climate-related difficulties.

The study will help policymakers in Ogun state to focus on the development and implementation of strategies that will help farmers adapt to the changing climate conditions.

The study highlights the value of promoting and implementing food security programs through policies that will ensure a stable and sufficient food supply, especially during periods of climate-related difficulties.

Climate change is a global issue that needs global attention. This study will inform regional and international decisions on issues of climate change and human utility in areas different from Ogun state.

Policies and research in Ogun state should be made to encourage community involvement and awareness-raising initiatives to inform nearby communities and farmers about the effects of climate change and available adaptation options.

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NATO PA's Role in Consolidating Article 2 of the Atlantic Alliance Treaty

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ABSTRACT

Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Washington Treaty, stipulates that international relations between member states should be conducted peacefully and with mutual respect, based on free institutions, thus creating conditions of stability, security, and satisfaction within the Alliance. It also promotes the elimination of opposition factors about international economic policies, which, in turn, are based on a collaborative foundation. Despite this more peaceful premise, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is, above all, a collective defence alliance, and over its 74-year history, there have been no further commitments that would allow for more integration despite the shared common values that were at its inception. The Parliamentary Assembly of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO PA) is an Interparliamentary Organisation (IPO) that acts independently of the North Atlantic Alliance but brings together parliamentarians from its member states and associates. Although its resolutions are merely recommendatory and advisory in nature, they have provided crucial strategic input into NATO's action, allowing parliaments to properly reflect on the organization's interests and strategies in national debates.

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Introduction

According to its founding treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) goes beyond the collective defence alliance referred to in Article 5 to become a community of values based on mutual respect, as enshrined in Article 2 of this treaty. (NATO, 2022). However, despite envisaging peaceful values based on common values, the North Atlantic Alliance has not gone beyond the materialization of a collective defence organisation between its member states, and there have been no additional commitments during its 74 years of existence that would allow for greater integration, despite the sharing of common values.

To address the role of the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO (NATO PA), this essay aims to analyse its role and influence in promoting and preserving the values enshrined in the Washington Treaty (1949), especially those that include the development of international relations based on peace and respect between member states (NATO, 2022).

This is an Interparliamentary Organisation (IPO), which, like most of its counterparts, has no formal link with the corresponding Intergovernmental Organisation. However, as it comprises delegations from the parliaments of member countries, it acts within the framework of parliamentary diplomacy and can be configured as an instrument of soft power, a complement, or even an alternative to traditional diplomacy exercised within the government.

In this context, the first part of the essay deals with the Washington Treaty, focussing on the assumptions in question. The second part presents the Parliamentary Assembly, its genesis, mission, and objectives, followed by an analysis of its role in consolidating the alliance's values, with an appraisal of the existing bibliography and, finally, the concluding remarks.

The founding of the North Atlantic Alliance

NATO was founded with the signing of the Washington Treaty, also known as the North Atlantic Treaty, on 4 April 1949 (NATO, 2022). With only 14 articles, this document, which established the North Atlantic Alliance, provided for the sharing of risk, responsibility, and benefit of collective defence between the signatory states, the very concept of collective defence is the basic principle of the Alliance (NATO, 2022). The collective defence or mutual assistance pact to stop Soviet expansion is enshrined in Article 5 and was the objective that led to the creation of this International Organisation, and committed member states to protect each other (Mudge, 2022) (Eurocid, 2022).

Thus, since its creation, this Organization has consisted of a structure that allows the implementation of the objectives defined in its founding document without changing, even with the end of the Eastern threat (Eurocid, 2022).

As pointed out by Maria Cowles and Michelle Egan (2012), during the bipolar conflict, the North Atlantic bloc, led by the United States of America (USA), became a military and political counterweight to Soviet influence on the European continent. With its North American military forces stationed in Western Europe to deter potential Soviet aggression. This military presence materialised the US commitment to securing Europe and containing communism (Cowles and Egan, 2012).

Although, even with the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), some leaders of NATO countries questioned its continued existence, which was dedicated exclusively to the collective defence of its members, since this premise had become superfluous (Thompson, 2014). It was even suggested that NATO should evolve, even changing its area of intervention or geography. Given these circumstances, Senator Richard Lugar said in 1993 that "NATO must change its area or its business"¹, thus summarising the position defended by many member states (Rato, 1995: 765).

To this end, the Alliance has deployed forces and moved out of its area in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Gulf of Aden, and Libya, at the same time as it sought to establish more constructive relations with Russia and other countries that had previously belonged to the Soviet bloc. In this way, NATO has managed to maintain its relevance, transforming itself into a more flexible alliance and broadening its focus to include peacekeeping operations, crisis management and other missions outside Europe (Gheciu, 2009).

Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 was an event that had significant repercussions on international relations, including the position of the Allies, most of whose member countries condemned this unilateral Russian action as a clear violation of international law and a clear attack

¹ That year, during Bill Clinton's administration, Senator Richard Lugar of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee amended that with the dissolution of USSR, the Alliance needed to "get out of the area or get out of the business" (Thompson, 2014).

on the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine's territory. This event has reinvigorated tensions between NATO and Russia, contributing to a period of more tense relations between the West and Moscow, with the Alliance taking steps to strengthen its military presence and security in the Black Sea region, reinforcing deterrence against aggressive actions. This tension had lasting impacts on geopolitical dynamics in Europe and security policies in the region (Oliveira, 2016).

The invasion of Ukraine in 2022 by Russian troops significantly aggravated the tension and security situation in Europe. This aggression on Ukrainian territory reminded European countries of the importance of NATO as the main collective defence organisation for their security. United against Russia, the Alliance members have begun to strengthen their defences and have been providing material to support Ukraine, establishing a new strategic concept, approved in Madrid in 2022, to enhance the defence capacity and security of the Member States, as Russia has re-emerged as the greatest threat to stability in Europe. (Euronews, 2022).

With this new context, the North Atlantic Alliance regained its momentum and, in unison, condemned this Russian attack and repositioned itself on European territory, on the eastern flank, and realised the accession of countries from this region, such as Finland (Kauranen and Gray, 2023).

NATO Parliamentary Assembly

NATO PA is an international organisation of a parliamentary nature that brings together the parliaments of the member and associate countries of the North Atlantic Alliance (Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, 2016). Founded in 1955, at the height of the bipolar conflict, NATO's member countries sought to consolidate transatlantic values and relations between the Americans and Europeans (Brumter, 1986).

Bringing parliamentarians into the Alliance's collective deliberations only came about shortly after the Washington Treaty in 1951, when the Ottawa Session of the North Atlantic Council took place. The proposal was put forward by Norway and provided for the creation of a forum dialogue exclusively for parliamentarians within the central structure of NATO, which would, in turn, facilitate transatlantic interaction by strengthening interparliamentary cooperation (Šabič, 2016).

Harry Truman, then US president, was in favour of the initiative, as he considered that creating a platform for dialogue between European and American parliamentarians "could only be beneficial" (Šabič, 2016: 245). The US Congress was also in favour of founding this parliamentary dimension in the North Atlantic Alliance. At the time, Senator Fulbright² supported the idea of an Atlantic Assembly, an interparliamentary body that could bring together not only the parliaments of NATO member countries but also the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), two key transatlantic International Organisations (Šabič, 2016).

In May 1954, the NATO Canadian Parliamentary Association was created, in which all senators and members of the House of Commons interested in addressing North Atlantic issues could participate. Led by Senator Wishart McL. Robertson, President of the Senate, this association organised the first plenary session of Alliance parliamentarians in July 1955. Once up and running, the Canadian Parliamentary Association began to follow the North Atlantic Council's suggestion to develop interparliamentary relations with parliaments in other Alliance countries (NATOPA, 2022).

² Senator William Fulbright was a renowned US senator who, as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, was the author of the Fulbright Resolution, which supported international peacekeeping initiatives and urged the US to participate in what would become the United Nations. Later, he supported the Marshall Plan, which helped rebuild Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War, and the creation of NATO (Fulbright College of Arts & Sciences, 2023).

The first "Conference of Members of Parliament from NATO Countries" took place in Paris between 18 and 22 July 1955 and brought together 158 parliamentarians from the 14 member states at the time (VIPCO, 2015). This conference contributed to discussions about NATO's potential role in the Alliance's economic relations. A draft resolution submitted to the Conference, although not adopted by the participants, emphasised the unique positions of the North Atlantic Alliance countries regarding the "invocation" of the provisions of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty (Charman and Williams, 1982).

Referring to the 1955 Conference, British MP Geoffrey de Freitas, one of the founders of the NATO Conference of Parliamentarians (which in 1999 would adopt the name of NATO Parliamentary Assembly), wrote: "The Conference was founded by parliamentarians, for parliamentarians, and will only preserve its vitality as long as it remains essentially parliamentary" (NATOPA, 2022). This IPO³ was thus based on a matrix of security and economic issues promoted by the international parliamentary dialogue (Malang, 2018).

In short, while in 1955, NATO's objectives centred on establishing an effective system of collective defence for the parliamentarians who founded its Parliamentary Assembly, the Alliance should go beyond a strictly military interpretation of the treaty towards the development of a true "Atlantic community". However, the governments of the member states were slow to attach any importance to NATO PA (Hobbs, 2005).

In May 1956, the North Atlantic Council mandated the foreign ministers of Canada, Italy, and Norway, in what was known as the "Commission of Three", to prepare a report addressing the best way to extend cooperation to areas other than just the military as a way of strengthening unity within the Atlantic Community. This Commission requested input from the Conference of NATO Parliamentarians and, in the document called "The Report of the Three Wise Men⁴", approved in December of that year. It was clear that parliamentarians were among the prominent supporters of the Alliance, and in their contact between parliamentarians and the electorate, they contributed to the development of public support for the Intergovernmental Organization and solidarity among its members. In this sense, the report recommended maintaining a close relationship with NATO parliamentarians and continuing to support the development of the Conference that began in 1955 (Lunn, 2006).

Despite the importance attributed by the Commission of Three, it was not until 1974, on the occasion of the Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations, specifically in the 13th paragraph, that the role played by NATO's PA and the North Atlantic Alliance's support for the parliamentary dimension was formally recognised, although not explicitly mentioned (NATOPA, 2022) (Šabič, 2016).

In this context, the Parliamentary Assembly has been institutionally separated from NATO since its inception, although today, it is a fundamental link between the Alliance and its member states (Walker, 2022).

³ International Parliamentary Organisations (IPOs) have existed since the 19th century. With the end of the Cold War, these parliamentary institutions gained greater international recognition and space for action (Costa, et al., 2013). The involvement of PIOs in international affairs generally takes place on three fronts: through their capacity to monitor or supervise the foreign policy of national governments; in the context of parliamentary diplomacy, the formation of diplomatic relations, especially in the fields of peace-building, crisis management and democracy promotion, at bilateral and multilateral level; and in the establishment and provision of positions in representative bodies of international or regional organisations (Malamud & Stavridis, 2011).

⁴ The Report of the Three Wise Men had an important impact on the Alliance and made it possible to introduce areas of co-operation beyond the military, encouraging political consultations between members and broadening NATO's strategic framework for action (NATO, 2022).

Regardless of this separation, the Assembly has a strong working relationship with the International Organization. The Washington Treaty makes no explicit mention of the existence of an Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. For this reason, NATO PA operates as a separate entity while still representing a tangible expression of its core mission. Formal recognition would imply amending the Washington Treaty, and not all governments and parliaments favour such a formal link (Hobbs, 2015).

NATO PA's activities are guided by the Standing Committee, which is made up of the Presidents of the national delegations. The Bureau has seven members: the President, four Vice-Presidents, and includes the Secretary-General and the Treasurer (NATOPA, 2022).

Its structure also includes five standing committees that deal with the following security-related topics: the civilian dimension; defence, economics, politics and science and technology (NATOPA, 2022). Other constituent bodies include the Special Group for the Mediterranean and the Middle East (GSM), which promotes interparliamentary dialogue with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and the Interparliamentary Councils of Ukraine and Georgia⁵. Plenary sessions are held annually, on a rotating basis, in spring and autumn, at the invitation of the Parliament of the host member state. At each session, the Committees produce thematic resolutions expressing the Assembly's views in that area, which are then voted on and addressed to the North Atlantic Council in the form of recommendations (NATOPA, 2022).

Even with the enthusiasm at its foundation, NATO's PA was a marginal actor for much of the Cold War period. While at the time, the main focus was on the military and strategic dimensions of the alliance, led by the NATO Military Committee and the Supreme Allied Command in Europe (SACEUR), the Assembly acted more as a channel for communication and coordination between the legislatures of the member countries, allowing parliamentarians to exchange information, assess security policies and strengthen collective commitment to the principles of the alliance, especially in promoting deterrence and responding to the challenges of bipolar hostility (Šabič, 2016).

However, when the conjuncture of international cooperation changed with the end of this period of history, there was a willingness on the part of the countries that left the Soviet bloc, whose political systems were essentially autocratic, to transition to parliamentary democracy (Hobbs, 2015).

After the Cold War, the Parliamentary Assembly also had to reconsider its role, with the result that it now favours dialogue and cooperation⁶. Within this framework, new initiatives have been developed, with special emphasis on realising seminars and conferences aimed at supporting the development of parliamentary democracy in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the Rose-Roth Seminar⁷. NATO PA has thus taken on the new role of integrating into its activity members of the parliaments of Central and Eastern European countries, as well as those seeking a closer association with the Alliance. The support involves providing political assistance to strengthen democracy in the transatlantic region, thereby increasing and reinforcing NATO's programme of collaboration and cooperation (Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, 2016).

The Assembly was thus given a new mission: to assist in the processes of democratic transition in the newly independent countries of Eastern and Central Europe (Walker, 2022). One of these associated countries is Ukraine. One of the countries concerned was Ukraine, shortly after the country's

⁵ Its statutes also provide for the creation of new Committees, Subcommittees and Working Groups, depending on the international context (NATOPA, 2022).

⁶ NATO was also going through an identity crisis at this time, since the adversary, the USSR, and the Warsaw Pact, which had led to its creation, had been dissolved (Šabič, 2016).

⁷ The first edition of the Rose-Roth Seminar took place in December 1991 in Lithuania, in an atmosphere of clear tension with the Soviet troops still present in that country (Born, 2005).

independence in 1991. The Ukrainian parliament, the *Verkhovna Rada*, became an associate member of the NATO PA and has been a regular and active participant in the Assembly's work (NATOPA, 2022).

It is also important to mention the annual visits by parliamentarians to Allied military installations and the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) (NATOPA, 2022).

NATO PA's objectives at the time of its foundation were to facilitate dialogue between parliamentarians, especially on security issues; to promote parliamentarians' awareness and understanding of the most pressing security issues and the policies to be developed within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance; to provide NATO and the governments of member states with a collective parliamentary opinion; to give the Organisation's policies greater policy transparency and a corresponding degree of collective responsibility; and to strengthen the transatlantic relationship (Brumter, 1986).

Nowadays, the Armed Forces play new roles, and their missions go beyond traditional warfare. The emergence of new types of threats, especially in cyberspace, highlights the need for reforms and restructuring in national defence. These changes necessarily require parliamentary involvement, and it has therefore become imperative within NATO to give new prominence to the role of parliaments in the areas of defence and security to the extent that the traditional parliamentary functions of overseeing government acts, approving budget expenditure, provide transparency and bring public opinion closer together. The candidate countries' commitment to setting up mechanisms and adapting their armed forces involved sharing best practices and training among parliamentarians (Walker, 2022).

Consequently, from the 1990s onwards, the following objectives were added to the initial ones already mentioned: establishing links based on parliamentary democracy throughout the transatlantic area; the integration of parliamentarians from third countries into the work of the Assembly and direct support for their parliaments if they wish to become members of the Alliance; to foster cooperation with states that wish to cooperate with the Alliance without seeking membership, including states in the Caucasus and Mediterranean regions; and to promote the training of parliamentarians in the essential principles of democratisation, including in the armed forces (NATOPA, 2022).

Throughout its existence, NATO PA has become a dialogue platform, unique to members of parliaments, for debating and influencing decisions on the security of the Alliance. Also acts as a facilitator and promoter of parliamentary awareness and understanding of the most pressing issues affecting the security of NATO countries and contributes to national parliamentary monitoring of security and defence issues (Walker, 2022).

Considering the most recent event of the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Parliamentary Assembly, in May of the same year, at its Plenary Session in Vilnius, Lithuania, approved a declaration of full support for the Ukrainians and pledged unconditional support to Ukraine, increased military support and more severe sanctions against the aggressor, i.e., Russia. On the same occasion, this IPO recommended strengthening the defences of the eastern flank and supported Sweden and Finland's applications for membership (NATOPA, 2022).

In 2023, NATO PA adopted a series of political recommendations not only on strengthening support for the war effort and reconstruction in Ukraine and security and stability in the Black Sea but also on protecting allied democracies and partners from disinformation, implementing the new deterrence and defence base and protecting maritime infrastructure in Alliance countries (NATOPA, 2023).

The Parliamentary Assembly has always followed the key issues on NATO's agenda and its summits. Today, the parliamentary dimension does not need any sense of affirmation for its role to be recognised, having already demonstrated its independence from official constraints and its ability to perform the two functions for which it has shown itself to be uniquely suited: that of "critical observer of NATO policies and activities and forum for regular transatlantic exchanges at parliamentary level", as Geoffrey de Freitas argued in 1982, cited by Charman and Williams (1982) (Charman and Williams, 1982).

NATO PA in the security community

The creation of an Organisation made up of delegations from NATO parliaments, although formally separate from the intergovernmental dimension, reflected the desire of parliamentarians to give substance to the provisions of the Washington Treaty beyond the assumptions of collective defence. In other words, it aimed to establish a security community that shares and promotes common values, as provided for in Article 2 of this treaty (NATO, 2022).

This concept of a security community⁸, evident in Article 2, was introduced in 1957, in the middle of the Cold War, when Karl W. Deutsch tried to understand how countries could cooperate in an international environment characterized by intense ideological and military rivalries. According to this assumption, in a security community, states share not only interests but also a series of practices and institutions that promote mutual trust and cooperation. In this type of community, member states see their interests as interconnected to promote peace and avoid conflict between them. As Deutsch himself says, "a group of states that have integrated and in which there is an effective guarantee that the members of the community do not adopt hostile attitudes towards each other and resolve disputes peacefully. The members of this community are drawn together by a sense of belonging, mutual sympathy, trust, and common interests. (Deutsch and al, 1957).

The member states of the community are bound by a mutual commitment to intervene in collective defence against external threats, which implies a degree of integration associated with a "sense of belonging" in which the "expectation of peaceful transformation" in the relationship between states is guaranteed by the sharing fundamental values "relevant to the political decision-making process" (Deutsch and al, 1957: 140).

"(...) A security community (...) is a group that has become integrated - where integration is defined as the achievement of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices that are sufficiently strong and widespread to ensure peaceful change among the members of a group with reasonable security over a long period" (Deutsch, 1961: 98). The more integrated the peoples of a region are, the less likely war becomes between its states.

Considering NATO's context in the bipolar conflict, the security community makes it possible to transcend the "security dilemma" and break out of the vicious cycle of fear and the accumulation of power caused by uncertainty about the intentions of other states, which can lead to escalation and war (Hertz, 1950). However, what we have seen is that, internally, the security community has mitigated the security dilemma for the reason already described, while externally, it can increase the security dilemma of one or more states due to the insecurity and uncertainty resulting from their exclusion from the community.

Created during the Cold War (1955), the Parliamentary Assembly, in turn, although institutionally separate from NATO, has always sought to strengthen the relationship and follow the main issues

⁸The originality of this concept stems from the link between security and integration. Integration means building a "sense of community" that sustains "institutions and practices and practices strong enough to guarantee lasting expectations of peaceful change" (Deutsch and al, 1957: 5).

under discussion, as recommended in the “The Report of the Three Wise Men”, which praised the role of parliaments and parliamentarians in promoting public support for the inter-governmental organisation and a sense of solidarity between members. This document also suggested that the Alliance should cooperate in more diverse areas, going beyond political cooperation, i.e., also dealing with the economy, science, technology, and culture. NATO PA also shared this premise, arguing that the Alliance should go beyond security and defence issues under Article 2 of the founding Treaty, thus broadening the scope of the Organisation based on mutual respect and shared common values (Lunn, 2006).

In 1998, in a revision of Karl Deutsch's concept and considering the end of bipolarity and Russia's rapprochement with the West, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998) considered the security community as a "transnational region made up of sovereign states whose populations maintain sustained expectations of peaceful change" and understood that security communities are based simultaneously on "cooperative security", between member states, and "collective security", against an external threat (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 30).

The interconnection between these two types of security enhances the convergence of states through shared values, identities and meanings, direct relations in multiple contexts, reciprocity, and long-term interests. This security community is characterised by its normative nature, which is reflected in common values and norms, in particular, the ban on the use of military force to settle disputes between member states. A security community also shares a common ideational vision of the international order, which projects its normative model and identity beyond its domain and its domain and conditions the place occupied by the other powers in the system (Adler and M. Barnett, 1998: 31).

In short, despite having gone through some internal crises, which saw no purpose in maintaining the North Atlantic Alliance with the dissolution of the USSR, against all expectations, the transatlantic community has survived all the changes in the international system. Nowadays, too, the Parliamentary Assembly has taken on a new role by involving delegations of parliamentarians from countries seeking to move closer to NATO's values and strategic guidelines (NATOPA, 2022).

This context allowed the Parliamentary Assembly to develop a more critical role in that, when the communist threat was off the radar, the North Atlantic Alliance was able to maintain the status quo through the parliamentary aspect, not only as a bastion of liberal democratic values but also by legitimising the international preponderance of the USA. Closer relations between parliamentarians, who oversee and legitimise the actions of governments, promote the Alliance's good image in the eyes of public opinion in the member states, especially since it is parliaments that oversee and legitimise the actions of governments and can also serve as vehicles for promoting the Alliance's good image in the eyes of public opinion, especially when it began to act and project forces outside the area. (Šabič, 2016).

It should also be noted that the Eastern countries that resulted from the disintegration of the USSR showed a willingness to transition from autocratic political systems to parliamentary democracy. However, it was clear that this transition and rapprochement would have to take place in stages to deal with the enormous geopolitical vacuum left by the end of the Warsaw Pact (Hobbs, 2015). In this scenario, the role played by parliamentarians from NATO countries was fundamental, particularly in sharing best practices concerning Through the mechanisms of parliamentary diplomacy, NATO PA has fostered and promoted mutual understanding and the strengthening of parliamentary democracy not only among member countries but also among those who identify with its values and wish to participate in the Allies' partnership and cooperation programmes (NATOPA, 2022).

Notwithstanding the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, which put NATO back to business, the years leading up to the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 were marked by many ups and downs in the organisation, with Donald Trump's administration and his "America first" policy and Brexit, which removed one of NATO's major donors from the European Union (EU), being particularly notable in the downward phase, the rise of populist and nationalist movements within the European bloc, the EU's Global Strategy, which revitalised the European role of the Atlantic Alliance, and the recognition of the rise of China as a strategic threat to the status quo and the international liberal order, which can only be sustained by an enlarged security community, which at this point is the most important (Deudney and Ikenberry, 2012).

NATO PA has followed this trend and has not only debated these issues at its meetings but has also involved the parliaments of the global partners in these meetings.

Indeed, through parliamentary diplomacy, the Parliamentary Assembly helps to promote a sense of Atlantic solidarity between the different legislative chambers, in line with the objectives of the Atlantic Alliance, while giving democratic legitimacy and greater transparency to the measures approved by governments within the framework of NATO and promoting a better understanding of its objectives and missions among the legislators and citizens of the Alliance (NATOPA, 2022).

This link was only further strengthened with the Ukrainian War, when the parliamentary dimension proved closer than ever to the intergovernmental organisation, carrying out exhaustive work on recommendations and also making parliaments aware of the need to approve not only support for the war effort and the reconstruction of Ukrainian territory (as well as the reception of refugees) and the reinforcement of defence investments in national state budgets but also to implement NATO's transformation and defend democratic values.

Conclusion

NATO is a security community of values united in its commitment to democracy, mutual respect, individual freedoms, human rights, and the rule of law (NATOPA, 2022). However, until recently, some thought the organisation was doomed to failure, with Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 reviving the Alliance's vigour in the face of the threat of Russian expansion on the European continent.

In the geopolitical context of the North Atlantic, NATO PA is not just a forum for interparliamentary dialogue but the materialization of mutual respect and democratic values promoted by the intergovernmental dimension. Although it is formally independent of the intergovernmental dimension, it is through it that the parliamentarians of the North Atlantic Treaty countries establish their interconnections (Born, 2005).

Parliaments are essential for ensuring that decision-making processes occur democratically and transparently and are responsible for overseeing the state's actions in all policy areas. Although constitutional provisions may vary from country to country, parliaments are traditionally the sovereign body that approves state budgets, which include items for national defence and the armed forces. Parliamentarians also analyse and authorise expenditures related to the deployment of military personnel on foreign territory, as well as integration and investment in the missions of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATOPA, 2022). Thus, through oversight and accountability mechanisms, national parliaments monitor the Alliance's activities, including military operations and associated spending and implementing policies, ensuring accountability.

It should also be noted that as representatives of the people, parliamentarians are also vital in building consensus and promoting public support for issues related to national and collective defence and security (Péjo, 2020).

By bringing together parliamentarians, the Parliamentary Assembly plays an important role in strengthening the broad political solidarity that underpins the North Atlantic Alliance and in promoting its mission and values, both within and outside the Atlantic community.

NATO PA's main objective has always been to obtain an advisory status, like that of the parliamentary assemblies of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE PA) and the Council of Europe (PACE). In this sense, it is considered to have followed the right path. Since its foundation, there has been a desire on the part of the parliamentarians who make up this IPO to contribute to the success of the North Atlantic Alliance through the creation of cooperation mechanisms between the Atlantic countries in the application of the provisions of Article 2 (NATOPA, 2022). Through political dialogue, this Assembly provides a forum where legislators discuss issues of international security, military strategy, emerging threats, and global challenges and produce recommendations to governments and NATO's leadership based on debate and analysis, helping to shape the organization's policies and strategies (Hobbs, 2005).

Through these functions, this Assembly plays a significant role in promoting international cooperation, finding solutions to global security challenges, and ensuring the effectiveness of the alliance among member countries. Parliamentary diplomacy is, therefore, key to promoting dialogue, debating security and defence issues, and developing common policies among member states (Born, 2005).

The Parliamentary Assembly's relations with the Intergovernmental Organization have always been, and will probably continue to be, the solution to the Assembly's permanence in Atlantic relations as a parliamentary forum that reflects the fact that the Alliance is, first and foremost, a community of nations based on values. As the Secretary General of NATO between 1971 and 1984, Joseph Luns, described it, "The Assembly is fulfilling, in a practical way, a task that would not otherwise have been carried out and that is useful to the Alliance in its international context and to the governments that are members of the Alliance" (NATO PA, 2010).

Through this positive partnership, in which parliamentarians strengthen relations in a game of soft power, the idea is consolidated that NATO is more than a military alliance. It is a pluralistic security community based on the aspiration to strengthen democratic institutions and maintain Kantian peace among its members, as provided for in Article 2 of the Washington Treaty (Milloy, 2006). In this context, the Parliamentary Assembly has strategically relevant contributions in several areas: it allows NATO's objectives and interests to be properly reflected in national parliamentary debates, it acts as an indicator of public opinion, and it is a privileged means of communication that allows opinions and concerns to be shared directly with foreign counterparts.

Furthermore, as the only body that regularly brings together European and North American legislators, it has helped to sustain the transatlantic relationship, shaping itself into a successful network of cooperation that goes beyond the intergovernmental sphere, where dialogue is facilitated between member countries and the parliaments of partner nations, strengthening ties and promoting collaboration on security and defence issues (Šabič, 2016).

In addition, as the Assembly itself points out, the debates and discussions that take place in the parliamentary dimension make an important contribution to developing the consensus among member countries that must underpin the Alliance's policies and help to make the Alliance's functioning and policies more transparent and understandable to parliaments and their audiences.

Serving as a permanent reminder that intergovernmental decisions and recommendations ultimately depend on political support under the constitutional due process of democratically elected parliaments (NATO PA, 2022). Through these functions, NATO PA plays a significant role in promoting international cooperation, finding solutions to global security challenges, and ensuring the effectiveness of the alliance among member countries (Šabič, 2016).

For all these reasons, while over the years North Atlantic Alliance has spent too much time focussing on the military potential of Article 5 while forgetting the strategic political importance of other articles of the founding document, NATO PA has sought to go further in its action, focussing mainly on the importance of the non-military problems envisaged in the Washington Treaty, with emphasis on the economic, cultural and scientific issues which, over the years, were fundamental to its consolidation and its principles to this day.

By fostering dialogue and cooperation through parliamentary diplomacy, the parliamentarians of the member states and their associates establish relationships of mutual trust and synergies that extend to the intergovernmental dimension, and these links are, in fact, an aggregating and consolidating factor of Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, according to the premise that this essay set out to analyse and support, in clear support of what Geoffrey de Freitas defended in 1974 and which is still valid today: "The only forum where parliamentarians from both sides of the Atlantic meet regularly to discuss issues of common interest" (NATO PA, 1975).

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The Regional Security Complex Theory and Energy Triangle of EU-Turkey-Russia

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ABSTRACT

This study explores the application of the regional security complex theory (RCST) to the energy relations between the European Union (EU), Russia, and Turkey. It underscores the critical role of energy security in shaping international relations and highlights the mutual interdependence among these actors in the energy issue. The study sheds light on the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on energy security and emphasizes the need for diversification of energy sources to reduce dependency on Russian natural gas. Turkey's active and neutral policy with Russia has formed a security complex in energy relations among these three actors. The claim that shared concerns or threat perceptions among actors assumed by the regional security complex theory constitutes a security complex has been used within the framework of this study to justify the existence of an energy security complex between Turkey, Russia, and the EU. Furthermore, given its strategic geographical position and energy infrastructure projects, this research outlines Turkey's potential as a critical isolator actor and energy hub in the region. Overall, this study offers valuable insights into the complex dynamics of energy relations and the evolving regional energy security landscape in the EU-Russia-Turkey triangle.

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Introduction

It can be argued without exaggeration that the relationship between the European Union (EU)-Russia and Turkey is a complex one. A crucial aspect of this relationship involves the intricate energy interactions between both entities. Recently, the changing dynamics of global politics have elevated the concept of "energy security" to the forefront of international relations. Relying on a single country for energy supply has been perceived as a means of exerting influence over another country. Thus, within this context, the diversification of energy suppliers and routes has gained significant importance. The increasing demand for energy and the initiatives aimed at diversifying energy sources has led to a heightened focus on natural gas in recent decades. It is evident that Turkey is heavily dependent on Russian gas, as it relies on Russia for approximately 50 per cent of its natural gas needs (Gaber, 2022). Furthermore, it is important to note that the EU, as the largest consumer of natural gas, is also inclined to utilize Russian gas. Therefore, energy security has increasingly become a driving force behind EU-Turkey and Russia relations, with a particular emphasis on natural gas.

The various approaches brought to the concept of security by the Copenhagen School have made it possible to analyze the energy issue as a security concept. At the same time, the school's proposed regional security complex approach has made it possible to envision an energy-centric security complex in the EU-Turkey-Russia triangle. The regional security complex theory (RSCT) divides the international order into regional security complexes, global powers, and insulating countries. Turkey is classified as an insulator, meaning it is not connected to any security complex and lacks the power to influence any complex (Buzan, 2003:147). However, Turkey's unique geographical position challenges its insulator identity and offers opportunities for engagement in energy security cooperation. The establishment of a Turkey-based regional energy security complex is seen as a possibility, considering Turkey's regional situation and the need for energy interdependence.

The reasons that make it possible to propose a kind of energy security complex in the EU-Turkey-Russia triangle are undoubtedly the mutual interdependence relationships among these actors in the energy domain. However, in recent crises such as the Russia-Ukraine war, energy security has become of primary importance for all three actors in this triangle. Therefore, the fundamental assumption of this study is that the EU, Russia, and Turkey form an energy security complex. To support this argument, the upcoming sections will first focus on the basic assumptions of the Regional Security Complex Theory, examining how the issue of energy security can be analyzed within this theoretical framework. On the other hand, to fully illustrate mutual interdependence relationships, especially the projection of natural gas imports and exports between the EU and Russia, is necessary. Therefore, the post-Ukraine crisis dimension of the EU-Russia energy relationship will be revealed.

Additionally, within the framework of the concept of the "insulator power" proposed by Buzan and his colleagues (Et al., 1998), who are among the founders of the regional security complex theory, Turkey's position will be examined. According to the theory, Turkey, as an insulating power, occupies an influential position in energy-centered relations between the EU and Russia. Turkey is at the centre of the EU-Russia-Turkey energy security complex with its pipelines, geostrategic position, and its project of becoming an energy hub.

Regional Security Complex Theory

The Copenhagen School argues that security is not an inherent quality but a product of human creation. The notion of security varies depending on the prevailing circumstances and how threats are perceived (Buzan, 2015: 131). Therefore, discussions on security must address inquiries such as who formulated this notion and with what purpose. Security is established when the necessity arises. Expanding on this idea, Buzan (1991: 436) argued that the perception of security could be associated with different sectors and identified five distinct sectors such as political, military, environmental, economic, and societal. The Copenhagen School's methodical approach, which classifies the perception of security into sectors, underscores that the determinants of these sectors are the targets of the threats; in other words, the primary factor is the objective (Buzan, 1991: 440). The Copenhagen School has broadened the application of the sectoral approach method, which analyzes the intricate connections among different entities concerning security. In this study, the interpretation of energy security encompasses a dynamic process that guarantees consistent and dependable supply and demand across multiple sectors, such as political, military, economic, social, and environmental, operating at different levels ranging from international and regional to national and individual. This involves the engagement of diverse actors within the realm of security (Huysmans, 1998).

In the domain of theories pertaining to International Relations (IR), the notion of energy security has attracted considerable scrutiny, especially in the aftermath of the oil crises experienced during the 1970s. The termination of the Cold War constituted a momentous milestone, propelling energy-related issues to the forefront of worldwide political discussions. Consequently, energy security has

assumed a crucial role in deliberations across diverse academic fields, encompassing international relations. Towards the later stages of the Cold War, the Copenhagen School investigated security in environmental, economic, and social dimensions, deviating from the military and state-centred approach. This institution is the primary establishment to embrace a constructivist approach to assessing energy security (Açıkmeşe, 2011: 57-58).

One of the new extensions brought to the security approach by the Copenhagen School is the theory of regional security complexes. The regional security complex theory (RSCT) also presents a more up-to-date and pertinent approach to conceptualizing energy security. Buzan is the founding academic associated with this particular theory, with additional contributions from Wæver (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The concept of a regional security complex is defined as a collection of states whose primary security concerns are intricately linked to the point where their national securities cannot realistically be considered independently. One significant advantage of RSCT is its ability to challenge prevailing notions and facilitate discussions about security concerns among members of a specific security complex. This approach dispels the overly generic assumptions of liberalism and realism and proposes that the concept of energy security can be analyzed and approached using different methods, all within the framework of RSCT (Buzan, 2003). RSCT confidently explains the existence of energy complexes and the relationships between two or more states within a region while also demonstrating how energy has been "securitized" within a particular geographical area. However, in order to classify an energy security complex, it is crucial to understand the nature and extent of energy dependencies by studying a state's energy profile, which includes factors such as external dependence, diversification possibilities, trade levels, and domestic supplies. This underscores the challenging nature of RSCT, as a state with 100% dependency on oil, for example, contributes to the securitization of energy, whereas a state where oil only constitutes 10% of its energy profile presents a distinct perspective. Therefore, when analyzing energy security from this standpoint, it is necessary to decide whether it is more advantageous to group major energy sources together or to base our understanding on the overall energy reliance of a given state. Additionally, it is important to recognize that energy security also encompasses the need for supply security and demand security. Moreover, dependence between two or more states can be both positive and negative.

As a result of the theory of regional security complexes, the Copenhagen School argues that there are two types of regional complexes: homogeneous and heterogeneous. Homogeneous complexes can emerge in any security sector, including military, environmental, and societal security, while heterogeneous complexes are regional complexes in which different security sectors are integrated. For example, the EU has a heterogeneous regional complex in which all security sectors are perceived similarly by both state and non-state actors (Buzan et al., 1998: 17-18). This study asserts the existence of a kind of energy security complex in the EU-Russia-Turkey triangle. Regional energy security complexes are composed of interactions related to energy between two or more states in a specific geographic area. Inevitably, an energy dependence relationship exists among these actors. In this context, it is claimed that Russia, the EU, and Turkey form a regional security complex from the perspective of energy security (Elbassoussy, 2019: 340).

The claim of the existence of an energy-related security complex between the EU-Russia-Turkey is explained through the mutual interdependence of these actors. Therefore, an analysis is needed to understand the policies these actors have developed in the context of energy security. The crises that have occurred in recent years have inevitably brought the issue into the realm of energy security. In this sense, the strained relations between the EU and Russia, particularly due to the recent Ukraine war, should be analyzed through sanctions and the energy crisis.

EU-Russia Energy Relations

After Russia's intervention in Ukraine, the issue of the European Union's energy dependence has once again become a significant topic in energy security studies. In response to Western sanctions, Russia has imposed restrictions on the amount of natural gas supplied to Europe as a retaliatory measure. Most recently, in the summer of 2022, the Russian energy company Gazprom announced that natural gas exported to Europe via the Nord Stream 1 pipeline would be provided at only 20% capacity due to "maintenance work" (Halser and Paraschiv, 2022). Simultaneously, the European Commission (2022) unveiled the "European Natural Gas Demand Reduction Plan." According to this plan, aiming to reduce dependency on Russia in the energy sector and enhance Europe's energy security, member countries of the European Union are expected to reduce their natural gas consumption by 15%. Initially, these reductions are envisioned to be voluntary, but if the situation worsens regarding energy supply from Russia, the proposed limitations on consumption may become mandatory and binding (European Commission, 2022).

While there may be a mutual interdependence between Russia and the EU, especially in terms of natural gas supply, this dependency renders the EU more vulnerable to Russia. According to data from the European Council for the year 2020, Europe produces 42% of its consumed energy domestically and imports the remaining 58% from external sources. Renewable energy constitutes 40.8% of the total energy produced in European Union countries, while nuclear energy makes up 30.5%. However, the imported energy consists largely of fossil fuels, with 29% of oil, 54% of coal, and 43% of natural gas being imported from Russia. The data also indicates that natural gas accounts for 24% of Europe's total energy consumption, inevitably trapping Russia-EU relations in the dimension of energy (Eurostat 2020).

In a statement dated 20 July 2022, the European Commission (2022) characterized the decreasing energy supply from Russia to Europe as a "conscious attempt to weaponize energy." As of June 2022, the flow of natural gas from Russia to Europe has decreased to the level of 30% of the 2016-2021 average, and there is an expectation that this flow might come to a complete halt while the war continues in Ukraine (European Commission, 2022). Efforts to reduce Europe's dependency on Russian natural gas are not new and have been ongoing since the Soviet era. These efforts can be summarized as implementing policies to prevent monopolization, scrutinizing and, if necessary, penalizing Gazprom's monopolistic practices, diversifying natural gas supply sources, increasing LNG import capacity, constructing cross-border pipeline connections, and developing contingency plans for disruptions in natural gas supply from Russia (Di Bella et al., 2022). The ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia's policies, and global inflationary pressures currently lend greater urgency to these initiatives than ever before. The European Union initiated efforts to decrease dependence on Russian natural gas from the early days of the Ukraine war. The "REPowerEU" project, launched by the European Commission on 18 May 2022, sets the goal of ending energy relations with Russia by 2030 (European Commission, 2022).

According to the assessments of the European Commission, in the event of Russia cutting off natural gas, there will be a gap of forty-five billion cubic meters between August 2022 and March 2023, including the winter period (European Commission 2022). Therefore, if the same amount of savings can be made in natural gas consumption, Europe will not be affected by Russia's moves. However, there are several uncertainties here. Firstly, will measures voluntarily taken by countries be sufficient to achieve such savings? Secondly, there is no binding agreement on how the savings will be made. The fact that this is entirely left to the governments of member countries, without coordination at the European level, raises questions about how effective the implementation can be. Finally, the plan includes many exceptions. For example, countries such as Ireland, Malta, and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCA), which are not connected to the Continental European natural gas network, will be exempt from restrictions. Spain and Portugal, due to the situation with their connections, will only be obligated to a 7% reduction. Countries entirely dependent on natural gas for electricity generation, such as Greece, will not be required to make a reduction in

consumption (Di Bella et al., 2022). All these exceptions will make it challenging to implement the plan effectively. In a period when European economies are undergoing a sensitive process with the impacts of the pandemic, inflation, and recent political instability in some EU member countries, is it possible to experience interruptions in energy? The plan proposes addressing the gaps created by energy savings "economically efficiently and on the basis of solidarity" but lacks explanatory provisions on how this can be fully achieved throughout Europe.

According to the initial reactions to the plan, Southern European countries such as Spain and Greece, which do not need heating much due to their warmer climates and have relatively low industrial production, believe that the plan requires "disproportionately excessive sacrifice" from them. Northern European countries, more industrialized and consuming more energy in winter, such as Germany, argue that they have already invested in renewable energy and continue to do so, accusing Southern European countries of "acting irresponsibly" (Siddi and Prandin, 2023). Under these conditions, will the "calls for solidarity" from the commission be sufficient to establish a common front in the energy field against Russia, or will the natural gas plan lead to increased disagreements within Europe?

In addition to the attempts to reduce dependency targeted by the plan, it is necessary to address diversification efforts. In this context, negotiations with countries such as the United States, Qatar, and Azerbaijan can be shown as alternatives to natural gas currently supplied by Russia, Norway, and North African countries. In March, after Russia invaded Ukraine, U.S. President Joe Biden promised European leaders to supply more liquefied natural gas (LNG) to compensate for Europe's shrinking natural gas supply (Renshaw and Disavino, 2022). However, doubts about how the United States will increase LNG exports to Europe exist due to the limits of the U.S. LNG sector's exports and the dominance of long-term agreements that determine where natural gas will be exported globally for 20 years. The United States plans to triple its commitment to export an additional 15 billion cubic meters of LNG to Europe this year, exceeding Biden's commitment in March. However, even if natural gas exports from the United States to Europe increase, the ongoing threats of Russia not sending natural gas create uncertainty as Europe approaches the winter months, where natural gas usage is high (Simon, 2022). As the number one producer of liquefied natural gas globally, the United States plans to ship more liquefied gas to the region as a solution to European allies' dependence on Russian gas. Currently, all seven facilities producing liquefied gas in the United States are operating at full capacity. Therefore, some experts point out that no matter how high global fuel prices are, America may not be able to produce more LNG in this period (Semet, 2023).

On the other hand, with the export facility Calcasieu Pass of Venture Global in the state of Louisiana expected to provide more liquefaction services starting this year, America's production capacity is expected to increase by the end of 2022 (Cunningham and Kern, 2022). According to analyses of Rystad Energy (2023), the U.S. can easily surpass the 15 billion cubic meter target because prices in Europe seem to go far beyond spot prices in Asia. On the other hand, if the supply of natural gas from Russia is cut off, the existing liquefied natural gas stations in Europe have limited capacity to receive additional natural gas from America or other producers. With all these dynamics, especially with the decrease in natural gas supply and the increase in global demand, the increase in energy prices does not seem like an easily bearable cost for European economies, which are already in danger of recession. On the other hand, there is a risk of dependency on the United States, especially in the field of natural gas, for European countries that want to reduce their dependence on Russia (Semet, 2023). In terms of diversification efforts, the supply of natural gas from other producer countries to the EU remains a long-term plan, considering the production capacity of source countries and the inadequacy of pipeline connections. Therefore, the EU must make extensive infrastructure investments to reduce external dependence, especially in energy and, specifically, natural gas. The shift to renewable energy sources will not be able to prevent the slowdown in industry and production in the short term.

The energy dependency of the European states on Russian gas has been a fact seen by the European states and others. That is why the EU and leading states in the organization have been looking for diversification of energy suppliers and alternative energy resources, especially green energy. Acknowledging this strategic deficiency and looking for alternative ways are not adequate to reduce energy dependency as it takes a long time and costs a tremendous sum. In short, the EU's high demand for energy resources to maintain its status, economic growth, and technological and industrial superiority has made Turkey a key actor in the EU's energy security.

Potential of Turkey as an Isolator Actor

The evolving structure of international security after the Cold War, marked by the cessation of competition between the two superpowers, has provided other states with greater opportunities for influence. Consequently, the concept of regions has gained significance, requiring intense interaction among proximate states for an area to be considered a region. Within this framework, security relations concentrate regionally, leading to the development of friendship or enmity through interstate interactions over time (Shafaei and Naghdi, 2015). A region constitutes a distinct subsystem formed by the security relations among a group of states connected by geographical proximity. In this context, the regional security complex theory focuses on the diverse security themes inherent in regions and how this diversity can be examined. The study of the regional security complex theory begins with the division of the world into different regional security complexes, global powers, and isolated units. Super or global powers are states that transcend geography and distances in their security relationships, operating at the global system level (Fawn, 2009). While every state can belong to only one complex, global powers serve as exceptions. Major powers, positioning themselves above regional powers, are often considered global power contenders, influencing multiple regions. Despite being analyzed at the global level alongside global powers, major powers have limited capacities to impact the global system. The competition among major powers enhances regional competition within security complexes (Buzan and Wæver, 2003).

Post-Cold War international players on the global stage include the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the European Union as a whole, Japan, China, and Russia. According to Buzan (1991: 190), a security complex is built upon the interconnection of the fundamental security concerns of a group of countries that cannot be realistically separated from each other. Regional security complexes are analytical units defined primarily within the framework of the security concept, characterized by intense mutual interdependence among constituent entities. Buzan's concept emphasizes filling the gap between state and system (global) levels or national security and international security (regional) through regional security complexes.

Weak interactions among regional security complexes are explained by the concept of isolating units. Isolating units may belong to no complex or multiple regional security complexes (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 484). The concept of isolation, traditionally associated with states in the literature, is applicable in the context of isolating regions (mini complexes) as well. Isolating states and regions have relatively less mutual dependence on the security domain with their neighbouring regional security complexes. While the isolation concept is central to the regional security complex theory, it is not adequately detailed by the theory. The key issue here is how the concept of isolation should be addressed. Due to the unique dynamics within each regional security complex, initial impressions suggest limited interaction between different regions (Santini, 2017).

Turkey, in this context, has been defined by the founders of the theory as playing an isolating role between Europe and the Middle East (Buzan, 1991:196). Although it may not be directly included in any security complex today, the concept of isolation provides an explanation for Turkey. Turkey, unable to be singularly affiliated with either the European or Middle Eastern security complex, is influenced by and, at times, has the potential to influence these security complexes. According to the

theory, isolating states are expected to assume a relatively passive role by absorbing energies around them (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 392). However, Turkey challenges the classic isolating definition with its regional active policies, as suggested by Buzan and Waever (2003: 485). Despite pursuing an active foreign policy, Turkey still functions as an isolating state as it fails to strategically bring together actors from different neighbouring regional security complexes (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 485).

Turkey's geographical proximity to energy-rich regions such as the Middle East, Russia, and the Caspian region, as well as its role as a bridge between these regions and the European Union, positions it as a potential centre for a regional energy complex. The concept of an "energy security complex" in this region is put forward, suggesting that Turkey has the potential to be an effective member of such a complex, going beyond its role as an insulator country. The energy security complex refers to a regional security complex that is formed by energy-related interactions between two or more states in a specific geographic area, including energy dependence and the perception of such dependency as a security concern (Elbassoussy, 2019). In the context of this paper, the regional energy complex includes Russia, the European Union (EU), and Turkey. These countries are considered regional security complexes due to their interdependence in terms of energy resources and infrastructure. The energy security complex in this region is characterized by the presence of natural gas and oil pipelines across Ukrainian and Turkish territory, which creates interdependencies and challenges in ensuring energy supply security. The EU's lack of a direct geographical link to Russia is often neglected due to the extensive pipeline networks across Ukraine and Turkey, which connect the European Union's members to Russian energy resources.

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine War, initiated on 24 February 2022, has had a direct impact on Ukraine's territorial integrity, regional security, and the security of Europe's natural gas supply. Prior to the conflict, EU member states relied on Russia for 45% of their total natural gas consumption, equivalent to approximately three hundred million m³ per day. However, with the commencement of the war and in a manner reminiscent of the illicit annexation of Crimea in 2014, there has been a substantial reduction in Europe's natural gas imports from Russia due to EU-imposed sanctions. Consequently, as of October 2022, the daily imports had dropped to below one hundred million m³ (McWilliams et al., 2023).

Four primary routes facilitate the transportation of Russian gas to Europe, namely the Nord Stream, the Ukrainian Transit Line, the Yamal, and Turkish Stream. Following the commencement of the war, gas flow in the Yamal route, connecting Belarus to Poland and Germany, was abruptly halted. Simultaneously, a significant reduction in gas flow through the Ukrainian Transit Line occurred since the war's onset, with an ongoing conflict between Gazprom and the Ukrainian natural gas company Naftogaz (Andrei, 2022). Conversely, Nord Stream has experienced multiple interruptions in recent times attributed to leaks, with each party placing blame on the other. In contrast, the Turkish Stream seems to be a pipeline that continues to operate without interruptions. As of October 2022, more than 10 billion m³ of Russian gas has been transported to Europe through the Turkish Stream. This underscores the significance of the Turkish Stream, similar to TANAP, in ensuring the supply of natural gas to Europe (Semet, 2022).

In this period of heightened significance for the Turkish Stream, two additional occurrences have highlighted Turkey's potential role as a crucial energy hub for delivering Russian natural gas to Europe. Firstly, there was a disruption in gas flow at the end of September 2022 due to detected leaks in the natural gas pipelines of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, which supply gas from Russia to Germany. Concerns have been raised, suggesting the possibility of sabotage orchestrated with underwater military equipment (Teslova, 2022). Secondly, during the 6th Conference on Cooperation and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Astana, Russian Federation President Vladimir Putin, in discussions with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, presented the idea

of rerouting natural gas to Europe by addressing the losses experienced in the Nord Stream Lines in the Baltic Sea. This involved redirecting through the Black Sea and establishing main routes passing through Turkey. The same statement also proposed the potential establishment of a natural gas centre in Turkey. While the realization and technical details remain uncertain, the announcement that the proposal will undergo decisive discussions between the parties within a week has generated optimistic expectations (Milov, 2022: 68).

Despite not possessing abundant hydrocarbon resources, Turkey's energy approach revolves around positioning itself as a pivotal nation in the energy landscape, commonly referred to as an "energy hub." Particularly in the natural gas domain, Turkey has effectively implemented this strategy over the years through extensive energy infrastructure projects. Turkey appears to have adeptly leveraged its geostrategic location to serve as a crucial transit route connecting energy resources with end consumers. Key projects like TANAP, Turkish Stream, and the Turkey-Greece Natural Gas Interconnection exemplify Turkey's notable achievements in the natural gas sector (Novikau and Mohasilovic, 2023).

Effectively managing TANAP is crucial for Turkey, serving the dual purpose of fulfilling its domestic energy requirements and providing a viable alternative to Russian natural gas for Europe, given Turkey's intermediary role. Thus far, the primary focus has been on guaranteeing the secure transmission of gas through the pipeline and facilitating its distribution to global markets. In the upcoming period, TANAP is expected to gain increased significance for the European Union, which is intensifying efforts to explore alternative energy sources due to the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine (McWilliams et al., 2023). The potential expansion of TANAP's capacity or the establishment of new parallel lines is under consideration, and Azerbaijan's success in the Second Karabakh War is likely to further support such initiatives. This situation is expected to impact the ongoing negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan regarding Karabakh, as no peace treaty has been signed in favour of Baku. The positive atmosphere also favours the advancement of Trans-Caspian projects. Kazakhstan's initiative to transport hydrocarbon resources to Azerbaijan through the Caspian Sea and subsequently to global markets via existing Turkish lines, bypassing Russia, is of utmost importance. This scenario, similarly applicable to gas-rich Turkmenistan, could significantly influence the energy landscape in Eurasia. Developments in the Eastern Mediterranean have gained increased significance, with Turkey actively asserting its role in regional energy collaborations through agreements with the TRNC and Libya, along with ongoing hydrocarbon exploration activities (Novikau and Mohasilovic, 2023).

Despite the EU seeking alternative sources in the aftermath of the Russian-Ukrainian War, the reality remains that natural gas imports from Russia will persist under the current circumstances. In this context, Turkey stands out as the most secure route. In summary, Turkey's persistent efforts to become an energy hub in the region have the potential to overcome the challenges in the energy triangle of EU-Russia-Turkey. This, in turn, may contribute indirectly to the resolution of political disputes among various actors in the region. Therefore, in the context of the regional energy security complex proposed by this study, Turkey occupies a highly influential position as an isolator actor.

Conclusion

The Regional Security Complex Theory has enabled the analysis of the complex relationship, energy interactions, and the concept of "energy security" between the European Union (EU), Russia, and Turkey. In an environment where diversifying energy suppliers and routes, especially in the context of natural gas, has become crucial, the Regional Security Complex Theory can be applied to envision an energy-centric security complex in the EU-Turkey-Russia triangle. The theory classifies Turkey as an insulator but suggests that its unique geographical position could offer opportunities for engagement in energy security cooperation. Therefore, considering the mutual interdependence

relationships in the energy issue among these actors, it can be argued that the EU, Russia, and Turkey form an energy security complex. The post-Ukraine crisis dimension of the EU-Russia energy relationship makes such an assumption possible, given Turkey's effective position in energy-centred relations between the EU and Russia, including its pipelines, geostrategic position, and its project of becoming an energy hub (Firat and Dağ, 2023).

Disruptions in Russia's natural gas supply have created a new challenge for the energy security of the European Union. As emphasised earlier, the EU's plan to reduce natural gas consumption in response to potential supply cuts includes some uncertainties and exceptions. Additionally, efforts for diversification, including negotiations with the United States, Qatar, and Azerbaijan as alternatives to Russian natural gas, and concerns about natural gas supply from these countries do not provide sufficient opportunities for the EU's energy security (Firat and Dağ 2023). Moreover, policies for extensive infrastructure investments and the transition to renewable energy sources, especially natural gas, do not offer an immediate solution to meet the energy needs of the EU. This situation aligns with the energy security concerns of the EU and Turkey, emphasizing the importance of common concerns among actors, a fundamental condition for discussing a regional security complex.

As mentioned in the previous sections, both Turkey and the EU have a similar level of dependence on Russian natural gas. In the last decade, the issue highlighted by crises between Russia and the EU has transformed into an energy matter, becoming a prominent security concern. Similarly, the issue of energy, which is also a significant determinant of Russia-Turkey relations, has become a crucial topic of discussion between Turkey and the EU, particularly after the recent migration issues. From Russia's perspective, retaining the EU as the largest market for Russian natural gas is crucial. Therefore, our study's findings have shown that these three actors share common concerns and, furthermore, have common interests in the field of energy security. Thus, the shared concerns among the actors in the region, forming a security complex, and the focus of our study on the energy security of the Turkey-EU-Russia trio make it possible to define it as an energy security complex.

This study primarily examines Turkey's strategic role in the context of a regional energy security complex. In this context, Turkey's unique position between Europe and the Middle East and its potential to influence and be influenced by security complexes in these regions is crucial. At the same time, Turkey's efforts to become a significant energy hub, particularly due to its potential as a critical energy centre in the natural gas domain, support this role. Examining Turkey's role in transporting natural gas to Europe, especially in light of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, makes it possible to explore the complex regional energy security assumption formed in the EU-Russia-Turkey triangle.

In conclusion, this study attempts to explore the concept of energy security within the framework of the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) proposed by the Copenhagen School. According to the theory, energy security operates at various levels, connecting political, military, economic, social, and environmental factors from international to individual levels. The RSCT provides a suitable approach to conceptualize energy security, emphasizing the interdependence among states within a specific geographical area. The study argues for the existence of an energy security complex in the EU-Russia-Turkey triangle, highlighting the mutual interdependence of these actors in the energy issue.

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Beyond the Quasi-Alliance? An Analysis of the Japan-Australia Special Strategic Partnership

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ABSTRACT

This article examines a pathway of the Japan-Australia “special strategic partnership” in recent years. Both countries have developed a special strategic partnership, referred to as a “quasi-alliance”. Hence, the purpose of this research is to contextualise the development of the Australia-Japan quasi-alliance from global, regional, and bilateral perspectives. Globally, the quasi-alliance has been influenced by power transition and hegemonic competition in global politics. Regionally, the quasi-alliance has been embedded into the trilateral and multilateral strategic frameworks in the Indo-Pacific. Bilaterally, the quasi-alliance has been shaped by the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC). Nonetheless, close security ties were temporarily adrift over Australia’s submarine deal and realigned by tangible milestones, such as the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) and the new JDSC signed off in 2022. While investigating these footsteps of the quasi-alliance formation, this article considers whether both countries have moved beyond the quasi-alliance toward a full military alliance in the changing strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

Introduction

Australia and Japan developed a “special strategic partnership” during the administrations of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Tony Abbot (MOFA, 2014). Globally, both countries formed a special strategic partnership in the middle of a global power transition and geopolitical rivalry between China as a challenger and the United States as the hegemonic power (Walton and Kavalski, 2017). Although the Japan-Australia relationship is “multifaceted” with a variety of common interests, including new cooperation for climate change (Walton, 2022a), most researchers of Japan-Australia relations have focused on whether the bilateral relationship would evolve from a “special strategic partnership” or the “quasi-alliance” to a formal “alliance” (Akimoto, 2022a). In other words, will Tokyo and Canberra consider an upgrade of the “quasi-alliance” to a formal military alliance? Since Abe was a major contributor to the formation and development of the special strategic partnership (Wilkins, 2022b), this article sheds light on the period from 2012 to the present, including the second Abe administration and the post-Abe period. In particular, it contextualises the development of the Japan-Australia “special strategic partnership” development by examining main global, regional, and bilateral political events.

From a global perspective, it is essential to note that since 2012, both countries have been faced with a transition of global power in the age of Indo-Pacific geopolitics. As key US allies, Tokyo and Canberra have taken policies to counterbalance a rising China, although China is an indispensable trade partner for both countries. As an example of this dilemma, Tokyo and Canberra support the Indo-Pacific strategy facilitated by the United States, but at the same time, both countries need to deal with the influence of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) promoted by Beijing (Akimoto, 2021). In this respect, it can be viewed that both Japan and Australia would like to strengthen the quasi-alliance but also need to determine how to side-step a possible hegemonic war between China and the United States.

From a regional perspective, both Japan and Australia have contributed to the formation of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) policy, and hence, it is necessary for the Quad countries, especially Japan and Australia, to avoid and mitigate a traditional security dilemma with China. From a bilateral perspective, both Japan and Australia have strengthened their security alignment to the extent that it could be regarded as a so-called “quasi-alliance”, albeit not a formal military alliance. In this sense, it is meaningful to contextualise the development of the quasi-alliance based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC), first announced on 13 March 2007 and upgraded on 22 October 2022.

To what extent do Tokyo and Canberra share common strategic viewpoints on China amid the geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States? How has the Japan-Australia quasi-alliance been adrift and realigned by several events, such as Australia’s submarine deal and the upgrade of the JDSC? In the middle of the global power transition, will Japan and Australia move beyond the quasi-alliance? In order to answer these research questions, this article tracks the footsteps of the bilateral special strategic partnership and applies a framework of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis to examine the possibilities and limitations of a formal Japan-Australia military alliance in the Indo-Pacific geopolitics.

Japan and Australia in the Global Power Transition

In the middle of the power transition period, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe set forth strategic visions for Japanese diplomacy, including “diplomacy taking a panoramic perspective of the world” and a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) (Yoshimatsu, 2021). As pointed out by some scholars, including Tetsuo Kotani, a professor at Meikai University, Abe’s FOIP vision was adopted by the administration of former President Donald Trump as Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy vis-à-vis China’s BRI (Kotani, 2021: 61). From a realist perspective, John Mearsheimer pointed out that “if China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the US and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war” (Mearsheimer, 2005). Moreover, Graham Allison has warned of a possible war between China and the United States when they end up with the so-called “Thucydides trap”. Allison cited an analysis of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, who noted, “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable” (Allison, 2017). Allison argues that there are 16 cases in history in which a rising power threatened to rule one and that 12 of them resulted in war (Allison, 2015). It has been argued that the Thucydides trap works in Asia, where a power transition from the United States to China is observable. Therefore, Japan and Australia need to be aware of and step away from the Thucydides trap in the Indo-Pacific (Porter, 2022).

What are the strategic implications of the Thucydides trap for the Japan-Australia relationship? At a press conference after the Australia-Japan foreign ministers’ telephone conference with his counterpart Marise Payne on 9 February 2021, former Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi commented that “I believe many writers would argue that it [the Thucydides trap] does not apply at the present point” (MOFA, 2021). Motegi’s remark as a foreign minister was diplomatically

appropriate, as it intended not to cause unnecessary tension between Tokyo and Beijing. Strategically, however, the Thucydides trap cannot be overlooked when considering Japan's special strategic partnership with Australia and the Japan-US alliance.

The question is, where does the Thucydides trap exist in the Indo-Pacific region? If there is a military emergency in the Korean Peninsula, as in the Second Korean War, the Australian government would invoke the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty), as confirmed by Malcolm Turnbull on 11 August 2017 (Ho, 2017). Yet, what if China dares to intervene in the military conflict over the Korean Peninsula, just like in the case of the Korean War (1950-1953)? (Vergan, 2023). If this is the case, the Thucydides trap may exist for Japan and Australia over the Korean Peninsula. If a military conflict occurs in the East China Sea, the United States might encourage Australia to defend Japan. If diplomatic tension over the Taiwan Strait is about to escalate into a military emergency, both Japan and Australia would be requested by the United States to make military contributions to the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait (Taiwan Today, 1955; Nakada, 2024; Nikkei Asia, 2023). Still, Australia would carefully consider the applicability of the ANZUS Treaty to the imbroglios in the East China Sea or the Taiwan Strait (Bisley and Taylor, 2014). What if the regional skirmish escalates into a full-scale armed conflict between the United States and China?

Entrapments in these conflicts are nightmare scenarios and typical cases of alliance dilemmas for both Japan and Australia. Since there has been no NATO-like regional alliance in Asia, excluding the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) (Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute United States Department of State, 2023), both Japan and Australia have been involved in "regional security architecture" alongside with their alliances with the United States (Curtis, 2023), it used to be observed that Japan would be able to join the ANZUS Treaty in the Cold War period, forming Japan, Australia, New Zealand, United States (JANZUS) (Tow, 1978). More recently, it has been discussed that Japan should join the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defence cooperation, turning the group into Japan-Australia-United Kingdom-United States (JAUKUS) (Auslin, 2022).

Both JANZUS and JAUKUS options could have been effective security alignments in the Indo-Pacific strategic sphere, but they are highly unlikely to be acted on at the time of writing. Hence, it is necessary to take the regional security implications of the TSD and the Quad for the bilateral strategic alignment into consideration in the following sections. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and Saudi Arabia (BRICS) increased their geopolitical influence in global politics, while Saudi Arabia had officially joined the BRICS, and the Japan-Australia security partnership would need to consider the strategic implications of BRICS for the bilateral relationship in the Indo Pacific (Japan Times, 2024).

Japan, Australia, and the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD)

Japan and Australia have cooperated in the framing of the TSD with the United States. Some observers regard the TSD as a "little NATO" or "shadow alliance" against China, and it may be natural for Beijing to consider it to be a containment against the nation (Jain, 2004). Still, it is important to note that the TSD does not have a defence obligation, unlike NATO; hence, it is not a formal alliance (Satake, 2017). In essence, the TSD can be regarded as the trilateral strategic "alignment" within a framework of intra-alliance politics (Wilkins, 2007). Although its origin dates back to the trilateral counter-terrorism cooperation in the post-9/11 context (Schoff, 2015: 40), the first ministerial meeting of the TSD was held by Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on 18 March 2006 in Sydney (MOFA, 2006). Notably, the TSD initially "welcomed China's constructive engagement" in the Asia-Pacific region, indicating that this strategic alignment is not a containment against Beijing (Ibid).

Although the initial motive of the TSD was not to contain China, the TSD has been gradually incorporated into a geopolitical dilemma between the TSD and Beijing over time. On 4 October 2013, the fifth ministerial meeting of the TSD was held on the margins of the APEC ministerial meeting. Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, and Secretary of State John Kerry shared their strategic interests and mutual concerns over the East China Sea. They moreover confirmed the significance of international law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was confirmed in the joint statement (MOFA, 2013). Thus, the TSD was initiated not as containment against China, but the joint statement of the fifth TSD included a diplomatic message so that Beijing should “agree on a meaningful code of conduct” opposing “coercive or unilateral actions that could change the status quo in the East China Sea” (Ibid). In addition, the joint statement of the six TSD ministerial meetings noted that “the ministers expressed their serious concerns over maritime disputes in the South China Sea” (MOFA, 2016b).

In June 2019, it was reported that Japan, Australia, and the United States would begin a liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Papua New Guinea, which was described as a “belt and road” in the South Pacific (Kodachi, 2019). Clearly, the TSD countries intended to take concrete measures against China’s Belt and Road initiative. The ninth ministerial meeting of the TSD was held by Foreign Minister Taro Kono, Foreign Minister Marise Payne, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in Thailand on 1 August 2019 (MOFA, 2019a). The ministers affirmed the achieve the FOIP vision and shared common concerns over the situation in the South China Sea (Ibid). In a joint statement, the three ministers also agreed to remain in communication regarding the situation of the East China Sea (MOFA, 2019b).

On 4 August 2022, Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi, Foreign Minister Penny Wong, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken held the tenth ministerial TSD meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. In a joint statement, the three ministers did not mention the South China Sea or the East China Sea but reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” (MOFA, 2022c). Thus, the TSD sent a diplomatic message to Beijing during the rising regional tension over the Taiwan Strait. As noted by Purnendra Jain, Tokyo and Canberra have faced “pressing and challenging security issues” as Indo-Pacific countries, especially the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine (Jain, 2023: 122). In this sense, it can be considered that the TSD’s focus on Taiwan was influenced by the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which broke out on 20 February 2014 and militarily escalated on 24 February 2022, and that both Tokyo and Canberra cannot be free from a “risk of entrapment” in a possible military emergency in the Indo-Pacific region (Satake and Hemmings, 2018). Strategically, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has profound implications for the Japan-Australia relationship because the Soviet Union and Russia occupied the Northern Territories/Kurile Islands near the end of the Second World War (Mulgan, 2022). The development of the TSD evidently indicates that both Japan and Australia have been faced with the increasing political influence and maritime aggressiveness of Beijing, as well as the growing tensions over the Taiwan Strait.

Japan, Australia, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)

Like the case of the TSD, both Japan and Australia have contributed to the institutionalisation of the Quad. The Quad, as noted by Ryosuke Hanada, is not an “alliance” against China but intends to counter China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region (Hanada, 2018). Having said that, it is argued that the Quad as a “minilateral security framework” could aggravate a “steep incline” into a Thucydides-type trap (Panda, 2022). Likewise, it has been observed that India was cautious about being entrapped in the Quad, and its differences with other Quad partners were exposed. Some analysts argued that the TSD, as an older and more formalised alignment, would function better than the Quad in the event of a possible military emergency (Channer, 2022), and it has been argued that India’s strategic views on China are different from Japan (Amari, 2022). Another analyst went too

far as to say that India does not need the Quad to counter China (Babones, 2020). At the same time, however, although India used to be hesitant, New Delhi changed its diplomatic attitude to the Quad, and it has become a more willing partner and strong supporter of the Quad (Jain, 2022). Either way, both Japan and Australia view India as a strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific, and therefore, it is important to consider the strategic implications of the Quad for the Japan-Australia security partnership.

The Quad member states have held meetings to discuss regional and global security issues based on shared fundamental values, such as democracy, human rights, and the rule of law (MOFA, 2022d). As a background to the Quad, the four countries formed a core group to lead the international community's support after the Earthquake off the Coast of Sumatra and the Tsunami Disaster that occurred in the Indian Ocean in December 2004. The Quad was originally proposed by Shinzo Abe, and the first meeting by Quad officials took place in May 2007. Although there was a working-level meeting and a maritime exercise in 2007, the so-called Quad 1.0 during the first term of the Abe administration was not fully institutionalised for several reasons, including a China factor (Madan, 2020).

The Quad was institutionalised and developed into the so-called Quad 2.0 during the second term of the Abe administration as well as the Donald Trump administration. Specifically, Foreign Minister Taro Kono proposed to institutionalise the Quad and upgrade from the sub-cabinet level to the foreign ministerial level (Satake, 2021). As a result, director general-level meetings of the Quad have been held on a regular basis since November 2017 (Borah, 2021). The first foreign ministers' meeting of the Quad took place in New York in September 2019, and the second foreign ministers' meeting was held in Tokyo in October 2020. In March 2021, Quad's top leaders' video conference was held for the first time. In September of the year, the first in-person meeting by top leaders of the Quad took place in Washington. Notably, the Quad 2.0 includes cooperation for non-traditional security and has the potential to provide general support among Southeast Asian countries (Walton, 2022b).

Globally, the Quad was formulated in the age of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," where the United States and China have been competing for a regional and global hegemony (Smith, 2020). The four countries have strengthened their strategic networks in the post-coronavirus pandemic period and the middle of the Ukraine crisis. In February 2022, the Quad foreign ministerial meeting was held in Canberra, and the Quad top leaders teleconference took place the following month. In May 2022, the in-person Quad meeting of the top leaders took place in Tokyo. In July 2022, the Quad Energy meeting took place in Sydney, and the foreign ministerial meeting in New York took place in September 2022. In this context, some researchers have argued that the so-called Quad 3.0 has been emerging in the age of the Indo-Pacific (Akimoto, 2022b; Koga, 2022; Shankar, 2021).

In response to the institutionalisation of the Quad, China has been cautious and seemingly paranoid about the grouping (Mohan, 2022). At first, Beijing did not take the formation of the Quad seriously, stating that "they are like the sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean: They get some attention but will soon dissipate" (Rudd, 2021). Indeed, when Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd decided on a "policy to disconnect from the Quad", the quadrilateral alignment was deactivated (Marlow, 2022). Yet, Beijing began to rethink its optimistic viewpoint on the Quad later. The Quad members had planned to cooperate to monitor illegal fishing activities by China in the Indo-Pacific region (Japan Times, 2022a). On 22 May 2022, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the Quad had been formed "to contain China", and Beijing has regarded the Quad as "Asian NATO" (Pandey, 2022). The Quad has included quadrilateral strategic cooperation in the field of economic security as well. In a joint statement in March 2021, for instance, the four countries agreed to "launch a critical- and emerging-technology working group to facilitate cooperation on international standards and innovative technologies of the future" (Rajagopalan, 2022).

In the middle of the energy crisis caused by the Russia-Ukraine War, the Quad was faced with the necessity of quadrilateral energy security alignment as well. On the occasion of the Quad leaders meeting in Tokyo on 24 May 2022, for example, Quad leaders launched the Quad Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Package as measures against climate change as well as energy insecurity (MOFA, 2022b). On 13 July 2022, the first-ever meeting of Quad energy ministers took place in Sydney. In the meeting, Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Koichi Hagiuda, Australian Minister for Climate Change and Clean Energy Chris Bowen, Indian Minister of Power and New and Renewable Energy R. K. Singh, and US Secretary of Energy Jennifer M. Granholm agreed to cooperate for enhancement of energy security and transition to clean energy toward the decarbonisation goal (US Department of Energy, 2022). Notably, Hagiuda asked Bowen and Granholm to supply more LNG to Japan in the middle of the energy crisis aggravated by the influence of the Russia-Ukraine War (Kato, 2022).

It can be argued that the Quad as a strategic alignment could raise a traditional “security dilemma” in relation to China (Hemmings, 2022) and might increase the possibilities of the occurrence of other regional conflicts in the Indo-Pacific strategic sphere. Whereas diplomatic tension over the Taiwan Strait has built up, Japan has currently attempted to acquire so-called “counterstrike capabilities”, namely enemy base strike capabilities (Japan Times, 2022b). Although policy debate in Japan has focused on enemy base strike capabilities in conjunction with missile defence systems in the event of a possible military emergency in the Korean Peninsula, the strike capabilities could also target China (Akimoto, 2020b). In this respect, Japan and Australia should be aware of growing tensions between China and the Quad member states. For this reason, both Japan and Australia are expected to figure out how to mitigate the security dilemma and avoid entrapment in a possible war between China and the United States.

The Quasi-Alliance Adrift: The Case of Australia’s Submarine Deal

Although Tokyo and Canberra have beefed up their security partnership in a changing global security environment, the “quasi-alliance” resulted in a drift over Australia’s future submarine development project. Australia’s future submarine program (FSP) caused thorny tension with Japan and exemplified the bilateral relationship could be influenced by certain types of domestic and external pressure (Bergmann et al., 2016). It has been reported that the Abbot administration had originally made overtures to the Abe government to provide technology transfer of Japan’s Soryu-class submarine for the development of Australia’s next-generation submarine in 2014. In October 2014, it was reported that Defence Minister David Johnston had officially requested Tokyo to help develop a new fleet of Soryu-class submarines, although the 2009 Australia’s Defence White Paper published by the Labor government noted that the new submarines of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) would be built by the domestic shipbuilding industry in South Australia (Turnbull, 2014). Moreover, it has to be noted that the Liberal Party also promised that Australia’s future submarines would be built in South Australia just before the 2013 federal election (ABC News, 2016). In essence, Abbott regarded Japan’s submarine as “the world’s best large conventional submarine” (Abbott, 2016) and excluded the possibility of a competitive tender process for the FSP from the outset.

Hence, Japan’s Soryu-class submarine initiated by a so-called “captain’s call” was the front-runner for the FSP (Parliament of Australia, 2021: 7). Still, there existed opposition and cautious opinions inside Australia. Greg Sheridan, for example, argued in *The Australian*: “I am now coming, reluctantly, to the view this option just presents too much risk, financially, politically and militarily. I don’t think Abbott can secure Japanese subs through a good process. Impatience with the process is one of Abbott’s weaknesses” (Dobell, 2015). On 9 February 2015, it was announced that the competitive evaluation process (CEP) would be introduced to the FSP (Kerin, 2015). In addition, the leadership change from Abbott to Malcolm Turnbull on 15 September 2015 influenced Canberra’s decision-making on the submarine deal. In the meantime, Japan was reluctantly ready to reconsider

its “made in Japan” approach to the submarine deal. Masaaki Ishikawa, Director General for Acquisition Reform at the Ministry of Defence, said in an interview with *Reuters* published on 30 September 2015 that “Whatever option Australia chooses, we are ready to provide the necessary technology transfers and skills... We will optimise the role of Australian industry” (Kelly and Kubo, 2015).

Considering the flexible stance of the Japanese side, it was observed that Australia would increasingly be likely to select Japan for the FSP (Johnson, 2016). On 26 April 2016, however, the Turnbull government announced that Canberra would select France’s Naval Group (then Direction des Constructions Navales Services: DCNS) to partner with Australia’s next generation submarine development. This “pragmatic decision” made by the Turnbull administration prioritised the economic impact of developing Australia’s future submarines in Adelaide on the redevelopment of the domestic shipbuilding industry so that it could contribute to the employment rate in the country (Tingle, 2016). To be more specific, Turnbull himself explained on that day that “This \$50 billion investment will directly sustain around 1,100 Australian jobs and a further 1,700 Australian jobs through the supply chain” (Turnbull, 2016).

On hearing the result of the CEP, Japanese Defence Minister Gen Nakatani expressed “immense disappointment” at the decision and stated that he would seek an explanation about the process (Bisley and Envall, 2016). On the other hand, Abbott, as an initiator of the submarine deal, commented, “Australia’s special relationship with Japan is more than strong enough to withstand this disappointment... I am confident that our strategic partnership will continue to grow through other means” (McDonald, 2016). Alan Dupont, an adjunct professor at the University of New South Wales, observed that Japan would digest the disappointment and the bilateral relationship would be “back to business” within a year (Ibid).

In addition to domestic considerations, a China factor may have influenced the decision-making process in Canberra. Notably, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted that Canberra should not choose Japan’s submarine for the FSP out of “consideration of the feelings of Asian countries” over the Asia Pacific War (Ryall, 2016). Indeed, Japan’s Soryu-class submarine, armed with Type 89 heavyweight homing torpedoes and UGM-84 submarine-launched Harpoon missiles, is famous for its propulsion and stealth quality (Mizokami, 2017). As pointed out by Hugh White, Japan’s bid for the FSP had strategic implications, whereas German and French bids were based on commercial purposes. White raised critical questions in an article in *The Age* published on 14 March 2016, as follows: “How willing would we be, ultimately, to take Japan’s side in a war, and send our forces – including our submarines – to fight alongside them against China?”, suggesting that it would not be wise for Canberra to choose Japan’s submarines (White, 2016). Similarly, Geoff Slocombe raised questions regarding the China factor: “Given that China is Australia’s number one trading partner, what would be the impact of teaming with Japan and the US in what will be seen by China as a strategic coalition to contain their naval expansion?” (Bergmann et al., 2016). Thus, there exists a persuasive argument that if Canberra chose Japanese technology for the FSP, it would have a negative impact on its commercial relationship with China in the end.

In the Japanese defence community, there was not only disappointment at the decision but also relief by the speculation that the transfer of Japan’s submarine technology to Australia might lead to a leak of the technology to other countries, especially China, as pointed out by Tetsuo Kotani (Kotani, 2016). In addition, some observers argued that Japan’s loss to France in the competition was better than the contract cancellation afterwards. On 15 September 2021, Scott Morrison announced that Australia would nullify the contract with France and should introduce the technology of nuclear submarines from the United States and the United Kingdom based on the trilateral security partnership, namely AUKUS (Wilkins, 2021b). In hindsight, therefore, some Japanese defence policy

experts would argue that Japan's loss to France in the FSP did not deserve disappointment after all, and the bilateral relationship was realigned despite the quasi-alliance adrift over the submarine deal.

The Quasi-Alliance Realigned: Upgrade of the Japan-Australia JDSC

Despite the bitter experience with the submarine deal, the Japan-Australia “quasi-alliance” rapidly recovered and developed during the second Abe administration (Satake, 2022). In retrospect, the Japanese government has recognised a status of “quasi-alliance” between Japan and Australia based on the JDSC on 13 March 2007, signed by Abe and John Howard (MOFA, 2007). Howard played a significant role in strengthening the bilateral defence ties by sending the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) to Iraq to escort the Japanese Self-Defence Forces (SDF) for post-war reconstruction activities (Howard, 2010: 458). The 2007 JDSC was signed based on bilateral peacekeeping and security cooperation (Akimoto, 2013). With regard to the JDSC, Greg Sheridan reported that “The Howard Government was keen to be as ambitious as the Japanese could accommodate and would have been happy with a formal security treaty. However, Japanese Government lawyers believed that it would be legally and politically too difficult to square such a treaty with their constitution” (Dobell, 2014). Although the JDSC is not a formal threat that requires mutual defence obligation, the bilateral strategic partnership has been “progressively institutionalised” based on the JDSC (Wilkins, 2021a: 1). Abe explained that the JDSC was not aimed to encircle China, although the bilateral security link contributes to reinforcing the US alliance system in the region (Mulgan, 2007).

Importantly, the JDSC has been a cornerstone for the development of a bilateral “quasi-alliance” because the term “quasi-alliance” began to be used after the signing of the 2007 JDSC. During the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence at the House of Councillors on 10 April 2007, Hiroshi Takano, as a legislator of Komeito, asked Foreign Minister Taro Aso whether Japan-Australia relations could be regarded as “quasi-alliance” or not. In response, Aso replied that the bilateral relationship had reached a level of quasi-alliance (National Diet Library, 2007). Aso's answer as a foreign minister of the first term of the Abe administration to Takano's question was important because it was the first time a minister of the Japanese government recognised Japan-Australia's “quasi-alliance” during the Diet deliberation.

Diet members of opposition parties in Japan have also recognised that Japan-Australia relations could be viewed as “quasi-alliance”. Shigefumi Matsuzawa of Your Party (Minnanoto) pointed out that the bilateral relationship is quasi-alliance during his question to Prime Minister Abe in deliberating on Japan's right to collective self-defence on 15 July 2014 (National Diet Library, 2014). Matsuzawa argued that Australia should be categorised as a foreign “country that is in a close relationship with Japan” as stipulated in the so-called “Three New Conditions for ‘Use of Force’ as Measures for Self-Defence” in the Peace and Security Legislation (MOFA, 2016a). On 1 April 2016, Akihisa Nagashima of the DPJ stated that the Abe-Abbott connection was significant and described Australia as Japan's “quasi-ally” in his question to Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida during the Committee on Foreign Affairs at the House of Representatives (National Diet Library, 2016). Evidently, there has existed a bipartisan recognition in Tokyo that Australia is Japan's quasi-ally based on the JDSC as well as accumulated security cooperation.

In Australia, it has been reported that the Japanese side had recognised the bilateral relationship as a “quasi-alliance”. John Garnaut of *The Sydney Morning Herald* quoted a comment by a Japanese official: “Military ties between Australia and Japan have been growing so fast that they amount to a ‘quasi-alliance’” (Garnaut, 2014). Garnaut also quoted a comment by Malcolm Cook regarding the bilateral defence ties: “The dual-tightening of Australia's alliance with the US and its defence partnership with Japan is the most important strategic decision that Australia has made in the post-Cold War era” (Ibid). In addition, *The Australian* reported on 13 October 2013 that Tony Abbott had

described Japan as Australia's "best friend in Asia" and a "strong ally" of the country (Brookes, 2014: 3).

Regarding the remark by Abbott, Chris Brookes of the Australian Defence College argued in *Indo-Pacific Strategic Papers* of 2014 that "it is not in either Australia's or Japan's interest to seek a bilateral security alliance" (Ibid: 6). Hugh White described the bilateral relationship as a "de facto strategic alliance" in *The Age* on 15 September 2014 (White, 2014). In a report on the *Indo-Pacific Strategic Papers* of 2015, Lendley Ghee of the Australian Defence College reconfirmed that the bilateral relationship is not an alliance but a quasi-alliance (Ghee, 2015). In accordance with Japan's Peace and Security Legislation, the revised Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) was signed by Abe and Turnbull in Sydney on 14 January 2017 (Australian Government, 2017). The revised ACSA enhanced the bilateral military interoperability, strengthening the quasi-alliance system. In January 2018, H. D. P. Envall observed that "the term quasi-ally pops up every so often from Tokyo and is now widely deployed in the media" (Envall, 2018).

In the face of the uncertainty stemming from the Trump administration, Peter Jennings of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) argued in July 2018 that "Australia should conclude a defence treaty with Japan, the most consequential democratic regional power" (Jennings, 2018). Likewise, Malcolm Davis from the ASPI contended that Australia should conclude a formal military treaty with Japan, building a "trilateral defence alliance" (Davis, 2019). Davis specifically noted that "a key step at the diplomatic level must be developing a formal alliance relationship with Japan that complements and enhances both states' alliance structures with the US" (Ibid). Politically, it was reported that Defence Minister Christopher Pyne described Japan as a "quasi-ally" of Australia when he had a meeting with his counterpart, Defence Minister Takeshi Iwaya, in Tokyo on 23 January 2019 (WING, 2019). During an interview with the author, former Ambassador Bruce Miller described the Japan-Australia "quasi-alliance" as "action before words" (*fugen jikko*) (Akimoto, 2019). In other words, although Tokyo and Canberra have not explicitly used the term "quasi-alliance" in an official document, both countries have already recognised quasi-alliance and behaved as quasi-allies.

On 19 October 2020, a joint statement on security cooperation was issued by Defence Ministers Nobuo Kishi and Linda Reynolds, who expressed "strong opposition to any destabilising or coercive unilateral actions that could alter the status quo and increase tensions" in the Indo-Pacific region (Thakur, 2020). On 17 November of the year, Prime Minister Scott Morrison visited Tokyo and had a summit meeting with Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga. It was Morrison's first overseas trip during the COVID-19 pandemic, and he became the first international leader to have a summit meeting with Suga during the pandemic period (Ibid). Regarding upgrading the bilateral security ties, Ramesh Thakur commented that Japan and Australia would "edge toward an alliance" in *The Japan Times* (Ibid).

From 10-12 November 2021, Japan's Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) JS Inazuma conducted a joint exercise with Australia's RAN Frigate HMAS Warramunga in the waters off south of Shikoku. The exercise is called Nichi-Go Trident, and Inazuma carried out asset protection for Warramunga based on Article 95-2 of the SDF Law as part of the Peace and Security Legislation (MOD, 2021). The application of the legislation for the ADF was of significance given the opposition during the Diet deliberation in the enactment process (Akimoto, 2018). The Nichi-Go Trident exercise best exemplified the strategic coordination and alignment based on the Japan-Australia quasi-alliance for maritime peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

On 6 January 2022, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Prime Minister Scott Morrison signed off the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) (MOFA, 2022a). The Japan-Australia RAA intends to facilitate reciprocal access and cooperation between the SDF and the ADF. The Japan-

Australia RAA is an equivalent of the Japan-US Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), or the “Agreement regarding the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan” (MOFA, 1960). The signing of the RAA was, therefore, of significance because it signifies the substantial upgrade of the bilateral security alignment. Some media erroneously described the RAA as a “defence pact” or “military alliance”, but it is not a formal military alliance (Wilkins, 2022a). Although it is not a formal alliance, Tokyo had already regarded Canberra as a “semi-ally”, and the special strategic partnership would already constitute a “virtual alliance” in the context of the mutual alliances with the United States (Dominguez, 2022).

Importantly, the JDSC was upgraded by Prime Ministers Kishida and Anthony Albanese in Perth on 22 October 2022. The new JDSC reaffirmed the “special strategic partnership” and the significance of the FOIP vision (DFAT, 2022). Graeme Dobell of the ASPI contended that the quasi-alliance between Canberra and Tokyo became “less quasi and more alliance” given the similarity between Article 6 of the ANZUS Treaty and Article 6 of the new JDSC (Dobell, 2022). Although there is no mention of “China” in the text of the joint declaration, a “joint statement” announced at a summit meeting included the term “Taiwan”, signifying the significance of security cooperation in the event of a possible Taiwan emergency (Walton and Akimoto, 2022). Notably, Michael Green, Chief Executive Officer of the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, pointed out that upgrading the JDSC might be regarded as a stepping stone toward a full-fledged bilateral military alliance (Ibid). In addition, it is fair to argue that the bilateral defence upgrade was also facilitated by the rise of China as well as the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War on 24 February 2022 (Akimoto, 2022a). In short, both Tokyo and Canberra were forced to realign the quasi-alliance in the face of the increasingly severe strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific. However, there are regulatory barriers to the further development of bilateral strategic collaboration (Satake, 2023).

SWOT Analysis on the Formation of the Japan-Australia Alliance

Considering the footsteps and development of the Japan-Australia quasi-alliance, this section intends to conduct a so-called SWOT analysis in order to examine the feasibility of forming a formal bilateral military alliance. The SWOT analysis or SWOT matrix is frequently used to identify strengths (internal), weaknesses (internal), opportunities (external), and threats (external) in the process of strategic planning or project planning, and it can be applicable to the field of international security too (Blaxland, 2019).

The SWOT analysis was applied by some researchers in Ukraine to investigate the strategic cooperation between Ukraine and NATO and clarify the necessary criteria for Ukraine’s entry into NATO prior to the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War (Bratko et al., 2021). Thus, it can be fair to argue that a SWOT analysis is a useful analytical approach to the examination of alliance formation. Accordingly, a SWOT analysis can be applicable to the feasibility assessment of forming a Japan-Australia alliance, as shown in the Table below.

Table: A SWOT Analysis on the Formation of a Japan-Australia Alliance

a) Strengths / Merits	b) Weaknesses / Limitations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinforce the mutual alliances with the US vis-à-vis China (balance of power) • Prepare for possible emergencies (Taiwan Strait, East and South China Seas, etc.) • Risk hedge (fear of abandonment) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The threat perception gap between Tokyo and Canberra (imbalance of threat) • Limitations of the SDF due to Article 9 • The existence of the Japan-US Security Treaty and the ANZUS is regarded as sufficient
c) Opportunities / Spillovers	d) Threats / Demerits
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The TSD could be upgraded into a formal trilateral military alliance • The Quad would be strengthened as well • It may facilitate the formation of a regional defence architecture in the Indo-Pacific 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Economic ties with China may be affected • Security dilemma with China • Thucydides trap as possible military emergencies, including the Second Korean War (fear of entrapment)

a) *Strengths in Japan-Australia Alliance Formation*

First, the strengths (or merits) of the Japan-Australia military alliance are 1) reinforcement of the mutual alliances with the United States while preparing for possible regional military emergencies, including the Taiwan Strait, and 2) balance of power as well as hedge against fear of abandonment in the US-centred alliance system. Globally, the hegemonic competition between the United States and China, as well as the ongoing Russia-China War, can be perceived as facilitative factors to the formation of the Japan-Australia military alliance. Regionally, China's maritime expansionism in the Indo-Pacific and Japan's fear of abandonment in a possible conflict in the East China Sea could be facilitative factors. Bilaterally, the RAA and the new JDSC can be regarded as footsteps toward the formal bilateral alliance, while both countries would need to pay attention to the possibilities of "fear of abandonment". As was the case with the Trump administration, it would be possible that a future US administration would take unexpected diplomatic actions, suggesting pulling out the US forces from the allies. Such a possibility would make Tokyo and Canberra reconsider the necessity of forming a formal military alliance as a risk hedge. Nationally, the enactment of Japan's Peace and Security Legislation can be regarded as a critical step toward its military normalisation, which enables Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defence to protect Australia. However, the Peace and Security Legislation would not function well without the proper military support from the United States. It is possible for potential enemies of Tokyo to conduct decoupling diplomacy vis-à-vis the Japan-US military alliance by nuclear blackmail, etc. In the middle of geopolitical uncertainties, Tokyo and Canberra might recognise the necessity of upgrading the bilateral quasi-alliance into a full-fledged military alliance.

b) *Weaknesses in the formation of the Japan-Australia military alliance*

Second, weaknesses (or limitations) of the alliance are 1) Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and constitutional limitations of the SDF, 2) a threat perception gap over China between Tokyo and Canberra, and 3) the existence of mutual alliances with the United States. In essence, the Japan-Australia military alliance would contribute to the balance of power between the US-led alliances

and the rising Chinese military power, but as Stephen Walt pointed out, the balance of threat is another key factor to the formation of an alliance (Walt, 1987). In this respect, whereas Japan has been continuously threatened by missile launches by North Korea and challenged by the maritime expansionism of China, Australia has not received direct military threats, unlike the case of Japan. Therefore, the “imbalance of threat” both countries have recognised signifies limitations in the formation of a bilateral alliance. Fundamentally, it might sound paradoxical, but the existence of the mutual alliance with the United States can be recognised as a fundamental hindrance to the necessity of the bilateral formal alliance between Japan and Australia. In other words, the existing military alliance ironically makes the bilateral alliance unnecessary. In this respect, there are few incentives for decision-makers in Tokyo, Canberra, and Washington to encourage the formation of the bilateral military alliance.

c) Opportunities in the Japan-Australia Alliance Formation

Third, opportunities (or spillovers) of the bilateral alliance are thought to be spillovers, such as 1) upgrade of the TSD as a trilateral alliance and the Quad as a more formal security alignment, and 2) possible formation of regional defence architecture. As discussed in this article, the TSD could be more effective and functional than the Quad in the event of a possible military conflict in the Indo-Pacific region. Given the fact that the ANZUS might not necessarily be invoked in possible military conflicts in the region owing to the decision by New Zealand, the formation of the trilateral military alliance among Japan, Australia, and the United States would be more realistic, which tackles regional conflict resolutions. Like the case of New Zealand, India might keep its distance from involvement in possible armed conflict in the region, and the upgrade of the TSD, rather than that of the Quad, is considered a realistic spillover by the formation of the Japan-Australia military alliance. Having said that, the formation of the Japan-Australia military alliance would enhance not only the functionality of the TSD but also that of the QUAD in the field of regional peace and security. Such a scenario would accelerate the formulation of a defence architecture in the Indo-Pacific region, where there is no NATO-type military mechanism.

d) Threats in the Japan-Australia Alliance Formation

Fourth, threats (or demerits) of the bilateral alliance are 1) weakening economic ties with China and 2) security dilemma and fear of entrapment in the possible hegemonic war. In the case of the formation of the Japan-Australia military alliance, it might be true that there is no urgent necessity for both countries to upgrade the quasi-alliance into a formal military alliance because there exists no imminent and direct military threats to both countries at this stage. Likewise, it is difficult to argue that the merits of the formation of the Japan-Australia military alliance outweigh the demerits of the alliance formation. Globally, a possible hegemonic war is a nightmare scenario for both Tokyo and Canberra. Regionally, the Australians have feared a possible entrapment risk in the Taiwan Strait, although the Turnbull administration previously promised the applicability of the ANZUS Treaty to the case of a possible military emergency in the Korean Peninsula.

Suppose a military emergency in the Indo-Pacific drastically changes the geopolitical situation, such as a survival-threatening situation including nuclear blackmail, and damages the national interests of Tokyo and Canberra. In that case, both countries might swiftly consider the conclusion of the bilateral alliance. Such scenario cases, like the Second Korean War, an armed conflict in the East China Sea, or the Taiwan emergency, would drag Tokyo and Canberra into military conflicts. In these cases, Japan might abandon the peace clause, seek to form a military alliance with Australia and eventually pursue military independence from the United States. Otherwise, albeit crystal-gazing is difficult, the Japan-Australia relationship would remain the quasi-alliance, namely a special strategic partnership, in the foreseeable future.

Conclusion

This article has examined the development of the Japan-Australia special strategic partnership by shedding light on bilateral security ties. Globally and regionally, both countries have contributed to establishing and institutionalising trilateral and quadrilateral regional security frameworks. Strategically, Tokyo and Canberra have also been confronted by China's increasing political assertiveness and maritime unilateralism. As key US allies, both countries have advocated and supported Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy vis-à-vis Beijing's BRI in recent years. At the same time, however, both countries have been aware of the "entrapment risk" of a possible war between the United States and China, hypothetically stemming from the so-called Thucydides trap, especially over the Korean Peninsula, the East and South China Seas, and the Taiwan Strait.

Related to the bilateral relationship with Beijing, this research has clarified that the Japan-Australia relationship has been influenced by China's challenge to US hegemonic status in the Indo-Pacific. Japan's bid for Australia's future submarine development project was affected by the leadership change in Australia, the economic factor in the shipbuilding industry, and Australia's national interests in relation to trade partnership with Beijing. In a sense, it is possible to argue that Japan as a "nuclear-bombed" and "nuclear-threatened" state, and Australia has somewhat different threat perceptions in regard to China and North Korea's nuclear weapons due to geographical and strategic vulnerabilities (Akimoto, 2020a). Still, this does not mean that Tokyo perceives Beijing as an immediate military threat, and Japan has managed to maintain diplomatic ties and enjoys a healthy trading relationship with China. In addition, Canberra is thought to be reluctant to jeopardise its economic and trade partnership with Beijing in the global power transition period. Although the Japan-Australia quasi-alliance resulted in adrift over the submarine deal, it was reconfirmed that Japan had recovered from the disappointment in the result and signed the RAA and upgraded the JDSC, realigning the quasi-alliance with Australia.

Moreover, the creation of the Peace and Security Legislation during the Abe government enables the SDF to protect the ADF in peacetime, grey-zone situations, and military emergencies. For instance, the Nichi-Go Trident of November 2021 best exemplified the realignment of the Japan-Australia quasi-alliance at an operational level, although the SDF is still not formal "military forces" according to the official interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Moreover, the SDF would be able to exercise the right to collective self-defence for the ADF in the event of a so-called "survival-threatening situation". Both countries upgraded the JDSC in October 2022 based on the political and strategic alignments. Despite all these bilateral strategic alignments, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the China factor for Canberra have been and will remain major hindrances to a formal security treaty between the two nations. Paradoxically, moreover, the existence of mutual alliances with the United States can be regarded as another inhibitive factor to the formation of the Japan-Australia military alliance. The application of the SWOT analysis furthermore indicates that the formation of the formal Japan-Australia military alliance is not achievable due to weaknesses, limitations, threats, and demerits as prohibitive factors. Having said that, the Japan-Australia special strategic partnership will be effectively functional in the event of a possible military emergency in the Indo-Pacific region, and at the same time, both countries, in conjunction with the United States, are expected to avoid any possible military clashes in the age of the power transition in Indo-Pacific geopolitics.

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