Call for Papers for a Thematic Issue on “Trump’s Tariff War: Its Impacts and Implications to BRICS Economies and Trade”
The aggressive tariff regime imposed by US President Donald Trump on major world economies has led to a range of economic outcomes across various regions. Due to Trump’s announcement, the US economy contracted by 0.3 per cent during quarter 1 of 2025, resulting in the first decline in three years. Similarly, China’s factory operations dropped to a 16-month low, while Taiwan’s GDP surged 5.4 per cent on pre-tariff tech exports. Before the implementation of tariffs, Europe experienced a growth rate of 0.4 per cent, while Canada is on track to fall short of its GDP estimates. From the US and Europe to China and Taiwan, the repercussions of his aggressive trade policies are visible in everything from factory output to GDP forecasts.
The primary rationale provided by the Trump administration for its sweeping tariff policy is to restore balance to the United States’ trade relations with major trading partners and protect U.S. industries. But the reality is different. Upon analysis, the available economic data, trends, and situations revealed a far more imbalanced scenario across the world’s regions. Trade experts are firmly of the opinion that a significant rise in US tariffs in 2025 is having a substantial impact on global trade. Furthermore, the increase in existing tariffs may distort output patterns and lead to a sharp reconfiguration of global value chains, resulting in a less efficient and more opaque trade system.
Emerging Observations:
In February and March 2025, the rise in tariffs has impacted imports from Canada, Mexico, and China, particularly in the steel, aluminium, and car sectors. It is believed that the US’s sweeping so-called “reciprocal” tariffs are affecting most of its trade partners. The structure of these new measures, rather than being driven by actual discrepancies between US tariffs and those imposed by trade partners, is instead guided by the ratio of trade deficits to imports, with a minimum increase of 10 percentage points – far exceeding market expectations (Baldwin and Barba Navaretti 2025, Evenett and Fritz 2025).
Southeast Asian countries, namely Vietnam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, are among the most seriously affected. Similarly, for the EU, the announced tariffs would raise the effective tariff rate to around 17 per cent, up from below per cent before the beginning of Trump’s second
term. China’s initial retaliation to the US’s announcement triggered a tit-for-tat escalation of symmetric tariff hikes, which led the two countries to reach a bilateral tariff rate of around 12 per cent [Francesco et al., May 2025].
Understanding the implications of sweeping tariff measures does require a clear-cut view of the tariff landscape prior to President Trump’s second term. Yet accurately measuring applied tariffs remains a challenge (Caliendo et al. 2023, Teti 2024). To overcome the limitations of the widely used WITS database – particularly its omission of tariffs imposed through trade disputes – we use as a starting point the 2019 CEPII MAcMap-HS6 database (Guimbard et al. 2012) and incorporate detailed data on tariff escalation between the US and China during Trump’s first term [Fajgelbaum et al. (2024)], as well as tariff reductions granted under Biden’s term. As a matter of fact, the new tariff measures are certainly higher than that to be required to achieve genuine reciprocity.
Keeping in mind the magnitude is exceptionally high even by historical parameters, the new tariffs may have far-reaching effects on macroeconomic aggregates, trade patterns, and the structure of global value chains (GVCs). Based on the available database, there could be Three possible scenarios to examine the potential impact of the 2025 measures on global trade and the economy.
First, there is a mild scenario involving the February and March 2025 measures, the observed tariff escalation with China, and the suspension of the reciprocal tariffs announced on 2 April. In this ‘status quo’ scenario, we also include the retaliation implemented by China and Canada. The ‘full’ scenario, instead, assumes no suspension of the 2 April tariffs, combined with the extension of tariffs to pharmaceuticals and electronics, as already announced. We assume that these products will face tariff increases in line with those previously imposed on steel, aluminium, and cars – i.e., a 25-percentage-point hike [Francesco et al., May 2025].
Given these observations, it has become imperative that academicians and experts be invited to study the emerging issues in depth, intensively, and extensively in terms of their impacts and implications and to propose possible solutions to minimise the effects on global trade and the economy. This could only be possible when a special issue is requested. The following topics may be covered:
• Impact and implications to BRICS economies;
• Impact and implications on the growth of BRICS trade;
• Impact on BRICS countries’ GDP and Inflation;
• Impact on international Business [FDI]
• Is there a possibility of Recession in BRICS countries?
• Effect on the confidence of businesses in BRICS economies
• Impact and implications on the Chinese and Indian economies.
Tentative timeframe for Special Issue:
Abstract submission deadline: 01 AUGUST 2025
Declaration of Accepted Abstracts: 15 AUGUST 2025
Deadline for Full Paper Submission: 15 JANUARY 2026
Publication of the Issue: 30 JUNE 2026
Guest Editor:
Professor Badar Alam Iqbal
Senior Research Associate;
Southern African Policy and Development Nexus
Email ID: badar@sapdnafrica.co.za