Cenk Özatıcı, Dr
Freelance Researcher
Polat Üründül, Dr
Freelance Researcher
ABSTRACT
This article analyses the changing dynamics in Turkish-Russian relations during the Syrian civil war. The Syrian civil war has had a significant impact on relations between Türkiye and Russia. Initially, at odds over Türkiye’s support for Syrian opposition forces and Russia’s support for the Assad regime, tensions peaked when the Turks shot down a Russian warplane. This paper argues that Türkiye’s security concerns, including threats from the Syrian regime and the PYD, and Russia’s desire to remove obstacles for its national interests in Syria have led to strategic cooperation between the two countries. Russia’s pragmatic approach to Türkiye’s security needs and its military dominance in Syria encouraged Türkiye to cooperate with the Russians. This cooperation, evident in projects such as the Astana process and arms deals, was also seen as an opportunity by Russia to weaken NATO and strengthen the Assad regime.
KEYWORDS: Türkiye, Russia, Syria, Cooperation, War, Conflict
Introduction
The bilateral relationship between Russia and Türkiye is of paramount importance in the field of international relations. These two countries, located at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, have historical legacies, rich and diverse cultures, and geopolitical substantiality. The relationship between the two nations has evolved through a complex mix of competition, cooperation, and strategic confrontation. This has been shaped by territorial disputes, ideological differences, and geopolitical rivalries in the international arena, as well as an environment of economic interdependence and common security concerns on some occasions. Such circumstances have led to the intersection of different interests and goals of Russia and Türkiye at different periods of history. Especially during the Ottoman Empire and the Tsardom of Russia, the two nations fought against each other many times, but they developed friendly relations after the establishment of the Republic of Türkiye until the Second World War. After the Cold War started, bilateral relations between Türkiye and Russia deteriorated until the Soviet Union collapsed. Following the end of the Cold War, the subsequent course of relations between the Turks and the Russians was marked by turbulence, characterised by both cooperation and tension. However, it is noteworthy that pragmatic considerations have often forced Ankara and Moscow to engage in dialogue and promote cooperation despite occasional tension and differences. The Syrian civil war is a crucial example of this.
The Syrian civil war began as a part of the Arab Spring in March 2011, and it stands as one of the most significant geopolitical incidents of the 21st century. Although the very first events started as peaceful protests in the beginning, they turned into an armed uprising against the Assad regime, directly or indirectly involving international actors with various interests, such as Türkiye and Russia (Kargin, 2018; Dağ, 2022: 153). As Western countries such as the US and Türkiye support opposition forces against the regime in Syria, Iran and Russia directly support the Assad government (Dağ, 2022: 155). Initially divergent in their stances towards the Assad regime, Türkiye and Russia experienced significant challenges, such as Türkiye’s downing of a Russian military aircraft in 2015, prompting retaliatory measures from Moscow during the civil war. While both nations tackled terrorist organisations such as ISIS, their support for opposite factions during the civil war underscored divergences between them. In this way, Syria has become an area for regional and international competition in which foreign powers support belligerent actors of proxy war for their regional and international interests rather than a conflict between two sides (Kargin, 2018: 31). In the meantime, the increasing influence of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) terrorist organisation in northern Syria, perceived as a threat to Turkish national security and supported by Western actors, compelled a recalculation of Turkish-Russian dynamics, leading Ankara to adopt a more pragmatic stance towards Russia and the Assad regime (Bağcı and Demirel, 2023: 510). This trend, compounded by escalating tensions between Türkiye and traditional Western allies, evoked a further rapprochement between Türkiye and Russia even though Russia at times turned a blind eye to the YPG’s growing influence, allowing it to open an office in Moscow and expressed concern about Türkiye’s cross-border operations (Euronews, 2022). This rapprochement also manifested itself in different fields, including energy, tourism, and the defence industry. For example, following the reconciliation efforts led by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin, Russian tourists continued to boost the Turkish tourism sector again. In addition, Russia has made significant investments in big energy projects in Türkiye, particularly the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant and the Turkish Stream pipeline. Furthermore, Türkiye procured the S-400s from Russia after being unable to purchase Patriot missiles from its Western allies to safeguard its airspace. In recent years, Russia has been claimed to circumvent the sanctions imposed on it during the Ukraine war through Türkiye. During the Russian-Ukrainian war, Türkiye also pursued a more pragmatic approach towards both countries, making attempts to mediate both sides of the conflict, in contrast to other Western states who adopted a more confrontational stance to stop the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This has prompted speculations that Türkiye is adopting a pro-Russian stance rather than its traditional pro-Western foreign policy. However, it kept both Russia and the West at “arm’s length” (Bechev and Köstem, 2021: 3).
This article firstly examines the threats posed by the Syrian civil war to Türkiye’s security, touches upon Russia’s intervention in the civil war, and discusses the key incidents in the deterioration and redevelopment of bilateral relations between Türkiye and Russia. While doing these, this paper also traces the development of the relationship between Russia and Syria, the impact of Russia’s direct intervention in Syria on Türkiye’s policy towards the civil war, the Turks’ shootdown of a Russian jet, and how Russia approached the YPG throughout the civil war. Regarding the partnership that occurred between Türkiye and Russia in Syria, this work addresses normalisation, coordination, and alignment phases step by step. The study argues that the reasons for the rapprochement between the Russians and the Turks, following the emergence of crises between the two nations during the civil war, are Western support for the YPG terrorist organisation, Russia’s pro-active participation in the civil war and Assad regime’s continued rule of Syria. This paper also states that the transformation in Turkish foreign policy towards Russia has further endangered Türkiye’s relations with the West, even though the Turks have never completely abandoned its traditional pro-Western foreign policy.
Syrian Crisis and Security Challenges of Türkiye
The intestinal war and subsequent lack of control in the region had a significant impact on the increase of violence in Türkiye. The dissemination process was mainly helped by non-state armed entities, specifically ISIS and YPG. The spread of violence originating from the Syrian civil war has begun to demonstrate its contagious nature gradually. The utilisation of the political instability in Syria by terrorist groups has presented a substantial national security dilemma for Türkiye. The contagious character of the Syrian civil war became apparent following the emergence of ISIS and the declaration of autonomy by PYD-YPG in northern Syria (Dağ, 2015, 2018). This led to substantial geopolitical consequences when the conflict expanded into Turkish territory in 2013. The Syrian civil war has facilitated the infiltration of extremist and terrorist organisations into the north of Syria, posing a threat to Türkiye’s security (Aktürk, 2019).
The rise in security vulnerabilities posed by terrorist organisations, both domestically and internationally, as well as the power disparity, have significantly influenced Türkiye’s geostrategic aims. The formation of Rojava, an extended “federal system,” in March 2016 brought about a notable shift in Turkish policy towards the Syrian Kurdish groups, particularly the PYD-YPG. Türkiye faced additional complexity due to the emergence of the PYD and its military extension, the YPG, as a vital ally for Western powers in their endeavours to defeat ISIS. The occurrences, which seemed to suggest the growing force behind the Kurdish political “autonomy” movement, led to separate military operations in Syria and a renewed focus on the security aspects of the Kurdish issue inside Türkiye’s political scene. From this moment onwards, Türkiye has mostly prioritised its foreign policy endeavours towards eliminating terrorist forces within its border region rather than actively seeking to overthrow the Assad government. Consequently, Turkish foreign policy has transitioned to direct military intervention rather than relying on proxy warfare. Following the paradigm shift in 2016, Türkiye has prioritised a policy focused on security. As a result of significant security dangers, Türkiye had to abandon its objective of empowering the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.
Türkiye’s policy was weakened by the threats stemming from regional instability, the power vacuum, and the evolution of regional and international dynamics. Türkiye was compelled to engage in a process of self-correction in its foreign policy strategy in order to develop a fresh and robust approach to dealing with instability and security deficiencies. Since 2016, the focus on overthrowing the Assad administration and taking a leading role in the Arab Spring has decreased. In Türkiye, the focus changed as a result of the rise of PYD/YPG and ISIS. Secondary priority was given to objectives such as assisting the demise of the Assad administration, providing support to rebel groups, and engaging in a proxy battle.
It is important to highlight the connection between the improving relationship between Türkiye and Russia and the various security concerns, both internal and external, that Türkiye faces. Türkiye’s alignment with the Russian axis is strongly influenced by Türkiye’s security vulnerabilities, which are exacerbated by the United States. Türkiye has had a growing number of security challenges since 2013. Initially, the settlement process that commenced in 2013 concluded in the summer of 2015, during which the PKK escalated its activities within Türkiye. Furthermore, Türkiye has become a vulnerable target of ISIS terrorism due to its porous borders. Furthermore, by 2016, a significant portion of Syria’s northern border was under the control of the YPG. Türkiye’s heightened security dangers and the unsuccessful coup attempt by the Gülenists in July 2016 prompted the country to seek stronger ties with Russia. This decision was influenced by the United States’ diminishing trustworthiness in Türkiye’s fight against the PKK and PYD-YPG (Aktürk, 2019).
Russian Intervention in Syria’s Civil War
It is useful to start by restating the essential facts of Russian-Syrian relations. Russian interests in the Middle East are best served by Syria as an ally. Rooted in history is the bond between the two nations. In July 1944, Soviet Russia and Syria established diplomatic relations. The 1980 pact of friendship and cooperation between the two nations remains in effect. By the way, when Egypt chose to forge closer ties with the West and distance itself from the Russian alliance, tensions between Moscow and Syria began to increase. As a result, the Soviet Union is paying more attention to Syria than any other Middle Eastern nation. Given this, the fact that Russia’s sole Middle Eastern base is situated in the Syrian ports of Tartus and Latakia is highly significant from a geopolitical standpoint. Some Gulf monarchs, including Saudi Arabia and Qatar, were the ones that sparked the Arab Spring, according to Moscow (Charap, 2019),
Russian involvement in Syria has been on display since 2011 due to these factors. Regarding this matter, in November 2011, Russia dispatched three battleships to Tartus. The Russian military’s involvement in Syria has grown substantially since 2012. Russia was able to take advantage of fresh chances at Haseke, Palmira, and Deir Ez-Zor, in addition to its naval facility in Tartus, and repurpose its military bases (Önhon, 2021). Iran has been advising and providing logistical support to the Syrian regime since 2013, and Russia has supported this responsibility. Iran, meanwhile, has started to beef up its land forces. Russia and the West were already in a power struggle when 2013 happened in Ukraine. Tense ties between the US and Russia, as well as Russia and Europe, were triggered by the 2013 rise to power in Kyiv by a US-friendly government. The Russian Federation’s invasion of Crimea exacerbated tensions between Russia and, the United States (US) and the European Union. The West and Russia fought for control of Syria, Libya, and Ukraine.
Indeed, Russia harboured significant doubts regarding the democratic uprisings in the Middle East right from the start. In line with its geopolitical objectives in the area, Russia provided backing to the Assad dictatorship. The regime’s loss of territorial control allowed for its deterritorialisation, which was then followed by the Russian policy that employed military methods. Due to Russia’s assessment that a potential government collapse would have severe and lasting consequences for the country (Charap et al., 2019). On the flip side, the rise and swift growth of ISIS in Iraq and Syria heightened Russia’s sense of threat. The ISIS “caliphate” was an extremist religious organisation that influenced certain regions surrounding Russia. It attracted hundreds of militants who spoke Russian and came from Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus, who joined ISIS and other Jihadi groups. Russia perceived the crisis in Syria as a clash between religious factions and a non-religious government. Russia’s anxieties were further heightened by the establishment of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, as well as the declaration of the caliphate by the terrorist group.
The Russian intervention in Syria primarily targeted not only ISIS but also the Syrian opposition forces that opposed the Assad regime. Similar to Assad’s approach, Putin’s plan revolves around simplifying the civil war into a choice between the regime and “terrorists”. Like Assad, Putin has likewise emphasised that “Who filled the resulting void after the destruction of the Syrian State? Terrorists.” (Charap et al., 2019). Putin’s plan presents a clear binary option between the regime and takfiri fanatics like ISIS or Al-Nusra. Moscow asserts that the one viable method for combating terrorism in the long run is to reinstate the statehood of Syria. During the initial four years of the Syrian civil war, Moscow provided financial, diplomatic, and military support. By mid-2015, the extent of the danger of ISIS had become clear. Although ISIS had declared itself a caliphate in June 2014, the takeover of Palmyra in May 2015 demonstrated the capabilities of this terrorist organisation (Charap et al., 2019). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by Lavrov, has categorically identified ISIS as the foremost and most significant menace in Syria. In the summer of 2015, Assad acknowledged that the regime was encountering substantial challenges, and it seemed imminent that the regime would collapse owing to a shortage of manpower.
Russia’s direct intervention in Syria in September 2015 introduced a new aspect to the ongoing Syrian civil conflict and had implications for Türkiye’s foreign policy. Subsequently, as per a document disclosed by the Russian government, the Russian military forces have made an indefinite pledge to their military presence in Syria (Kanat, 2016: 199). Bashar al-Assad sought military support from Russia, citing the existing friendship and cooperation agreement between the USSR and Syria, which was established in 1980. On the same day, Russian President Putin sanctioned the deployment of the armed troops of the Russian Federation in the Syrian Arab Republic. Following a covert deal, the Russian military initiated their entry into the Syrian civil war in September 2015. This involved the direct participation of the Russian military in the battle and provided Russia with a means to safeguard its ally, the Assad regime. A total of 32 warplanes were initially sent to Syria, consisting of 12 SU-24m, 12 SU-25SM, 1 SU-25UB, 4 SU-34, and 4 SU-30SM aircraft (Pukhov, 2016). During the subsequent time intervals, there was a notable rise in the quantity of warplanes. A contingent of the Russian air force with 1500-3000 soldiers was deployed to Syria. They were equipped with T-90 A tanks, a variety of wheeled and tracked armoured vehicles, and Msta-B-type howitzers (Pukhov, 2016).
Therefore, the regime’s complete dominance of the skies of Syria thoroughly overwhelmed the opposition and provided them with a substantial strategic edge. The initial Russian participation involved the use of aircraft attacks launched from the Khemeimim airfield against various Syrian opposition militant groups, such as the Syrian National Coalition, ISIS, and al-Nusra. Furthermore, Russian military special forces and military advisors were dispatched to Syria. Russia’s presence in Syria became impossible to overlook. Russian control now encompasses both the upgraded port at Tartus and the Khmeimim Air Base in Latakia. The bases were equipped with advanced air defence systems, notably the S-300, S-400, and Panther, as well as a variety of aeroplanes such as the Su-25, Su-30, Su-35, and Mig-25 (Önhon, 2021: 299).
Hence, Russia’s decision to cease its involvement in the proxy war in Syria and directly intervene on the ground has significantly influenced the shift in Turkish policy towards Syria. Assad’s visit to Russia in October 2015, where he expressed gratitude to Putin for the direct military backing and the subsequent extensive collaboration between Russia and Assad, had a notable effect on Turkish Foreign Policy objectives in Syria. This is because the likelihood of removing Assad from power became even more remote. Ankara was perturbed by the asymmetry of power in the Syrian civil war. Türkiye’s response to Russia’s military intervention in Syria was noteworthy. At that time, Erdoğan, who was serving as the Prime Minister, repeatedly conveyed provocative messages to Russia, including:
“If the Russians do not undertake the construction of Mersin Akkuyu, another party will assume the responsibility. They allocated a total of three billion dollars to that specific investment. We are the primary consumer of natural gas in Russia. Russia would experience a significant setback if it were to lose Türkiye. If necessary, Türkiye has the capability to acquire natural gas from multiple sources” (Yavuz, 2015).
Türkiye had different reasons for reacting in this way. To exemplify, Russia’s airstrikes in Syria impeded Türkiye’s objectives in northern Syria and bolstered the authority of the government forces in the area. Türkiye’s air engagement was also impacted by Russia’s intervention. Since 2012, Türkiye has possessed military and geopolitical dominance over Syria. Türkiye successfully downed the regime’s military helicopters in 2013 and 2014. Nevertheless, it is improbable that Russia would be subjected to the same treatment. It was also that the Russian air forces targeted both ISIS and the resistance troops supported by Türkiye. Due to Russia’s assistance, the Syrian opposition forces, who were positioned near Damascus, swiftly transformed into dissidents striving to safeguard their own interests. Furthermore, the growing military presence of Russia in Tartus has restricted the capabilities of the Turkish Navy in the eastern Mediterranean.
Russia’s active participation in the civil conflict has resulted in a shift in the balance of power, favouring the pro-Assad faction, which also includes Iran. Assad exploited President Barack Obama’s hesitancy to increase US involvement in the Middle East, as well as the divides among Sunni Arab nations. In the subsequent phase, Türkiye has diminished its rhetoric on regime change and has mostly focused on engaging in the battle against ISIS and YPG militias. Additionally, Türkiye has consented to partake in coordination meetings with Russia and Iran to seek a political resolution.
The Russian Warplane Downing by Türkiye and Its Repercussions
The shift in Russian strategy, which emphasised the use of military force, had a significant impact on the relationship between Türkiye and Russia. Consequently, the increasing distrust between the two nations. Meanwhile, Türkiye has started to articulate military strategies in Syria, indicating the assumption of control over military capabilities in response to an increased feeling of threat. The escalating incursions into airspace and widening acts of violence have been evident in this process. On 3 October 2015, Türkiye officially informed Russia of the breach of airspace by a Russian warplane. However, a day later, another incident occurred when an MIG-29 aircraft was detected by the radar while Turkish airspace was being patrolled near the borders (Yükselen, 2020). As a result, Türkiye escalated the matter to NATO, intending to deter the Russian infringements of its airspace. Although NATO provided verbal support, the violations of airspace persisted. A more troublesome matter came to light regarding the Russian attack targeting the Turkmens in the Bayırbucak region, which is adjacent to the southern border of Türkiye (Yükselen, 2020).
As to the official news agency of the Turkish Republic, Turkmen people are recognised for their strong allegiance to Türkiye in the region, and they have been identified as a crucial asset for both the Syrian opposition and Türkiye. The Bayırbucak Turkmens serve as a crucial resistance against the regime and act as a natural obstacle to prevent the PYD-YPG from expanding and reaching the Mediterranean Sea. Türkiye shot down the Russian Sukhoi Su-24 military aircraft on 24 November 2015. The Russian aircraft, which was in flight near the Turkish border, experienced a crash over the Bayırbucak region. It possessed a strategic significance that extended beyond its symbolic nature. The surrender of Bayırbucak by the opponents would result in the forfeiture of the crucial route to Idlib. The collapse of the Bayırbucak region would alleviate all the pressure exerted by the opposition on Latakia. The elevation of that region had the capacity to strike at the core of the Assad administration. This incident was the inaugural instance of a NATO member country intercepting and destroying a Russian aircraft due to breaches of airspace regulations. The US unequivocally backed Türkiye, with Barack Obama affirming that “Türkiye possesses the legitimate prerogative to safeguard its airspace” (BBC, 2015). Putin issued an order on 28 November 2015, implementing economic penalties against Türkiye (CNN Turk, 2015). The Turkish Economic Social and Political Research Foundation reports that the plane disaster in Türkiye incurred an annual cost of 11 billion dollars (Tüses, 2016). However, besides the economic aspect, the most significant influence was observed in Türkiye’s strategic and security dimensions. Following the incident, Russia promptly accused Türkiye of engaging in illicit oil trade with ISIS, asserting that Türkiye provides economic and logistical support to the terrorist organisation. Additionally, Russia alleged that Türkiye allows ISIS to freely access its borders (BBC, 2015). Significantly, the YPG, which is derived from the PKK, established a branch in Russia in February 2016, asserting its authority over the territory it governs in Syria. The US has previously garnered extensive backing for the PYD-YPG in order to halt the swift spread of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, notably following the year 2015. Nevertheless, Russia, a formidable global force, has openly and explicitly provided backing to PYD-YPG as a response to Türkiye’s actions. As the relationship between Ankara and Moscow deteriorated to its lowest point, the territorial control of PYD-YPG expanded even further by exploiting the significant differences between Türkiye and Russia (Kanat, 2015).
Russia was openly seeking to utilise the Kurdish factor to limit Türkiye’s political and military manoeuvrability. During the discussion of the Raqqa operation, Lavrov proposed that the UN envoy should include PYD-YPG in the Syria talks. This decision made PYD-YPG a participant in the discussions despite being labelled as a terrorist organisation by Ankara. To fully comprehend why Türkiye’s security concerns reached their peak in 2016, it is crucial to acknowledge the significant backing that the PYD-YPG received. The PYD-YPG was able to move across the western side of the Euphrates River with the assistance of Russian air support. Additionally, the US provided the PYD-YPG with powerful weapons and declared Operation Euphrates Wrath for Raqqa in collaboration with the PYD-YPG (Yükselen, 2020). It is important to mention that Türkiye is approaching the point of war with Russia due to the warplane problem, which has significantly restricted its ability to move. The ultimatum presented by Lavrov to elevate the YPG as a significant player posed a critical challenge for Türkiye. Sergey Luskov, spokesperson for the Russian General Staff, declared a three-step decision, stating that they will persist with their operations in Syria following the incident. In addition, he declared that henceforth, all aerial assaults would be conducted with the safeguard of military aircraft, and the cruiser Moscow would be deployed off the coast of Latakia. Liskov emphasised that “They have the ability to neutralise all possible dangers at any given moment” (Sputnik International, 2015). Hence, the primary hindrance to Türkiye’s military campaign against PYD-YPG in Syria was Russia’s overwhelming control of the airspace. Given the prevailing conditions, Türkiye has found it imperative to normalise relations and engage in cooperation with Russia rather than having the option to do so.
Formation of a New Strategic Partnership to Address Security Vulnerabilities: Türkiye-Russia Relations After the Jet Crisis
Step One: Normalisation
The Türkiye-Russia relationship was strained in November 2015 following Ankara’s downing of a Russian military aircraft. Approximately seven months following the crisis, Ankara initiated measures to restore the relations between Türkiye and Russia. Following President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s apologies, all parties agreed to go forward and engage in a comprehensive dialogue in the summer of 2016, actively discussing their policies for Syria (Özterem, 2017). Following Davutoğlu’s resignation, the newly appointed Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım expressed his intention to cultivate more allies and reduce the number of adversaries (Milliyet, 2016). This discussion is crucial as it demonstrates Türkiye’s departure from its aggressive foreign policy after 2011 and the emergence of a new security-focused realist approach. Türkiye’s normalisation process with Russia exemplifies its paradigm change as it seeks to establish a balance in its relations with the US.
It is important to highlight the connection between Türkiye’s improving relationship with Russia and the various security concerns, both internal and external, that Türkiye faces. Türkiye’s alignment with the Russian axis is directly linked to Türkiye’s security vulnerabilities and the exacerbation of these vulnerabilities by the US. Türkiye has had a growing number of security challenges since 2013. Initially, the settlement process that commenced in 2013 concluded in the summer of 2015, during which the PKK escalated its activities within Türkiye. Furthermore, Türkiye has become a vulnerable target of ISIS terrorism due to its porous borders. Furthermore, by 2016, a significant portion of Syria’s northern border was under the control of the YPG (Aktürk, 2019). Türkiye’s pursuit of closer relations with Russia was motivated by the escalation of security threats and the failed coup attempt by the Gülenists in July 2016 (Bağcı and Erdurmaz, 2017: 131-145). The decision was motivated by the belief that the US had grown less dependable in Türkiye’s efforts to combat the PKK and PYD-YPG. The unsuccessful coup attempt in 2016 appears to have opened up a fresh chance for enhancing bilateral cooperation between Russia and Türkiye. The leaders of the US and Europe displayed reluctance and hesitancy in providing backing to President Erdoğan for his actions in suppressing the coup planners and supporters. The US Secretary of State, John Kerry, explicitly cautioned the Turkish government against engaging in large-scale arrests and purges. President Erdoğan attributed the failed military coup to the US, specifically pointing to Fethullah Gülen, the main instigator of the coup, who currently resides in Pennsylvania. In contrast to the cautious Western stance, President Putin endorsed President Erdoğan and the JDP government. President Putin emphasised his strengthening stance: “We firmly reject the utilisation of unconstitutional and aggressive means against nations. We extend our sympathies for the casualties and express our desire for the prompt reestablishment of constitutional governance and stability in Türkiye” (Aktürk, 2019: 43).
The unsuccessful coup attempt on 15 July had a diverse impact on enhancing Turkish-Russian relations. President Erdoğan attributed responsibility to the coup plotters for deliberately damaging Turkish-Russian relations through the act of shooting down a Russian jet in November 2015. Therefore, on 9 August 2016, President Erdoğan and President Putin convened in Moscow; the encounter was interpreted as the cessation of animosity between the two factions. This trip held great significance since it marked Erdogan’s inaugural international travel following the failed coup attempt on 15 July. During his visit to St. Petersburg, President Erdoğan emphasised that President Putin’s prompt phone call following the coup attempt had significant psychological significance. He also expressed confidence that the cooperation between the two countries will be restored in the near future (Aktürk, 2019). The encounter has significance beyond being a mere symbolic act. Following a significant delay, discussions were held at both the presidential and ministerial levels with the aim of revitalising connections, and the involved parties reached an agreement to restore bilateral relations to their state before the crisis. Putin announced the lifting of the restrictions imposed on Turkish enterprises, providing a sense of comfort for the Turkish private sector. In addition, the leaders reached a consensus to collaborate on the restoration of visa-free travel and charter flights. Significantly, the parties also conveyed their inclination to enhance collaboration in the defence sector (Tüfekçi, 2018). Thus, Türkiye and Russia initiated a process of normalisation in response to their anti-US sentiments (Cheterian, 2023: 1285).
Step Two: Coordination
The reconciliation between the two nations cannot be characterised as complete collaboration; a significant disagreement persisted between Türkiye and Russia over the entirety of the Syrian civil war. Nevertheless, both Russia and Ankara opted to separate and categorise the areas of conflict and collaboration (Köstem, 2021). Rather than characterising the Arab Spring as a democratic movement, Russia cynically interpreted protest movements as a pro-Western conspiracy. In contrast, Türkiye openly supported the uprising movements, but this support became ineffective as the Assad regime strengthened its control. Türkiye sought deeper engagement with Russia in order to counterbalance the immense military force of the US. Türkiye’s reconciliation with Russia amidst the security crisis served as a crisis mitigation tactic. The main security concern for Türkiye was the PYD-YPG, which gained control over a significant portion of Syria instead of the Assad regime. In February 2016, President Erdoğan expressed scepticism about the relationship between the US and the YPG, as he believed that the US’s backing for the YPG contradicted its actions of continuously launching artillery attacks against them (BBC, 2016). After that, President Erdoğan stated firmly,
“Are we not also members of NATO along with the United States? Do we have an alliance with you, the PYD, or the YPG? We also desire to acquire that information. We are determined to continue the bombardment of the PYD and YPG without any intention of ceasing. We shall firmly prevent the establishment of a new Qandil in the northern region of Syria” (BBC, 2016).
During the same time frame, Erdoğan also conveyed his growing impatience, indicating that a military operation was imminent. As President Erdoğan continued to deliver these aggressive signals to the US consecutively, the scope of collaboration with Russia was growing. In August 2016, Ankara and Moscow negotiators reached an agreement to enhance collaboration among intelligence agencies, foreign ministries, and chiefs of staff (Ersen, 2017). Subsequently, the military troops of Türkiye and Russia in Syria began exchanging information and synchronising their actions. This involved enhancing coordination through regular joint meetings with army chiefs, heads of intelligence agencies, and defence ministries (Erşen and Köstem, 2020). The coordination was important for Türkiye as it enabled the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to commence their inaugural combat campaign in Syria. Following the normalisation and coordination process, Moscow granted Türkiye authorisation to deploy military force in Syria (Aktürk, 2019). The main external result of the normalisation was observed by the commencement of Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016, during which Türkiye became militarily involved in Syria with the aim of eliminating YPG elements, specifically from the Azaz-Jerablus area (Yükselen, 2020).
Russia offered military and intelligence assistance to Türkiye’s operation. This support can be construed as indicating that the relations between the two countries experienced an increase in speed or intensity following the jet crisis. The bilateral relations, which experienced enhancement during the jet incident, alleviated Türkiye’s regional policy in Syria. Since 2016, Türkiye has found itself embroiled in a complex geopolitical struggle between two major global powers, Russia and the US. Türkiye utilised this equilibrium game to commence a military intervention in northern Syria with the objective of establishing a secure zone. Türkiye has found itself caught in a perilous situation where both parties are utilising it in their conflict against each other (Altunışık, 2020). The security gap process not only redirected Turkish foreign policy towards a security-focused approach, but it also shifted the alignment of Turkish foreign policy from a strategic alliance with the US to a strategic alliance with Russia, as emphasised by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu. The revival of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant project, the acquisition of S-400 air defence systems, and the signing of the Turk Stream project in 2016 exemplified a shift in foreign policy.
Step Three: Alignment
The relationship between Russia and Türkiye has rapidly evolved into an informal geopolitical alignment since 2016 (Köstem, 2020). According to Snyder (1997: 6), the notion of alignment is determined by the “anticipations of nation-states regarding whether they will receive support or opposition from other states in future interactions” (Snyder, 1997). The concept of alignment with other governments involves the mutual anticipation of policy cooperation and coordination in the security field, subject to particular criteria (Walt, 1998). Since 2016, the collaboration between Türkiye and Russia has broadened to encompass several sectors, such as nuclear energy, natural gas pipelines, and the defence industry. The escalation of attacks by the PKK and its Syrian counterpart, the YPG, on Turkish security forces and civilians over the 2015-2016 period has emerged as the most crucial issue for Türkiye (Erşen, 2017). From this perspective, Türkiye is compelled to address cross-border challenges through the process of reconciliation with Russia. Conversely, Russia sought collaboration with Türkiye to safeguard its enduring advantages in the Middle East and the Black Sea following its expensive involvements in Ukraine and Syria. The problems between Türkiye and the US arose from the US’s expanding support for the YPG in Syria, which in turn provided an opportunity for Russia to take advantage of the developing differences between these two NATO members.
During this period, Türkiye and Russia collaborated in various domains, including nuclear energy, natural gas pipeline projects, and the defence industry. The Akkuyu nuclear project, which was put on hold following the 2015 jet crisis, was resumed as a result of the improved relations between Türkiye and Russia. The Turkish government has agreed to designate the Akkuyu project as a “strategic investment.” In addition, President Putin’s visit to Türkiye occurred one month after President Erdogan’s trip to Russia in August. Furthermore, in October 2016, they formally agreed to the construction of the Turkish Stream natural gas pipeline (Ersen, 2017). The partnership between Türkiye and Russia reached a more challenging stage for the US when President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly declared the signing of the S-400 agreement during his remarks at the JDP Parliamentary Group Meeting on 25 July 2017 (BBC Türkçe, 2017). Following 2016, the foreign policy-making process in Turkish foreign policy started to prioritise security perceptions and expectations. Due to the PKK and YPG being the main sources of vulnerability, Turkish-Russian ties have seen an expansion in areas of collaboration as a means to counterbalance the US. Turkish decision-makers viewed the US’s growing anti-Türkiye policies, the strong language used by the Trump Administration, and the resulting debates over issues such as the PKK, FETO, and the Eastern Mediterranean as a threat to Türkiye’s national security.
The Astana discussions with Russia, Türkiye, and Iran established a favourable foundation for the subsequent coordinating process. In December 2016, Türkiye and Russia reached a consensus on a strategic strategy to facilitate the safe removal of residents from Aleppo (Erşen and Köstem, 2020). By the conclusion of 2016, Türkiye, Russia, and Iran were actively seeking opportunities for collaboration. The foreign ministers of Türkiye, Russia, and Iran convened in Moscow on 20 December 2016 and reached a consensus on a forthcoming plan of action for the Syrian civil war (MFA, 2016). Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared that Türkiye and Russia have entered into a “strategic partnership.” Furthermore, he emphasised that this marks the shift from a bipolar global order to a state of multi-polarisation (Erşen and Köstem, 2020). Similarly, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu characterised Russia as Türkiye’s strategic ally (T24, 2018). When analysing Türkiye’s security deficit and the involvement of the US in this situation by supporting the YPG in northern Syria, it becomes evident that collaborating with Russia during the Syrian civil war was not only an option for Türkiye but rather a necessity. Since 2016, Türkiye has mostly focused on countering the threat posed by the PYD-YPG in northern Syria. Through a series of sequential military operations, Türkiye successfully preserved its operational capabilities in Northern Syria during the post-2016 period. Nevertheless, such military activities were carried out in accordance with, and owing to, the agreement reached with Russia. On the other side, Russia aimed to weaken the transatlantic alliance and its strategic objective of Western-led regime change by working along with Türkiye (Köstem, 2021). Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, publicly endorsed the Turkish-Russian agreement on military operations during a live broadcast in August 2021 (Habertürk TV, 2021). Davutoğlu stated that Operation Euphrates Shield was planned while he was serving as the Prime Minister. However, at the very moment the operation was being executed, the city of Aleppo was deliberately abandoned “in order to secure the Russians’ approval of the operation” (Habertürk TV, 2021). This statement indicates that as the security issues originating from Syria increased, the focus on the downfall of Assad diminished.
Conclusion
The Syrian civil war has been one of the most significant conflicts of the 21st century, reshaping regional alliances and global power dynamics. Amid the chaos and devastation, the role of external actors has been crucial in determining the course and outcome of the conflict. Among these actors, Türkiye and Russia have emerged as key players, each country pursuing its own interests and exerting considerable influence within Syria’s borders. The civil war has caused both crises and opportunities for cooperation between Türkiye and Russia (Tüfekçi, 2017). The divergent positions of the two countries in the civil war have resulted in a series of crises in the short term, while they have facilitated the formation of a strategic partnership in the long term,
While the Turks were against the Assad regime and the Russian involvement in Syria at the beginning of the civil war, the parties have experienced crises and problems that brought the two countries to the edge of war. To exemplify, Türkiye downed a Russian warplane due to a border violation in 2015, and Russia responded with sanctions and other hostile actions. When the Assad regime killed dozens of Turkish soldiers in Idlib, Syria, Russia adopted a tone in support of the Syrian regime regarding the crisis, criticising Türkiye. Such hostile attitudes continued until a rapprochement, and if Türkiye were not a member of NATO, perhaps a war between the Turks and the Russians would have been inevitable. The downing of the Russian aircraft by Türkiye was a strategic challenge to preserve Turkish influence in Syria, given the presence of the Turkmens in the Bayirbucak region. While Russia issued an order to implement economic sanctions against Türkiye, NATO and particularly the US-backed Türkiye’s right to safeguard its airspace.
However, incidents that occurred during the Syrian civil war have also had a major impact on economic relations between Türkiye and Russia, particularly in the energy and tourism sectors. The Turkish economy has suffered billions of dollars in losses as a result of Russian sanctions, and the YPG terrorist organisation has increased its influence in northern Syria, with Russia turning a blind eye. When the relationship between Türkiye and Russia deteriorated to its lowest point, the fact that the YPG terrorist organisation in northern Syria posed a significant threat to Türkiye’s security and that the organisation had been backed by Western states, especially the US, has forced the Turks to reapproach with the Russians. Rather than aligning with the policies conducted by the Western countries, which provide support to the PKK’s armed branch in Syria, the Turks found it crucial to foster closer ties with Russia. This was particularly significant in order to prevent Russia’s dominance in the Syrian airspace from providing comfort to the YPG. Türkiye has, therefore, toned down its rhetoric against the Assad regime and focused on tackling terrorist organisations in northern Syria, also taking part in coordination meetings with Russia and Iran to seek a political solution to the civil war. Russia’s support for the Erdogan government in Türkiye following the failed coup attempt, even though all Western countries except the United Kingdom (UK) have not been fair to Türkiye, has also been another turning point in improving relations between the Turks and Russians. As both countries’ anti-US sentiments grew even more during the civil war, Türkiye and Russia initiated a normalisation process, separating the areas of conflict and cooperation. As a result, although Türkiye did not completely abandon its traditional pro-Western foreign policy, the interdependence and cooperation between the two countries increased. The Astana process between Türkiye, Russia, and Iran has led the Turks to maintain their active role in northern Syria and preserve their diplomatic influence in negotiations. Türkiye had also received military and intelligence assistance from Russia in its military operations against the PYD terrorist organisation in Syria. While Turkish President Erdoğan criticised the US for its support for the PYD, the relationship between Türkiye and Russia has turned into a strategic relationship. Rapprochement between Russia and Türkiye that occurred during the civil war also manifested itself in issues outside the civil war and spread to areas such as energy, tourism, and the defence industry. The revival of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant project, the acquisition of S-400 air defence systems, and the establishment of the Turkish Stream project were examples of this. Such developments have reinforced the rapprochement between Türkiye and Russia even more.
The Syrian civil war has been a milestone in bilateral relations between Türkiye and Russia. Türkiye intervened in the civil war over threats to its borders from the Syrian regime and the PYD, and wanted to increase its influence on Syrian territory by supporting the anti-regime opposition. While the tension escalated continuously, a Russian warplane was shot down by Türkiye for violating Turkish airspace, triggering a serious crisis between the Turks and the Russians. As a result of the US support for the PYD, its indifference to the military coup attempt in Türkiye, and the failure to overthrow the Assad regime, the Turks have entered into cooperation with Russia and Iran to gain influence in the field and secure its borders, especially against the PYD threat. This article argues that rapprochement between Türkiye and Russia was a necessity rather than a choice for both sides. Russia’s more pragmatic approach towards Türkiye’s security concerns and its elected government, as well as its military dominance within Syria’s borders, left the Turks with no choice but to engage in strategic cooperation with Russia because of its security concerns. In addition, Russia has also realised that it would not serve its interests in the region to develop hostile relations with Türkiye, which has significant control over the Syrian opposition as a NATO member. Moreover, cooperation with Türkiye through projects such as the Astana process, the sale of S-400s, and the Turkish Stream has been seen by Russia as an advantage for weakening NATO and protecting the Assad regime. This article also mentions that Türkiye has pragmatically developed strategic relations with Russia for its own security interests, although it has not completely abandoned its traditional pro-Western foreign policy. In the meantime, Russia has sought to overcome obstacles that could pose problems for its national interests both in Syria and other regions, such as the Black Sea and Caucasus. If the PYD’s activities continue its separatist campaign in Syria and Russia’s war in Ukraine is prolonged in the future, strategic cooperation between Türkiye and Russia can be expected to grow and expand further.
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