

the

best

Journal of Politics and Development

ISSN 2632-4911

Volume 14 ■ Number 2 ■ Summer 2024



# the rest: journal of politics and development

*Previously published as Journal of Global Analysis (JGA)*

## Editors-in-Chief:

**Ozgur TUFEKCI, Assoc. Prof.** | Karadeniz Technical University, Türkiye & CESRAN International

**Rahman DAG, Assoc. Prof.** | Marmara University, Türkiye & CESRAN International

## Associate Editor:

**Alessia CHIRIATTI, Dr.** | Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy

**Marco MARSILI, Dr.** | Ca' Foscari University, Italy & CESRAN International

## Assistant Editor:

**Ekrem OK** | Agri Ibrahim Cecen University, Türkiye & CESRAN International, UK

## Editorial Board

**Sener AKTURK, Prof.** | Koç University, Turkey

**Enrique ALBEROLA, Prof.** | Banco de España, Spain

**Mustafa AYDIN, Prof.** | Kadir Has University, Turkey

**Ian BACHE, Prof.** | University of Sheffield, UK

**Kee-Hong BAE, Prof.** | York University, Canada

**Mark BASSIN, Prof.** | Sodertorn University, Sweden

**Alexander BELLAMY, Prof.** | Uni. of Queensland, Australia

**Richard BELLAMY, Prof.** | Uni. College London, UK

**Andreas BIELER, Prof.** | University of Nottingham, UK

**Pinar BILGIN, Prof.** | Bilkent University, Turkey

**Ken BOOTH, Prof.** | Aberystwyth University, UK

**Stephen CHAN, Prof.** | SOAS, University of London, UK

**Nazli CHOUCRI, Prof.** | MIT, USA

**Judith CLIFTON, Prof.** | Universidad de Cantabria, Spain

**John M. DUNN, Prof.** | University of Cambridge, UK

**Kevin DUNN, Prof.** | Hobart and William Smith Colleges, USA

**Can ERBIL, Assoc. Prof.** | Boston College, USA

**Stephen Van EVERA, Prof.** | MIT, USA

**Marc FLEURBAEY, Prof.** | Princeton University, USA

**Bulent GOKAY, Prof.** | Keele University, UK

**Ayla GOL, Prof.** | York St John University, UK

**Stefano GUZZINI, Prof.** | Uppsala Universitet, Sweden

**David HELD, Prof.** | London Sch. of Economics, LSE, UK

**Tony HERON, Prof.** | University of York, UK

**Raymond HINNEBUSCH, Prof.** | Uni. of St Andrews, UK

**John M. HOBSON, Prof.** | University of Sheffield, UK

**Michael KENNY, Prof.** | University of Sheffield, UK

**Cécile LABORDE, Prof.** | University College London, UK

**Scott LUCAS, Prof.** | University of Birmingham, UK

**Kalypso NICOLAIDIS, Prof.** | University of Oxford, UK

**Ziya ONIS, Prof.** | Koc University, Turkey

**Alp OZERDEM, Prof.** | George Mason University, USA

**Danny QUAH, Prof.** | London School of Economics, UK

**José Gabriel PALMA, Prof.** | Cambridge University, UK

**Jenik RADON, Prof.** | Columbia University, USA

**Oliver RICHMOND, Prof.** | University of Manchester, UK

**Ibrahim SIRKECI, Prof.** | Regent's College London, UK

**Ian TAYLOR, Prof.** | University of St Andrews, UK

**Ali WATSON, Prof.** | University of St Andrews, UK

**Brian WHITE, Prof.** | University of Sheffield, UK

**Stefan WOLFF, Prof.** | University of Birmingham, UK

**BiroI YESILADA, Prof.** | Portland State University, USA

**Hakan YILMAZKUDAY, Prof.** | Florida International University, USA

*The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development is published on behalf of the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN) as an academic e-journal. The articles are brought into use via the website of the journal (<https://therestjournal.com/>). CESRAN and the Editors of The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development do not expect that readers of the review will sympathise with all the sentiments they find, for some of our writers will flatly disagree with others. It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed in any article, which appears in The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development.*

*\* The surnames are listed in alphabetical order.*

# the rest: journal of politics and development

*Previously published as Journal of Global Analysis (JGA)*

## INDEXING & ABSTRACTING

- Academic Index
- Bielefeld Academic Search Engine (BASE)
- Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO)
- Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ)
- EBSCO Publishing Inc.
- EconLit
- EconPapers
- Genamics JournalSeek
- IDEAS
- Index Islamicus
- Infomine
- International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR)
- International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBZ)
- International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)
- International Relations and Security Network (ISN)
- Lancaster Index to Defence & International Security Literature
- Peace Palace Library
- Research Papers in Economics (RePEc)
- Social Sciences Information Space (SOCIONET)
- Ulrich's Periodicals Directory

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## RESEARCH ARTICLES

**133**

**Great Power Politics over the Natural Resources in Afghanistan**

*By Babur Rahmani*

**153**

**In Search of an African Theory of Democracy: Utilizing the Tiv Cultural Philosophy of Ya-Na-Angbian**

*By Ayaka Simon Silas & Yusufu Ahmed Audu*

**165**

**Portuguese Neutrality during World War II - A Case Study of Portuguese Foreign Policy Analysis**

*By João Tavares*

**181**

**It is Time to Reconsider the Hereditary Succession of Politicians and Medical Practitioners in Japan: Reform Ideas to Overcome the Adverse Effects**

*By Yukio Sakurai*

**194**

**Enhancing Disaster Resilience through Gender-Sensitive Policy Frameworks: A Case Study of Pakistan**

*By Nialish Khan*

**208**

**Women Leaders and the Concept of Women Empowerment: Benazir Bhutto and Margaret Thatcher**

*By Betül Türyaki*

**223**

**Mind the Gap! Small State Influence within the EU during the Brexit Process: The Case of Slovakia**

*By Sedanur Yıldız & Özgür Tüfekçi*

**238**

**Relations Between Russia and Türkiye in The Context of The Syrian Conflict: From Edge of the War to Strategic Cooperation**

*By Cenk Özatici & Polat Üründül*



International Think-tank [www.cesran.org](http://www.cesran.org)

Consultancy

Research Institute

CESRAN International is headquartered in the UK

CESRAN International is a member of the United Nations Academic Impact (UNAI)

**CESRAN International** is a think-tank specialising on international relations in general, and global peace, conflict and development related issues and challenges.

The main business objective/function is that we provide expertise at an international level to a wide range of policy making actors such as national governments and international organisations. CESRAN with its provisions of academic and semi-academic publications, journals and a fully-functioning website has already become a focal point of expertise on strategic research and analysis with regards to global security and peace. The Centre is particularly unique in being able to bring together wide variety of expertise from different countries and academic disciplines.

The main activities that CESRAN undertakes are providing consultancy services and advice to public and private enterprises, organising international conferences and publishing academic material.

Some of CESRAN's current publications are:

- THE REST: Journal of Politics and Development (tri-annual, peer reviewed) [www.therestjournal.com](http://www.therestjournal.com)
- Novus Orbis: Journal of Politics and International Relations (biannual, peer reviewed) [www.dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/novusorbis](http://www.dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/novusorbis)
- Journal of Conflict Transformation and Security (biannual, peer reviewed)
- Political Reflection Magazine (quarterly) [www.politicalreflectionmagazine.com](http://www.politicalreflectionmagazine.com) (2010-2023)
- CESRAN Paper Series
- CESRAN Policy Brief
- Turkey Focus Policy Brief

CESRAN International also organises an annual international conference since 2014. Until 2023 it was called as “International Conference on Eurasian Politics and Society (IEPAS)”. From 2023, it was renamed as “CESRAN: Annual Conference on International Studies”.

[www.cesran.org/call-for-papers](http://www.cesran.org/call-for-papers)

- **Ranked among the top 150 International think tanks**

# Portuguese Neutrality during World War II - A Case Study of Portuguese Foreign Policy Analysis

the rest:  
journal of politics and development  
2024 | vol 14(2) | 165-180  
[www.therestjournal.com](http://www.therestjournal.com)

**João Tavares**

PhD candidate in International Relations at NOVA FCSH. Assistant at Faculty of Law and Political Science of Lusófona University - Oporto University Center and Associated Researcher at CEAD Francisco Suárez, e-mail: [joao.tavares@ulusofona.pt](mailto:joao.tavares@ulusofona.pt)  
ORCID No: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3764-8797>

## KEYWORDS

Salazar,  
Estado Novo,  
Portuguese Foreign Policy,  
Foreign Policy Analysis

## ABSTRACT

*The main object of this investigation into Portuguese neutrality during the Second World War is to understand the reasons that led to the choice of neutrality and how the conceptual elements of the Foreign Policy Analyses and the historical events relating to the conflict conditioned the decision-making process. Portuguese foreign policy decision. Portuguese foreign policy under Salazar followed a set of guidelines that were based on norms and intangible elements, which allowed the regime to carry out its mission of ensuring its autonomy on the European continent and, simultaneously, guaranteeing the security of the colonies located in the rest of the world. The Portuguese option for neutrality is conditioned by a vast series of internal and external constraints, as well as an ideological coherence that is somewhat standardised in relation to previous events, where sometimes a lack of information and uncertainty regarding the other parties demolish ideal premises of the Rational Actor model. In the Portuguese case, as it was an idiosyncratic dictatorship in which the head of government centralised all the main decision-making powers within himself. However, he surrounded himself with capable elements and an information network, which excelled in bilaterality, to help with the decision-making task. Portugal had to position itself in the face of the conflict, and this highlights the alliances to which it was linked and which would influence decision-making. Salazar was aware that he could not marginalise Spain or ignore the importance of Great Britain.*

Received June 2, 2024  
Revised June 27, 2024  
Accepted July 10, 2024

## Introduction

The main purpose of this research is to understand the reasons that led to the Portuguese option for neutrality during the Second World War, how the conceptual elements of the Foreign Policy Analysis apply to the historical context of the Second World War and how the decision-making process in Portuguese foreign policy of the Salazar regime was conditioned. Since all the States coexist with each other within the international system (Mendes, 2022), so the Salazar regime had to face its external challenges, and one of the most striking crises of Salazar's foreign policy (Nogueira, 2000) is the positioning of Portuguese during World War II, which we will address in this research.

For all intents and purposes, Salazar had three possible paths to follow. On the one hand, it would be natural and expected for Lisbon to opt for a rapprochement with its natural ally, Great Britain, since both Portugal and Great Britain, despite their differences and disputes, remained loyal to the

principles of the alliance for more than five centuries (Pereira, 2012). On the other hand, Portugal could have chosen to join the Axis, an alliance composed of Nazi Germany, fascist Italy and imperial Japan, where some ideological affinities existed. Perhaps there are certain types of stereotypes in relation to dictatorships, which, although they seem convenient in many situations, can be extremely misleading (Leite, 1998; Hollis and Smith, 1986). To go down this path is to ignore factors such as national culture, geopolitical alignments, and the very origin and evolution of the political regimes themselves (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010), as well as the history of Portugal itself (Nogueira, 2000). However, the third option based on neutrality at the time of the outbreak of war was the option chosen by the political decision-maker, Salazar, as President of the Council of Ministers of Portugal.

Therefore, we seek to answer the following starting question: What was the reason that led Portugal to opt for the decision of neutrality during the Second World War? Parallel to the analysis of these issues, we seek to understand all the factors and conditioning factors in the decision-making environment that were behind the Portuguese option on neutrality and to understand if the option for non-belligerence was the right path was to follow.

However, we cannot forget the importance of the role of the political decision-maker in the decision-making process in Portuguese foreign policy, and we will try to understand its influence on this option, taking into account the historical context and the factors that influence decision-making, within the decision-making environment (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010) which results from an analysis of various types of constraints that influenced decision-making, together with internal and external factors and the way they influenced the decision-making process in Portuguese foreign policy.

Using the Rational Actor model, which consists of analysing the decision-making process from the point of view that the state is the sole manager of the decision. In this model, the state acts as an indivisible and independent organism, which treats the decision as a game of gains and losses and rationally chooses the most advantageous option, according to the national interest of the Portuguese (Allison, 1971; 1969), regarding the option for neutrality.

We will also address the role of the political decision-maker, who in this case is António de Oliveira Salazar, the head of government in office and the head of the foreign policy executive. We will review the various factors that allow us to understand the option taken by the political decision-maker. At the same time, we try to explain how Salazar's personality influenced the Portuguese option for neutrality.

We will also investigate the importance that Francoist Spain had in the decision-making process in Portuguese foreign policy, how the Spanish state led by General Francisco Franco influenced the Portuguese choice, and the impact of Portuguese influence on Madrid's decisions.

And finally, within the scope of the Rational Actor model, we will apply the "Prisoner's Dilemma" to our case study to determine whether the Salazar regime opted well for neutrality during World War II.

### **The decision-making environment in the face of international and domestic factors**

The decision-making environment in foreign policy of a given State is full of factors that will influence the respective process, according to which the political decision-maker will take into account the geopolitical and geostrategic positioning of the state, as well as the alliances and international commitments to which his state is bound so far, as well as their vulnerabilities and valences (Júnior and Farias, 2021; Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010), taking into account the historical context of the decision-making environment in which Salazar's Portugal is inserted.

In the mid-1930s, the European continent was again in convulsion, both because of the fear coming from Eastern Europe, provoked by the emergence of Soviet communism after the Russian Revolution of 1917, and because of the outbreak of new economic and social crises, triggered by the Great Depression of 1929, which contributed to the emergence of new forms of authoritarianism against the inability of liberal democracies to act on the problems that plagued the country. Old continent, and they were still suffering the consequences of the First World War (Mattoso, 1998).

Several European countries succumbed to totalitarian or authoritarian experiences, even degenerated into armed conflicts, with special emphasis on the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) that broke out in the Iberian Peninsula and threatened to drag Portugal into the conflict, which motivated Salazar to assume the ministerial portfolio of Foreign Affairs (Meneses, 2010).

After the victory of the nationalist forces over the Spanish Republic, in the context of armed peace in Europe, the signing of the Luso-Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression of April 14, 1939, which linked Salazarist Portugal and Francoist Spain, was celebrated. The purpose of this Iberian Pact was to preserve the neutrality of the Iberian Peninsula in the event of a world conflict because Spain sympathised with the Axis powers, while Portugal maintained the link of the old alliance with Great Britain (Tíscar, 2014). Alliances are one of the biggest constraints a leader can have when making foreign policy decisions (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010). The greatest victory for the Portuguese regime, on the threshold of a new world conflict, was “the realisation of Salazar’s idea of ‘peninsular friendship’ and opening a period of good relationship and political solidarity between the two regimes” (Nogueira, 2000: 79). In this way, salazarist Portugal and Francoist Spain formed an alliance, the bases of which were based on a pact of non-aggression and mutual consultation between the two Iberian states (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010).

In the run-up to World War II, Francoist Spain joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1939, which ended up putting Portugal in an unpleasant position. From the perspective of the government in London, it was a very bad sign since General Francisco Franco could hardly refuse the Germans the crossing of the Pyrenees if the government in Berlin intended to proceed with the military occupation of Portugal and Gibraltar, with a view to imposing an effective continental blockade, despite the existence of a cordial relationship between the two Iberian dictators (Herz, 2004).

Despite the apparent Portuguese ideological affinity with the ideologies that characterise the Axis alliance, the Portuguese reaction on this matter was peremptory, in which Lisbon refused the invitation to join the Anti-Comintern Pact, which revealed the distance Portuguese this type of political regime, in which it demonstrates that it follows the logic of primacy by the Luso-British Alliance. as shown in the following excerpt from Salazar’s unofficial note (Salazar, 1943: 173-174 apud Serrão, 2000a: 206):

*“Fortunately the duties of our alliance with England, which we do not wish to exempt ourselves from confirming at such a grave moment, do not oblige us to abandon in this emergency the situation of neutrality.*

*The government will regard it as the highest service or greatest grace of Providence to be able to maintain peace for the Portuguese people and hopes that neither the interests of the country, nor its dignity, nor its obligations will impose upon it to compromise it.*

*But peace cannot be disinterestedness or careless indifference for anyone. It is not in the power of any man to escape himself and the nation from the painful consequences of a long and extensive war. Being aware that their work and responsibilities have greatly increased, the government hopes that the nation will collaborate with them in the resolution of the*



*greatest difficulties and accept in the best possible way the sacrifices that become necessary and will seek to be distributed with the possible equity (...)."*

Regarding the Luso-British Alliance, from the Portuguese perspective, its durability was not in question since there was a geopolitical basis for its existence (Severiano Teixeira, 2010); Portugal needed the alliance as a small power endowed with a large maritime empire to ensure communication with its colonies. Britain benefited from the profits of the Portuguese colonies and enjoyed the strategic advantages provided both in mainland and insular Portugal, as well as in overseas Portugal. Historically, neutrality was a luxury that Portugal could never discard (Nogueira, 2000). Despite the conflicts and regime changes, the Old Covenant withstood the passage of time and remained fundamentally in force at the time of the Second World War (Leite, 1998).

In this way, we can attest that the Luso-British Alliance and the Iberian Pact constituted the two fundamental diplomatic instruments that would govern Portuguese foreign policy (Nogueira, 2000) during the Second World War.

In the context of Foreign Policy Analysis, we find that international factors are always diverse and varied and produce many stimuli in the decision-making environment. Foreign policy decisions are often strategic, but the behaviour of adversaries and allies affects the decision in an interactive way (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010).

At the same time, we find that the internal environment is also rich in stimuli, but their quantity and influence depend largely on the type of political regime in place. In the case of Portuguese, we are talking about a dictatorship that dilutes, in many cases, the ability of social, economic and political groups to take part in the decision-making process in Portuguese foreign policy. However, the economic domain and public opinion are nonetheless the most important domestic factors that help shape the decision-making process (Weeks and Crunkilton, 2017; Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010).

For a small power like Portugal on the European scene, in addition to the serious political implications that could arise from an option for belligerence, it would entail enormous financial costs to support an armed conflict.

However, the role of Portuguese public opinion in the conflict is interesting to address, since in the form of acquiescence to the positions of the Government, Portuguese firm support for Great Britain in the memory of the Portuguese nation still won affection for England, despite the consequences of the British Ultimatum of 1890 (Severiano Teixeira, 1987). As Serrão (2000a: 398) notes, "Public opinion remained loyal to the Portuguese-British friendship, seeing it as a safeguard against the clouds of war that were gathering on the horizon". At the same time, there remained, among the Portuguese population, the remnant of the Germans' sense of responsibility for what happened during the First World War, except in very restricted elites (Leite, 1998), without forgetting the disaster of Portuguese participation in the same conflict (Meneses, 2010). It should also be noted that, although it was not a determining factor for the option of neutrality, Portuguese public opinion was very important since, during the conflict, Salazar had the support of the population despite the restrictions and sacrifices that had to be demanded" (Serrão, 2000a; Serrão, 2000b; Nogueira, 2000)

After reviewing the major factors that, in our view, conditioned the decision-making, we will then analyse the environment of the decision and the various constraints that lead to its formulation.

By applying the Rational Actor model to this case study in Portuguese foreign policy, we find that its application implies that the state acts intentionally and is motivated by strictly defined objectives, demonstrating its ability to order options and preferences and maximise the usefulness of its choices

(Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010; Freire and Vinha, 2017). The great Portuguese motivation in the face of a continental conflict is once again a traditional response of Portuguese foreign policy (Severiano Teixeira, 2010; Macedo, 1987; Martínez, 1985), based on keeping Portugal away from the problems emanating from the centre of Europe, as well as the Luso-British Alliance, if circumstances allow (Meneses, 2010; Nogueira, 2000).

Therefore, the process of ordering preferences takes place. In terms of absolute gains, Portugal could have entered the war in favour of Britain, either early or later in the conflict, on the side of the liberal democracies, and thus receive dividends from a possible victory, which could translate into monetary or gender compensations later on. It could also capitalise on its effort by supporting the Axis forces, and in the event of a victory for the totalitarian forces, in addition to the monetary gains, it could acquire new colonial territories from one of the defeated powers.

However, as Freire and Vinha (2011: 23) point out, “decision-makers usually decide when a better alternative emerges that seems better than those previously considered (...) Instead of optimisation, there is only satisfaction, through a choice that meets the minimum requirements, avoiding riskier options.”

In addition to not guaranteeing the optimisation of political decision-making, this model, with all its other virtues, carries various impediments to its implementation. Some are of a human nature, deficiency and quantity of information, uncertainties, incapacity of the decision-maker or his own belief systems and cognitive process, and time constraints (Freire and Vinha, 2011: 23). Rationality is not in itself the absolute explanation for any kind of decision. There are other dynamics that cannot be ignored, especially standardised processes and the role that the leader plays in the decision-making process in times of crisis.

The decision environment reflects, especially in a crisis, a decision with unpredictable consequences and is also characterised by lack of time, ambiguity of information, uncertainties, risks and motivations (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010). This is proven by time constraints that defy the urgency of taking a stand (Allison, 1971; 1969). Several states were forced to take a stand, either on the very day of the invasion of Poland or in the days immediately after. In the case of Portugal, it was the day after the event, and a decision that satisfied the minimum requirements was necessary to safeguard Portugal's interests (Pereira, 2012). Alongside this, London suggests and rejoices with the Portuguese distancing from the conflict (idem). On the other side of the border, even given the scarcity of time, there were good indications that Franco would go in the same direction as the Portuguese government (Nogueira, 2000).

Neutrality allowed the Lisbon government to play cautiously, without committing itself to any definitiveness, and slightly altering its positions vis-à-vis the belligerent powers throughout the conflict, according to circumstances (idem).

In Foreign Policy Analysis, information is one of the central elements in the foreign policy decision-making process, but we can see that foreign policy decision-making is full of incomplete and inaccurate information (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010). The Salazar regime, at the time of the decision to neutralise, was not sure if there would be a secret pact between the great powers for the division of their colonies (Rosas, 1996). In this sense, Portugal will rely on its network of diplomatic missions and its allies; however, despite the information sent to Lisbon, in many cases, it appears to be ambiguous and contradictory.

Ambiguity is one of the major constraints in the decision-making process. It occurs when there is a multiplicity of contradictory information that can dictate different outcomes (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010). In any case, ambiguous information is more likely to be ignored (Mintz and DeRouen Jr,

2010). Even before the beginning of the war, information arrived from various sides that affirmed the interest of Great Britain or the USA in occupying Cape Verde, the Azores, or even Madeira, which were of great strategic importance to either side in a possible conflict (Serrão, 2000a). This caused serious discomfort in Salazar and led the President of the United States of America (USA), Franklin Delano Roosevelt, to write to the head of the Portuguese government to reaffirm that the Americans had no interest in occupying the islands. Even the Foreign Office itself, on several occasions, had to reaffirm that the British had no intention of occupying the Portuguese island territories (Pereira, 2012). On the other hand, Salazar was no longer so sure about German intentions since, despite constant denials, the Portuguese dictator knew that if the fate of the war depended on it, Hitler would not hesitate to violate Portuguese sovereignty (Meneses, 2010; Nogueira, 2000).

One aspect that contributes to the decision-making process in foreign policy is the decision maker's familiarity with the situation, especially since it is a situation similar to one already experienced. Familiarity with the problem leads to intuitive decision-making; rather than examining the components that affect the decision, the decision-maker jumps to conclusions based on previous experiences with similarities (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010: 27). This process can lead to ignoring inconsistent information. In the case of the Portuguese, the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) certainly weighed on Salazar's decision in the face of World War II, largely regarding pay-offs and due to the prospect of distancing international affairs from the European continent.

At the same time, Portugal's unsuccessful participation in the First World War remains present in Portuguese memory, the experience of which could not be repeated given the serious monetary and human losses (Rosas, 1996).

In the realm of international politics, political leaders make decisions that affect and are affected by the decisions made by other policymakers (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010: 28). Understanding it allows us to perceive an interactive strategic decision that is a crucial part of understanding foreign policy preferences, process, judgment, and choice. Without prejudice to the Portuguese option for neutrality having been issued through a unilateral unofficial note, Great Britain's opinion on Portugal's position and the non-invocation of defence clauses at the outbreak of war functioned as an interactive sequence of decisions that ultimately met Portuguese expectations. The same is true of Spain, which we shall develop later.

In the field of foreign policy, we should not dissociate the risk component from decisions, as they are not high-stakes decisions that have an influence on the country's resources. The amount of risk a policymaker is willing to take affects his or her foreign policy decisions, and Salazar was willing to take little or no risk. It is important to note that the ability to take risks depends on the personality of the policymaker and his satisfaction with the status quo (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010: 28).

Perhaps, if the decision had not been to remain neutral in line with its Iberian neighbour, Portugal ran a serious risk of being annexed by Francoist Spain or taken over by German forces, as planned in Operation Félix (Nogueira, 2000; Rosas, 1996). Salazar also feared that if the Americans entered the war, their presence would result in an "export of democratic ideals, which endangered the corporatist regime Portuguese" (Rosas, 1996: 900). Thus, if the option in the face of war did not fall on the defence of a policy of neutrality like that evoked in the Spanish Civil War, in the future we could incur "serious risks to our national integrity" (Serrão, 2000a: 126).

A final factor in the decision-making process that we must take into account is the responsibility of the leader in the face of the options taken, as his image could be drastically damaged within the regime since the Second World War presented itself as a threat "to Salazar's power, from this internal: not only was there the possibility of growing economic difficulties [...] but, in a conflict between Western democracies and National Socialism, it was natural for the political temperature

to rise” (Meneses, 2010: 255), which implied a cautious management of the situation in the short and long term by the political decision-maker.

### **The role of the policymaker in relation to psychological factors and the personality of the policymaker**

Constraints are not the only explanatory variables of foreign policy decision-making. Psychological factors can have a great impact on the decisions of the political decision-maker; as Freire and Vinha (2011: 30) note, “leaders (...) shape the way foreign policy is made and the consequent behaviour of States in international politics”, so that the ability to influence the decision-making process comes from instrumental rationality, which constitutes a more limited view of procedural rationality, and is based on the preferences of individuals since leaders do not completely control a situation, and its influence is severely circumscribed (Júnior and Farias, 2021).

Thus, personality and personal political preferences do not directly determine foreign policy” (Freire and Vinha, 2011: 31). Still, when we are talking about a dictatorship, the impacts of personal characteristics greatly affect the decision-making process and, consequently, foreign policy itself, especially in times of crisis. It’s hard to say whether the person makes the moment or the moment makes the person. But be that as it may, decisions must be made (Colgan and Weeks, 2015; Weeks, 2014).

Several psychological factors shape the decision-making process in Portuguese foreign policy during World War II. As Meneses (2010: 252) notes, “In the light of his position in relation to the Spanish Civil War, it is therefore not surprising that Salazar responded to this new and enormous crisis by centralising decision-making powers in his person”. This attitude shows, first, a great deal of confidence on the part of the policymaker in his or her abilities and ability to control events. Secondly, it shows a certain aversion to the collegial decision-making process, which had already been noted by Nogueira (2000).

Immediate concerns are one of the elements that influence the leader’s decision-making since they are upstream in the decision-maker’s mind, according to Jervis (1976). Political decision-makers are influenced by the occurrence of events, so clearly, in the moments before the invasion of Poland, Salazar’s concerns were, in the first place, related to the outbreak of war, “(...) the general concerns about the disturbed political environment in Europe did not allow us to forget that its virtual consequences could affect Portugal” (Serrão, 2000: 176). Secondly, on Spain’s possible entry into the conflict: “The government (...) it will transform the defence of the maintenance of a politically similar regime in Spain into one of the major priorities of foreign policy, accepting the inherent risks” (Rosas, 1996: 898-899). Finally, there was the fear that Great Britain, given the circumstances, would ally itself with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) to fight Nazi Germany and the Axis powers and that this would translate into a communist infiltration in central and peripheral Europe (Meneses, 2010), which could extend to Portugal.

Beliefs are another variable that conditions the attitude of the political decision-maker. Actions can be mediated by a mental process that contains a mixture of feelings and beliefs that refer to previous experiences and that we can define as old information; at the same time, actions are tempered by current perceptions and stimuli (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010).

The two types of information are associated and help to understand preferences for the course of action (Simon, 1957; Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010). Salazar had a set of beliefs that helped him decode and face the storms of war (Nogueira, 2000; Meneses, 2010). Salazar believed that the Treaty of Versailles would be “the cause” of a new world war (Serrão, 2000: 174; Nogueira, 2000) due to the exaggerated scale of the humiliations inflicted on the defeated, especially Germany. In the event

of a conflict, Portugal should remain neutral to ensure its survival, thus seeking to ensure that the Madrid government remains neutral (Meneses, 2010). Salazar perceived that the British would cut off his maritime access to the colonies if Lisbon chose to align itself with Nazi Germany (Nogueira, 2000; Mattoso, 1998), whose regime Salazar saw as follows (Salazar, 1937, apud Meneses, 2010: 261):

*“I consider it a disgrace for Europe that (...) Nazism imposed itself everywhere with the virulence and rigidity of some of its principles. For those who have a moral notion of civilisation, it will be a frank setback.”*

This set of beliefs, combined with analogies and learning, allows the decision-maker to use the shortcut of remembering similar situations experienced by him or history and learning from them, reflecting this in the decision-making process (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010). It should be noted that the option for neutrality in the face of European conflicts is a constant in the Portuguese foreign policy of the Estado Novo; thus, the preference for it at the gates of an armed conflict on the European continent is somewhat standardised (Severiano Teixeira, 2010). In addition, Portugal managed to maintain a good level of social, political and institutional cohesion so as not to have to rush into any decision-making to go to war, as a way of forgetting internal upheavals, as was the case with Portugal's entry into the First World War, during the period of the First Portuguese Republic (Pinto, 2016; Meneses, 2000; Nogueira, 2000).

Cognitive decision-maker dissonance means that decision-makers either devalue some information that shows signs of inconsistencies with previous images or beliefs or else pay too much attention to information consistent with those images or beliefs (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010). At this point, we have not been able to demonstrate that Salazar devalued the information of the Portuguese services or embassies on behalf of his beliefs. What is known is that the dictator was obstinate with the idea of neutrality and that he would keep it at all costs unless his ally England formalised his request officially or one of the colonies (especially the largest), islands, or mainland Portugal suffered some attack. Salazar himself made an incomplete analysis of the situation in Europe between 1939 and 1945, based on a model of realpolitik, “which assumed that states and their leaders acted according to reasonable and quantifiable considerations” (Meneses, 2010: 250).

Although images and beliefs influenced the decision-making process of Portuguese foreign policy, “when a new war broke out in Europe in 1939, Salazar sought to inform himself about Portuguese diplomatic activity during the First World War” (Meneses, 2010: 251). This small detail reveals anything but carelessness about the need to obtain information to conduct its policy, avoiding past mistakes. Despite some preconceived ideas about the nature of the conflict and its actors, Salazar never stopped seeking information, either through direct contact with other diplomats such as Pedro Theotónio Pereira or Veiga Simões or experienced senior civil servants such as Luís Teixeira de Sampaio, the then secretary-general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and his right-hand man when he assumed the duties of Minister of Foreign Affairs (Nogueira, 2000).

However, Salazar was concerned with understanding the consequences for Portugal of the various scenarios on the table. If Nazi Germany emerged victorious from the conflict, there was no certainty about the position that Portugal would occupy in the imagination of Adolf Hitler; in the event of a British victory, Salazar believed that the status quo would Portuguese be maintained in the establishment of the new world order.

We tried to prove the role that certain psychological factors can play in the decision-making process and, at the same time, to demonstrate how they conditioned the option for neutrality. However, we believe that the role of the leader is not limited exclusively to a set of premises but to the basis of all this, that is, his own personality (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010).

Salazar sought to rise to the occasion by showing the behaviour of a strong dictator (Pinto, 2000) that is: Salazar came from a particular but well-defined political milieu; he had a vision of the world and society; he directed the entire institutional design of the regime, in fact, “the use of a scale of centralisation of decision-making in extensive terms, however, it fully justifies the expression ‘strong dictator’ to characterise Salazar’s exercise of power” (Pinto, 2000: 2).

His own societal and civilisational visions helped him, throughout his career and during the Second World War, to understand the positioning of the spheres of power, to perceive where he should move and to fit Portuguese interests into the international environment (Pinto, 2013). It is possible to understand from his origins and ideas that he was a protector of morals, traditions and anti-materialism. He was a “moral dictator” (Meneses, 2010: 205), and this condition, in part, was an approach to regimes whose bases were not based on the same premises.

In a way, these personal traits, combined with certain positive results of his policies, won him the support of a good part of the social strata, especially at critical moments in the life of the country. We cannot accurately assess the degree of the genuineness of this “politics of truth” nor whether it was practised “always” that it was necessary (Meneses, 2010: 209):

*“When Salazar arrived at the executive, humility and modesty were the defining traits of his self-portrait. These traits (...) were maintained for a long time, being (...) enriched by other elements: constancy of ideas, spirit of sacrifice and absence of political ambition. It was also insisted on (...) «politics of truth», according to which the country was informed of what it needed to know when it needed to know”.*

Despite these simple traits, he did not neglect his surroundings and was very aware of the country’s interests on the international stage. He was a well-travelled person, although he had visited Belgium when he was young and Seville on a state visit (Nogueira, 2000) with little empirical perception of the outside world, but this did not make him conduct Portuguese foreign policy based on images or beliefs, since Salazar followed international politics and the movement of ideas closely (Pinto, 2016; 2013). The Portuguese dictator gave much importance to international politics to try to anticipate the movements of the great powers on the international chessboard. This characteristic allowed him to read and understand the events and phenomena of the 1920s and 1930s, which helped him to define Portugal’s positions, especially in the antechamber and at the outbreak of war. His extreme self-discipline was marked by meticulous attention to detail that seemed unwavering (Teixeira, 2008).

In addition, in the conduct of his policies, Salazar demonstrates a certain “cynical pragmatism, above all to distance himself from fascism, which would guide him until the end of his life” (Meneses, 2010: 193) and which would manifest itself when it was time to make concessions, where so far they reveal how Salazar adopted tactics to prepare the country for the post-war era (Teixeira, 2008), which revealed his great calculus and ability to predict events.

By understanding the leadership style, we can understand why certain positions are taken and why certain alternative courses of action are not taken (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010). There are three broad dimensions that help us characterise the type of leader: sensitivity to political constraints, openness to information, and motivation to act. It helps us determine whether a leader is goal-oriented or context-oriented, as goal-oriented leaders are more susceptible to taking more violent steps, or context-oriented leaders are more risk-averse and take more careful steps (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010), as is the case with Salazar (Nogueira, 2000). In other words, the former are more active, the latter more reactive.

We should not deviate from the purpose of this work, which is why, regarding Salazar's actions in foreign policy and, more specifically, his choice of neutrality, we can consider him, based on his personal characteristics and way of conducting politics, as a context-oriented leader. Although the dictator is not Portuguese, flexible to other opinions and solutions, and is unlikely to change his position or ideology, there are facts that demonstrate his adaptability to various contexts, internal or external, as was the case during the Second World War. In addition to this, there are other factors, such as their ability to consult and discuss, as evidenced by their need to listen to the ambassadors deployed in European countries during the conflict (Nogueira, 2000), even if it does not give them much room for manoeuvre to make decisions.

Authoritarian leaders face few political constraints when it comes to the foreign policy decision-making process (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010). This view may be true of the internal sphere. However, the international environment is rich in stimuli and constraints, especially in times of serious political crisis or when, being a small power, one is allied with a great power with a regime very different from ours.

Context-oriented leaders strive to work within the confines of constraints. Working within constraints entails coalition building, empathy, sensitivity to coalition constituents, and commitment (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010). If we carefully analyse the historical facts, we see that the President of the Council will move away from multilateral solutions, but Salazar is a man of law; he gives great priority to respect for norms and laws, regardless of their democratic value or not, always acting in line with them in the international system.

In addition, it will strive to build and maintain alliances, seek to preserve empathy between its partners, whether historical or of the moment (Pinto, 2016; 2013) and be attentive to their fears and concerns without leaving the position of neutrality and will remain loyal to the commitments made before and during the war.

The leader's willingness to accept new information is another factor to consider, as context-oriented leaders actively seek information (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010). As mentioned above, Salazar sought as much information as possible and confronted it with his beliefs to obtain a vision as close as possible to the reality of the international panorama.

Context-oriented leaders are more sensitive to the political context (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010). There is a concern to understand the various results of their policies, and they seek to make long-term readings of them, as well as of the positions taken by other leaders. To this end, they seek the opinion of others and attach great importance to a vast network of information. Salazar gave great importance to bilateral relations (Nogueira, 2000).

In this way, and in view of everything described above, we believe that there are two categories that can characterise Salazar's leadership style as strategic and opportunistic (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010) if we consider that the attitude of neutrality was planned in the face of the events that the President of the Council of Ministers predicted would happen since he was perfectly aware of the structural constraints and domestic constraints that surround him and actively seeks to new information, in order to take advantage of the positions of the other actors in order to favour their position and preferences. The ability to negotiate is a key component of this style. This kind of leadership will in no way risk alienating important players in international chess (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010).

## The importance of Francoist Spain in the decision-making process in Portuguese foreign policy

The end of the Spanish Civil War brought with it the signing of the Iberian Pact, which was strategic for the Lisbon government (Tíscar, 2014), as Salazar notes (Salazar, 1943: 147-248 apud Serrão, 2000: 196):

*“Portugal and Spain are forced to live side by side on the Peninsula: good or bad neighbourliness favours us or harms us both. Many times in eight centuries of life, Portugal fought against Spain (...) to maintain or consolidate its independence; He also often fought alongside him against others. This trait is characteristic and sums up in itself the history of peninsular relations: two (...) independent states, Two nations in fraternal solidarity. I don't know why, but freedom and independence from Spain seem to be postulates of Portuguese life. (...) We helped Spanish nationalism and civilisation as much as we could, (...) confronting everywhere the incomprehension and blindness of Europe (where national Spain had so few friendships); (...) From the outset, we were what we should have been – faithful friends of Spain, in the heart of the peninsula”.*

At the outbreak of the war, Salazar's concern was to ensure Spain's neutrality (Meneses, 2010; Nogueira, 2000). In the initial phase of the world conflict, Franco was tempted to align himself with the Axis, which would cause serious problems for Portugal since “the historical dilemma posed to Generalissimo Franco, to take advantage of the results obtained in the Civil War and ally himself with the Axis powers, was to a large extent nullified by the success of Portuguese diplomacy, especially from Ambassador Pedro Teotónio Pereira, in maintaining the neutrality of the Iberian Peninsula” (Serrão, 2000a: 391).

In this period, despite the similarity of the regimes, the relationship between the two Iberian countries was not always stable, with moments of high tension (Mattoso, 1998), because of the force that a more radical wing of the Franco regime exerted on Franco himself and that was against Portugal, because it saw Portugal as a historical error that had no right to exist (Meneses, 2010).

While the Salazar regime saw in Serrano Suñer as the engine of Spanish imperial interventionism, Suñer, in turn, saw Portuguese diplomacy as “an obstacle to overcome” (Meneses, 2010: 283). However, the radical current would not succeed, and after the meeting between the two Iberian leaders in Seville in 1941, Suñer's animosity to Salazar gave way to respect and great admiration, leading the former to later write (Suñer, 1947: 268 apud Meneses, 2010: 287):

*“There, at this edge of Europe, one of the most refined politicians of our time lives and quietly develops his energies and talent. A remarkable man who has all the rigour of an authentic professor and all the passion of a mystic. And then – more intimately – one feels the sympathy of his humanity nuanced with the qualities of irony very characteristic of a man of timid manners, but with an immense moral value”*

In relations with Francoist Spain, the difficulties did not lie solely with Serrano Suñer. General Francisco Franco was not totally trustworthy; he had his own interests at stake that were not entirely clear (Nogueira, 2000; Serrão, 2000); however, Spanish public opinion, as the war progressed, became increasingly anti-German due to “much-needed food leaving Spain for Germany” (Meneses, 2010: 283). Franco blamed the Allies for the poverty to which they were subjecting the Spanish people and criticised Britain for its association with the USSR, “although he did not reveal any particular hostility against London. He was determined to preserve Spanish neutrality” (Meneses, 2010: 286). This detail greatly benefited Portuguese interests, as they saw Spanish neutrality assured and could continue to play on both boards without the other players turning their backs, thus



allowing, in case of great need, Spain to collide with Portugal in favour of Great Britain against the Axis. But they were essentially agreed: neutrality was indispensable.

The issue of neutrality was almost as vital to Spain as it was to Portugal and territorial integrity Portuguese it was something that Spain would be willing to protect, even if “Portugal was forced to cede sovereignty over part of its territory” (Meneses, 2010: 288). Franco had promised Salazar all the help he needed to defend Portugal and that “Germany should also come to Portugal’s rescue”. Franco also hoped for Portuguese aid in the event of an attack on Spain (Meneses, 2010: 289).

Salazar, despite all the pressure and misunderstandings, believed that the two Iberian states agreed on the course to follow during the rest of the conflict, collaborating with each other to preserve a neutrality that, albeit for different reasons, was what best served the interests of both (Salazar, 1943: 319-320 apud Meneses, 2010: 290):

*“The position of neutrality assumed by Portugal always deserved the agreement and approval of the British government, which could not ignore, nor can it contest, the advantages that came from it, especially in relation to Spain, whose non-participation in the war was only possible due to Portugal’s non-participation in the conflict. More than once in written messages or verbal statements, our policy was thanked by the British Government.”*

Although it is “difficult to assess the real impact that Salazar’s actions had on Franco’s mind” (Meneses, 2010: 280), for all intents and purposes, peninsular neutrality would not exist without the belief of General Francisco Franco, without the perseverance of Salazar and without the will of the two states (Nogueira, 2000).

### **The survival of Salazar’s regime in the international system**

We have already seen that both sides have influenced each other. As there was interaction between its parts, and the decisions were mutually affected, we can consider the decision for neutrality an interactive strategic decision, being able to attest to it with a variant of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” and draw some conclusions.

The “Prisoner’s Dilemma” is an example of a one-shot decision and takes place in an environment of incomplete information, where each player seeks to avoid the worst possible outcome. In this case, we will use a variant of the model, knowing in advance what the position of the other will be. This simulation, based on International Relations Game Theory (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010), is a variant of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”. The scale used varies between -5 and 2, and the following meaning is attributed to the values: -5 is equivalent to the most negative result that any of the participants can obtain; -1 reveals the outcome of a choice that will result in a negative pay-off; 1 exposes a possible gain from the option taken; 2 represents the optimal outcome that both sides can achieve.

We will try to demonstrate that, in the event of the existence of information, the actors will undoubtedly choose the option that guarantees them the best pay-off, which is to cooperate. We will also try to gauge who would be most harmed in other scenarios. Pay-offs will be arbitrary numbers that demonstrate to common sense the usefulness of each outcome (Mintz and DeRouen Jr, 2010).

**Graph 1: The Prisoner's Dilemma applied to the case study**

		Spain	
		Respect Alliance	Doesn't respect alliance
Portugal	Neutral	2,2	-1,5
	Non-Neutral	1,2	-5,-1

Graphic Number 1 illustrates, on the Portuguese side, the decision to remain neutral or not in the armed conflict. On the Spanish side, whether they choose to respect the alliance with Portugal or not. We find that both countries gain maximum advantages if they choose to cooperate with each other. In other words, if both Iberian states distance themselves from the world conflict and ensure their peninsular neutrality, they can prevent either of the belligerent sides from dragging the other into war, as well as save on the human, social, economic and political cost that the conflict would require from both states, especially with the consequences of the First World War and the Spanish Civil War still recent in the memories of their respective societies. It is the best option for each of the parties.

In the second case, if Portugal had not remained neutral in the conflict and Spain still chose to respect the Iberian Alliance, both countries could benefit from the same gains, even if they were not the maximum. Portugal, taking a belligerent part in the conflict, would hardly have chosen the Axis side. Firstly because of the Luso-British Alliance, since Salazar was very apprehensive about the intentions and attitudes of the German regime and lastly because he knew that severing relations with the British would jeopardise Portuguese sovereignty in the colonies, which was manifestly against the national interest. This scenario would depend a lot on the ability to convince General Francisco Franco, who was sympathetic to the Axis, to form a coalition with Great Britain, which was clearly unlikely given the existing allied blockade of Spain (Pereira, 2012) and the fact that, historically, Madrid sided with continental forces in European affairs, not forgetting all the help provided to Spanish nationalists by Germany and Italy during the Spanish Civil War. Although this perspective shows a scenario of gains, these are not so high because, at the beginning of the conflict, we could not guarantee an Allied victory, and, in case of defeat, it would have had disastrous consequences for Portuguese survival.

If Portugal chose to remain neutral, and Spain did not respect the Iberian Pact, Portugal ran the risk of being invaded by Spain, which was more likely to violate Article 2 of the treaty and allow itself to assist a foreign power such as Germany in invading Portugal. In this way, Lisbon would run the risk of falling, and Spain would either remain neutral but without the strength of a bloc, or it would become belligerent by accepting the costs and risks inherent in the war, which is why we consider that it maintains a positive pay-off, unlike Portugal.

If Portugal did not remain neutral and Spain did not respect the Iberian Pact, this would mean that both countries were on opposite belligerent sides, since Salazar, for the reasons mentioned above, would most likely choose to align himself with Great Britain, leaving Francoist Spain to get closer to the Axis led by Nazi Germany. This option would achieve the worst-case scenario for the Iberian neighbours, with Portugal obtaining a more negative pay-off than Spain, as it ran the risk of being invaded, either by Francoist Spain or by Nazi Germany, and the military power differential between the Portuguese and either of the two invaders was very large. Still, the pay-off that Spain would obtain would be negative since it would entail the costs of participating in the war and, if the result was not as expected, it would run a serious risk of being dismembered and occupied at the end of the conflict by the Allies.

In short, everything depended on the risk that Francoist Spain would be willing to take, which shows that Portugal depended more on Spanish positions in relation to the world conflict about its survival

as a sovereign state than Spain depended on Portugal. Perhaps General Francisco Franco knew that any option other than cooperating with Salazar could have negative consequences for Spain's continuity as a sovereign state due to the unpredictability of the war.

## Conclusion

We find that we are facing a one-shot decision, and Salazar's choice of neutrality obeys a set of previously established premises, which result from a combination of various types of factors, whether internal or external. In other words, it meant the primacy of the national interest Portuguese, to avoid losses of sovereignty, since a possible Portuguese entry into the conflict in which it had no disputed interests since the harmful consequences of Portuguese participation in the First World War were still very present in the memory of Portuguese society. Neutrality was the best solution to the new crisis. We also found that neutrality would not only benefit Portugal but also help to satisfy its old ally England, as well as Nazi Germany and the Axis powers, in order to ensure stability in the Iberian Peninsula.

However, it was the external factors that most conditioned the Portuguese option during the Second World War since "Portuguese neutrality depends above all on the strategies of the great powers" (Rosas, 1996: 900). We see that, despite the constraints that the great powers represented, it was in Lisbon's interest to remain neutral and, therefore, it did everything to maintain this status. First, he sought to compromise Francoist Spain and reinforced the idea that he would only enter the war if his sovereignty was threatened or if Great Britain invoked the alliance in a clear way, forcing Portugal to come to his aid.

We should not at all underestimate the role of Salazar and the competence of Portuguese diplomacy in defending the national interest. The question of Portuguese neutrality is seen from two major perspectives: the traditional perspective of Salazar as a statesman, where the option of neutrality, its maintenance and its success were due to Salazar's diplomatic action. Another perspective seeks to go beyond the dictator Portuguese and observes Portuguese neutrality through other factors, such as the Spanish domestic situation and, above all, the strategic evolution of the conflict and the war objectives of the belligerent powers" (Nogueira, 2000). Thus, the strategic neutralisation of the Iberian Peninsula is the prolongation of the neutralisation of the western European coast, whose interest was convergent to Portugal, Spain, Great Britain and Germany (idem).

However, it should be noted that if the political decision-maker had been someone else, the consequences for Portugal could have been different. Salazar fell into the good graces of both sides of the dispute and surrounded himself with diplomats of excellence who allowed him to conduct his policies. Another leader, other than Salazar, could have made other choices, and the pay-offs of those same ones might not have been so advantageous.

Portugal, like any power on the European continent, was under the control of foreign interests, and neutrality suited all interested parties. However, as we have proven, the policy of neutrality is a premise of the Portuguese foreign policy of the Estado Novo, which, in addition to defending it from the outset, could otherwise reap serious outcomes sought throughout the conflict to remain neutral, benefiting from this prior prerogative, since the Spanish Civil War. In addition, the personality of the policymaker and psychological factors played an important role in defining and, particularly, maintaining neutrality.

The way in which Salazar and his diplomacy moved the pieces on the various boards and the fact that they made the information they collected an added value achieved great results for the Portuguese regime, "as on many other occasions over many centuries of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, the British and Portuguese interests are identical on this vital issue" (Meneses, 2010: 266), so identical

that Great Britain could not afford to risk losing an Atlantic ally in Portugal (Serrão, 2000b), which contributed to Salazar having employed all his political acumen in a very calculated way in order to maintain control of foreign policy and war concessions (Teixeira, 2008).

In addition to this eclectic perspective, we understand that Portugal was more conditioned by the Spanish position, in terms of survival as a sovereign state than its neighbour, despite the awareness of General Francisco Franco that any option that did not involve cooperating with Salazar could bring negative consequences for itself and for Spain due to the unpredictability of the war (Tiscar, 2014).

## References

- Allison G (1969) Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. *American Political Science Review* 63(3): 689-718.
- Allison G (1971) *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Colgan J and Weeks J (2015) Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict. *International Organization* 69(1): 163-194. doi:10.1017/S0020818314000307.
- Freire MR and Vinha L (2017) Política externa: modelos, atores e dinâmicas. In: Freire, M R (coord.). *Política Externa: As Relações Internacionais em mudança*. Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, pp. 15-61.
- Herz N (2004) *Operation Alacrity - The Azores and the War in the Atlantic*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
- Hollis M and Smith S (1986) Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making. *British Journal of Political Science* 16(3): 269-286. doi:10.1017/S0007123400004415.
- Jervis R (1976) *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Júnior HR and Farias RS (2021) *Análise de Política Externa*. Brasília: Contexto.
- Leite JC (1998) Neutrality by Agreement: Portugal and the British Alliance in World War II. *American University International Law Review* 14(1): 185-199.
- Mattoso J (1998) *História de Portugal. Vol. VII - O Estado Novo*. Lisboa: Editorial Estampa.
- Macedo JB (1987) *História Diplomática Portuguesa - Constantes e Linhas de Força. Volume I*. Lisboa: Instituto de Defesa Nacional.
- Mendes PE (2022) Sistema vestefaliano. Sousa, F, Mendes, P E, Freitas, J A G D, Ferreira, D, Rocha, R and Tavares, A, (coord) *Dicionário de Ciência política e Relações Internacionais*. Coimbra: Edições Almedina: 577.
- Meneses FR (2000) *União Sagrada e Sidonismo - Portugal em Guerra (1916-18)*. Lisboa: Edições Cosmos.
- Meneses FR (2010) *Salazar – Uma biografia política*. Lisboa: Dom Quixote.
- Mintz A and DeRouen Jr, K (2010) *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Pereira BF (2012) A diplomacia de Salazar (1932-1949). Lisboa: Dom Quixote.
- Pinto AC (2000) O império do professor: Salazar e a elite ministerial do Estado Novo (1933-1945). *Análise Social* 35(157): 1-22.
- Pinto JN (2013) Portugal: ascensão e queda. Lisboa: Dom Quixote.
- Pinto JN (2016) Cinco homens que abalaram a Europa. Lisboa: Dom Quixote.
- Rosas F (coord) (1996) Portugal e a Guerra Civil de Espanha. Lisboa: Edições Colibri.
- Severiano Teixeira N (1987) Política externa e política interna no Portugal de 1890: o Ultimatum Inglês. *Análise Social* 23(98): 687-719.
- Severiano Teixeira N (2010) Breve ensaio sobre a política externa portuguesa. *Relações Internacionais*, 28, pp. 51-61.  
[http://www.scielo.mec.pt/scielo.php?script=sci\\_arttextandpid=S1645-91992010000400004andlng=ptandnrm=iso](http://www.scielo.mec.pt/scielo.php?script=sci_arttextandpid=S1645-91992010000400004andlng=ptandnrm=iso)
- Serrão JV (2000a) História de Portugal – Da 1ª Legislatura à visita presidencial aos Açores (1935-1941). Volume XIV. [S.l.]: Verbo.
- Serrão JV (2000b) História de Portugal – Da II Guerra à Morte do Marechal Carmona (1941-1951). Volume XV. [S.l.]: Verbo.
- Teixeira M (2008) Caught on the Periphery: Portuguese Neutrality during World War II and Anglo-American Negotiations with Salazar. Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania.
- Tíscar MJ (2014) O Pacto Ibérico, a NATO e a Guerra Colonial. Nº 32. Coleção Atena. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda/Instituto da Defesa Nacional.
- Weeks J (2014). Dictators at War and Peace. London: Cornell University Press.
- Weeks J and Crunkilton C (2017) Domestic Constraints on Foreign Policy in Authoritarian Systems. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*.  
<https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-413>.



[www.cesran.org](http://www.cesran.org)

Tower Court, Oakdale Road, York YO30 4XL, UK

the  
rest  
Journal of Politics and Development

ISSN 2632-4911

## Call for Papers

*The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development* endeavours to become the foremost international forum for academics, researchers and policymakers to share their knowledge and experience in the discipline of international relations and its subfields: international security, international political economy, international organisations, foreign policy analysis, political history, etc.

*The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development* is an open-access, double-blind peer-reviewed journal. The journal is published at its own website <https://therestjournal.com/The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development> welcomes submissions of **articles** from related persons involved in the scope of the journal as well as **summary reports of conferences and lecture series** held in social sciences.

Prospective authors should submit 4.000-9.000 words articles for consideration in Microsoft Word-compatible format. For more complete descriptions and submission instructions, please access the Author Guidelines and Style Guidelines pages at the website <https://therestjournal.com/> Contributors are urged to read the author guidelines and style guidelines carefully before submitting articles. Articles submissions should be sent through the "MANUSCRIPT SUBMISSION" page at the website.

*Editors-in-Chief:*

**Dr. Ozgur TUFEKCI**

**Dr. Rahman DAG**

# *Leadership*

***Honorary President***

Ken Booth



***Director-General***

Ozgur Tufekci



***Deputy Director-General***

Rahman Dag



**cesran** international  
CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS - CESRAN



think-tank ■ consultancy ■ research-institute

[www.cesran.org](http://www.cesran.org)



the

nest

**Journal of Politics and Development**

ISSN 2632-4911